PROBLEMS  OF  WAR  AND  OF  RECONSTRUCTION 

EDITED  BY 

FRANCIS  G.  WICKWARE 


THE  AMERICAN 
AIR    SERVICE 


PROBLEMS  OF  WAR  AND  OF  RECONSTRUCTION 

THE  AMERICAN 
AIR    SERVICE 

A   RECORD  OF   ITS  PROBLEMS,  ITS  DIFFICULTIES, 
ITS    FAILURES,    AND    ITS    FINAL    ACHIEVEMENTS 


BY 

ARTHUR  SWEETSER 

SOMETIME  CAPTAIN,  AIR  SERVICE,  UNITED  STATES  ARMY 


WITH  AN  INTRODUCTION  BY 

NEWTON  D.  BAKE.Q' 


SECRETARY 


ILLUSTRATED 


D.  APPLETON  AND  COMPANY 

NEW  YORK  LONDON 

1919 


.    •«' V  •   •v^ftPyMGHT,  1919,  BY 

AND  COMPANY 


PRINTED  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA 


TO 
MY  WIFE 


403341 


THE  AUTHOR'S  ROYALTIES 
ON  THE  SALES  OF  THIS 
VOLUME  ARE  DEVOTED  TO 
THE  AMERICAN  RED  CROSS 


PREFACE 

The  Air  Service  lias  been  almost  universally  mis- 
understood, even  among  its  friends.  It  has  been  so 
wholly  new  and  so  firing  to  the  imagination,  its  de- 
velopment has  been  so  enshrouded  in  secrecy  on  the 
one  hand,  and  so  emblazoned  by  misrepresentation  on 
the  other,  that  even  men  actually  officers  of  its  staff 
are  bewildered  and  confused  as  to  the  actual  facts. 
It  is  doubtful  that  so  little  of  the  truth  was  ever 
known  about  an  enterprise  of  such  surpassing  national 
importance. 

The  story  of  the  Air  Service  is  a  story  of  contrasts 
running  from  high  lights  into  the  deepest  shadows. 
Initiated  in  a  burst  of  enthusiasm  and  imagination 
almost  unparalleled  in  our  history,  driven  along  the 
road  towards  accomplishment  with  skill  and  energy 
but  without  the  supergenius  that  alone  could  have 
brought  success,  set  upon  at  the  most  unfavorable 
moment  by  an  outburst  of  public  disappointment,  yet 
finally  crowned  with  a  superb  record  over  the  lines  in 
Belgium,  France,  and  Italy,  it  is  a  story  that  well 
deserves  to  be  understood. 

It  has  had  its  failures,  serious  failures  indeed,  but 
it  has  also  had  its  successes.  We  have  heard  very 
much  of  the  former  and  very  little  of  the  latter.  The 
story  of  how  an  unprecedented  programme  was 
adopted  and  carried  out,  of  teaching  men  to  fly,  to 
use  machine  guns,  cameras,  and  bombs  in  the  air,  of 
developing  new  industries  and  converting  virgin 
forests  into  airplane  wings  and  fuselages,  of  erecting 
airdromes  and  factories  in  England  and  France,  and 
finally  of  meeting  the  enemy  fliers  over  No  Man's 

vii 


PREFACE 

Land  —  all  this  forms  a  stupendous  picture  that  de- 
serves to  be  put  into  a  permanent  setting. 

America  dedicated  herself  to  the  cpnquest  of  the 
air.  She  failed  in  the  time  allotted  because  she  had 
utterly  no  knowledge  of  the  myriad  difficulties  that 
confronted  her.  This  does  not  mean,  however,  that 
her  effort  was  not  supremely  worth  while  and  that  by 
it  she  did  not  accomplish  infinitely  more  than  if  she 
had  aimed  less  high.  America's  Air  Service  at  the 
termination  of  hostilities  had  a  personnel  of  over 
150,000  men,  more  than  half  of  them  in  France,  over 
a  thousand  trained  fliers  on  the  front,  a  system  of 
schools  here,  in  France,  and  in  England  capable  of 
an  expansion  that  would  soon  have  been  overwhelming 
to  the  enemy,  an  industrial  machinery  which,  with  its 
Liberty  Motors,  De  Haviland  planes,  raw  materials, 
and  accessories  was  fast  becoming  the  Allies'  supply 
center,  and  above  all  a  record  of  845  enemy  planes 
driven  to  destruction. 

It  is  my  hope  that  this  book  may  throw  these  main 
outlines  into  their  true  perspective.  Every  cable, 
letter,  document,  and  chart  desired  has  been  available 
in  its  preparation.  Out  of  all  the  overwhelming  mass 
of  detail,  I  have  endeavored  to  select  the  highlights  of 
historical  importance,  so  as  to  provide  new  informa- 
tion for  those  already  familiar  with  parts  of  the  sub- 
ject, while  not  confusing  those  unfamiliar  with  it  in  a 
maze  of  detail.  If  at  times  there  is  a  surfeit  of  facts 
and  figures,  forbearance  is  asked  in  recognition  of 
the  fact  that  years  may  pass  before  another  writer 
has  the  time  to  go  over  this  ground  again,  and  that 
consequently  it  is  better  to  include  too  much  than  too 
little.  A  very  conscious  effort  has  been  made 
throughout  to  let  the  facts  and  figures  speak  for  them- 
selves without  prejudice  of  the  writer's  personal 
opinion. 

viii 


PREFACE 

American  aviators  have  been  stated  by  their  Coin- 
mander-in-Chief  to  be  without  equals  in  daring  or 
fighting  ability.  It  is  fitting  that  the  great  organiza- 
tion of  which  they  form  the  apex  should  be  worthy  of 
the  traditions  they  have  set.  If  this  book  serves  to 
bring  about  a  fairer  and  more  complete  judgment  of 
the  whole  situation,  if  it  explains  the  romance  and 
achievements  as  well  as  the  difficulties  and  failures  of 
the  aviation  project,  I  shall  feel  that  it  has  been 
worth  while. 

I  desire  here  to  express  my  deepest  appreciation  to 
three  collaborators  without  whose  aid  the  publication 
of  this  book  in  the  present  circumstances  would  not 
have  been  possible.  As  it  happened,  just  after  the 
manuscript  had  been  finished,  the  author  was  called 
to  Europe  for  work  in  connection  with  the  Peace  Con- 
ference and  was  constrained  to  leave  to  others  the 
work  of  proofreading  and  the  extremely  complicated 
task  of  checking  the  great  number  of  figures  in  the 
book. 

To  his  wife,  to  Captain  E.  H.  Cumpston,  Statistical 
Officer  of  the  Air  Service,  and  to  Mr.  Francis  G. 
Wickware,  the  editor  of  this  series,  he  is  most  pro- 
foundly grateful. 

ARTHUR  SWEETSER. 


CONTENTS 

PREFACE        *  '      ' . ..  .  .  .  .  .  .  Vii 

INTRODUCTION        .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .         XXV 

CHAPTER  I 

THE  BIRTH   OF  AMERICAN   AVIATION 

Langley's  aerodrome  —  Its  scientific  success,  its  tragic 
failure,  and  its  final  vindication  —  Early  experi- 
ments of  the  brothers  Wright  —  Their  first  flights  — 
Interest  of  the  War  Department  awakened  —  The 
first  Government  specifications  for  aircraft  —  Offi- 
cial demonstration  of  the  conquest  of  the  air  — 
Birth  of  Army  aeronautics  —  Apathy  of  Congress  — 
Foreign  military  developments  —  First  Congres- 
sional appropriation  —  Establishment  of  the  first 
Army  flying  school  —  American  airplanes  in  mili- 
tary operations  —  The  first  military  planes  —  Trans- 
fer of  the  Army  training  school  to  San  Diego  • — 
Low  state  of  American  aviation  in  1913 — Unpopu- 
larity of  the  service  in  the  Army  —  The  Aviation 
Section  created  in  the  Signal  Corps  on  the  eve  of 
the  European  "War  .  .  .  .  "  «  3 

CHAPTER  II 

DEVELOPMENTS    THROUGH    THE    EUROPEAN    WAR 

Enormous  and  rapid  development  of  aviation  by  the 
European  belligerents  —  The  United  States  de- 
barred from  participation  by  military  secrecy  — 
American  military  aeronautics  in  1914  —  The  First 
Aero  Squadron  organized  —  The  first  specifications 
for  military  airplanes  —  Estimate  of  the  airplane 
as  a  fighting  machine  —  The  $300,000  appropriation 
for  1916  —  National  Advisory  Committee  for  Aero- 
nautics created  —  Its  investigation  of  aeronautical 
science  in  the  colleges  —  Military  aeronautics  in 
1915  —  Defects  of  the  Act  creating  the  Aviation 
Section  in  the  Signal  Corps  —  New  provision,  for 

xi 


CONTENTS 

aviation  in  the  National  Defense  Act  of  June  3, 
1916  —  The  crisis  on  the  Mexican  border  and  a 
special  emergency  appropriation  —  Aerial  service 
with  the  Pershing  expedition  —  The  $13,000,000 
appropriation  for  1917  —  Secretary  Baker  on  the 
needs  of  the  Air  Service  —  Its  reorganization  under 
Colonel  George  O.  Squier  —  Problems  of  equipment 
and  personnel  —  Military  aeronautics  in  1916  —  The 
$10,800,000  appropriation  for  3918  adopted  after 
our  declaration  of  war  .  .  .  .  22 

CHAPTER  III 

AMERICA'S  EARLY  WAR  PROGRAMME 

Eesumption  by  Germany  of  unrestricted  submarine  war- 
fare—  Declaration  of  a  state  of  war  —  Its  antici- 
pation by  the  War  Department  —  Aviation  in  the 
original  war  programme  —  Urgent  war  appropria- 
tions—  The  serious  situation  in  the  airplane 
industry  —  Industrial  conference  of  the  National 
Advisory  Committee  for  Aeronautics  —  Its  recom- 
mendations —  Aircraft  Production  Board  created  — 
Its  functions,  powers,  and  personnel  —  Howard  E. 
Coffin  appointed  Chairman  —  Joint  Army  and  Navy 
Technical  Board  created  —  Original  programme  of 
the  Aircraft  Production  Board  —  The  alarming 
patent  situation  —  Its  solution  by  the  National 
Advisory  Committee  —  Aircraft  Manufacturers '  As- 
sociation formed  and  vested  with  all  patents  of  its 
members  —  The  problem  of  training  aviators  —  The 
Canadian  system  adopted  —  Cooperation  of  scientific 
schools  secured  —  Six  * '  ground  schools  '  *  inaugu- 
rated —  Three  flying  fields  located  and  built  —  The 
situation  at  the  end  of  six  weeks  of  war  .  '.•  42 

CHAPTER  IV 

THE  COMING  OP  THE   FOREIGN  MISSIONS 

Arrival  of  the  British  and  French  War  Missions  —  Their 
effect  on  the  aviation  programme  —  The  military 
situation  in  Europe  —  Mastery  of  the  air  with  the 
Germans  —  Inventory  of  America's  aviation  re- 
sources —  Eelative  human  and  material  resources  of 
the  Allies  —  American  flying  school  at  Issoudun, 
France,  authorized  —  First  aviation  detachments  for 
overseas  service  —  Training  in  French  schools  au- 
thorized —  Training  arrangements  with  Canada, 
xii 


CONTENTS 

Great  Britain  and  Italy  —  American  technical  mis- 
sion sent  to  Europe  —  Its  purposes  and  services  — 
Premier  Ribot  's  appeal  to  America  —  Its  trans- 
lation into  a  new  and  immensely  expanded  aviation 
programme  —  The  new  programme  compared  with 
the  French  Air  Service  —  Opposition  of  the  General 
Staff  —  The  programme  sent  to  Congress  by  Secre- 
tary Baker  without  its  endorsement  —  The  bill  in 
the  Committee  on  Military  Affairs  —  Supporting 
statement  of  the  Signal  Corps  —  The  bill  reported  58 

CHAPTER  V 

THE  ADOPTION  OF  THE  NEW  PROGRAMME 

The  campaign  for  public  and  Congressional  sanction  — 
Publicity  methods  of  the  Aircraft  Production  Board 
—  The  press  enlisted  in  support  of  the  programme  — 
Public  statements  of  Mr.  Coffin,  General  Squier, 
Secretary  Baker,  and  President  Wilson  —  Extent  of 
editorial  support  —  Effect  on  public  opinion  of  the 
publicity  campaign  —  The  bill  in  Congress  —  The 
debate  in  the  House  —  Mr.  Mann 's  speech  —  Debate 
limited  to  an  hour  and  a  half  —  The  bill  passed 
without  amendment  and  without  roll  call  —  The 
debate  in  the  Senate  —  Final  passage  and  enact- 
ment —  The  programme  launched  —  The  seeds  of 
later  disappointment  sown  in  the  optimism  of  the 
early  publicity  .  ..»...,  .  .;-  •  •••'••  ,  V  74 

CHAPTER  VI 

THE   UPBUILDING  OF  THE   FLYING  FORCE 

The  situation  at  the  passage  of  the  Aviation  Act  — 
Limited  foundations  for  expansion  under  the  new 
programme  —  Aircraft  Production  Board  personnel 
transferred  to  the  Signal  Corps  —  Equipment  Divi- 
sion created  under  Colonel  E.  A.  Deeds  —  Creation 
of  the  Aircraft  Board  —  Difficulties  of  organiza- 
tion —  Their  reaction  upon  production  —  The  prob- 
lem of  personnel  —  Impossibilities  of  the  manu- 
facturing programme  —  Advanced  and  primary 
training  delayed  by  lack  of  planes  —  Eecruitment 
of  the  flying  force  —  Essential  qualifications  of 
military  aviators  —  Quality  of  the  army  of  volun- 
teers—  Selection  of  candidates  —  Aviation  examin- 
ing boards  —  Physical  tests  —  Recruitment  of  non- 
flying  officers  —  Status  of  flying  cadets  —  Organiza- 

xiii 


CONTENTS 

tion  and  functions  of  the  ground  schools  —  Their 
courses  of  instruction  and  services  —  Structures  to  - 
house  the  air  army  —  Location  and  rental  of  the 
flying  fields  —  Their  design  and  construction  —  Fly- 
ing fields  increased  from  two  to  18  in  the  first  eight 
months  of  the  war  —  Construction  overseas  .  .  92 

CHAPTER  VII 

THE  TRAINING  OF  THE  FLIERS 

Courses  of  instruction  for  aviators  —  Primary  training 
—  Three  stages  in  the  flying  course:  dual  work, 
solo  work,  cross-country  work — The  "  Eules  of 
the  Air  ' '  —  Cadets  graduated  as  reserve  military 
aviators  —  Advanced  training  —  Three  specialized 
classes  of  pilots  —  Recruitment  of  aerial  observers  — 
Training  of  observers  and  army-corps  pilots  — 
Training  of  bombers  and  bombing  pilots  —  Training 
of  pursuit  pilots,  the  fighting  force  —  Training  of 
instructors  —  Aerial  gunnery  —  Its  development 
through  synchronizing  the  machine  gun  with  the 
airplane  propeller  —  Eoyal  Flying  Corps  system  of 
training  adopted  —  Aerial-gunnery  schools  —  Cas- 
ualties in  training  —  Their  number  and  causes  — 
Status  of  the  training  system  at  the  end  of  the 
first  year 109 

CHAPTER  VIII 

THE  TRAINING  OF  THE  GREAT  GROUND  FORCE 

Ground  force  required  to  keep  a  plane  in  the  air  —  Re- 
quirements and  training  of  non-flying  officers  — 
Supply  officers'  school  —  Adjutants'  school  —  En- 
gineer officers'  school  —  Armament  officers'  and 
armorers'  school  —  School  for  compass  officers  — 
Training  in  aerial  navigation  —  Development  of 
aerial  photography  —  Photographic  Section  created 
in  the  Signal  Corps  at  the  instance  of  the  Com- 
mittee on  Public  Information  —  School  of  Military 
Cinematography  —  First  schools  of  aerial  photo- 
graphy at  Langley  Field  and  Cornell  University  — 
Advanced  courses  in  map  compilation  and  interpre- 
tion  for  photographic  intelligence  officers  —  Kodak 
Park  established  by  the  Eastman  Kodak  Company  — 
Courses  of  instruction  —  Aerial  photography  at  the 
flying  fields  —  Training  of  pilots  and  observers  • — • 
Development  of  aerial  radio -telegraphy  —  Radio 

xiv 


CONTENTS 

instruction  entrusted  to  the  Signal  Corps  —  Train- 
ing of  radio  officers  —  Training  of  radio  operators 
and  mechanics  —  Radio  Section  created  —  Standard- 
ized courses  of  instruction  —  Importance  of  the 
ground  force  of  mechanics  —  Difficulties  and 
methods  of  recruitment — 'Necessity  for  specialized 
training  —  Schools  at  industrial  establishments  — 
Winter  schools  at  Northern  flying  fields  —  Kelly 
Field  mechanics  school  —  Training  at  vocational 
schools  ...  •  ,  .  .  .  .  .  .  124 


CHAPTER  IX 

REACHING  BACK   FOR  EAW   MATERIALS 

Complexity  of  the  industrial  problems  of  materiel  — 
Mobilization  of  raw  materials  and  creation  of  new 
industries  by  the  Government  —  Spruce  the  founda- 
tion of  the  airplane  —  Spruce  forests  of  Oregon  and 
Washington  —  The  logging  industry  at  the  outbreak 
of  war  —  Its  reorganization  under  Government  con- 
trol—The I.  W.  W.  and  the  labor  situation  —  Thir- 
teen thousand  troops  sent  into  the  spruce  forests  — 
Spruce  Production  Division  organized  under  Colonel 
B.  P.  Disque  —  Loyal  Legion  of  Loggers  and  Lum- 
bermen created  —  Wage  adjustments  —  Spruce  re- 
quirements and  production  methods  —  Substitutes 
for  spruce  adopted  —  Kiln  drying  of  lumber  — 
[Reorganization  of  lumber  transportation- — Linen 
for  airplane  wings  —  Failure  of  the  Irish  supply  — 
Development  of  a  cotton  substitute  —  Shortage  of 
airplane  dope  —  Development  of  supply  of  acetate 
of  lime  and  other  constituents  —  Engine  lubricants 
— 'Castor  oil  an  essential  for  rotary  engines  —  A 
hundred  thousand  acres  planted  to  castor  beans  — 
Development  of  a  standard  mineral  lubricant  — 
The  Liberty  Aero  Oil  and  the  tragedy  of  its  con- 
summation—  The  problem  of  special  equipment, 
instruments  and  accessories  14S 


CHAPTER  X 

THE  MANY-SIDED  PROBLEM  OF  ENGINES 

Engines  the  limiting  element  on  expansion  of  the  Air 
Services  —  Aviation-engine  manufacture  in  the 
United  States  before  the  war  —  Engines  for  training 
planes — The  OX5  and  the  A7A  —  The  Hispano- 

XV 


CONTENTS 

Suiza — 'The  Gnome  and  the  Le  Rhone  —  Battle- 
plane engines  the  heart  of  the  aviation  problem  — 
State  of  design  at  the  time  the  United  States  entered 
the  war  —  Efforts  to  adapt  foreign  models  —  The 
Clerget  and  the  Lorraine-Dietrich  —  The  Rolls- 
Royce —  The  Bugatti  —  The  project  for  an  ail- 
American  high-powered  motor  —  Reasons  for  its 
adoption  —  The  Liberty  Motor  designed  —  The  first 
unit  assembled  within  a  month  —  The  motor  proved 
in  tests  —  Choice  of  manufacturers  —  Difficulties  of 
manufacture  —  The  skilled-labor  problem  —  Aban- 
donment of  the  eight-  and  adoption  of  the  12- 
cylinder  type  —  Its  power  under  test  —  Production 
estimates  and  performance  —  Demands  of  foreign 
Governments  and  other  American  services  —  Causes 
of  delays  in  production  —  Changes  in  design  — 
Exacting  and  rigid  specifications  —  Difficulties  of 
inspection  —  Lack  of  tools,  jigs  and  gauges  —  Lack 
of  coal  and  difficulties  of  transportation  —  Develop- 
ment of  new  types  of  the  Liberty  —  Its  technical 
performance  .  >  .»  .  •  •  •  168 

CHAPTER  XI 

THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  PLANE  CONSTRUCTION 

Training  and  battle  planes  two  distinct  elements  in  the 
problem  of  planes  —  Primary  training  planes  —  The 
Curtiss  JN-4D  and  the  Standard  J-l  —  Advanced 
training  planes  —  Adaptation  of  the  JN-4D —  The 
Thomas-Morse  scout  —  Battle  and  bombing  planes 
—  Reasons  for  the  discrepancy  between  expectation 
and  accomplishment  in  their  production  —  Lack  of 
technical  knowledge  —  Difficulties  of  communica- 
tion—  Lack  of  manufacturing  facilities  —  Unex- 
pected intricacy  of  the  work  —  The  best  Allied 
planes  chosen  for  American  reproduction  —  The 
Spad  —  The  De  Haviland  the  mainstay  of  the 
American  programme  —  Preliminary  experiments 
and  organization  of  manufacture  —  Complications 
between  types  ' '  4  "  and  ' '  9  ' '  —  Optimism  and 
disappointments  in  regard  to  production  —  The  first 
De  Haviland-4's  ordered  overseas  —  The  manifold 
problems  of  equipment  —  Production  of  "  4's  "  at 
the  end  of  the  first  year  —  Defects  of  the  early 
planes  —  Continued  development  of  the  De  Havi- 
land-9  —  The  Bristol  scout  —  Its  redesign  for  the 
Liberty  Motor  —  Its  disappointing  career  —  Night- 
bombing  planes  —  The  Handley-Page  —  The  co- 
operative agreement  with  England  —  The  Caproni  — - 
xvi 


CONTENTS 

Its  adaptation  to  the  Liberty  Motor  —  Plans  for  an 
all- American  plane  —  Planes  ordered  and  produced 
overseas  —  The  situation  at  the  end  of  the  first  year  186 

CHAPTER  .XII 

DISRUPTION  AND  THE  NEW  START 

Freedom  of  the  Air  Service  from  criticism  during  the 
first  ten  months  —  The  Service  first  involved  in  the 
general  attack  on  the  war  administration  —  The  War 
Department's  unfortunate  announcement  of  ship- 
ments of  American  planes  —  Difficulties  within  the 
Air  Service  —  Investigations  ordered  by  the  War 
Department  and  the  Aircraft  Board  —  The  Service 
on  the  defensive  —  Public  confidence  destroyed  by 
indiscriminate  attacks  in  the  press  and  in  Congress 
—  Charges  of  Gutzon  Borglum  —  Headlong  dis- 
ruption under  way  —  The  first  reorganization  under 
John  D.  Eyan  and  General  William  L.  Kenly  — 
Investigation  demanded  —  Borglum  discredited  — 
Charles  E.  Hughes  selected  to  cooperate  with  the 
Department  of  Justice  —  The  final  reorganization  — 
Bureau  of  Aircraft  Production  and  Division  of 
Military  Aeronautics  created  —  The  first  Air  Service 
administration  completely  obliterated  —  Estimate 
of  their  difficulties,  failures  and  achievements  — 
Mr.  Hughes '  findings  —  Unf ulfillment  of  early  hopes 
and  promises  —  The  unforeseen  difficulties,  physical 
and  human  —  The  substantial  achievement  —  Pro- 
duction of  training  and  battle  planes  and  engines  — 
Production  of  raw  materials  and  accessories  —  Per- 
sonnel of  the  Air  Service  —  Training  of  pilots,  ob- 
servers, and  other  officers  —  Training  of  the  ground 
force  —  The  force  overseas  —  The  situation  at  the 
new  start  .  ,  .  .  ••*,;«  210 

CHAPTER  XIII 

THE  REAL  MEANING  OP  THE  PROGRAMME 

Early  problems  of  the  new  administration  —  The  overseas 
programme  —  America's  aims  in  aviation  —  Basis 
and  method  of  the  Allies'  demands  —  The  A.  E.  F. 
Aviation  Project  or  Official  Aviation  Programme  — 
The  Air  Service  conceived  as  a  great  international 
striking  force  —  Gradual  expansion  of  the  A.  E.  F. 
Project  —  Its  disproportion  both  to  the  rest  of  the 
military  programme  and  to  British  and  French 
ratios  —  Comparison  with  the  total  Allied  and 

xvii 


CONTENTS 

enemy  aerial  force  at  the  beginning  of  the  July 
offensive  of  1918  —  Development  of  the  Air  Service 
continued  by  the  new  administration  along  the 
original  lines  —  The  final  steps  in  reorganization: 
John  D.  Eyan  appointed  an  Assistant  Secretary  of 
War  —  The  development  along  individual  lines  dur- 
ing the  final  months  of  the  war  —  The  Liberty  Motor 
in  service  and  in  production  —  The  Hispano-Suiza 
and  Bugatti  motors  —  The  plane  problem  still  un- 
settled—  The  S.E.-5,  a  single-seater  fighter 
adopted  —  Night  bombers  —  The  Handley-Page  and 
the  Caproni  —  Observation  planes  and  other 
bombers:  a  new  Bristol,  the  Le  Pere,  Loening, 
Pomilio,  and  Martin — The  De  Haviland  battle  plane 
in  service  and  in  production  —  Raw  materials: 
spruce,  wing  fabric,  and  dope  —  Equipment  and 
accessories  —  The  situation  at  the  termination  of 
hostilities  —  The  business  problems  involved  —  Capi- 
talization and  financing  of  airplane  and  engine 
companies  —  The  cost-plus  arrangement  —  Effect  of 
the  effort  on  American  industry  —  Expenditures  of 
the  Air  Service  .  «  .  ,.  .  »i  .  229 

CHAPTER  XIV 

THE  WORK  AT  THE  FIELDS 

Development  of  training  during  the  final  half-year  of 
war  —  Adequacy  of  facilities  to  meet  the  A.  E.  F. 
Aviation  Project  —  The  programme  modified  by  de- 
lays in  production  —  Difficulties  of  coordination  be- 
tween the  A.  E.  F.  and  the  Air  Service  —  The 
personnel  programme  and  the  personnel  at  the 
termination  of  hostilities  —  Products  of  the  training 
system  —  Ground  schools  —  Primary  training  • — • 
Pursuit  pilots  —  Aerial  observers  —  Bombing  pilots 

—  Aerial-gunnery     schools  —  Photographic,     radio, 
and  mechanical  personnel  —  Casualties  in  training 

—  Extent  of  the  conquest  of  the  air  —  A  formation 
flight  of  103  planes  —  A  flight  from  the  Gulf  to  the 
Great  Lakes  —  A  landing  in  the  midst  of  the  Ever- 
glades—  Examples  of  aviators'  troubles  —  A  mili- 
tary transcontinental  flight  in  formation  —  An  alti- 
tude  record   of   29,000    feet  —  Parachute    descents 
from  airplanes  —  Fast  flights  —  New  uses  for  air- 
planes —  Passenger  carrying  —  The  aerial  mail  ser- 
vice—  Development  of  the  aerial  radio-telephone  — 
Its  use  in  formation  flying  and  influence  on  aerial 
tactics  .  ....       257 

xviii 


CONTENTS 
CHAPTER  XV 

THE  BALLOON   SERVICE 

The  balloon  service  a  necessary  consort  of  aviation  — 
History  of  military  ballooning  —  Its  neglect  in  the 
United  States  —  Its  development  through  the 
European  War  —  Service,  duties,  and  dangers  of 
balloon  observers  —  American  balloon  service  at  the 
outbreak  of  war  —  The  war  programme  —  Training 
of  personnel  —  Schools  at  Fort  Omaha,  Camp  John 
Wise,  and  Arcadia  —  French  ballooning  system 
adopted  —  Courses  for  observers  and  manoBuvring 
officers  —  Arrangements  for  telephonic  communica- 
tion—  Officer  personnel  at  the  termination  of  hos- 
tilities—  Balloon  design  —  Difficulties  and  results 
of  production  —  Production  of  helium  gas  in  bal- 
loon quantities  —  Total  personnel  and  overseas  per- 
sonnel at  the  signing  of  the  armistice  —  Trans- 
formation school  in  France  —  The  balloon 'service  in 
action  ,  .  :•  •/  •  .  "  «  .  .  2S4 

CHAPTER  XVI 

THE   STRUCTURE   OVERSEAS 

Course  of  the  overseas  development  of  the  Air  Service  — 
Coordination  of  American  and  Allied  resources  — 
The  development  in  France  —  Training  of  fliers  — 
The  flying  field  at  Issoudun  —  Summary  of  Air 
Service  establishments  —  The  Bomorantin  assembly, 
repair  and  salvage  plant  —  Establishments  at  Orly, 
Tours,  and  Colombey-les-Belles —  Organization  of 
the  first  squadrons  —  Equipment  of  the  combatant 
squadrons  and  training  fields  with  French  and 
American  planes  — -  The  development  in  England  — 
Training  of  fliers  —  Their  service  with  the  Eoyal 
Flying  Corps  —  Training  of  mechanics  —  The  Anglo- 
American  night-bombing  agreement  —  Total  per- 
sonnel trained  in  England  —  The  development  in 
Italy  —  The  situation  at  the  termination  of  hostili- 
ties —  The  service  of  the  American  air  force  .  .  298 

CHAPTER  .XVII 

THE  AIR   SERVICE  IN  ACTION 

Exploits  of  the  Air  Service  at  the  front  —  First  German 
planes  brought  down  by  American  aviators  —  First 
reconnaissance   over  the   German  lines  —  Death  of 
xix 


CONTENTS 

Major  Eaoul  Luf  bery  —  First  American-trained  ace 

—  First  bombing  raid  —  A  reputation  established, 
but  at  a  cost  —  The  Air  Service  first  a  major  strik- 
ing force  at  Chateau-Thierry  —  Death  of  Lieutenant 
Quentin  Roosevelt  —  Official  recognition  of  the  Ser- 
vice in  the  second  battle  of  the  Marne  —  The  Air 
Service  at  St.  Mihiel  —  Command  of  the  air  with  the 
Americans  —  General  Pershing  >s  tribute  —  Further 
unofficial  testimony  —  The  offensive  on  the  Meuse  — 
Plights  in  force  —  Harassment  of  the  German  re- 
treat—  American    aviators    with    the    British    in 
Flanders  —  Their  service  as  reported  by  the  Royal 
Flying  Corps  —  American  aviators  with  the  Italians 

—  The  Austrian  rout  on  the  Piave  —  A  daylight  raid 
on  the  naval  base  at  Pola —  Summary  of  achieve- 
ments of  the  Air  Service  in  action  —  Enemy  planes 
and  balloons  brought  down  in  France  —  Losses  of 
American  planes  and  balloons  —  Air  Service  casual- 
ties—  List  of  American  aces  —  General  Pershing 's 

last  words  of  praise      .         .         .         .         «         .314 

APPENDICES 

1.  The  Aviation  Act  of  July  24,  1917        .        ...         .       341 

2.  Air  Service  Stations  on  November  11,  1918     .         .       348 

INDEX  353 


ILLUSTRATIONS 


PAGE 

American  airplane  photograph  of  the  village  of  Cantigny 
during  the  successful  attack  by  American  troops  on 
May  28,  1918  .  .  .  .  ;'  Frontispiece 

Langley's  airplane  with  the  original  motor  on  the  ice  at 

Hammondsport,  1914    .         .         .         .         Facing          6 

The  original  Wright  machine  in  its  first  flight  at  Kitty 

Hawk,  December  17,  1903      .         .         .         Facing          6 

Front   of   the   first   American  "Liberty"  Caproni 

Facing        12 

Front  of  the  American  Handley-Page          .         Facing        12 

Fuselage  department  of  the  Curtiss  Aeroplane  Company, 

Churchill  Plant,  January,  1918      .         .         Facing        24 

Expert  woodwork  on  the  wings     .         .         *         Facing        34 
Trueing  up  the  fuselage      .         .         •         .        Facing        34 

Wing  department  of  the  Dayton-Wright  Airplane  Com- 
pany, Plant  1,  February,  1918  .  .  Facing  46 

Covering  the  wings  with  fabric,  Dayton-Wright  Air- 
plane Company,  Plant  1  .  .  Facing  60 

"Doping"  the  wings,  the  treatment  for  waterproofing 
the  wing  fabric  and  making  it  non-inflammable 

Facing        60 

Expert    welding    on    Caproni  fittings,    Standard  Aero 

Corporation  .         .         .          .         .         Facing        76 

Eoughing  out  the  De  Haviland  propeller        .         Facing        76 

Machining  tops  of  Liberty  Motor  cylinders,  plant  of  the 
Nordyke  and  Marmon  Company,  April,  1918 

Facing        86 

Plant  of  the  Ford  Motor  Company  devoted  exclusively  to 

the  manufacture  of  Liberty  motors        .         Facing        96 
xxi 


ILLUSTRATIONS 


PAGE 

The  miniature  range  for  testing  and  developing  speed 

and  accuracy  of  observation  .          .         Facing       104 

Cross-country  formation  flying,  Kelly  field,  -May,  1918 

Facing       112 

The  mounting  of  the  machine  gun        »         .         Facing       122 
The  bombs  and  their  releasing  device    .         .         Facing       122 

French  aerial  photographic  map  of  the  Peronne  sector, 
made  by  piecing  together  and  interpreting  hundreds 
of  single  airplane  photographers  .  .  •  .  129 

Ground  school  radio  instruction,  receiving  and  sending 

in  code        .         .         .         .         .   .      .         Facing       136 

Ground    school    instruction    in    machine-gun    assembly 

blindfolded  .         .       ,:.         .         .         Facing      136 

Engine  school  for  airplane  mechanics,  Hazelhurst  Field, 

Mineola,    Long  Island  ,          .          •         Facing       144 

A  giant  of  the  Oregon  spruce  forests    .         .         Facing       150 

Government  cut-up  plant  at  Vancouver  Barracks,  Wash- 
ington, on  the  twentieth  day  of  construction  * 

Facing  154 

The  mounting  of  the  camera  on  British  observation 

planes  •  •  •  •  .  ...  .  Facing  166 

Observer  in   the  "  camera   obscura"  used   on   bombing 

planes  »         « *    .  :«         •         .    '      .         Facing       166 

The  Liberty  Motor  at  the  summit  of  Pike's  Peak  for 

its  first  altitude  test,  August,  1917          .         Facing       178 

Outdoor  test  shed  at  the  Liberty  Motor  plant  of  the 
Nordyke  and  Marmon  Company,  April,  1918 

Facing       178 

Th»  Curtiss  JN-4D  training  plane        »         *         Facing       188 
An  American-built  De  Haviland-4  battle  plane       Facing       196 

Launching  of  the  "Langley",  the  first  American-built 
Handley-Page  bomber,  at  Elizabeth,  New  Jersey, 

July  5,  1918 Facing       206 

xxii 


ILLUSTRATIONS 


PAGE 

ate  height          .   ~     .          .          .          .         Facing       214 


Eifle  practice  on  clay  pigeons  from  a  tower,  tp^  sim- 
ula 


The  first  five  machine-made  Liberty  Motors  at  the  plant 

of  the  Packard  Motor  Car  Company       .         Facing       224 

The  first  American-built  Caproni  bomber,  equipped  with 
three  Liberty  Motors,  first  flown  at  Mineola,  Long 
Island,  July  4,  1918  ....  Facing  244 

The   Thomas  Morse  scout  and  the  Leoning  monoplane 

Facing       254 

Chart  of  Air  Service  training  and  channels  of  trans- 
fer * 260 

Squadron  of  sixteen  planes  in  battle  formation,  Rockwell 

Field,  California,  June,  1918          .          .         Facing       268 


Bomb  dropping  at  the  training  fields  .  Facing  280 
Night  flying  at  the  training  fields  .  •',  .  Facing  280 
The  Caquot  balloon  ascending  .  .  .  Facing  292 

Balloon  crew  at  the  gas  cylinders  connected  with  the 

feeding  tube         .          .          .    '  ,.  .         .         Facing       296 

Pilot  and  artillery  observer  in  balloon  basket  with  tele- 
phone equipment  and  parachutes  in  stops        Facing       296 

An  airdrome  of  the  American  Air  Service  in  France 

Facing       308 

Airplane  photograph  of  Chateau-Thierry  before  it  was 

retaken  by  the  Americans  and  the  French      Facing      326 


XXlll 


INTRODUCTION 

In  these  pages  Captain  Sweetser  has  told  in  a 
vigorous  and  comprehensive  way  the  story  of  the 
American  Air  Service.  Happily,  he  begins  with  the 
story  of  Samuel  Pierpont  Langley,  who,  after  years 
of  patient  study,  first  achieved  actual  flight  by  a 
heavier-than-air  machine  and  must  always  be  re- 
garded as  the  discoverer  of  the  principles  which 
made  the  spectacular  triumph  of  later  years  possible. 
Professor  Langley  was  a  great  scientist ;  his  life  had 
been  spent  in  high  and  useful  pursuits ;  but  through- 
out all  his  later  years  he  followed  the  lure  of  the 
idea  which  he  had  caught  from  the  birds,  and  his 
daring  imagination  refused  to  be  trammeled  by 
demonstrations  which  other  eminent  scientists  made 
by  mathematical  processes  of  the  impossibility  of 
mechanical  flight.  When  he  died,  his  full-scale 
demonstration  had  been  wrecked  by  trifling  acci- 
dents. The  doubters  had  all  their  own  way,  and  he 
was  saved  from  ridicule  only  by  the  eminence  of  his 
scientific  reputation  and  his  known  services  in  other 
fields  of  human  knowledge.  But  the  very  machine 
which  trickily  failed  to  fly  for  him  subsequently 
flew,  and  it  is  now  preserved  in  the  Smithsonian  In- 
stitution, over  which  Professor  Langley  long  pre- 
sided, and  for  all  time  will  be  the  vindication  of 
Langley 's  claim. 

The  application  of  the  principles  thus  discovered 
and  demonstrated  came  from  other  hands.  The 
story  is  here  unfolded  in  detail.  Beading  it,  we 
realize  that  we  of  this  generation  have  witnessed 
the  genesis  of  an  idea  which  may  prove  as  revolu- 

xxv 


INTRODUCTION 

tionary  as  the  steam  engine,  and  which  has  already 
so  far  developed  as  to  transform  the  whole  art  of 
war.  Professor  Langley's  first  flight  was  in  1894. 
In  1903  the  larger  demonstration  was  attempted.  In 
the  same  year  the  Wright  brothers  actually  flew 
their  first  machine  at  Kitty  Hawk.  Fourteen  years 
later  the  horsemen  of  the  air  charged  through  the 
clouds  on  every  battle  front,  directing  artillery  fire, 
bombing  rear  areas,  and  engaging  in  hand-to-hand 
conflict  with  one  another  at  dizzy  heights  in  the  very 
vault  of  the  heavens. 

Especial  interest  will  attach  just  now  to  the  chap- 
ters of  this  book  that  deal  with  the  initiation  and 
development  of  the  American  aircraft  programme 
for  the  European  War.  At  the  outset  of  our  par- 
ticipation it  was  believed  by  those  who  had  most 
seriously  studied  the  subject  to  be  impossible  to 
organize,  equip,  and  transport  to  France  an  Ameri- 
can army  of  such  a  size  as  would  materially  affect 
the  numerical  balance  between  the  enemy  and  the 
Allies.  The  French  and  British  Missions  which 
visited  us,  having  in  mind  the  size  of  armies  hitherto 
transported  great  distances  by  sea,  urged  only  the 
sending  of  a  modest  force  in  order  that  the  American 
flag  might  appear  with  those  of  the  Allies  and 
America's  participation  be  made  palpable  by  the 
presence  of  American  soldiers  on  the  Western  Front. 
No  such  vast  American  army  as  was  subsequently 
organized  and  transported  was  deemed  either  neces- 
sary or  possible.  It  was  for  this  reason  that  the 
suggestion  of  the  French  Prime  Minister,  that  we 
embark  upon  a  great  aviation  programme,  was 
favorably  received.  The  programme  as  cabled  to 
us  from  France  called  upon  America  to  do  in  one 
year  more  than  twice  as  much  as  France  was  then 
doing  at  the  end  of  substantially  three  years  of  war 

xx  vi 


INTRODUCTION 

pressure,  and  this  we  were  to  undertake  in  an  in- 
dustry which  had  been  neglected  among  us  and  in 
which  the  progress  made  abroad  during  the  war  had 
been  largely  withheld  from  us.  Probably  no  mili- 
tary secrets  were  more  closely  guarded  in  Europe 
than  developments  in  aircraft.  As  a  consequence, 
when  we  entered  the  war,  airplane  construction  in 
the  United  States  was  upon  a  most  limited  scale, 
and  our  knowledge  of  the  developments  which  had 
taken  place  in  Europe  was  largely  hearsay.  It  did 
seem  to  us,  however,  that  in  view  of  the  fact  that 
we  could  not  overcome  transportation  limitations 
enough  to  send  a  great  army,  we  could  mobilize  the 
machine-trained  industry  of  America  and  make  our 
contribution  to  the  Allied  cause  complete  and  un- 
questioned mastery  of  the  air. 

The  response  of  both  Congress  and  the  country  to 
this  suggestion  was  immediate  and  enthusiastic,  and 
with  generous  appropriations  the  work  was  under- 
taken with  an  enthusiasm  which  refused  to  see  the 
difficulties  or  to  be  chilled  by  delays  and  embarrass- 
ments however  exasperating.  As  the  aircraft  pro- 
gramme moved  along,  it  became  apparent  that  it  was 
not  to  be  America's  sole,  or  even  her  greatest,  con- 
tribution to  the  cause.  Our  national  energy  was 
not  limited  to  this  development,  but  became  involved 
in  an  industrial  and  military  mobilization  which  left 
us  at  the  signing  of  the  armistice  with  an  army  of 
two  million  men  in  France  and  substantially  another 
two  million  in  training  and  in  service  at  home.  We 
developed  through  the  Chemical  Warfare  Service 
the  introduction  and  production  of  new  gases,  enor- 
mously increased  the  output  of  small  arms  and 
ammunition,  devised  new  machine  guns  and  auto- 
matic rifles,  and  did  a  thousand  other  things  on  a 
great  scale.  Meanwhile,  with  men  of  the  highest 

xxsrii 


INTRODUCTION 

talent  and  devotion,  called  from  civil  life,  the  air- 
craft programme  was  developing,  its  delays  and 
difficulties  were  being  overcome,  and  sober  experi- 
ence was  forcing  limitations  of  time  which  enthusi- 
asm and  zeal  had  refused  to  recognize.  As  I  have 
read  Captain  Sweetser's  manuscript,  it  has  seemed 
to  me  that  he  tells  candidly  and  fully  the  difficulties 
and  also  the  achievements.  The  record  he  gives  is 
substantially  that  contained  in  the  official  proceed- 
ings of  the  War  Department,  and  I  have  no  doubt 
that  those  who  have  been  most  immediately  respon- 
sible for  the  work  in  aircraft  will  desire  no  other 
judgment  passed  upon  them  than  that  which  justice 
deduces  from  the  facts. 

After  all  is  said,  the  great  mistake  in  the  air  pro- 
gramme was  publicity.  This^  was  pointed  out  by 
Mr.  Mann  on  the  floor  of  the  House  of  Representa- 
tives in  a  very  sane  and  wise  speech.  If  there  had 
been  no  publicity  on  this  subject,  the  work  done  on 
the  air  programme  would  have  seemed  a  very  great 
achievement.  Its  misfortune  is  that  it  fell  short  of 
the  hopes  of  its  authors  and  keenly  disappointed 
the  imagination  of  the  country,  which  had  been 
aroused  to  great  expectations.  We  were  deal- 
ing with  a  miracle.  The  airplane  itself  was  too 
wonderful  and  new,  too  positive  a  denial  of  previous 
experience,  to  brook  the  application  of  any  pru- 
dential restraints  which  wise  people  would  have 
known  how  to  apply  to  ordinary  industrial  and  mili- 
tary developments.  As  a  consequence,  the  magicians 
of  American  industry  were  expected  to  do  the  im- 
possible for  this  new  and  magical  agency,  and  this 
expectation  was  increased  by  the  feverish  earnest- 
ness with  which  all  Americans  desired  that  our 
country  should  appear  speedily,  worthily,  and  de- 
cisively in  the  war.  Whether  so  large  a  programme 

xxviii 


INTRODUCTION 

could  have  been  accepted  by  the  Congress  and  the 
country  without  some  such  advertisement,  no  one 
can  now  say ;  but  in  view  of  the  very  understanding 
debate  in  Congress,  it  seems  likely  that  it  could, 
and  further  likely  that  the  expectations  ultimately 
defeated  were  rather  those  of  the  public  imagination 
than  of  the  sober  statesmen  who  voted  for  the  pro- 
gramme and  understood  better  than  was  possible 
for  the  general  public  the  difficulties  and  discourage- 
ments likely  to  be  encountered. 

No  doubt  a  just  appraisement  of  America's  effort 
in  the  air  will  soon  be  made.  The  history  of  this 
war  will  be  written  and  the  separate  services  will 
have  their  accounting.  When  that  is  done,  it  will 
be  well  if  we  learn  from  our  experience  with,  the 
air  programme  to  avoid  too  rosy-colored  expecta- 
tions, while  we  at  the  same  time  preserve  that  neces- 
sary enthusiasm  and  determination  without  which 
great  enterprises  are  impossible.  The  history  of  the 
Air  Service  will  show  the  development  and  pro- 
duction of  the  Liberty  Motor  as  a  great  achieve- 
ment ;  it  will  show  the  fertility  and  ingenuity  of  the 
American  engineer  and  the  capacity  of  American 
business  for  hasty  and  large-scale  organization.  The 
pages  of  that  history,  too,  will  be  replete  with  stories 
of  adequacy  on  the  part  of  American  men  under  the 
supreme  tests  of  this  newest  mode  of  warfare.  The 
age  of  Elizabeth  is  famous  for  her  ' '  sea  dogs. ' '  This 
age,  for  America,  will  be  famous  for  our  soaring 
soldiers  who  showed  an  aptitude  for  learning  this 
game  and  a  bravery  in  playing  it  which  reflect  great 
glory  on  the  race  from  which  they  spring. 

Perhaps,  however,  the  greatest  value  of  this  book 
will  lie  in  the  fact  that  it  is  an  authoritative  state- 
ment of  the  present  state  of  the  conquest  of  the  air. 
The  necessities  of  war  speeded  the  development  of 

xx  ix 


INTRODUCTION 

aircraft  enormously.  Ten  times  as  many  years 
would  not  have  produced  the  same  advance  if  the 
years  had  been  devoted  to  peaceful  pursuits  and 
commercial  uses  of  airplanes  had  been,  the  only  in- 
centive to  inventors  and  producers.  "With  the  start 
now  made,  however,  it  is  difficult  to  restrain  one's 
forecast  of  the  possibilities  of  the  immediate  future. 
Long-distance  nights  and  high  altitudes  have  become 
commonplace ;  that  the  Atlantic  will  be  successfully 
crossed  by  airplane  seems  not  only  possible,  but  cer- 
tain, and  that  in  all  likelihood  within  a  few  months. 
Elaborate  plans  are  making  in  all  countries  for  aerial 
postal  service ;  and  with  the  perfection  of  appliances 
new  possibilities  of  use  will  be  discovered,  until  the 
airplane  upon  its  mission  of  peaceful  commerce  or 
service  will  be  as  familiar  to  the  next  generation  as 
the  locomotive  is  to  this. 

In  the  meantime,  apparently  unlimited  possibili- 
ties of  development  have  opened  for  lighter-than-air 
devices.  The  old  balloon  which  followed  the  way- 
ward currents  of  the  air  has  been  replaced  by  motor- 
driven  dirigibles;  and  now  we  have  the  commercial 
production  of  helium  to  replace  hydrogen,  thus  re- 
moving the  hazard  of  inflammability  which  has 
hitherto  not  only  made  ballooning  perilous,  but 
limited  the  engineering  possibilities  in  balloon 
construction. 

The  imagination  leaps  at  the  possibilities  of  these 
developments.  We  cannot  foresee  or  foretell  what 
services  these  new  wonders  are  to  render  to  man- 
kind. The  possibilities  are  limitless ;  but  as  yet  we 
can  only  stand  by  the  wayside  and  exclaim  as  they 
go  by:  "My  father,  my  father,  the  chariots  of 
Israel  and  the  horsemen  thereof ! ' ' 

NEWTON  D.  BAKER. 


XXX 


THE  AMERICAN 
AIR    SERVICE 


CHAPTER  I 

THE  BIRTH  OF  AMERICAN  AVIATION 

Langley  'a  aerodrome  —  Its  scientific  success,  its  tragic  failure, 
and  its  final  vindication  —  Early  experiments  of  the 
brothers  Wright  —  Their  first  nights  —  Interest  of  the 
War  Department  awakened  —  The  first  Government  specifi- 
cations for  aircraft  —  Official  demonstration  of  the  con- 
quest of  the  air  —  Birth  of  Army  aeronautics  —  Apathy  of 
Congress  —  Foreign  military  developments  —  First  Con- 
gressional appropriation  —  Establishment  of  the  first 
Army  flying  school  —  American  airplanes  in  military 
operations  —  The  first  military  planes  —  Transfer  of  the 
Army  training  school  to  San  Diego  —  Low  state  of 
American  aviation  in  1913  —  Unpopularity  of  the  service 
in  the  Army  —  The  Aviation  Section  created  in  the  Signal 
Corps  on  the  eve  of  the  European  War. 

Aviation  in  the  United  States  opened  with  one  of 
the  hardest  fought  and  most  thrilling  battles  in  the 
history  of  science,  a  battle  the  almost  startling  success 
of  which  was  wholly  negatived  by  a  tragedy  of  mis- 
understanding. The  story  of  Professor  Samuel  Pier- 
pont  Langley  and  " Langley 's  Folly"  shows  as  few 
others  can  the  marvelous  overcoming,  one  after  an- 
other, of  almost  insuperable  obstacles  through  the 
cold,  logical  working  of  a  master  mind  threading  its 
way  through  a  scientific  wilderness.  At  the  end  came 
tragedy,  for  just  as  success  was  about  to  be  attained, 
a  burst  of  ridicule  flared  out  and  the  age-long  ambition 
to  fly  had  to  be  left  unfulfilled  by  the  first  discoverer 
of  the  physical  means. 

Langley 's  interest  in  flight  dated  back,  as  with  so 
many  others,  to  the  days  when,  as  a  boy,  he  had  lain 
in  the  pastures  and  watched  the  birds  soaring  over- 

3 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

head.  In  1886,  when  his  mind  had  become  highly 
trained  in  science,  he  was  roused  to  an  active  study 
which  was  destined  to  lead  him  through  18  years  of 
the  most  arduous,  time-denying,  and  almost  impossible 
work.  There  was  no  place  to  begin  other  than  at  the 
beginning,  so  'Langley  started  out  to  discover  the 
principles  of  flight  by  all  manner  of  primitive  arrange- 
ments, such  as  rubber-driven  models  and  a  huge  re- 
volving table  with  arms  sweeping  through  a  200-foot 
circumference  at  a  speed  of  70  miles  an  hour.  After 
three  tedious  years  he  satisfied  himself  that  flight  was 
possible  because  of  the  sustaining  power  of  the  air, 
and  on  the  principle  that  "a  swift  skater  runs  safely 
over  the  thin  ice  or  a  skipping  stone  goes  over  water 
without  sinking,  until  its  speed  is  exhausted." 

In  1889  began  the  application  of  these  principles  to 
an  actual  model,  or  ' '  aerodrome, ' '  as  he  called  it,  from 
the  Greek  equivalent  of  "air  runner."  This  was  a 
small  machine,  not  big  enough  to  carry  a  passenger, 
but  sustaining  itself  entirely  by  an  almost  human  per- 
fection of  balance.  "Everything,"  Langley  wrote, 
"not  only  the  engine  but  the  boilers  which  were  to 
supply  it,  the  furnaces  which  were  to  heat  it,  the 
propellers  which  were  to  advance  it,  the  hull  which 
was  to  hold  all  these  —  were  all  things  to  be  originated 
in  a  construction  which  so  far  as  I  knew  had  never 
yet  been  undertaken  by  anyone."  Four  more  years 
were  consumed  in  this  work.  Finally,  on  May  6, 1894, 
after  innumerable  delays,  "for  the  first  time,"  as 
Langley  wrote,  "the  aerodrome  swept  continuously 
through  the  air  as  a  living  thing,  and  as  second  after 
second  passed  on  the  face  of  a  stop  watch  until  a 
minute  had  gone  by  and  it  still  flew  on,  and  as  I  heard 

4 


THE  BIRTH  OF  AMERICAN  AVIATION 

the  cheering  of  the  few  spectators,  I  felt  that  some- 
thing had  been  accomplished  at  last,  for  never  in  any 
part  of  the  world  or  in  any  period  had  any  machine  of 
man's  construction  sustained  itself  in  the  air  before 
for  even  half  this  brief  time. ' ' 

Langley  now  regarded  his  work  as  completed,  but 
the  Government  at  once  investigated  his  achievement 
and  directed  him  on  November  9,  1898,  to  attempt  to 
adapt  the  principles  he  had  discovered  to  a  man- 
carrying  machine  for  use  in  warfare.  In  this  investi- 
gation a  new  series  of  delays  and  disappointments 
met  him  at  every  turn,  notably  the  total  lack  of  an 
engine  of  suitable  lightness  and  power,  which  sent 
Langley  on  a  fruitless  search  throughout  Europe,  with 
the  final  necessity  of  adding  this  new  problem  to  his 
own  difficulties. 

On  August  8,  1903,  on  a  malarial  section  of  the 
Potomac  30  miles  outside  Washington,  a  small  model 
was  successfully  launched  by  being  driven  along  a 
runway  on  top  of  a  large  houseboat  in  order  to  gather 
momentum  before  taking  the  air  over  the  water. 
Tragedy  lurked  close  at  hand,  however,  for  when,  on 
October  7,  the  first  man-carrying  machine  was 
launched,  it  was  caught  by  the  falling  ways  and 
pulled  head-on  into  the  river.  Nothing  could  have 
been  more  fatal.  The  great  number  of  newspaper- 
men, practically  all  feature  writers  rather  than 
technical  experts,  who  had  spent  many  weary  days 
in  the  malarial,  uninhabited  country  nearby  and  who 
had  been  greatly  provoked  by  Langley 's  silence,  burst 
into  sarcasm  and  ridicule  which  left  practically  no 
opportunity  for  impartial  judgment.  A  subsequent 
failure  from  the  same  cause,  which  nearly  resulted  in 

5 


THE  AMEEICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

the  drowning  of  the  engineer  and  increased  the 
ridicule  of  the  press,  discouraged  the  War  Department 
from  any  further  efforts. 

Nevertheless,  let  it  be  said,  Langley's  vindication 
has  since  come,  although  he  himself  did  not  live  to  see 
it,  succumbing  three  years  after  the  tragedy  to  what 
many  called  a  broken  heart.  On  April  2,  1914,  the 
old,  original  machine,  which  had  never  been  given  a 
fair  test,  was  shipped  to  Hammondsport,  New  York, 
where  on  May  28,  equipped  with  pontoons  but  other- 
wise practically  unchanged,  it  rose  from  the  water  and 
sailed  through  the  air  as  gracefully  as  any  of  the  great 
modern  planes  from  the  big  Curtiss  factory  nearby. 

Very  different  from  Langley's  methods  were  those 
adopted  by  Orville  and  Wilbur  Wright  in  their  efforts 
to  solve  the  age-long  problem  of  flight.  Unlike 
Langley,  the  scientist  and  theoretical  thinker,  they 
approached  the  problem  from  the  experimental  point 
of  view,  as  accorded  with  their  experience  as  manu- 
facturers of  bicycles. 

In  1899  the  two  brothers  first  came  to  an  interest  in 
flight  through  observation  of  birds  and  study  of 
books  on  ornithology.  Unsuccessful  in  their  first 
attempts  to  secure  books  on  aviation,  they  later  ac- 
quired an  appreciable  library  on  the  tragic  failures 
of  others  who  had  attempted  to  conquer  the  air.  They 
presently  convinced  themselves  that  all  of  these  efforts 
had  come  to  naught,  not  so  much  because  of  faulty 
plane  design  or  engines,  but  rather  from  lack  of 
knowledge  of  the  principles  of  equilibrium.  So  in 
1900,  along  the  soft  sandy  stretches  at  Kitty  Hawk, 
North  Carolina,  away  from  fugitive  air  currents  and 
land  obstructions,  they  began  a  series  of  experiments 

6 


LAXGLEY'S   AIRPLANE    WITH   THE    ORIGINAL    MOTOR   ON   THE   ICE    AT 

HAMMONDSPORT,    1914 


THE  ORIGINAL  WRIGHT  MACHINE  IN  ITS  FIRST  FLIGHT  AT  KITTY  HAWK,. 
DECEMBER    17,    1903 


THE  BIRTH  OF  AMERICAN  AVIATION 

with  gliders  which  embraced  the  new  principles, 
adapted  from  the  birds,  of  a  warping  wing  to  insure 
balance.  Although  this  was  their  first  contribution 
to  practical  aviation,  the  success  achieved  appeared 
to  them  so  small  that  Wilbur  wrote,  on  their  return 
to  Dayton,  that  it  was  extremely  doubtful  if  "we 
would  ever  resume  our  operations. ' ' 

The  fascination  of  it,  however,  had  entered  too 
deep.  "After  our  return  home,"  again  to  quote 
Wilbur,  "we  could  not  keep  our  minds  off  the  puzzling 
thing  we  had  observed,  nor  keep  from  studying  pos- 
sible solutions  of  our  difficulties,  and  before  long  we 
were  as  deeply  interested  as  before."  In  1902,  they 
again  went  to  Kitty  Hawk,  installing  this  time  the 
innovation  of  a  fixed  vertical  vane  at  the  rear  of  the 
glider,  which  worked,  Wilbur  wrote,  "as  we  had  ex- 
pected, so  that  we  could  control  lateral  balance  or 
steer  to  the  right  or  left  by  the  manipulation  of  the 
wing  tips. ' '  Over  70  glides,  some  600  feet  in  length, 
were  made,  with  or  against  the  wind,  and  under  good 
control. 

Next  came  the  adaptation  to  a  motor-driven  plane. 
During  the  fall  of  1903  a  most  primitive  machine 
with  a  12  horse-power,  200-pound  gas  motor  was  put 
together  at  Kitty  Hawk,  the  construction  requiring 
the  operator  to  lie  prone  and  control  the  front  hori- 
zontal rudder  with  his  hands  and  the  vertical  tail  by 
a  cradle  in  which  his  hips  rested.  On  December  17, 
1903,  Wilbur  Wright  rose  into  the  air  for  the  first 
time  that  man  had  ever  flown  in  a  mechanically 
driven,  heavier-than-air  machine.  Four  short  flights 
were  made;  the  first  was  barely  skips,  but  the  last 
covered  850  feet  in  a  time  of  59  seconds.  During 

7 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

the  summer  and  autumn  of  1904,  a  second  machine 
was  built,  and  on  September  20  the  first  circular 
flight  ever  made  took  place.  During,  the  year  1904 
the  Wrights  went  up  over  100  times,  and  in  1905  they 
reached  a  record  of  24  miles  in  38  minutes. 

By  this  time  the  secrecy  with  which  the  Wrights 
had  surrounded  their  early  work  had  been  gradually 
dispelled,  and  the  world  began  to  knock  insistently 
at  their  doors.  In  1907  they  offered  to  sell  all  their 
rights  and  interests  to  the  United  States  Government, 
but  the  Board  of  Ordnance  and  Fortification  replied 
rather  tersely  that  it  had  no  money  available  for  the 
purpose.  Nevertheless,  the  War  Department  was 
awakened  to  the  possible  military  value  of  aircraft 
and  on  December  23,  1907,  issued  the  first  airplane 
specifications  ever  drawn  by  a  Government  body. 
Strikingly  enough,  these  specifications  were  largely 
drawn  by  Major  George  0.  Squier,  who  later  was  to 
be  charged  with  the  greatest  aeronautical  expansion 
ever  attempted.  They  were  made  especially  severe, 
requiring  a  speed  of  40  miles  an  hour,  a  flight  of  an 
hour  with  two  persons  of  a  total  weight  of  350  pounds, 
fuel-carrying  capacity  sufficient  for  a  flight  of  125 
miles,  and  ability  to  steer  in  all  directions  without 
difficulty.  Twenty-four  bids  were  received,  but  only 
two  contracts  were  awarded,  that  of  the  Wrights 
being  dated  February  23,  1908.  Congress  refused 
utterly  to  countenance  this  work,  denying  the 
$200,000  appropriation  asked  through  the  Secretary 
of  War,  and  necessitating  recourse  to  the  Board  of 
Ordnance  and  Fortification  for  funds. 

In^Sejgtember  of  1908  came  the  tests  the  world,  was 
waiting  for,  the  tests  fEat^wese-fcf  demonstrate  pub- 


THE  BIRTH  OF  AMERICAN  AVIATION 

licly  and  on  the  authority  of  the  Government  that 
the  conquest  of  the  air  had  been  achieved.  On  the 
ninth  day  of  that  month,  on  the  parade  ground  at 
Fort  Myer,  just  outside  Washington,  Orville  Wright 
moved  his  odd-looking  mechanism  out  of  the  shed  at 
7 :50  a.  m.,  and  with  only  a  little  effort  rose  grace- 
fully and  easily  into  the  air.  Fifty-seven  times  he 
circled  the  grounds  at  a  height  of  about  100  feet  in  a 
time  just  short  of  an  hour.  That  afternoon  he  made 
the  first  flight  of  over  an  hour,  completing  55  rounds 
in  one  hour,  two  minutes,  and  15  seconds,  and  later 
he  took  Lieutenant  Lahm  as  passenger  for  a  trip  of 
six  minutes  and  24  seconds. 

Flight  was  now  publicly  demonstrated.  Neverthe- 
less, so  great  was  the  interest  and  enthusiasm  that 
Orville  continued  his  exhibits,  taking  Major  Squier 
up  as  a  passenger  on  September  12.  Then  on  Sep- 
tember 17  came  the  first  fatal  accident ;  the  propeller 
blade  broke  when  the  machine  was  at  a  height  of  about 
75  feet,  the  plane  careened,  glided  35  feet,  and  then 
pitched  forward  to  the  ground,  killing  Lieutenant 
Self  ridge  and  injuring  Wright.  This,  America's  first 
sacrifice  to  the  science  of  aviation,  put  an  end  to  the 
experiments  for  the  season,  although  Wilbur  Wright 
in  France  continued  to  electrify  the  scientists  of 
Europe. 

In  July,  1909,  the  Wrights  returned  to  Fort  Myer 
with  a  new  plane  which  not  only  was  accepted  by  the 
Government  under  the  original  agreement,  but  earned 
an  additional  $5,000  bonus  for  the  inventors  by  a 
successful  10-mile  cross-country  flight.  Now  for  the 
first  time  the  United  States  Government  possessed  a 
man-carrying  airplane,  and  with  the  aid  of  the 

9 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

Wright  brothers,  although  still  without  Congressional 
appropriation  of  funds,  the  first  steps  in  teaching 
Army  aviators  to  fly  were  taken. 

Progress  during  the  next  few  years  was  amazingly 
slow  when  looked  at  in  retrospect.  The  difficulties 
that  aviation  had  in  securing  a  foothold,  even  when 
proved,  are  surprising.  The  War  Department's 
annual  reports  were  as  voices  crying  in  a  wilderness, 
without  echo  or  response.  In  the  year  of  the  Wrights ' 
first  flight,  General  Allen,  the  Chief  Signal  Officer, 
made  what  one  would  expect  to  have  been  a  startling 
statement,  that  "the  age  of  mechanical  flight  is  at 
hand."  In  1909  he  reported  that  the  Wrights  had"! 
flown  for  two  hours  and  20  minutes,  had  carried  a 
passenger  one  hour  and  20  minutes,  and  had  reached 
a  height  of  400  feet,  while  six  aviators  had  crossed 
the  hour  mark  and  flights  had  been  made  across  the  ,, 
English  Channel  and  from  Governor's  Island  to 
Grant's  Tomb  in  New  York  City  and  back,  'j^.11 
first-class  powers  except  the  United  States,"  he  said, 
"are  providing  themselves  systematically  with  aerial 
fleets." 

The  year  1910  General  Allen  reported  as  one  of 
' '  unprecedented  activity. ' '  Speed  had  increased  over 
50  per  cent,  to  above  a  mile  a  minute;  the  non-stop 
flight  record  had  gone  up  to  244  miles  in  five  hours 
and  32  minutes,  the  altitude  record  to  8,692  feet,  and 
the  horse  power  of  motors  from  25-30  to  50-100 ;  while 
the  Alps  had  been  crossed  in  40  minutes,  flights  made 
from  Paris  to  London,  and  four  passengers  carried 
beside  the  pilot.  The  United  States,  however,  "had 
been  left  far  behind,"  having  but  one  lieutenant  and 
nine  enlisted  men  on  aeronautical  duty.  The  science 

10 


THE  BIRTH  OF  AMERICAN  AVIATION 

must  be  considered,  lie  said,  "whether  we  wish  to  or 
not."  His  recommendation  is  noteworthy,  dating 
back  as  it  does  hardly  beyond  yesterday  to  the  year 
1910.  "At  a  low  estimate,  it  is  believed  that  at  least 
20  aeroplanes  should  be  in  the  service  of  the  United 
States.  .  .  .  This  estimate  is  considered  extremely 
low."  Nevertheless  it  failed  of  acceptance. 

Meanwhile  France  and  other  European  nations 
were  developing  what  the  United  States  had  invented. 
At  the  French  Army  manoeuvres  on  September  9, 
1910,  an  officer  made  four  reconnaissances  in  quick 
succession.  On  one  of  these  trips  he  discovered  that 
a  counterattack  was  in  preparation  on  the  right  flank. 
He  flew  quickly  to  the  nearest  brigade  headquarters, 
secured  a  horse,  and  galloping  to  the  general,  gave 
him  the  information  which  enabled  timely  prepara^ 
tions  to  ward  off  the  blow. 

All  this  evidence,  however,  with  the  increased  pub- 
lic interest  through  a  series  of  exhibition  flights  all 
over  the  country,  was  having  weight  with  Congress. 
March  3,  1911,  deserves  to  be  marked  as  a  red-letter 
day  In  American  aviation  history,  for  on  that  day  the 
first  appropriation  ever  allotted  to  aviation  by  the 
law-making  body  was  enacted  in  the  Army  Appro- 
priation Act  for  the  fiscal  year  1912.  Thus,  three 
years  after  the  Wrights  had  officially  demonstrated 
the  fact  of  flight,  when  aviators  were  in  the  air  all 
over  the  world,  and  when  France  was  asking  for 
$1,000,000  for  aviation,  the  new  science  was  formally 
recognized  in  the  United  States  with  an  appropria- 
tion of  $125,000. 

A  real  beginning  in  Government  aviation  was  thus 
made  possible.  Planes  were  purchased  to  train  offi- 

11 


THE  AMEEICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

cers  at  San  Antonio,  Texas,  and  to  participate  in 
actual  field  reconnaissance  there.  In  June,J. 9 1 1^  the 
first  real  flying  school  was  established  at  College  Park, 
near  Washington,  and  by  the  end  of  the  year  America 
boasted  five  planes,  three  balloons,  and  six  licensed^; 
pilots.  During  this  first  pioneer  year,  nine  officers 
made  731  flights  for  a  total  time  in  the  air  of  129 
hours  and  39  minutes,  with  but  one  fatal  accident, 
that  of  G.  E.  M.  Kelly,  for  whom  Kelly  Field  was 
later  named.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  high 
record  was  made  by  Lieutenant  B.  D.  Foulois,  later 
American  Air  Service  commander-in-chief  in  France, 
with  312  flights  for  52  hours ;  and  the  second  highest 
record  by  Lieutenant  H.  H.  Arnold,  later  Assistant 
Director  of  the  Division  of  Military  Aeronautics,  with 
140  flights  for  a  total  of  29  hours.  Lieutenant 
Arnold  also  was  the  first  Army  aviator  to  fly  over  an 
hour,  being  in  the  air  one  hour  and  two  minutes  at 
College  Park  on  August  21,  1911,  with  a  distance  of 
42  miles.  The  general  progress  of  aviation  during 
the  year  was  described  by  General  Allen  as  "without 
precedent."  Speed  increased  to  80  miles  an  hour; 
distance  to  400  miles,  including  cross-country  flights 
from  St.  Louis  to  New  York  via  Chicago;  the  length 
of  time  in  the  air  to  14  hours ;  altitude  to  13,000  feet ; 
and  the  number  of  passengers  to  12.  The  hydroplane 
had  been  developed,  and  mails  carried  both  in  this 
country  and  in  England. 

"'The  year  1912  saw  a  similar  extension.  In  August 
came  the  Army  manoeuvres  at  Bridgeport,  Connecti- 
cut, where  four  aviators,  with  two  very  old  and  out-of- 
date  single-seaters,  located  troops  and  plotted  terrain 
at  2,500  feet,  made  photographs  at  1,500  feet,  and 


FRONT   OF   THE   FIRST   AMERICAN   "  LIBERTY  "    CAPRONI 


FRONT     OF     THE     AMERICAN      HANDLEY-PAGE,     SHOWING     SECRETARY     OF 
WAR    BAKER    AND    GENERAL    MARCH,    CHIEF    OF    STAFF 


THE  BIKTH  OF  AMERICAN  AVIATION 

signalled  by  radio  for  12  miles.     Airplanes^  were,  used 
for  the  first  time  in  the  United  States  in  connection 


with  arfflleiyj^ 

College  Park.  Three  methods  of  signalling  were  used 
to  control  the  batteries  —  radio,  dropping  of  cards, 
and  smoke  signals,  and  the  airplanes  established  their 
value  for  this  work  beyond  dispute.  Also  the  first 
known  use  of  machine  guns  from  airplanes  occurred 
at  College  Park  at  this  time,  an  Army  aviator  demon- 
strating the  possibility  of  offensive  aerial  warfare,  by 
securing  14  hits  out  of  50  shots  on  a  cloth  target  60 
feet  long  by  five  feet  wide  when  travelling  at  a  45-mile 
speed. 

College  Park  by  November  1,  1912,  had  grown  to 
have  12  officers,  39  men,  12  planes,  and  eight  hangars, 
virtually  the  Government's  entire  aeronautical  capi- 
tal. During  the  year  the  first  so-called  "  military 
planes"  were  received,  the  speed-scout  single-seater 
type  having  a  radius  of  100  miles  at  a  speed  of  65 
miles  an  hour,  and  the  two-seater  scout  with  45  miles 
an  hour  speed,  three  hours'  flight  endurance,  and 
weight-carrying  capacity  of  450  pounds.  All  ma- 
chines previously  used  had  been  ordinary  commercial 
planes  sufficient  for  exhibition  flying  but  lacking  the 
power,  speed  and  carrying  capacity  necessary  for 
military  use.  Just  two  less  than  1,500  flights  were 
made  in  the  fiscal  year  1912,  by  14  different  fliers  for 
a  total  time  in  the  air  of  224  hours  and  55  minutes. 
Lieutenant  Milling  made  the  high  record  with  431 
flights,  with  Lieutenant  Arnold  second  with  209.  The 
last  named  also  won  the  MacKay  trophy  for  a  cross- 
country flight  of  20  miles  at  1,500  feet  ;  it  is  significant 
of  the  times  that  only  one  other  aviator  was  entered. 

13 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

During  the  year  fatalities  were  very  high  —  four  offi- 
cers, one  civilian,  and  one  enlisted  man. 

Across  the  water  occurred  another  prophetic  event, 
reported  thus  by  General  George  P.  Scriven,  Chief 
Signal  Officer : 

The  first  review  ever  held  of  a  complete  aeroplane  armada 
•was  held  at  Villacoublay,  France,  September  27,  1912. 
Seventy-two  army  aeroplanes  were  present,  just  returned 
from  the  grand  army  manoeuvres  at  which  they  had  achieved 
many  triumphs.  At  the  conclusion  of  the  review,  20  air- 
planes rose  as  in  a  flock,  hovered  for  a  few  moments  over 
the  parade  ground,  and  then  sped  eastward  to  resume  their 
stations  on  the  German  frontier. 


At  about  this  time,  new  world's  records  were  set  as 
follows :  duration,  13  hours  and  17  minutes ;  altitude,  I 
18,537  feet ;  and  speed,  109  miles  per  hour. 

Meanwhile  the  need  for  development  of  the  Ameri- 
can service  was  becoming  clearer.  The  Secretary  of 
War,  in  response  to  a  request  of  Congress,  proposed  on 
March  26,  1912,  an  appropriation  of  $2,000,000  for  a 
continuing  policy  for  a  force  of  120  planes  and  a 
series  of  training  schools,  which  was  well  in  propor- 
tion to  European  progress.  This  plan,  however,  was 
not  adopted,  and  the  service  had  to  struggle  on  with 
very  limited  funds.  The  second  appropriation,  on 
August  24,  1912,  was  for  but  $100,000,  actually  less 
than  the  first;  the  third  appropriation  was  restored 
to  $125,000. 

A  flight  very  noteworthy  for  that  time  was  made  on 
March  28,  1913,  by  Lieutenant  Milling,  when  he  broke 
the  American  Army  record  for  distance  by  covering 
the  240  miles  between  Texas  City  and  San  Antonio, 
and  the  record  for  endurance  when  he  stayed  in  the 

14 


THE  BIRTH  OP  AMERICAN  AVIATION 

air  a  total  time  of  four  hours  and  22  minutes.  The 
flight  was  made  over  wholly  unfamiliar  country  with- 
out landing  places,  and  in  its  course  Milling  made  a 
remarkable  military  sketch  map,  fairly  complete  in 
details  and  showing  railroads,  wagon  roads,  streams, 
woods,  and  so  on.  Another  ''brilliant  flight"  was 
reported  at  San  Diego  of  55  miles  in  one  hour  and 
fivejninutes  at JS^OO Jeet^ 

The  problem  of  training  aviators  was  now  clarify- 
ing also.  The  early  practice  of  giving  the  prelim- 
inary training  at  the  manufacturers '  schools  had  now 
to  be  given  up  because  "the  general  interest  in  the  use 
of  the  aeroplane  has  fallen  to  such  a  low  ebb  that 
adequate  training  of  military  aviators  cannot  be  given 
at  these  schools."  The  new  system  provided  that 
preliminary  training  should  be  given  by  the  expert 
military  trainers,  "of  whom  there  are  now  two  or 
three  in  the  country,"  and  that  the  final  training 
should  come  in  actual  field  work.  On  May  6,  1913, 
it  was  decided  to  abandon  the  College  Park  Station, 
most  of  the  personnel  and  equipment  being  trans- 
ferred to  San  Diego,  California,  where  private  owners 
were  good  enough  to  allow  the  Government  the  use 
of  their  land.  By  the  summer  of  1913,  the  school  had  ] 
12  officers  under  instruction,  47  enlisted  men  on  hand,  ? 
and  seven  planes.  The  total  number  of  planes  in  the 
whole  Army  was  15,  and  the  total  number  of  men  who 
had  qualified  as  military  aviators  was  11,  of  whom  one 
was  dead  and  four  were  in  other  branches  of  the  1 
service. 

The  first  regular  estimate  for  over  $1,000,000  was 
that  proposed  for  the  1915  Army  appropriation, 
stated  by  General  Scriven  to  be  "necessary  if  the 

15 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 


United  States  is  to  keep  abreast  of  developments  in 
this  science  and  cope  with,  other  first-class  powers." 
Secretary  Garrison,  however,  threw  out  over  $700,000 
for  the  balloon  service  and  submitted  to  Congress  a 
net  figure  of  $300,000,  including  $25,000  to  provide 
bonuses  for  manufacturers  who  exceeded  certain 
degrees  of  merit.  Surprisingly  enough,  this  appro- 
priation was  reduced  in  hearings  before  the  House 
Committee  on  Military  Affairs  beginning  on  December 
4,  1913,  to  $250,000,  despite  the  fact  that  it  was 
"trifling"  in  comparison  with  those  of  foreign  powers. 
The  United  States  was  shown  to  stand  fourteenth^ 
among  the  nations  in  the  total  appropriations  of 
$86,570,000  made  in  the  previous  five  years  since  the 
first  Wright  flight,  as  follows :  Germany,  $28,000,000 ; 
France,  $22,000,000;  Russia,  $12,000,000;  Italy,  $8,- 
000,000 ;  Austria,  $5,000,000 ;  Great  Britain,  $3,000,- 
000 ;  Belgium,  $2,000,000 ;  Japan,  $1,500,000 ;  China, 
$700,000;  Bulgaria,  $600,000;  Greece,  $600,000; 
Spain,  $550,000;  Brazil,  $500,000;  United  States, 
$435,000.  The  United  States  stood  equally  low  in 
the  number  of  planes  arid  pilots  and  the  appropria- 
tions of  the  preceding  year,  as  shown  in  the  following 
figures : 


Planes 

Pilots 

Appropriations,  19  If 

260 

171 

$7,400,000 

100 

28 

5,000,000 

46 

52 

5,000,000 

29 

88 

3,000,000 

Italy  

26 

35 

2,100,000 

Japan  

14 

8 

1,000,000 

United  States  

6 

14 

125,000 

16 


THE  BIRTH  OF  AMERICAN  AVIATION 

Secretary  Garrison  protested  vigorously  against 
the  reduction  made  by  the  House  Committee  before 
a  Senate  subcommittee,  on  the  ground  that  it  would  be 
1 '  extremely  difficult  to  meet  the  needs  of  the  Army  in 
the  purchase  of  aviation  materials  and  the  mainte- 
nance thereof  for  the  existing  year  with  $300,000,  and 
a  reduction  of  that  amount  would  cause  us  grave 
embarrassment. ' '  He  added : 

There  has  been  a  great  deal  of  interest  in  this  matter  of 
aviation  and  Mr.  Hay,  the  Chairman  of  the  Military  Com- 
mittee of  the  House,  had  quite  a  long  talk  with  me  early 
in  my  encumbency  about  the  desirability  of  forming  a 
separate  aviation  corps  and  was  considering  the  appropria- 
tion of  a  very  large  sum  of  money.  I  discouraged  that  plan 
because  there  were  so  many  other  things  we  had  to  ask  for 
this  year  in  the  way  of  artillery  and  artillery  ammunition 
that  required  large  sums  of  money  that  we  thought  this 
development  could  wait.  If  you  will  look  in  the  Book  of - 
Estimates  you  will  find  a  statement  of  what  other  countries 
have  been  spending,  running  way  up  into  the  millions,  and 
I  then  said  it  seemed  to  me  that  if  we  simply  had  enough 
machines  and  enough  accessories  and  enough  money  to  keep 
our  men  au  fait,  they  will  get  the  benefit  of  all  this  large 
expenditure  in  other  countries  because  they  will  necessarily 
develop  the  art.  I  was  not  in  favor  of  going  into  the  mil- 
lions this  year,  but  I  do  think  the  estimate  has  been  so  legiti- 
mately modest  that  it  was  pretty  hard  to  lose  the  $50,000 
when  the  sentiment  was  really  in  favor  of  a  larger  appro- 
priation for  that  specific  thing. 

General  Scriven  added  that  "we  have  either  got 
to  go  ahead  with  aviation  or  stop."  Nevertheless, 
Congress  did  not  see  fit  to  restore  the  figure  to  the 
original  sum,  and  the  service  was  restricted  to 
$250,J)OOJ[or_  the_  fiscal  ^y^arJLJj^  Nothing  shows 
better  how  purely  experimental  and  negligible  the 

17 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

service  was  considered  at  that  time.  Up  to  December 
1,  1913,  only  47  men  had  been  in  training  as  aviators, 
of  whom  19  had  qualified,  and  only  24  machines  had 
been  purchased  in  the  five  years  since  Wright's 
first  flight. 

The  situation  was  now  becoming  critical,  especially 
for  lack  of  officers  to  train  as  fliers.  Moreover,  public 
interest  here  had  lagged  in  equal  proportion  to  the 
increase  of  interest  abroad.  '  *  America, ' '  said  Colonel 
Samuel  Reber,  in  charge  of  aviation,  "which  gave 
birth  to  aviation  and  led  the  world  during  the  period 
of  its  early  development,  has  been  distanced  by  the 
great  nations  of  Europe  and  with  the  exception  of 
the  hydroplane  has  contributed  practically  nothing  to 
the  science  in  the  past  three  years,  It  has  been  sur- 
passed not  only  in  the  number  of  pilots,  types  of 
planes,  and  engines,  but  also  in  engineering  skill  and 
construction."  The  enthusiasm  that  had  swept  over 
the  country  in  1910  in  a  series  of  meets  and  ex- 
hibitions at  Los  Angeles,  Belmont  Park  and  Chicago 
had  been  easily  satiated  by  a  few  stunts,  and  appar- 
ently very  little  further  was  expected  of  aviation  now 
that  flight  had  been  demonstrated  as  possible. 
Whereas  Glenn  H.  Curtiss  had  won  the  first  Gordon 
Bennett  contest  at  Rheims,  France,  in  1909  from  all 
comers,  the  French  aviators  who  came  to  this  country 
for  the  third  meeting  at  Clearing,  Illinois,  in  Sep- 
tember, 1913,  actually  smothered  all  American  com- 
petition. 

The  public  has  lost  interest  and  does  not  support  aviation 
as  a  sport;  the  Government  has  given  but  little  aid  in  de- 
veloping it  as  an  adjunct  to  the  national  defense  and  has 
imposed  no  restrictions  or  regulations  on  its  private  use; 

18 


THE  BIRTH  OF  AMERICAN  AVIATION 

the  output  of  aeroplanes  and  motors  in  this  country  is 
inferior  both  in  numbers  and  in  quality  to  that  of  the 
foreigners;  our  airmen  are  fewer  in  number  and  of  less 
experience;  no  public-spirited  citizen  has  endowed  an 
aeronautical  laboratory  as  has  been  done  in  many  instances 
abroad ;  our  technical  colleges  have  not  offered  opportunities 
for  the  scientific  training  of  aeronautical  engineers.  To 
place  the  development  of  mechanical  flight  on  a  correct 
engineering  basis  the  cut  and  try  methods  of  the  pioneer 
must  give  way  to  both  theoretical  and  practical  investigation 
of  the  laws  of  aerodynamics  and  to  careful  tests  of  machines 
and  the  materials  entering  into  their  production. 

Thus  was  American  aviation  officially  described  in 
1913. 

The  number  of  qualified  fliers  was  very  low.  At 
the  beginning  of  1913  it  was  estimated  that  of  the 
total  of  2,400  in  the  world,  Prance  possessed  1,200; 
England,  302;  Germany,  320;  Italy,  200;  Austria,  60; 
the  United  States,  50;  Belgium,  50;  Holland,  23; 
Spain,  18.  At  the  same  time  General  Scriven  said: 
"The  number  of  civilians  who  have  hitherto  under- 
taken to  fly  for  their  own  pleasure,  for  sport,  or  for 
money-making  is  fast  diminishing,  and  it  is  doubtful 
whether  in  the  event  of  war  a  score  of  men  capable  of 
making  flights  useful  to  the  army  could  be  obtained 
from  civil  life."  The  most  serious  phase  of  the 
situation,  but  one  easily  remedied,  was  that  Army 
officers  did  not  volunteer  for  this  work.  "The  re- 
wards offered,''  General  Scriven  told  Congress, 
"have  so  far  been  inadequate  and  have  not  resulted 
in  securing  even  the  limited  number  for  aviation  duty 
now  authorized  by  law."  The  service  was  freely  de- 
scribed as  "extra-hazardous,"  as  eight  officers  and 
one  enlisted  man  had  been  killed  to  date.  Thirty 

19 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

officers  were  authorized  for  the  service,  "if  you  can 
get  them, ' '  but  at  present  only  19  of  the  line  and  two 
of  the  Signal  Corps  were  on  duty.  In  all  the  five 
years  since  1908,  there  had  been  but  75  applicants, 
of  whom  17  had  dropped  out  and  13  were  disqualified 
temperamentally,  three  physically,  and  six  otherwise. 
In  all,  but  32  had  taken  up  flying  and  13  of  these  had 
been  relieved.  "We  cannot  get  them,"  Captain 
Mitchell  said,  "because  they  do  not  apply.  They  do 
not  see  any  future  in  it. ' ' 

Consequently,  at  this jpartingjof  the  ways,  a  bill 
was  present  eel  to  Congress  on  August  23,  1913,  to 
increase  the  personnel,  the  prestige  and  the  rewards 
of  this  "extra-hazardous"  service.  It  provided  for 
the  formal  recognition  of  aviation  by  establishing  an 
Aviation  Section  within  the  Signal  Corps,  with  an 
increase  to  60  officers  and  260  men.  Aviation  students 
were  to  receive  25  per  cent,  increase  in  pay;  junior 
military  aviators  were  to  have  the  rank,  pay  and 
allowances  of  one  grade  higher  and  50  per  cent,  in- 
crease in  pay  over  their  line  commissions;  military 
aviators  were  to  be  similarly  treated  except  for  an 
increase  of  75  per  cent. ;  and  enlisted  men  while  flying 
were  to  receive  an  increase  of  50  per  cent.  Congress 
was  told  that  "America  was  enormously  behind 
Europe ; ' '  that  no  American  motor  had  ' '  remained  in 
the  air  half  as  long  as  the  best  of  European  produc- 
tions;" that  "the  industry  is  starving,"  the  press 
apathetic,  the  public  wholly  disinterested;  and  that 
if  the  present  bill  were  not  passed,  aviation  would  slip 
wholly  into  decay  in  this  country.  Apparently  there 
was  agreement  on  all  sides  that  a  drastic  departure 
was  essential  if  the  art  were  to  be  saved,  the  only 

20 


THE  BIRTH  OF  AMERICAN  AVIATION 

question  being  as  to  whether  a  separate  service  should 
be  created,  as  urged  by  the  younger  officers.  The 
friction  on  this  point,  which  had  greatly  retarded  the 
service,  broke  out  even  before  Congress,  when  General 
Scriven  called  the  statements  of  one  of  the  younger 
officers  l '  not  only  offensive  but  untrue. ' ? 

Finally,  11  months  after  the  presentation  of  the 
bill,  on  July  18,  1914,  just  a  few  days  before  the  out- 
break of  the  European  War,  the  bill  actually  became 
law.  Its  importance  cannot  be  exaggerated,  for  in 
effedrtr  created  a  flying  service  with  an  established 
personnel  and  rewards  sufficient  to  attract  the  best 
kind  of  officers.  From  this  time  on  aviation  in  the 
American  Army,  although  held  within  the  narrow 
confines  of  the  whole  American  military  establishment, 
was  free  to  develop  on  a  clearly  defined  basis. 


21 


CHAPTER  II 

DEVELOPMENTS  THROUGH  THE  EUROPEAN  WAR 

Enormous  and  rapid  development  of  aviation  by  the  European 
belligerents  —  The  United  States  debarred  from  participa- 
tion by  military  secrecy  —  American  military  aeronautics 
in  1914  —  The  First  Aero  Squadron  organized  —  The  first 
specifications  for  military  airplanes  —  Estimate  of  the 
airplane  as  a  fighting  machine  —  The  $300,000  appropria- 
tion for  1916  —  National  Advisory  Committee  for  Aero- 
nautics created  —  Its  investigation  of  aeronautical  science 
in  the  colleges  —  Military  aeronautics  in  1915  —  Defects 
of  the  Act  creating  the  Aviation  Section  in  the  Signal 
Corps  —  New  provision  for  aviation  in  the  National  De- 
fense Act  of  June  3,  1916  —  The  crisis  on  the  Mexican 
border  and  a  special  emergency  appropriation  —  Aerial 
service  with  the  Pershing  expedition  —  The  $13,000,000 
appropriation  for  1917  —  Secretary  Baker  on  the  needs 
of  the  Air  Service  —  Its  reorganization  under  Colonel 
George  O.  Squier  —  Problems  of  equipment  and  per- 
sonnel —  Military  aeronautics  in  1916  —  The  $10,800,000 
appropriation  for  1918  adopted  after  our  declaration  of 
war. 

Not  until  the  outbreak  of  the  European  War  in 
1914  was  mankind  destined  to  complete  the  conquest 
of  the  air.  Where,  in  the  half-dozen  years  since 
Wright's  first  flight,  the  various  nations  had  crept 
slowly  forward,  largely  through  the  untiring  efforts 
of  a  few  zealots,  the  terrible  demands  of  the  life  and 
death  struggle  of  the  nations  drew  forth  a  genius  of 
development.  The  various  air  services,  new,  inspir- 
ing and  romantic,  quickened  imagination  the  world 
over.  The  vital  import  of  a  mile  or  two  more  of 
speed  an  hour,  or  a  little  higher  climbing  ability, 
brought  forth  in  a  few  months  from  the  organized 
science  of  the  world  developments  which  would  have 

22 


THE  EUROPEAN  WAR 

taken  a  decade  or  more  under  the  previous  conditions 
of  disorganized,  undirected  effort. 

From  this  great  development  the  United  States  was 
for  two  and  a  half  years  entirely  shut  off  by  the  heavy 
curtain  of  military  secrecy  which  the  belligerent 
Governments  were  forced  to  erect.  Only  an  occa- 
sional flash  of  light  shot  through  to  indicate  what  was 
going  on  in  the  scientific  laboratories  and  the  factories 
behind  the  battle  lines.  Nevertheless,  there  was  ever 
present  in  aerial  warfare  so  much  to  stimulate  the 
imagination  and  the  sense  of  chivalry  that  the 
American  public  was  eager  for  every  detail,  and  fol- 
lowed aviation  development  with  an  interest  which  it 
was  not  possible  for  a  non-military  people  to  extend 
to  other  more  technical  phases  of  the  distant  struggle. 

America's  aviation  leaders  were  fully  alive  to  the 
vital  military  importance  of  the  new  art.  General 
Seriven,  in  his  annual  report  written  riot  two  months 
after  the  Great  War  broke  out,  used  the  brief  experi- 
ence abroad  to  drive  home  once  again  his  demand  for 
an  adequate  air  army : 

•*• 

It  seems  probable  that  the  airplane,  and  to  some  smaller 
degree  all  aircraft,  have  altered,  not  the  principles  of 
strategy,  which  are  immutable,  but  the  theory  and  applica- 
tion of  grand  tactics.  It  now  appears  that  the  actual  game 
of  war  is  played  openly  with  the  cards  laid  on  the  table, 
and  opportunity  no  longer  given  for  inference  as  to  con- 
cealed movements  or  surprise,  perhaps  not  even  for  the  exer- 
cise of  the  high  military  quality  of  anticipation  of  the  un- 
seen movements  of  the  adversary. 

The  Aviation  Section  was  still  almost  negligible  in 
numbers,  the  parent  organization  in  the  Signal  Corps 
having  struggled  through  the  lank  years  of  apathy 

23 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

and  experimentation  barely  able  to  keep  alive  and 
wholly  unable  to  develop  on  a  broad  scale.  Neverthe- 
less, the  record  for  the  fiscal  year  before  the  war  had 
been  so  promising,  comparatively,  that  General 
Scriven  in  his  1914  report  stated  that  "the  aviation 
work  of  the  Signal  Corps  is  on  a  very  satisfactory 
basis."  An  amount  of  flying  quite  unprecedented 
had  been  carried  on  at  San  Diego.  During  the  year 
3,340  flights  were  made,  796  passengers  carried,  and 
747  hours  spent  in  the  air.  Many  flights  were  "at 
high  altitudes,  ranging  from  5,000  to  12,000  feet," 
and  a  new  American  cross-country  distance  and  dura- 
tion record  for  a  machine  carrying  a  pilot  and  one 
passenger  was  made  on  February  14,  1914,  when 
Lieutenant  Dodd  at  San  Diego  covered  246  miles  in 
four  hours  and  32  minutes. 

The  San  Diego  school,  located  by  courtesy  on  land 
loaned  free  of  charge,  which  the  Government  might 
be.  requested  to  vacate  at  any  moment,  developed 
favorably  despite  the  lack  of  instructors  and  planes. 
The  officers,  General  Scriven  said,  "with  little  or  no 
experience  and  with  no  precedent  to  guide  them, 
have  had  to  train  themselves  and  their  subordinates 
at  the  same  time."  Civilian  instructors  were  added 
during  the  year,  as  "teaching  men  to  fly  is  probably 
the  most  dangerous  occupation  in  the  world,  and  men 
who  can  do  this  work  and  do  it  well  are  very  rare  and 
their  services  are  cheap  at  almost  any  price. ' '  Three 
more  accidents  with  four  deaths  occurred  during  this 
period,  which  led  to  the  final  decision  to  abandon  the 
pusher  type  of  plane  in  favor  of  the  tractor,  as  the 
former  in  an  accident  tended  to  drive  the  aviator 
straight  into  the  ground  with  the  whole  weight  of  the 

24 


THE  EUROPEAN  WAR 

engine  on  top  of  him.  The  change,  however,  further 
held  up  training,  as  only  one  or  two  officers  knew  how 
to  manage  the  tractor. 

During  this  year  the  first  tactical  aerial  unit  in 
America's  history  was  created.  This  was  the  First 
Aero  Squadron,  formed  at  San  Diego  in  September, 
1914,  under  orders  of  December  4, 1913.  It  consisted 
at  the  time  of  16  officers,  77  men,  and  eight  planes,  and 
was  soon  destined  to  see  active  service  across  the 
sands  of  Mexico. 

One  of  the  best  indications  of  the  condition  of 
aeronautical  science  at  that  time  is  found  in  the  fact 
that  on  July  1, 1914,  the  first  specifications  for  a  highly 
specialized  plane,  that  is  to  say,  a  plane  that  not  only 
could  fly  but  could  also  answer  certain  definite 
military  requirements,  were  issued.  The  purpose  was 
to  encourage  the  few  lean  manufacturers  and  to  de- 
velop new  types  of  planes;  the  details  are  very 
illuminating.  They  called  for  a  "  biplane,  enclosed 
fuselage,  two  seater,  dual  control,  with  a  maximum 
speed  of  not  less  than  70  and  a  minimum  speed  of 
not  more  than  40  miles  per  hour  when  carrying  fuel 
and  oil  for  four  hours '  flight  at  70  miles  per  hour  and 
a  useful  load  of  450  pounds  and  under  these  condi- 
tions to  climb  4,000  feet  in  10  minutes. ' '  These  con- 
ditions were  considered  very  strict.  Only  12  com- 
petitors entered,  most  of  whom  were  known  not  to  be 
able  to  fulfill  the  requirements.  Fortunately,  at  this 
time  the  engine  situation  was  beginning  to  improve, 
after  a  long  period  when,  as  General  Scriven  said, l '  it 
looked  as  though  it  was  absolutely  hopeless  to  depend 
on  American  manufacturers  to  produce  a  satisfactory 
aeroplane  engine." 

25 


THE  AME 


RICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

Just  at  the  time  the  war  broke  out  in  Europe,  the 
1916  ^Srmy~appropriation  was  being  estimated.  A 
total  estimate  of  $1,006,300  was  submitted  to  Secre- 
tary Garrison,  providing  for  two  complete  squadrons 
of  16  planes  and  six  planes  for  insular  service,  to- 
gether with  lighter-than-air  equipment.  Mr.  Garri- 
son, however,  threw  out  the  latter,  reduced  the  air- 
plane figure  by  $100,000,  and  sent  an  estimate  of 
$400,000  to  Congress,  which  began  hearings,  before  the 
House  Committee  on  Military  Affairs  on  December  8, 
1914. 

General  Scriven  took  advantage  of  this  first  hearing 
after  the  outbreak  of  war.     Airplanes  had  shown,  he  | 
said,  '  '  that  they  are  the  most  tremendous  implement 
for  reconnaissance  and  for  the  gathering  of  informa- 
tion that  modern  war  has  ever  seen.     As  a  fighting 
machine,  the  aeroplane  has  not  justified  its  existence.  "  > 
They  could  spot  for  artillery,  he  said,  by  smoke  bombs 
or  by  dropping  fragments  of  tinsel  paper,  which  in 
falling  through  the  sunlight  gave  out  flashes  of  light.; 
A  lifting  power  of  only  150  pounds,  however,  rendered  1 
them  useless  for  offense. 

Much  concern  was  expressed  by  the  Committee  as 
to  whether  touch  was  being  kept  with  foreign  develop- 
ments, to  which  Colonel  Reber  answered:  "I  think 
we  are  —  as  far  as  it  is  possible  to  say  we  are  keeping 
abreast  of  conditions  that  we  do  not  know  anything 
about."  This  complete  exclusion  from  scientific  de- 
velopments abroad,  wholly  unavoidable  as  it  was,  was 
destined  to  have  a  most  serious  effect  on  America's 
later  preparation. 

The  industrial  situation  also  was  very  serious.  One 
hundred  machines,  General  Scriven  said,  could  not  be 

26 


THE  EUROPEAN  WAR 

secured  in  less  than  a  year 's  time,  for  up  to  then  only 
three  companies  had  done  business  for  the  Govern- 
ment, and  one  of  them  had  recently  ceased.  Said 
Colonel  Reber : 

Inasmuch  as  they  have  practically  no  orders  at  all  except 
what  they  get  from  the  Government,  they  can  hardly  make 
both  ends  meet.  In  fact,  two  manufacturers  have  told  me 
they  are  behind  the  game  and  hanging  on  by  their  eyes, 
hoping  times  would  get  better.  I  do  not  think  any  aeroplane 
manufacturer  is  making  money  out  of  the  Government  or 
anyone  else.  There  is  no  combination  among  them  because 
all  are  so  poor  they  need  the  business. 

All  of  which  led  Chairman  Hay  to  call  it  "a  pretty 
serious  situation. ' ' 

The  Governmentjfchen  had  but  11  planes  and  two    • 
training  planes,  with  11  about  to  be  ordered,  and  a  ; 
force  of  160  men  as  against  2,600  for  Germany  and 
3,000  for  France.     The  appropriation  asked  called  for 
a  front  line  of  but  32  planes,  with  a  reserve  of  50  — 
per  cent.     Figures  were  given  to  show  that  the  last 
budgets  before  the  war  were :    Germany,  $45,000,000 ; 
France,    $12,800,000;   Russia,   $22,500,000;   Austria, 
$3,000,000 ;  Great  Britain,  $1,080,000 ;  Italy,  $800,000 ; 
United  States,  $250,000.      Secretary  Garrison's  esti-^_      ^ 
mate,  therefore,  was  well  described  by  one  of  the  Com- 
mittee as  very  modest,  and  it  is  all  the  more  surprising      / 
that    the    amount    finally    authorized    came    to   but 
$300,000a  possibly  on  the  theory  expressed  by  Senator 
McKellar,  that  airplanes  "have  proved  worthless  to 
a  very  large  extent,  and  we  are  the  gainers  by  not 
having  spent  so  much." 

Nevertheless,  at  this  time  the  attention  of  the  coun- 
try's foremost  scientists  was  being  aroused  to  aero- 

27 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

nautics  to  a  degree  never  before  exhibited.  The  war 
abroad  had  driven  home  the  realization  that  in  this 
most  complicated  of  sciences  America  must  mobilize 
her  best  minds  if  she  were  not  to  be  hopelessly  out- 
distanced. Consequently,  a  bill  approved~by  Presi- 
dent Wilson  was  introduced  into  Congress,  and  be-  »  j 
came  law  as  a  part  of  the  Naval  Appropriation  Act 
of  March  3,  1915,  establishing  a  National  Advisory 
Committee  for  Aeronautics  to  supervise  and  direct 
the  scientific  study  of  the  problems  of  flight.  ..  The 
sum  of  $5,000  a  year  for  five  years  allotted  for  this 
work  stands  out  as  a  sharp  indication  of  the  actual 
value,  expressed  in  dollars  and  cents,  attached  to  it. 
Nevertheless,  the  Committee,  in  borrowed  offices,  at 
first  in  the  ante-room  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  set  out 
on  its  neglected  task  with  a  strong  membership,  com- 
posed by  law  of  two  members  each  from  the  Army 
and  the  Navy  air  services,  one  each  from  the  Smith- 
sonian Institution,  the  Weather  Bureau,  and  the 
Bureau  of  Standards,  and  not  over  five  other  civilian 
members. 

The  War  Department's  plans  for  aviation  were  out- 

i,--     r^      — _______^ ^ .»— ^— 

lined  to  the  Advisory  Committee  in  a  letter  from 
General  Scriven  on  April  16,  1915,  showing  that  there 
was  in  mind  the  development  of  the  school  at  San 
Diego,  the  establishment  of  the  first ' '  aviation  center ' ' 
at  San  Antonio,  Texas,  and  the  building  up  of  a  first- 
line  force  of  four  squadrons  of  eight  planes  each  with 
50  per  cent,  replacement  and  two  training  planes,  a 
total  of  50  planes.  "In  the  light  of  experience,  how- 
ever, and  of  present  information,"  said  General 
Scriven,  "I  now  believe  these  numbers  somewhat 
small  even  for  present  needs."  He  added  that  he 

28 


THE  EUROPEAN  WAR 

would  ask  for  a  front  line  of  as  much  as  75  planes  at  a 
cost  of  $750,000. 

One  of  the  most  extraordinary  flashes  of  light  on 
the  standing  of  aviation  at  that  time  came  when  on 
August  1,  1915,  exactly  a  year  after  the  outbreak  of 
the  European  War  and  seven  years  after  Wright  had 
made  his  first  flight,  a  letter  was  sent  by  the  Com- 
mittee to  112  colleges,  22  aeronautical  societies,  and 
eight  manufacturers,  asking  what  they  had  done,  were 
doing,  or  contemplated  doing  towards  the  conquest  of 
the  air.  Only  four  manufacturers  replied  and  these 
in  the  most  elementary  terms.  "The  interest  of  the 
colleges/7  the  Committee  summarized,  "is  more  one 
of  curiosity  than  that  of  considering  the  problem  as 
a  true  engineering  one  requiring  development  of  engi- 
neering resources,  and  therefore  as  not  yet  of  sufficient 
importance  to  engage  their  serious  attention. ' '  About 
25  educational  institutions  had  been  interested  in  one 
way  or  another,  some  of  which  had  dropped  the  sub- 
ject entirely,  and  the  majority  had  taken  only  the 
most  elementary  steps.  Institutions  such  as  Yale, 
Cornell,  Michigan,  Brown,  Georgia  School  of  Tech- 
nology, Worcester  Polytechnic,  Minnesota,  and  Penn- 
sylvania State  College  all  reported  lack  of  funds. 
Only  the  University  of  Michigan  and  the  Massachu- 
setts Institute  of  Technology  reported  a  regular 
course  of  instruction  and  experimentation.  Cornell 
was  interested  in  glider  experiments,  and  Pennsyl- 
vania State  College  possessed  an  airplane  five  years 
old.  Obviously,  in  this,  the  second  year  of  war 
abroad,  the  interest  in  the  scientific  development  of 
aviation  was  very  limited. 

Meanwhile,  although  the  Aviation  Section  was 
29 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

growing  very  slowly  within  its  narrow  limits,  its 
achievements  were  becoming  more  and  more  substan- 
tial. A  new  American  altitude  record  for  a  single- 
seater  plane  of  17,441  feet  was  established  on  October 
4, 1914,  by  Captain  H.  LeR.  Muller.  A  new  American 
two-seater  altitude  record  of  11,690  feet  was  estab- 
lished on  January  5,  1915,  by  Lieutenant  J.  E.  Car- 
berry,  pilot,  and  Lieutenant  A.  R.  Christie,  observer. 
Ten  days  later  Lieutenant  B.  Q.  Jones  established  a 
new  American  endurance  record  of  eight  hours  and 
52  minutes,  and  on  March  12,  a  new  world's  record  of 
seven  hours  and  five  minutes  for  a  pilot  and  two  pas- 
sengers. During  the  fiscal  year  1915  Government 
planes  were  in  the  air  nearly  twice  as  long  as  in  the 
year  before,  and  the  number  of  passengers  was  more 
than  doubled.  At  that,  only  1,269%  hours  were 
flown  and  1,730  passengers  carried  by  the  whole  Army 
air  service. 

The  extreme  necessity  of  preparedness  far  in  ad-^ 
vance  was  again  urged  by  General  Scriven  in  his  1915 
report.  "The  difficulties  surrounding  the  creation 
of  an  adequate  aeronautical  service  after  the  outbreak 
of  hostilities, ' '  he  said,  ' '  have  been  vividly  illustrated 
during  the  past  year  and  the  great  inconvenience  and 
dangers  resulting  from  the  lack  of  an  adequate  aero- 
nautical personnel  and  materiel  have  been  demon- 
strated so  forcibly  that  comment  is  unnecessary. " 
This  statement  was  reinforced  by  the  fact  that  there 
were  only  30  officers,  including  20  junior  military 
aviators  and  four  qualified  students,  and  177  men  in 
the  Aviation  Section.  A  confidence  in  the  aircraft 
industry  was  expressed  by  General  Scriven  which 
was  to  prove  later  to  have  been  seriously  misplaced. 

30 


THE  EUROPEAN  WAR 


Since  the  outbreak  of  the  European  War,  several  new 
factories  had  sprung  up  with  bold  claims  of  produc- 
tion, but  the  Government  did  not  have  the  accurate 
information  necessary  to  judge  their  capacity.  For- 
tunately, so  far  as  engines  were  concerned,  all  possi- 
bility of  misapprehension  had  been  removed  when  the 
complete  shutting  off  of  foreign  supplies  had  left  this 
country  high  and  dry. 

By  early  1916  America's  international  situation  had 
become  alarming,  and  the  agitation  for  military  pre- 
paredness had  assumed  definite  proportions.  The 
unfolding  of  the  magnitude  of  modern  warfare  had 
disclosed  America's  defenselessness  in  a  dramatic 
way,  and  as  a  result  a  series  of  changes  were  made  in 
the  whole  military  organization,  including  the  Air 
Service,  through  the  National  Defense  Act  of  June  3, 
1916. 

Very  serious  weaknesses  in  the  basic  legislation  of 
the  Air  Service  were  early  developed  in  the  hearings 
before  the  House  Committee  on  Military  Affairs  be- 
ginning on  January  18,  1916.  Not  only  did  the  law 
restrict  it  in  size  to  a  handful  of  60  officers  and  260 
men,  but  it  imposed  further  restrictions  that  made  it 
extremely  difficult  to  attain  even  that  small  strength. 
Aviation  duty,  which  was  fully  voluntary,  was  re- 
stricted to  unmarried  lieutenants  of  the  line  under 
30  years  of  age,  which  class  at  the  time  included  only 
668  officers.  The  tendency,  therefore,  was  "to  fill 
the  Aviation  Section  with  young  and  inexperienced 
officers,  the  majority  of  whom  were  Second  Lieu- 
tenants," as  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  on  August  16, 
1915,  only  five  of  the  29  officers  on  duty  were  above 
that  rank,  and  at  the  same  time  to  keep  out  many 

31 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

desirable  men  who  happened  to  be  married  or  over 
30  years  of  age.  Indeed,  of  the  60  officers  authorized 
in  the  basic  Act  passed  18  months  previously,  only 
46  were  actually  on  duty.  Thirty-eight  new  officers 
had  been  added  to  the  19  on  duty  at  the  passage  of  the 
Act,  and  nine  had  been  relieved  and  two  killed.  Of  a 
grand  total  of  43  fliers  trained  since  the  beginning  of 
aviation,  14  had  been  relieved  and  six  killed,  leaving 
23  actually  on  flying  duty.  No  real  reinforcement 
was  possible  from  civilian  aviators  in  case  of  a  crisis. 
Of  the  300  licensed  pilots  in  the  United  States  out-  i 
side  the  Army,  not  a  handful  were  good  cross-country 
fliers.  It  was  generously  estimated  that  possibly  100 
might  be  secured  after  a  month's  training,  but  the 
fields  available  could  train  only  25  men  at  a  time,  as 
there  were  but  19  planes  on  hand  and  six  in  manu- 
facture. 

Here  developed  an  early  instance  of  disagreement 
between  the  Air  Service  and  the  "War  Department. 
The  former  most  vigorously  requested  a  total  of  18 
squadrons,  one  for  each  of  the  seven  proposed  tactical 
units,  five  for  the  Field  Artillery,  three  for  the  Coast 
Artillery,  and  three  for  overseas,  with  a  total  strength 
of  368  officers  and  2,360  men  and  between  432  to  648 
planes.  The  War  Department,  however,  cut  this 
programme  practically  by  two-thirds,  allowing  but  ^ 
133^  officers  and  710  men,  and  Congress  sustained  the 
Department  over  both  the  protest  and  the  compromise 
suggested  by  the  aviation  authorities. 

The  rapid  distancing  of  the  United  States  in 
scientific  development  was  brought  out  at  the  hearings. 
There  had  been  no  experimentation  with  foreign  ma- 
chines, Colonel  Reber  said,  not  only  because  it 

32 


THE  EUROPEAN  WAR 

next   to_jmpossible   to   obtain    fhpTn;   hnt. 

"we  have  been  so  poor  we  have  just  been  able  to  keep 
our  own  equipment  going  without  doing  any  experi- 
mental work  that  has  amounted  to  anything  at  all."  ,_ 

All  the  legal  restrictions  complained  of  were  cleared 
away  by  Congress  in  the  National  Defense  Act  of 
June  3,  1916,  and  an  appreciable  increase  in  personnel 
was  allowed.  An  immediate  strength  by  July  1,  1916, 
of  one  major,  11  captains,  and  65  first  lieutenants  was 
authtrrkeefr  with  an  ev en luat- strength  by~JuljT'  1, 
1920,  by  annual  increments,  of  one  colonel,  one  lieu- 
tenant-colonel, eight  majors,  24  captains,  114  firsl 
lieutenants,  and  4,000  men.  At  the  same  time  ai 
Officers'  Reserve  Corps  and  an  Enlisted  Reserv< 
Corps  were  authorized,  consisting  of  16  majors, 
captains,  232  first  lieutenants,  and  2,000  men. 

Meanwhile,  early  in  March,  had  occurred  the  raids 
across  the  Mexican  border  and  the  entry  into  Mexico 
of  the  punitive  expedition  which  was  destined  to 
revolutionize  the  whole  aerial  programme  along  with 
the  rest  of  the  military  establishment.  The  Pershing 
expedition,  with  its  long,  tenuous  line  across  the  sands 
of  northern  Mexico,  afforded  the  first  practical  demon- 
stration of  the  value  of  aircraft  for  reconnaissance  in 
the  history  of  the  American  service,  and  showed,  as 
nothing  else  could,  the  vital  necessity  of  airplanes. 

The  First,  and  only,  Aero  Squadron,  equipped  with 
eight  old  and  low-powered  planes  and  commanded  by 
Captain  B.  D.  Foulois,  was  at  once  rushed  to  General 
Pershing 's  base  at  Columbus,  New  Mexico.  The  alti- 
tudes encountered,  up  to  12,000  feet,  the  vast  dis- 
tances, and  the  lack  of  good  landing  grounds  made 
the  theatre  of  northern  Mexico  one  of  the  hardest  to 

33 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

operate  in  that  any  army  had  ever  entered,  and  the 
original  machines,  which,  with  only  90  horse  power, 
could  not,  as  Secretary  Baker  said,  fly  as  high  as  the 
mountains,  were  rapidly  used  up  in  accidents  on 
March  19  and  20  and  April  6, 14,  19  and  24. 

A  special  emergency  appropriation  of  $500,000  was 
therefore  asked  of  Congress.  "We  now  have  actual 
field  operations  going  on,"  Secretary  Baker  said. 
* '  The  aeroplane  service  is,  of  course,  the  scouting  ser- 
vice, and  I  would  like,  if  possible,  to  buy  some  addi- 
tional aeroplanes  at  once,  taking  advantage  of  the 
experience  that  manufacturers  in  this  country  have 
had  from  the  European  experience,  and  send  them 
down  there  and  get  the  value  of  testing  them  under 
actual  field  conditions. "  The  appropriation  asked 
for,  the  greatest  yet  authorized  for  aviation,  was  ap- 
proved on  March  31,  and  allowed  the  Air  Service  to 
bring  itself  for  the  first  time,  even  in  a  small  way,  up 
to  date.  Twelve  new  160-200  horse-power  Curtiss 
planes  at  $12,000  each  were  bought  as  rapidly  as 
possible,  the  best  available  in  the  United  States,  with 
Lewis  guns,  automatic  cameras,  incendiary  and  dem- 
olition bombs,  and  wireless  equipment. 

From  the  time  of  their  arrival  on  the  border  the 
series  of  raids  ended.  Over  3,000  flights  were  made 
across  this  hostile,  sandy  desert,  for  a  total  of  30,000 
miles,  without  a  fatality.  A  great  amount  of  scouting 
over  country  in  which  cavalry  and  infantry  could  not 
operate  was  carried  out,  and  the  first  regular  aerial 
mail  route  maintained  by  the  United  States  was 
opened  over  the  110  miles  from  Columbus  to  Field 
Headquarters  at  Colonia  Dublan,  airplanes  covering 
the  distance  in  66  minutes.  On  August  22,  1916,  the 

34 


EXPERT    WOODWORK   ON    THE    WINGS 


TRUEING    UP    THE    FUSELAGE 


THE  EUROPEAN  WAR 

first  aerial  review  ever  held  by  the  United  States 
Army  passed  before  Brigadier-General  John  J. 
Pershing  "somewhere  in  Mexico." 

The  peculiar  success  of  aviation  in  Me?™?  had  its 
corresponding  effect  in  Washington.  Aviation  had 
proved  beyond  dispute  to  even  the  most  scoffing  that 
it  was  no  longer  experimental  or  freakish.  Un- 
doubtedly much  of  the  support  which  Secretary  Baker 
and  General  Pershing  later  gave  to.  the  Air  Service 
had  its  roots  in  this  demonstration.  At  the  same  time 
it  brought  about  the  first  appreciable  aviation  appro- 
priation ever  made  in  the  United  States  —  that  for  the 
fiscal  year  1917,  of  $13,281,666,  enacted  on  August  29, 
1916. 

The  estimate  first  made,  sent  in  on  October  13, 1915, 
by  General  Scriven,  had  called  for  only  $3,728,743; 
this  was  later  cut  down,  when  Secretary  Baker  came 
into  office  in  March,  1916,  to  $1,222,100,  on  which  sum 
the  early  hearings,  beginning  on  April  6,  1916,  were 
held.  Said  Secretary  Baker  before  the  House  -Com- 
mittee on  Military  affairs : 

Every  country  in  Europe,  even  England,  is  very  carefully 
guarding  from  our  military  observers  their  developments 
in  aeroplanes.  The  Germans,  the  French  and  the  English  do 
not  allow  our  observers  to  acquire  their  improvements  in 
aeroplanes,  and  the  only  way  we  have  access  to  that  in- 
formation at  all  is  that  some  of  the  Europeans  are  ordering 
aeroplanes  made  in  this  country,  and  so  our  manufacturers 
know  their  specifications. 

Secretary  Baker  also  illuminated  the  unfortunate 
internal  situation  which  had  prevailed  for  a  long  time 
in  the  Aviation  Section.  His  sympathetic  explana- 
tion was : 

35 


w 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

The  men  in  the  Aviation  Corps  have  been  almost  ex- 
clusively comparatively  young  men,  very  young  men  indeed, 
and  they  have  been  engaged  in  an  art  desperate,  daredevil, 
hazardous  indeed,  so  that  they  have  had  an  attitude  towards 
life  and  towards  themselves  that  men  have  who  are  engaged 
in  an  especially  hazardous  service.  Being  fliers,  they  have 
had  rather  a  disposition  to  chafe  at  the  restraint  and  dis- 
cipline which  was  made  for  more  normal  kinds  of  service, 
feeling  that  they  were  not  adapted  to  the  regulations  and 
restrictions  of  men  who  were  not  engaged  in  so  unusual  an 
occupation.  In  other  words,  they  had  an  impatience  at 
being  controlled  by  men  who  did  not  themselves  know  the 
business  in  which  they  were  engaged.  I  do  not  want  to  be 
understood  to  criticise  these  young  men.  They  are  pioneer- 
ing for  the  army  and  the  United  States  and  their  exploits 
are  superb. 

The  net  result  of  it  all  is  that  I  am  going  to  reorganize 
the  entire  Aviation  Ptffti^n — .Wft  are  going  to  have  ftl°  afl- 
vantage  of  the  knowledge  and  experience  of  Colonel  Squier, 
who  has  for  many  years  been  a  distinguished  scientist  in  the 
Signal  Service,  and  who  has  recently  been  in  Europe  ob- 
serving the  aeroplane. 

The  Secretary  was  equally  frank  about  America's 
backwarHnesg  hi  a  Via  Lion,  especially  in  motor's. 
' '  Europe^ ' '  he  said,  ' '  has  very  plainly  passed  us  injpie 
development  of  the  aeroplane  motor.  All  the  ma- 
chines made  in  this  country  to  go  abroad  are  tried  out 
as  to  motor  and  I  am  told  that  in  most  cases  they  take 
out  the  American  motor  and  put  in  their  own. ' '  He 
did  not  endeavor  to  ascribe  this  to  any  one  individual 's 
fault,  but  rather  to  an  unforeseeable  advance  en- 
gendered by  the  demands  of  the  war. 

It  seems  to  me  that  Congress  has  been  as  generous  as  the 
state  of  the  art  justified  and  that  the  army  division  in 
charge  of  aviation  has  shown  very  great  zeal  and  enterprise 
in  trying  to  develop  it.  In  the  Aviation  Section  there  has 

36 


* 


THE  EUROPEAN  WAR 

been  some  feeling  that  Congress  was  not  sufficiently  gen- 
erous but  it  is  easy  to  think  of  some  things  that  might  have 
been  done.  The  amazing  development  of  the  art  is  the  out- 
growth of  the  European  war.  I  think  that  both  the  Con- 
gress and  the  army  can  feel  they  have  really  done  very 
fairly  by  it. 

Secretary  Baker  presented  rather  startling  figures 
of  what  had  been  done  to  date.  In  all  the  six  years 
since  the  first  Wright  plane  had  been  purchased,  only 
59  planes  had  been  bought  by  the  Government.  Of 
these,  21  had  been  condemned,  11  destroyed  in  acci- 
dents, and  one  preserved  at  the  Smithsonian  Institu- 
tion. Only  23  were  in  active  service,  11  at  San  Diego, 
eight  in  Mexico,  and  four  at  Manila.  With  the  com- 
ing of  the  Mexican  crisis,  however,  a  complete  re- 
organization of  the  military  establishment  became 
necessary,  with  a  great  increase  in  every  branch.  The 
Air  Service  was  brought  up  to  a  strength  propor- 
tionate to  the  increased  force  necessitated  by  the 
mobilization  on  the  Mexican  border,  and  for  that 
crease  came  the  $13,000,000  appropriation. 

In  May,  1916,  the  promised  reorganization  was  car- 
ried through  by  Secretary  Baker  with  the  bringing 
back  to  this  country  of  Colonel  George  0.  Squier,  who 
had  been  for  four  years  Military  Attache  at  London. 
Colonel  Squier  was  well  known  in  aviation  circles, 
having  largely  drawn  up  the  first  Government  speci- 
fications ever  published  (those  of  the  Wright  plane 
in  1908)  and  having  been  among  the  first  passengers 
to  go  up  with  the  Wrights.  Moreover,  he  had  achieved 
international  reputation  in  electrical  science  by  de- 
veloping a  new  method  of  rapid  telegraphy  based  on 
the  use  of  alternating  current  with  the  polarizing 

37 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

photochronograph,  and  by  practically  doubling  the 
capacity  of  the  ocean  cables  through  the  employment 
of  a  single-phase  alternating  current  of  the  sine-wave 
type  operating  with  the  Morse  code.  Colonel  Squier 
returned  with  all  the  prestige  attaching  to  one  of  the 
handful  of  Americans  who  had  seen  the  European 
War  from  the  inside.  He  could  speak  with  authority 
on  what  was  actually  going  on  abroad  and  could  re- 
inforce his  arguments  with  personal  experience.  He 
was,  therefore,  in  a  splendid  strategic  position,  which 
was  further  strengthened  when  he  was  made  Chief 
Signal  Officer  on  February  14,  1917. 

The  development  made  possible  by  the  1917  appro- 
priation was  continued  when  the  1918  estimate  was 
submitted  on  September  13,  1916.  This  called  for 
$21,600,000,  but  it  was  ordered  reduced  by  25  per 
cent,  in  accordance  with  the  general  policy  of  reduc- 
tion in  the  War  Department,  and  later  to  $10,800,000 
by  inclusion  of  some  items  in  the  Fortifications  bill. 
Less  than  a  month  before  Germany  declared  for  un- 
restricted submarine  warfare,  hearings  on  this  appro- 
priation began  on  January  5,  1917,  before  the  House 
Committee  on  Military  Affairs. 

Colonel  Squier,  on  whom  the  brunt  of  the  testimony 
fell,  stated  that  the  great  appropriation  of  over  $13,- 
000,000  of  August  29,  1916,  had  placed  before  the 
Service  a  double  problem :  "  First,  getting  equipment 
made  that  was  safe  and  efficient,  and  second,  the  per- 
sonnel trained  to  fly  that  equipment,  a  team  which  we 
must  keep  abreast  and  not  let  get  in  tandem. "  The 
equipment  problem,  he  said,  had  been  attacked  by  the 
revolutionary  practice  of  placing  Government  in- 
spectors, over  40  in  number,  in  the  various  factories. 

38 


THE  EUROPEAN  WAR 

Heretofore  we  had  bought  finished  aeroplanes  with  paint 
and  dope  covering  them,  and  there  might  be  defective 
wooden  or  other  parts  that  could  not  be  detected.  So  we 
started  a  small  civilian  instruction  corps  to  put  into  the 
factories  whenever  we  got  a  contract,  to  stay  there  and  watch 
every  step  of  the  manufacture  and  to  report  daily,  so  that 
every  piece  of  wood  and  metal  that  was  to  go  into  a  Govern- 
ment aeroplane  was  to  be  known  and  stamped  as  the  best 
that  could  be  obtained.  .  .  .  This  has  led  to  the  improve- 
ment of  the  aviation  equipment  in  a  marvelous  way,  so 
that  the  equipment  we  are  getting  is  as  good,  I  am  sure,  as 
this  country  can  produce  and  is  improving  very  rapidly. 

This  improvement  had  a  splendid  psychological  re- 
action on  the  fliers.  "They  are  flying,"  Colonel 
Squier  said,  "a  distance  equal  to  many  times  around 
the  world  without  an  accident,  and  it  is  difficult  to 
think  even  an  automobile  could  go  that  far  without  an 
accident. ' '  In  fact,  from  January  1  to  December  26, 
1916,  7,087  flights  for  a  distance  of  251,755  miles  and 
a  time  duration  of  3,356.56  hours  had  been  made  with- 
out a  fatality. 

The  industrial  situation  was  frankly  pictured  as 
critical.  Manufacturers  had  been  confronted,  Colonel 
Squier  said, 

by  the  fact  that  there  has  been  no  buying  market  for  aero- 
planes in  this  country,  and  of  course  without  a  buying 
market  you  cannot  develop  an  engine  or  an  equipment; 
consequently  we  are  very  much  behind  Europe,  which  under 
the  spur  of  war,  has  gone  forward  in  a  marvelous  way 

along  these  lines.     The  flying  movement  abroad  is  simply. 

prodigious. 

The  appropriation  was  absolutely  necessary,  Colonel 
Squier  contended,  as  "the  American  manufacturers 
want  to  realize  that  they  can  go  to  work  and  count  on 

39 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

some  sort  of  a  general  policy  on  a  reasonable  scale; 
otherwise  they  are  not  going  to  put  their  money  into 
these  things." 

Moreover,  the  expenses  of  the  Air  Service  were  very 
large.  Colonel  Squier  pointed  out  that  it  cost  $£0,000 
to  keep  a  plane  in  the  air  one  year,  as  it  must  ordi- 
narily be  replaced  four  times,  and  the  life  of  its  engine 
he  estimated  at  300  hours,  with  a  cost  of  $35  to  $50  per 
horse  power  as  against  $3  to  $5  per  horse  power  of  an 
automobile  engine.  Thus  to  form  a  new  squadron  of 
12  planes  and  maintain  it  for  a  year  would  cost 
$800,000  for  the  first  year  and  $600,000  annually 
afterwards.  Said  Colonel  Squier : 

It  would  surprise  you  to  learn  how  highly  organized  and 
complicated  the  Air  Service  is.  There  is  nothing  else  like 
it.  It  is  the  acme  of  professional  and  mechanical  skill.  For 
instance,  it  requires  five  skilled  men  for  each  plane.  When 
a  machine  comes  down  in  war,  the  men  go  right  at  it,  like 
the  attendants  at  a  horse  race;  they  go  at  every  single  part 
of  it  instantly;  they  examine  every  part  of  it  to  see  that  it 
is  right  before  it  flies  again. 

This  work,  he  said,  appealed  to  mechanics  very 
much,  for  "  it  is  a  sort  of  vocational  school. ' '  At  that 
time  the  enlisted  force  stood  at  800  out  of  an  author- 
ized strength  of  1,800,  with  an  authorized  strength 
for  the  following  year  of  3,200.  This  was  sufficient 
to  equip  the  seven  old  squadrons,  six  reserve  squad- 
rons, and  four  new  ones.  At  the  same  time  there 
were  less  than  50  trained  military  aviators,  eight  or 
nine  enlisted  fliers,  30  students  at  San  Diego,  and  35 
in  reserve  immediately  available.  Up  to  November 
30,  1916,  there  had  been  222  applicants  to  enter  the 
Service,  of  whom  141  had  been  accepted,  33  relieved^ 

40 


THE  EUROPEAN  WAR 


one  resigned,  14  killed,  and  93  left  on  duty;  of  the 
last  45  were  qualified  fliers  and  43  students. 

In  all  the  years  to  date  only  121  machines  had  been 
delivered  to  the  Government.  151  these,  21  had  been 
destroyed,  27  were  out  of  service,  and  only  73  were 
actually  available,  including  30  at  San  Diego,  18  at 
Mineola,  Long  Island,  14  at  Columbus,  New  Mexico, 
seven  at  San  Antonio,  Texas,  and  four  at  Manila. 
There  were  under  order  302  machines  from  12  com- 
panies, including  five  small  companies,  and  56  ap- 
proved but  not  actually  ordered.  The  personnel 
comprised  three  majors,  nine  captains,  33  first  lieu- 
tenants, and  458  enlisted  men  on  December  7,  1916. 

An  argument  destined  to  have  weight  at  every 
future  consideration  of  aviation  was  brought  out  at 
this  hearing  by  Colonel  Squier. 

After  this  war  the  armies  in  general  will  disband  or 
shrink,  but  the  Air  Service  is  going  to  stay  where  it  is  and 
go  on.  It  is  an  asset  that  is  going  to  remain.  All  we  learn 
in  this  war  about  aerial  navigation  will  be  applied  to  the 
uses  of  civilization  in  the  peace  which  follows.  It  is  the 
one  point  of  permanent  gain,  and  that  is  why  this  country 
is  safe  in  putting  money  into  it. 

The  bill  carrying  the  full  appropriation  of  $10,- 
800,000  was  enacted  on  May  12,  1917,  just  five  weeks 
after  the  declaration  of  a  state  of  war  with  Germany. 


Alt 


41 


CHAPTER  III 

AMERICA'S  EARLY  WAR  PROGRAMME 

Eesumption  by  Germany  of  unrestricted  submarine  warfare  — 
Declaration  of  a  state  of  war  —  Its  anticipation  by  the 
War  Department  —  Aviation  in  the  original  war  pro- 
gramme —  Urgent  war  appropriations  —  The  serious  situa- 
tion in  the  airplane  industry  —  Industrial  conference  of 
the  National  Advisory  Committee  for  Aeronautics  —  Its 
recommendations  —  Aircraft  Production  Board  created  — 
Its  functions,  powers,  and  personnel  —  Howard  E.  Coffin 
appointed  Chairman  —  Joint  Army  and  Navy  Technical 
Board  created  —  Original  programme  of  the  Aircraft  Pro- 
duction Board  —  The  alarming  patent  situation  —  Its 
solution  by  the  National  Advisory  Committee  —  Aircraft 
Manufacturers*  Association  formed  and  vested  with  all 
patents  of  its  members  —  The  problem  of  training  aviators 

—  The  Canadian  system  adopted  —  Cooperation  of  scien- 
tific schools  secured  —  Six  ' '  ground  schools  ' '  inaugurated 

—  Three  flying  fields  located  and  built  —  The  situation  at 
the  end  of  six  weeks  of  war. 

On  January  31,  1917,  at  five  o'clock  in  the  after- 
noon, Count  von  Bernstorff  delivered  to  Secretary 
Lansing  Germany's  notification  of  her  decision  to 
resume  from  the  following  day  unrestricted  sub- 
marine warfare.  This  action,  which,  although  ex- 
pected, came  earlier  than  anticipated,  placed  the 
issue  of  war  or  peace  squarely  before  the  United 
States. 

On  February  5,  five  days  after  the  U-boats  had  been 
unleashed  and  two  days  after  the  breaking  of  diplo- 
matic relations  with  Germany,  the  Aviation  Section, 
with  the  other  branches  of  the  "War  Department,  was 
requested  to  prepare  an  estimate  covering  its  needs 
in  an  army  consisting  of  the  Kegular  Army,  the 

42 


AMERICA'S  EARLY  WAR  PROGRAMME 

National  Guard,  and  500,000  volunteers.  This  esti- 
mate, submitted  on  February  16,  came  to  a  total  of 
$48,666,666,  and  provided  for  an  air  service  directly 
proportional  in  strength  to  the  rest  of  the  military 
establishment  rather  than  for  a  great,  separate,  fight- 
ing force.  The  General  Staff  regarded  aviation  as 
a  correlative  branch  with  infantry,  artillery  and 
cavalry,  all  balanced  and  adjusted  to  each  other  in 
a  well  proportioned  unit.  The  conception  of  develop- 
ing the  Air  Service  enormously  beyond  this  propor- 
tional strength  only  came  three  months  later  as  a 
result  of  direct  touch  with  Europe. 

Progress  on  the  general  programme  of  the  War 
Department,  however,  required  considerable  time,  as 
the  personnel  was  small  and  inexperienced  in  the  face 
of  the  tasks  before  it.  Moreover,  all  during  February 
and  March  there  was  uncertainty  as  to  whether  Con- 
gress would  go  to  the  length  of  declaring  war.  This 
uncertainty  was  not  finally  cleared  away  until  the 
sinking  of  three  American  ships,  the  Vigilancia,  the 
City  of  Memphis  and  the  Illinois,  all  reported  on  the 
single  day  of  March  18,  brought  about  the  formal 
recognition  of  a  state  of  war  on  April  6. 

This  triple  indication  of  Germany's  ruthlessness 
once  again  quickened  action.  On  March  21  another 
general  memorandum  was  sent  through  the  War 
Department : 

The  Secretary  of  War  desires  that  you  prepare  estimates 
for  the  supplies  pertaining  to  your  bureau  needed  to  equip 
an  army,  including  the  present  Regular  Army  and  the  Na- 
tional Guard,  of  one  million  men  organized  into  32  infantry 
and  4  cavalry  divisions  and  Army  Corps  sufficient  for  12 
Army  Corps. 

•     43 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

A  second  memorandum  to  the  same  effect  was  sent 
out  later  in  the  same  day,  and  on  the  26th  a  third, 
which  stated:  ''It  is  desired  that  estimates  called 
for  be  submitted  not  later  than  9  a.  m.,  Thursday, 
March  29th." 

The  aviation  estimates,  rushed  through  by  Colonel 
J.  B.  Bennett,  Major  Foulois  and  Major  Wallace, 
were  sent  in  on  the  28th,  and  slightly  modified  on 
the  30th.     They  called  for  $54,250,000,  to  provide 
a  force  of  1,850  aviators  and  300  balloonists.     The 
details  of  this  first  estimate,  as  conceived  by  American  j 
officers  under  the  plans   of  the   General   Staff   and  i 
unaffected  by  Allied  pressure,  are  interesting  as  show- 
ing the  aerial  programme  this  country  would  have  j 
adopted  if  left  to  itself : 

32  Infantry  Divisions $25,600,000 

4  Cavalry  Divisions 3,200,000 

16  Aero  Squadrons  (for  Army  Corps  Head- 
quarters)   12,800,000 

16  Balloon  Companies  (same) 3,300,000 

9  Schools,  50  men  each  every  4  months,  or 

150  yearly 10,800,000 

Civilian  Training,  500  pilots 700,000 

Lighter-than-air  Equipment 1,000,000 

Civilian  Training,  300  balloonists 150,000 


$57,450,000 
Less  equipment  on  hand  (4  Aero  Squadrons)    3,200,000 


$54,250,000 

This  estimate,  later  reduced  to  $43,450,000  by  the 
$10,800,000  appropriated  on  May  12  for  the  year 
1918,  was  included  in  the  urgent  deficiency  war 
estimates  submitted  to  Congress  on  April  30.  The 

44 


AMERICA'S  EARLY  WAR  PROGRAMME 

figures  for  aviation  remained  unchanged  and  hardly 
questioned  during  a  considerable  delay  over  other 
items  of  the  bill,  which  did  not  finally  become  law 
until  June  15. 

Meanwhile,  with  the  country  standing  on  the  verge 
of  war,  some  realization  of  the  seriousness  of  the 
industrial  situation  in  regard  to  airplanes  began  to 
be  had.  On  February  3,  the  day  of  the  severance 
of  relations  with  Germany,  a  total  of  293  planes  were 
reported  by  a  special  investigating  committee  to  be 
on  order,  of  which  38  had  been  delivered  by  two  com- 
panies and  173  more  were  expected  by  June  30.  In 
all,  only  11  companies  were  under  contracts,  of  which 
two  were  to  be  cancelled.  It  is  peculiarly  illuminat- 
ing of  the  situation  at  that  time  that  the  National 
Advisory  Committee  for  Aeronautics,  a  body  of 
scientists  formed  to  study  the  technical  problems  of: 
flight,  should  have^  been  the  means  of  bringing  to- 
gether the  Government  and  the  manufacturers  for  the 
most  important  conference  yet  had.  This  well  shows 
the  lack  of  cohesion  between  the  Government  and 
producers  essential  to  a  big  programme,  as  well  as 
the  rather  amateur  methods  of  those  early  days. 

Less  than  three  weeks  before  the  United  States 
entered  the  war,  on  March  22,  a  joint  meeting  was 
called  by  the  Committee,  including  Army  and  Navy/ 
officers  and  representatives  of  practically  all  the  Iead1 
ing  airplane  manufacturers.    Dr.  Charles  D.  Walcotl 
the  Chairman,  declared  that  America  had  "  hardly 
made  a  beginning  ' '  in  aviation,  and  continued : 

Though  millions  may  be  available  for  a  specific  pm 
in  time  of  great  need,  no  amount  of  money  will  buy  time.' 
Even  the  most  generous  preparations  do  not  open  up  the 

45 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

years  that  have  passed  and  enable  us  to  carefully  lay  the 
foundation  of  a  great  industry  and  a  great  aerial  army 
through  the  education  of  engineers,  manufacturers,  teachers 
and  all  the  wide  variety  of  personnel  required. 

Here  indeed,  although  unrealized  at  that  time,  lay 
the  crux  of  the  situation.  America,  with  all  the 
apathy  of  peace,  had  been  outdistanced  by  the  bel- 
ligerents in  the  science  of  aviation.  It  is  easy  to 
appreciate  now  that  the  lack  of  realization  of  the 
engineering  and  industrial  difficulties  was  one  of  the 
great  causes  of  America's  late  start. 

Only  12  companies,  Dr.  Walcott  reported,  were 
than  capable  of  Government  work,  59  planes  having 
been  ordered  and  54  delivered  from  four  companies 
in  the  eight  years  before  1916,  and  during  1916,  366 
planes  ordered  and  64  delivered  from  nine  factories. 
To  meet  this  situation  Dr.  Walcott  suggested  coopera- 
tion between  the  Army  and  the  Navy,  concentration 
on  one  standard  training  plane,  the  standardization 
of  parts,  the  simplification  of  inspection,  the  mobiliza- 
tion of  essential  materials,  such  as  spruce,  and  the 
clearing  up  of  the  patent  situation. 

The  information  brought  out  at  this  meeting  proved 
so  serious,  and  the  inability  of  the  manufacturers  to 
meet  the  Government's  programme  was  so  evident, 
that  on  March  29  the  Advisory  Committee  addressed 
a  letter  to  the  Secretaries  of  War  and  of  the  Navy 
and  to  the  Council  of  National  Defense,  bringing 
out  the  vital  necessity  of  laying  down  a  continuing 
programme  in  order  to  justify  the  entrance  of  the 
manufacturers  into  airplane  work  on  a  large  scale. 
"At  present,"  the  letter  said,  "the  industry  may  be 
divided  into  two  parts,  the  Curtiss  Airplane  and 

46 


AMERICA'S  EARLY  WAR  PROGRAMME 

Motor  Corporation,  and  others."  Therefore,  "  if  it 
should  be  thought  necessary  to  provide  for  as  many 
as  3,000  planes  for  the  fiscal  year  1918,  4,000  planes 
for  the  fiscal  year  1919,  and  5,000  planes  for  the 
year  1920,"  a  three-year  programme  should  be  laid 
down  and  certain  special  materials,  such  as  spruce, 
mobilized  far  ahead. 

April  3,  immediately  after  word  came  from 
tue  Capitol  that  President  Wilson  had  asked  for  the 
declaration  of  a  state  of  war,  the  Committee  sent  out 
the  following  telegram  to  the  few  manufacturers  of 
planes  and  engines  whose  records  seemed  to  justify 
Government  contracts: 

Can  you  provide  training  reconnaissance  aircraft?  If 
so,  state  types,  facilities  for  manufacture,  date  of  delivery 
of  first  machine,  number  that  can  be  delivered  weekly  there- 
after. Same  data  in  regard  to  engines. 

The  replies  to  this  telegram  were  so  fragmentary  as 
to  offer  practically  no  basis  on  which  to  proceed; 
they  were  turned  over  to  S.  D.  Waldon,  as  a  special 
Committee  on  Production,  to  follow  up  in  any  way 
that  seemed  wise. 

The  first  step  toward  the  formation  of  what  later 
became  the  Aircraft  Production  Board  was  taken  a 
week  later,  on  April  10,  after  a  committee  had  con- 
sidered Secretary  Daniels'  proposal  for  an  Air  Ser- 
vice with  a  civilian  head.  A  very  vivid  realization 
of  the  industrial  difficulties  of  the  airplane  pro- 
gramme and  of  the  necessity  for  their  handling  by- 
men  of  the  widest  business  experience  had  been  im- 
pressed upon  the  Committee  through  its  meetings  with 
manufacturers  and  its  dependence  upon  the  work 

47 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

of  such  production  experts  as  Mr.  Coffin  and  Mr. 
Waldon  of  the  Council  of  National  Defense.  Accord- 
ingly, on  April  10  the  Advisory  Committee  urged 
upon  the  Council  the  appointment  of  an  Aircraft 
Production  Board,  the  purpose  of  which  was  denned 
as  follows : 

The  function  of  this  Board  shall  be  to  consider  the  situa- 
tion in  relation  to  the  quantity  production  of  aircraft  in 
the  United  States,  and  to  cooperate  with  the  officers  of  the 
Array  and  Navy,  and  with  other  departments  interested  in 
the  production  and  delivery  to  these  departments  of  the 

needed  aircraft. 

>• — • 

On  April  12  the  Committee  went  even  further,  proH 
posing  to  the  Council  the  most  ambitious  aviation  j 
programme  yet  suggested.     This  called  for  an  ap-/ 
propriation  of  300  millions  for  a  joint  Army  and 
Navy  three-year  programme  to  train  2,500  men  the/ 
first  year  and  5,000  the  next  year  in  12  new  prelimin-j 
ary  schools,  and  to  encourage  the  industries  to  theitf 
maximum  attainable  capacity  of  3,700  planes  in  1918, 
6,000  in  1919,  and  9,000  to  10,000  in  1920.     It  is  inter- 
esting to  note  that  3,700  planes  was  the  maximum 
thought  attainable  for  1918. 

The    Council    of   National   Defense   was   so    overH 
whelmed  with  the  multitude  of  new  duties  suddenly) 
thrust  upon  it  that  another  month  elapsed  before  in-i 
formation  was  in  hand  on  which  to  work  out  the 
suggestion  of  the  National  Advisory  Committee.     On 
May  16,  however,  a  resolution  was  passed  establishing 
the  Aircraft  Production  Board,   without  any  legal 
powers  but  authorized  by  the  Council,  itself  an  ad- 
visory body,  to  offer  advice  to  both  the  Army  and  the 
Navy  as  to  the  quantity  production  of  aircraft  and' 

48 


AMEEICA'S  EARLY  WAR  PROGRAMME 

as  to  problems  of  engineering,  specifications,  standard- 
ization, inspection,  schools,  supply  depots,  priority, 
and  in  short  anything  that  would  tend  to  provide  an 
adequate  materiel. 

Howard  E.  Coffin  was  named  by  the  Council  as 
Chairman  and  organizer  of  the  new  Board.  Mr.  Cof- 
fin, one  of  the  founders  of  the  Hudson  Motor  Car 
Company  and  President  of  the  Society  of  Automotive 
Engineers,  had  first  come  to  Washington  some  time 
before  as  one  of  the  Society's  appointees  to  the  Naval 
Consulting  Board  organized  by  Secretary  Daniels. 
Here,  as  Chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Industrial 
Preparedness,  he  had  made  an  industrial  inventory 
of  the  United  States,  and  in  1916  he  had  been  ap- 
pointed by  President  Wilson  to  the  new  Council  of 
National  Defense.  Mr.  Coffin's  first  duty  was  to 
organize  a  strong  Board  for  the  work  ahead.  General 
Squier,  Chief  Signal  Officer  of  the  Army,  and  Admiral 
David  W.  Taylor,  Chief  of  the  Bureau  of  Construc- 
tion and  Repair  of  the  Navy,  were  chosen  as  heads 
of  the  Army  and  Navy  Air  Services,  and  three  civil- 
ians were  brought  in.  E.  A.  Deeds  of  Dayton, 
Ohio,  formerly  General  Manager  of  the  National  Cash 
Register  Company,  President  of  the  Delco  Company, 
and  one  of  the  industrial  leaders  of  the  Middle  West, 
agreed  to  spend  three  or  four  days  a  week  on  the 
work,  little  foreseeing  at  the  time  how  much  of  his 
life  and  his  hopes  it  would  absorb.  R.  L.  Montgomery, 
of  the  Philadelphia  financial  house  of  Montgomery, 
Clothier  and  Tyler,  and  S.  D.  Waldon,  formerly  Vice- 
President  of  the  Packard  Motor  Car  Company,  were 
the  others  selected. 

During  the  next  few  weeks  the  Board  stepped 
49 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

boldly  into  the  emergency,  and  promptly  took  over, 
through  its  relationship  with  the  Army  and  the  Navy, 
the  laying  down  of  policies  of  production  and  the 
recommendation  of  contracts.  The  Board  had  almost 
as  much  information  as  to  the  actual  industrial  situa- 
tion as  the  regular  military  authorities,  and  it  had  the 
additional  advantage  of  wide  personal  experience  in 
big  business  development. 

These  early  days  saw  also  the  formation  of  the  Joint 
Army  and  Navy  Technical  Board  to  determine  the 
complex  problem  of  types.  Many  of  the  Army  and 
Navy  fliers  felt  that  in  the  sudden  expansion  men 
unfamiliar  with  flying  might  run  away  with  these 
decisions,  and  accordingly  they  secured  the  appoint- 
ment by  the  Secretaries  of  War  and  of  the  Navy  of 
the  Joint  Technical  Board.  This  Board  at  once  took 
over  the  whole  problem  of  types,  reporting  to  the 
Aircraft  Production  Board  the  types  desired  for  pro- 
duction. On  May  22,  six  weeks  after  the  outbreak  of 
war,  after  conferences  with  the  Canadians,  its  formal 
programme  was  laid  down,  requesting  the  Aircraft 
Production  Board  at  once  to  secure  samples  and  draw- 
ings of  half  a  dozen  each  of  the  most  successful  foreign 
planes  and  engines. 

On  June  12  the  Aircraft  Production  Board,  as  a 
result  of  conferences  with  the  Army  and  Navy  Tech- 
nical Board  and  with  the  manufacturers,  drew  up  a 
new  and  final  training  schedule  showing  the  actual 
decisions  reached  to  date  on  a  programme  which  then 
stood  at  2,330  primary  planes  and  144  advanced 
planes.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  at  that  early 
time  the  Curtiss  Company  led  the  list  with  orders  for 
1,108  planes,  while  two  new  companies,  the  Dayton- 

50 


AMERICA'S  EARLY  WAR  PROGRAMME 

Wright  Airplane  Company  and  the  Fisher  Body  Cor- 
poration, came  second  with  500  each.  The  whole  re- 
liance for  engines  was  on  four  companies.  This  orig- 
inal programme  so  well  shows  the  situation  at  the  time 
that  it  is  given  in  full : 

PRIMARY  TRAINING 

Estimated  Cost 
Standard   Aero   Corpora-      150  "J".  Training  $    900,000 

tion 
Curtiss    Aeroplane    Com-      600  "JN"  6,300,000 

pany 
Curtiss    Aeroplane    Com-      400  "JN"  4,200,000 

pany 
Hall-Scott      Motor      Car  1,000  "A7A"  engines          2,300,000 

Company 
Nordyke-Marmon      Com-  1,000  "A7A"  engines          2,300,000 

pany   (Hall-Scott) 
L.    W.    F.    Engineering        72  "JN"  432,000 

Company 
Pacific     Aero     Products       36  "JN"  216,000 

Company 
Dayton-Wright    Airplane     500  "JN"  3,000,000 

Company 
Aeromariiie    Engine    and        72  '«  Training "  432,000 

Sales  Company 
Fisher  Body  Corporation     500  "JN"  3,000,000 

$23,080,000 
ADVANCED  TRAINING 

L.    W.    F.     Engineering  36  Tactical   Land    Re- 
Company  connaissance            $    583,200 

General  Vehicle  Company  100  Gnome  engines                455,000 

Curtiss    Aeroplane    Com-  36  "R-4"                              669,600 
pany 

Curtiss    Aeroplane    Com-  72  "R-6"                           1,425,600 
pany 

Wright-Martin     Aircraft  500  Hispano-Suiza  en- 
Company  gines                           2,750,000 


$5,883,400 

The  Board's  attitude  towards  battle  planes  may  be 
seen  in  its  statement  that  "  a  large  part  of  the  next 

51 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

six  months  will  be  consumed  in  getting  from  Europe 
designs  of  airplanes  and  engines,  assigning  them  to 
factories,  and  getting  production  started. ' ' 

Just  at  this  time  the  patent  situation  became  very 
alarming.  On  December  18,  1916,  the  Wright-Martin 
Company,  as  purchasers  of  the  Wright  brothers'  orig- 
inal patent  at  a  cost  of  $1,000,000,  had  notified  all 
manufacturers  that  their  patents  were  being  in- 
fringed, and  had  enclosed  a  form  of  license  for  their 
use,  requiring  a  five  per  cent,  royalty  on  all  airplanes 
built,  with  a  minimum  annual  payment  of  $10,000. 
The  result  was  ' '  a  general  demoralization  of  the  whole 
trade,"  according  to  a  letter  from  the  Navy  Depart- 
ment to  the  National  Advisory  Committee  for  Aero- 
nautics, as  the  fear  of  litigation  had  caused  some 
manufacturers  to  stop  all  development  and  others 
to  jump  their  prices  $1,000  a  plane. 

The  National  Advisory  Committee,  after  a  series  of 
conferences  with  the  manufacturers,  drew  up  a  plan, 
approved  by  the  President  and  incorporated  in  the 
Naval  Appropriation  bill  for  1918,  for  the  appropria- 
tion of  $1,000,000  for  the  purchase  by  the  Government 
of  the  basic  airplane  patents.  In  its  stead,  however,  to 
remove  at  one  sweep  all  the  vexing  questions  involved 
in  the  purchase  or  condemnation  of  patents,  a  different 
plan  was  proposed  by  the  Committee  on  March  22, 
1917.  Under  this  scheme  all  manufacturers  so  desir- 
ing were  admitted  to  a  newly  formed  Aircraft  Manu*- 
facturers'  Association,  which  was  to  be  the  possessor 
of  all  patents  of  its  members.  Each  member  was  to 
pay  to  the  Treasury  a  $200  royalty  on  each  plane 
sold  by  it,  $135  of  which  was  to  go  to  the  Wright- 
Martin  Company  as  holders  of  the  Wright  patents 

52 


AMERICA'S  EARLY  WAR  PROGRAMME 

and  $40  to  Curtiss  as  holder  of  the  Curtiss  patents; 
neither  company,  it  was  later  agreed,  was  to  receive 
more  than  a  maximum  of  $2,000,000  before  their 
patents  ran  out.  The  balance  of  $25  was  to  go  to 
the  Association  for  development  and  further  patents. 

This  agreement  was  later  bitterly  criticized  as  form- 
ing a  trust  or  an  aircraft  pool.  The  Attorney-General 
ruled,  however,  that  it  was  not  monopolistic  because 
the  Association  was  open  to  all.  Undoubtedly  the 
agreement  put  an  immediate  end  to  a  situation  that 
was  threatening  the  whole  aviation  development,  and, 
whether  the  price  be  considered  high  or  low,  it  solved 
a  most  complicated  legal  problem  in  an  absolutely 
direct  manner.  The  Signal  Corps  and  the  Aircraft 
Production  Board,  it  should  be  observed,  have  been 
erroneously  charged  with  evolving  this  agreement. 

Meanwhile,  the  problem  of  securing  aviators,  of 
organizing  the  complicated  courses  of  training,  and  of 
constructing  the  great  flying  fields  was  becoming  in- 
creasingly important.  Here  again  a  tremendous  de- 
velopment at  emergency  speed  in  a  field  practically 
new  was  called  for.  Just  what  it  was  can  be  appre- 
ciated only  by  a  bird's-eye  view  of  the  situation  at 
that  time. 

At  the  outbreak  of  war  the  United  States  had  but 
two  small  flying  fields,  that  at  San  Diego,  operated  in 
a  modest  way  since  1912,  and  that  at  Mineola,  Long 
Island,  just  recently  opened.  The  grand  total  of 
students  enrolled  was  85,  which  certainly  did  not 
promise  a  great  aerial  army.  Fourteen  civilian  and 
no  reserve  military  aviator  instructors  were  available 
as  a  teaching  force.  The  equipment  at  the  fields 
consisted  of  51  primary  training  planes,  four  advanced 

53 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

training  planes,  nine  motor  trucks,  eight  motor 
cycles  and  three  automobiles.  The  whole  Aviation 
Section  consisted  of  65  officers  and  1,120  men.  This 
represented  the  groundwork  upon  which  it  was  neces- 
sary to  erect  the  development  called  for.  It  is  not  too 
much  to  say  that  in  practical  terms  the  United  States 
at  the  outbreak  of  the  war  had  almost  no  aviation 
facilities,  for  be  it  always  remembered  that  what 
equipment  there  was  on  hand  was  several  years  behind 
the  rapid  development  in  Europe.  Just  as  there  was 
no  one  here  who  had  ever  seen  a  battle  plane,  so  no  one 
here  had  any  idea  of  the  intricacies  of  training  re- 
quired to  turn  out  a  pilot. 

Obviously  the  first  step  was  to  gather  what  experi- 
ence was  available  from  the  Allies.  Accordingly, 
Colonel  Bennett,  Major  Foulois  and  Captain  Waldon 
visited  the  Canadian  fields  at  Toronto,  where  to  a 
certain  degree  a  large-scale  training  had  been  put  into 
effect  on  the  most  approved  British  plan.  Merely  a 
glance  sufficed  to  show  that  the  United  States  must 
replace  its  present  go-as-you-please  individual  training 
with  a  standardized  system  carefully  worked  out  along 
broad  lines. 

Again,  as  illustrative  of  the  informal  way  in  which 
everyone  in  those  early  days  of  the  war  stepped  into 
any  breach  that  happened  to  be  apparent,  it  was  the 
National  Advisory  Committee  for  Aeronautics  rather 
than  the  War  Department  which  took  the  first  steps 
to  initiate  this  system.  On  April  23,  at  a  meeting 
which  included  besides  the  Committee  such  unexpected 
elements  as  the  Secretary  of  the  Interior  and  civilian 
members  of  the  Council  of  National  Defense,  the 
Canadian  procedure  was  informally  discussed  and  a 

54 


AMERICA'S  EARLY  WAR  PROGRAMME 

complete  programme  laid  down  for  its  adoption  here. 
A  week  later,  on  April  30,  a  more  formal  meeting  was 
held  with  represenatives  of  the  six  scientific  schools 
chosen  to  carry  on  the  work  —  Massachusetts  Institute 
of  Technology,  Cornell  University,  Ohio  State  Uni- 
versity, University  of  Texas  and  University  of  Cali- 
fornia. The  plan  proposed  was  for  the  establishment 
of  cadet  courses  for  the  preliminary  training  of  avi- 
ators at  each  institution,  under  military  regulations 
but  with  all  the  facilities  and  the  teaching  staffs  of  the 
colleges  available  at  a  fair  rate  of  compensation.  The 
chosen  institutions  at  once  agreed  to  the  proposal  and 
to  the  sending  of  three  representatives  each  to  Toronto 
by  May  7. 

Meanwhile,  on  April  30  General  Squier  had  wired 
Professor  Hiram  Bingham  of  Yale,  who  was  at  the 
moment  learning  to  fly  at  Miami,  Florida,  asking  if  he 
would  assist  in  organizing  this  primary  training  on  a 
comprehensive  scale.  Bingham  accepted  at  once,  went 
on  to  Toronto  via  Washington,  and  with  18  university 
representatives  made  as  complete  a  study  of  the  Brit- 
ish preliminary  training  as  was  possible  in  the  time 
available.  On  May  10  he  wired  General  Squier  that 
he  could  graduate  the  first  class  of  120  men  from  the 
American  schools  on  July  14  after  an  eight  weeks' 
course. 

On  May  14  Bingham,  now  a  major,  returned  to 
Washington  to  an  office  where  piles  of  books  and  maps 
served  as  desks,  while  the  university  representatives 
went  back  to  their  respective  institutions  to  make 
ready  the  cots,  bedding,  books  and  other  special  facili- 
ties needed.  This  plan,  so  quickly  put  into  effect  by 
the  Air  Service,  was  formally  approved  by  Secretary 

55 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

Baker  on  May  19,  and  the  six  schools  opened  two  days 
later  with  no  definite  curriculum  except  instructions 
to  give  three  weeks  of  intensive  military  training  while 
the  other  details  were  being  prepared.  Thus  the 
"  ground  schools  "  come  into  being  as  the  first  step 
in  the  large-scale  training  of  American  aviators,  as  a 
result  of  the  informal  cooperation  of  the  Signal  Corps, 
the  National  Advisory  Committee,  the  Canadian  Gov- 
ernment, and  six  American  colleges.  As  against  the  85 
students  at  the  outbreak  of  war,  they  provided  almost 
at  once  for  200  men  a  week,  who  were  very  easily 
secured  from  the  long  list  of  applicants  on  hand  ever 
since  it  was  known  that  aviation  was  to  play  a  large 
part  in  the  war.  On  July  14  the  first  class  was 
graduated  exactly  as  promised,  except  that  it  had  147 
instead  of  120  members. 

In  the  meantime  the  more  time-consuming  work  of 
selection  and  construction  of  the  new  flying  fields 
was  under  way.  On  the  same  day  that  the  college 
presidents  met  to  discuss  the  ground  schools,  Major 
Foulois  and  Captain  C.  G.  Edgar  were  ordered  to 
make  a  tour  of  inspection  of  the  Middle  West  in 
search  of  sites.  They  reported  on  May  11,  and  on  the 
15th  authority  was  asked  of  the  Secretary  of  War 
to  establish  fields  at  Dayton,  Ohio,  Rantoul,  Illinois, 
and  Detroit,  Michigan.  The  proposal  was  endorsed  by 
the  Aircraft  Production  Board  as  "  a  wise  and  neces- 
sary action;"  it  was  formally  approved  by  Acting 
Chief  of  Staff  Bliss  on  May  16,  and  returned  to  the 
Aviation  Section  on  May  21  to  be  carried  out. 

Everything  meanwhile  had  been  made  ready  to  be- 
gin work.  Standard  plans  were  evolved  for  flying 
fields,  hangars,  barracks,  etc.,  through  visits  to 

56 


AMERICA'S  EARLY  WAR  PROGRAMME 

Toronto  and  conversations  with  the  British  and 
French  officers  who  were  just  then  arriving  in  Wash- 
ington from  the  front.  Work  was  started  by  the 
contractors  merely  on  the  strength  of  a  letter  that  a 
contract  was  being  prepared,  and,  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
the  fields  were  practically  completed  before  the  con- 
tracts were  actually  signed.  Work  on  the  four- 
squadron  Wilbur  Wright  Field  at  Dayton  began  on 
May  27,  and  on  the  two-squadron  Chanute  Field  at 
Rantoul  on  May  31,  under  the  stimulus  of  the  prospect 
that  the  first  ground-school  graduates  would  be  ready 
for  their  flying  instruction  on  July  14.  Fields  were 
selected,  rented,  cleared  of  woods  and  leveled,  great 
hangars  and  other  buildings  were  erected  and  roads 
and  railroads  built  in  such  quick  time  that  when  this 
first  class  left  the  colleges  they  were  able  to  go  direct 
to  the  new  fields  for  the  second  step  in  instruction. 

During  the  first  six  weeks  of  war,  therefore,  a  small 
but  strong  foundation  was  being  laid  to  meet  the  aerial 
programme  approved  by  the  General  Staff  as  a  bal- 
anced branch  of  a  many-sided  military  establishment. 
The  beginnings  of  the  enormous  industrial  develop- 
ment later  required  came  with  the  creation  of  the 
Aircraft  Production  Board,  and  the  groundwork  for 
a  large-scale  training  system  was  built  with  the  estab- 
lishment of  the  ground  schools  and  the  new  flying 
fields.  Moreover,  the  development  of  the  Liberty 
motor  was  begun  and  other  individual  steps  were 
taken,  especially  in  organization.  Compared,  however, 
with  what  was  to  come  later,  this  beginning  was  small 
indeed,  and  it  was  by  no  means  so  powerfully  pro- 
moted as  it  would  have  been  if  the  real  needs  had  been 
foreseen. 

57 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE  COMING  OF  THE  FOREIGN  MISSIONS 

Arrival  of  the  British  and  French  War  Missions  —  Their  effect 
on  the  aviation  programme  —  The  military  situation  in 
Europe  —  Mastery  of  the  air  with  the  Germans  —  Inven- 
tory of  America's  aviation  resources  —  Belative  human 
and  material  resources  of  the  Allies  —  American  flying 
school  at  Issoudun,  France,  authorized  —  First  aviation 
detachments  for  overseas  service  —  Training  in  French 
schools  authorized  —  Training  arrangements  with  Canada, 
Great  Britain  and  Italy  —  American  technical  mission 
sent  to  Europe  —  Its  purposes  and  services  —  Premier 
Bibot's  appeal  to  America  —  Its  translation  into  a  new 
and  immensely  expanded  aviation  programme  —  The  new 
programme  compared  with  the  French  Air  Service  — 
Opposition  of  the  General  Staff  —  The  programme  sent  to 
Congress  by  Secretary  Baker  without  its  endorsement  — 
The  bill  in  the  Committee  on  Military  Affairs  —  Support- 
ing statement  of  the  Signal  Corps  —  The  bill  reported. 

Then  came  to  Washington  the  British  and  French 
War  Missions,  Great  Britain's,  headed  by  Foreign 
Secretary  Arthur  James  Balfour,  on  April  22,  and 
France's,  headed  by  former  Minister  of  Justice  Rene 
Viviani  and  Marshal  Joffre,  victor  of  the  Marne,  three 
days  later.  Through  them  Washington  first  came  to 
actual  grips  with  the  war.  Previously  there  had  been 
all  the  shock  of  entering  on  a  wholly  new  path  and 
all  the  indecision  and  uncertainty  as  to  how  to  see  it 
through.  The  Missions,  however,  straight  from  the 
battle  front,  provided  definite  answers  for  every  ques- 
tion, and  brought  the  general  war  confusion  down  to  a 
hard,  cold  analysis  of  facts.  In  short  order  the  revo- 
lutionary principle  of  conscription  was  accepted,  and 
all  the  haze  surrounding  the  question  of  sending  troops 
to  France  dissolved  before  Marshal  Joffre's  appeal. 

58 


COMING  OF  THE  FOREIGN  MISSIONS 

In  aviation  more  than  anywhere  else  was  the  effect 
of  the  Missions  revolutionary.  Both  had  come  with 
very  strong  aviation  representatives,  the  French  with 
Major  Tulasne  and  Captain  de  la  Grange,  and  the 
British  with  Lieutenant-Colonel  Eees,  credited  with 
routing  single-handed  10  German  aviators.  Both  Mis- 
sions felt  free  to  make  a  strong  appeal  for  the  Air 
Service,  not  only  because  the  only  Americans  they  had 
seen  in  action  were  the  Lafayette  Escadrille  fliers,1 

i  Long  before  the  United  States  entered  the  war,  this  in- 
trepid band  carried  the  Stars  and  Stripes  in  the  air  at  the 
front  in  France.  The  idea  of  an  aero  squadron  composed 
exclusively  of  Americans  to  join  the  French  Army  was  con- 
ceived originally  by  Norman  Prince,  one  of  America's  pioneer 
aviators,  and  one  of  the  hundreds  of  Americans  who  hastened 
in  the  early  days  of  the  war  to  offer  their  services  to  France 
in  her  hour  of  need.  Prince  arrived  in  France  in  January, 
1915,  and  within  two  months  had  obtained  permission  of  the 
French  Government  to  organize  an  American  squadron  of  six 
pilots,  all  with  previous  flying  experience.  Delays  in  training, 
accidents,  and  other  causes,  however,  disrupted  this  early  or- 
ganization (composed  of  Prince,  Frazier  Curtis,  Elliott  C. 
Cowdin,  Bert  Hall,  James  Bach,  and  Andrew  Euel)  almost 
as  soon  as  formed,  and  it  was  not  until  May,  1916,  that  the 
American  squadron  was  finally  mobilized  on  the  Alsatian  front 
under  two  French  officers,  Captain  Thenault  and  Lieutenant 
de  Laage  de  Mieux.  The  seven  original  members  of  the 
Lafayette  Escadrille,  drawn  from  the  Foreign  Legion,  the 
French  Air  Service,  and  the  American  Ambulance  Service, 
were  Norman  Prince,  William  Thaw,  Victor  Chapman,  Kiffin 
Rockwell,  Bert  Hall,  Elliott  C.  Cowdin,  and  James  W.  Mc- 
Connell.  After  a  brief  period  of  service  in  Alsace,  the  squad- 
ron was  transferred  to  the  Verdun  sector,  where  it  was  joined 
by  Kaoul  Lufbery,  Dudley  Hill,  Lawrence  Rumsey,  and  many 
other  well  known  figures  in  American  aviation.  By  the  end  of 
1917  a  total  of  325  men  had  joined  the  Lafayette  Escadrille,  of 
whom  some  25  had  been  killed,  several  had  been  wounded,  and 
several  were  prisoners.  Of  the  original  seven,  Prince,  Chap- 
man, Rockwell,  and  McConnell  all  gave  their  lives  gloriously 
under  the  Lafayette  colors,  as  did  also  Lieutenant  de  Laage. 
The  only  surviving  member  of  the  original  squadron  left  at  the 
front  at  the  termination  of  hostilities  was  William  Thaw,  then 
a  lientenant-colonel  in  the  American  Air  Service. 

59 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

but  even  more  because  they  sensed  the  fact  that  the 
imaginative  appeal  of  air  fighting  would  prove  the  best 
basis  for  asking  American  aid  without  seeming  to  be 
endeavoring  to  push  us  into  the  maelstrom.  From  the 
moment  of  their  arrival  the  aviation  programme  began 
to  gather  speed,  until  shortly  it  had  completely  out- 
stripped all  the  plans  laid  down  for  it  by  the  General 
Staff.  It  cannot  be  too  clearly  understood  that  not 
until  the  arrival  of  the  Missions  did  the  subsequent 
large  programme  come  into  consideration. 

Just  at  this  time  the  aerial  situation  abroad  was 
very  serious.  On  May  4  was  received  through  the 
Chief  of  Staff  the  following  alarming  review  from  an 
American  Army  observer  on  the  other  side : 

At  the  present  moment  the  Germans  apparently  have  the 
mastery  of  the  air.  This  is  due  to  the  fact  that  they  have 
the  superior  machine.  The  English  and  French  are  strug- 
gling hard  and  suffering  very  severe  losses.  An  eyewitness 
has  just  described  to  me  witnessing  the  feats  of  the  new 
German  machines,  which  are  small  and  wonderfully  handy, 
and  can  describe  circles  around  the  British  machines.  He 
saw  one  German  machine  pass  along  the  whole  British  line, 
fired  at  by  anti-aircraft  guns  so  that  it  seemed  to  be  sur- 
rounded by  the  bursting  shell,  but  escaping  without  damage. 
He  saw  a  German  machine  dart  down  from  the  clouds  to 
attack  a  sausage  balloon,  but  the  anti-aircraft  guns  instantly 
put  a  barrage  entirely  around  the  balloon,  and  thus  saved 
it  from  destruction. 

Sir  David  Henderson  told  me  today  that  they  are  sending 
over  to  France  as  rapidly  as  possible  a  new  type  machine 
which  he  thinks  will  enable  them  to  cope  with  the  Germans. 
Incidentally,  I  may  say  that  Sir  David  Henderson  has  put 
me  in  touch  with  experts  of  the  Air  Board  who  will  recom- 
mend to  me  the  types  of  machines  and  engines  which  they 
think  we  should  adopt. 

60 


COVERING    THE     WINGS    WITH     FABRIC,    DAYTON-WRIGHT    AIRPLANE 
COMPANY,   PLANT   1 


'DOPING      THE   WINGS,  THE  TREATMENT  FOR   WATERPROOFING  THE  WING 
FABRIC    AND    MAKING    IT    NON-INFLAMMABLE 


COMING  OF  THE  FOREIGN  MISSIONS 

The  Allied  representatives  in  Washington  in  these 
circumstances  were  very  anxious  to  know  exactly  how 
n  uch  aid  the  United  States  could  give  towards  reac- 
quiring  the  supremacy  of  the  air.  A  complete  inven- 
tory of  America 's  strength  as  of  May  11  was  therefore 
prepared,  which  gives  some  very  interesting  figures. 
The  United  States  at  the  time  had  66  junior  military 
aviators,  of  whom  23  were  as  highly  trained  as  was 
possible  with  the  lack  of  facilities  here,  and  of  whom 
the  rest  had  had  over  one-half  year's  experience. 
There  were  also  34  civilian  or  reserve  military  aviators 
and  26  Army  officers  and  213  civilians  under  instruc- 
tion at  two  Government  schools  at  San  Diego  and 
Mineola,  and  at  two  civilian  schools  at  Newport  News 
and  Miami.  Three  to  four  thousand  applicants  were 
already  listed,  and  the  number  of  mechanics,  photog- 
raphers, etc.,  was  "  unlimited. ' '  Nine  new  schools 
were  contemplated,  with  a  capacity  of  75  to  100  men 
each,  and  with  further  additions  to  the  number  a  total 
of  22  should  be  reached  at  the  end  of  two  years.  Three  j 
hundred  planes  were  in  use  and  2,000  to  3,000  ex-  \ 
pected  soon. 

Obviously  America  possessed  enormously  more 
human  than  material  resources  in  aviation.  The  Allies, 
on  the  other  hand,  had  run  short  of  good  flying  per- 
sonnel through  the  terrible  drain  of  the  first  two  and 
a  half  years  of  war,  but  they  had  a  well  developed 
system  of  training.  It  was  clear,  therefore,  that  the 
resources  of  the  two  could  be  most  advantageously 
dovetailed,  and  on  May  8  Major  Tulasne  submitted  to 
General  Squier  a  memorandum  suggesting  the  estab- 
lishment of  an  American  advanced  flying  school  in 
France.  The  United  States  was  to  furnish  200  work- 

61 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

men  to  erect  it  and  "  all  the  tools,  nails  and  other 
implements  necessary, ' '  including  a  narrow-gauge  rail- 
road, while  France  was  to  furnish  the  planes,  motors 
and  suitably  cleared  land.  American  pilots  were  to 
begin  training  about  July  1  and  be  ready  to  engage 
in  battle  in  the  fall. 

This  proposal  was  transmitted  to  the  Secretary  of 
War  for  approval  on  May  10,  with  full  details  of  an 
estimated  cost  of  $773,500  and  of  a  weight  of  materials 
to  be  shipped  of  16,500  tons.  On  the  19th  it  was  re- 
turned rejected,  but  on  the  same  day  it  was  sent  back 
again  with  the  additional  argument  that  such  a  field 
would  be  essential  for  the  aviation  unit  to  accompany 
General  Pershing.  This  time  it  was  approved,  and 
on  May  27  the  first  detachment  of  aviation  enlisted 
men  for  overseas  service,  200  in  number,  was  ordered 
formed  at  Fort  Sam  Houston,  Texas.  On  June  15  they 
were  ordered  to  New  York,  and  July  6  directed  to 
proceed  abroad  "  on  the  first  available  transporta- 
tion, ' '  sailing  on  July  18  under  the  command  of  Cap- 
tain Lawrence  S.  Churchill.  Two  days  before  three 
ships  had  left  Hoboken  loaded  with  materials  for  the 
school,  which  had  been  selected,  gathered  and  put  on 
board  in  five  weeks  time.  On  September  15  the  school 
opened  at  Issoudun,  France. 

This,  however,  was  but  a  beginning  in  the  number  of 
men  to  be  trained.  Major  Tulasne  on  May  11  sub- 
mitted another  project  to  send  100  pilots,  500 
mechanics  and  500  enlisted  men  to  France  by  July  1, 
as  suggested  by  the  French  Minister  of  War  on  May  7, 
all  these  men  to  go  to  French  schools.  Decision  on  this 
proposal  was  delayed,  pending  determination  of  the 
plan  for  the  American  school  in  France.  On  June  12, 

62 


COMING  OF  THE  FOREIGN  MISSIONS 

however,  Major  R.  C.  Boiling,  former  general  coun- 
sel of  the  United  States  Steel  Corporation  and 
organizer  of  the  country's  first  National  Guard  Aero 
Company  in  the  spring  of  1915,  suggested  for  inclusion 
in  this  group  10  officers  of  that  unit  at  New  York  who 
had  had  50  hours '  flying.  Permission  to  send  these  men 
was  requested  two  days  later,  and  on  the  15th  Captain 
Frank  Page  suggested  the  sending  of  60  members  of 
the  first  class  at  the  ground  schools.  On  the  16th 
authority  was  asked  of  the  Secretary  of  War  to  send 
the  10  officers  and  the  60  cadets,  and  on  the  26th  the 
request  was  repeated  as  the  result  of  a  very  urgent 
cable  from  Boiling,  now  a  colonel  in  France,  advising 
the  training  of  the  greatest  possible  number  of  pilots 
and  mechanicians  in  French  schools.  On  July  2  the 
War  College  approved,  and  on  July  6  the  Secretary  of 
War.  Assembly  of  this  first  overseas  cadet  detachment 
began  on  the  llth,  and  on  the  14th  (Bastile  Day) 
orders  came  for  them  to  sail  on  the  first  available 
transport,  under  command  of  Captain  J.  E.  Miller, 
later  killed  in  action. 

Meanwhile,  also,  plans  were  laid  to  send  detachments 
to  Canada.  American  officers  had  been  deeply  im- 
pressed with  what  they  had  seen  there,  and  on  April 
30,  almost  as  soon  as  the  British  Mission  arrived,  they 
proposed  to  General  Bridges  the  sending  of  50  cadets 
and  200  mechanics.  This  was  approved  in  London  on 
May  6,  and  resulted  in  the  reciprocal  training  agree- 
ment which  was  later  expanded  with  such  great  ad- 
vantage to  both  nations. 

These  arrangements,  entered  into  with  considerable 
rapidity,  considering  the  difficulty  of  negotiations  be- 
tween new  allies  and  the  press  of  other  more  funda- 

63 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

mental  issues,  proved  of  the  greatest  aid  to  the  United 
States.  The  opportunities  opened  for  training  abroad 
were  greatly  widened  in  the  next  few  weeks  and 
became  a  major  part  of  America's  aerial  preparation. 
England,  which  nine  days  after  the  United  States 
entered  the  war  had  asked  for  50  "  ferry  pilots  "  to 
take  planes  back  and  forth  across  the  Channel,  opened 
her  training  facilities  to  American  cadets,  as  did  also 
Italy  on  the  arrival  of  her  Mission  here.  Thus  by 
the  fall  Americans  were  under  instruction  in  France, 
Italy,  England  and  Canada  in  numbers  greatly  in 
excess  of  what  could  have  been  possible  here  and  on  a 
plan  which,  despite  very  sharp  disappointments, 
greatly  increased  America 's  aerial  strength. 

Another  immediate  result  of  this  touch  with  tEe 
front  through  the  foreign  Missions  was  the  sending  to 
Europe  of  an  American  technical  mission  composed  of 
three  Army  officers,  two  Navy  officers  and  two 
civilians.  Captain  Waldon  on  May  2  had  outlined  the 
situation  to  General  Squier  as  follows : 

A  month  ago  we  were  considering  a  commission  to  Europe 
to  investigate  airplane  designs  and  airplane  engines.  The 
matter  was  dropped  at  your  suggestion  on  account  of  the 
coming  of  the  English  and  French  commissions.  We  have 
had  many  conferences  with  the  English  representatives.  All 
of  their  information,  however,  is  second-hand  and  not  as 
valuable  as  it  would  be  could  Captain  Clark,  for  instance, 
have  opportunity  of  collecting  it  on  the  ground. 

On  May  15  the  Aircraft  Production  Board  approved  ' 
General  Squier 's  resolution  that  this/ mission  be  sent  to 
England  and  France  as  suggested  by  the  British  Air 
Board.     R.  C.  Boiling  was  selected  as  the  head  of  the 
mission,  commissioned  a  colonel,  and  on  June  13  was 

64 


COMING  OF  THE  FOREIGN  MISSIONS 

given  a  general  letter  of  introduction  by  Secretary 
Baker,  authorizing  him  "  to  arrange  with  the  allied 
Air  Services  regarding  a  joint  programme  for  the  con- 
struction of  airplanes  and  engines  and  other  means 
whereby  the  allied  nations  might  render  mutual  assist- 
ance to  each  other  in  any  industrial  aspects  of  the 
aeronautical  situation. ' ' 

That  this  mission  did  not  sail  till  June  17  is  one  of 
the  vital  facts  in  regard  to  the  American  aerial  pro- 
gramme. The  United  States,  wholly  without  technical 
information  and  disappointed  in  its  hope  of  securing 
sufficient  data  from  the  British  and  French  Missions, 
sent  its  own  representatives  to  Europe  two  and  a  half 
months  after  the  outbreak  of  war.  That  delay,  al- 
though wholly  natural  in  all  the  rush  and  uncertainty 
of  the  early  work,  held  up  American  preparations  by 
just  that  much. 

As  soon  as  Colonel  Boiling1  arrived  in  Europe, 
progress  rapidly  gathered  speed.  Quick  decisions  were 
reached  on  the  types  of  planes  to  be  built  here,  and 
models  and  plans  were  sent  across;  underlying  busi- 
ness principles  as  to  royalties  and  the  allocation  of  raw 
materials,  such  as  linen  and  spruce,  were  arrived  at ; 
the  programme  of  training  cadets  overseas  was  greatly 
broadened ;  and  by  and  large  the  human  and  the  ma- 
terial potentialities  of  the  United  States  were  linked 

i  Colonel  Boiling  later  met  a  tragic  end,  the  first  American 
colonel  to  give  his  life  in  Prance.  During  the  great  German 
sweep  forward  against  the  British,  he  lost  his  way  in  his 
automobile  near  Amiens  and  was  killed  on  March  29,  1918,  on 
the  road  between  Estrees  and  Foucaucourt.  In  gratitude  for 
all  he  had  done  for  American  aviation  since  he  organized  the 
first  Aero  Company  of  the  National  Guard  in  1915  at  New 
York,  a  fiying  field  just  outside  Washington  was  later  named 
for  him. 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

up  with  the  technical  knowledge  and  battle-front  ex- 
perience of  the  Allies. 

But,  to  return  to  the  early  American  development, 
the  greatest  card  of  all  remained  to  be  played.  On 
May  26  the  United  States  Government  received  from 
Premier  Ribot  of  France  the  following  cablegram, 
terse  and  simple-appearing : 

It  is  desired  that  in  order  to  cooperate  with  the  French 
Aeronautics,  the  American  Government  should  adopt  the 
following  programme:  the  formation  of  a  flying  corps  of 
4,500  airplanes  —  personnel  and  material  included  —  to  be 
sent  to  the  French  front  during  the  campaign  of  1918.  The 
total  number  of  pilots,  including  reserve,  should  be  of  5,000 
and  50,000  mechanicians. 

Two  thousand  planes  should  be  constructed  each  month, 
as  well  as  4,000  engines,  by  the  American  factories.  That 
is  to  say,  that  during  the  six  first  months  of  1918,  16,500 
planes  (of  the  last  type)  and  30,000  engines  will  have  to 
be  built. 

The  French  Government  is  anxious  to  know  if  the  Ameri- 
can Government  accepts  this  proposition,  which  would 
allow  the  Allies  to  win  the  supremacy  of  the  air. 

'** 

These  few  sentences  laid  the  foundation  of  aviation 
as  it  exists  in  the  United  States  today.  They  com- 
pletely shattered  all  previous  American  plans  and  set 
in  motion  the  machinery  for  an  expansion  unprece- 
dented in  history.  Undoubtedly  they  form  one  of  the 
great  landmarks  of  America 's  participation  in  the  war, 
comprising  as  they  do  the  first  appreciable  appeal  for 
aid  by  the  Allies. 

The  task  of  amplifying  these  broad  figures  into  a 
detailed  programme  was  entrusted  to  Major  Foulois, 
a  pioneer  aviator  who  had  run  away  from  home  to 
enlist  in  the  Army  and  who  had  been  Wright 's  first 

66 


COMING  OF  THE  FOREIGN  MISSIONS 


cross-country  flier.  Conferences  were  held  day  and 
night,  charts,  tables  and  schedules  drawn  up,  and  all 
the  details  of  an  enormous  development  fitted  together. 
Every  effort  was  made  to  have  the  figures  watertight. 
But  with  no  experience  to  serve  as  a  guide,  the  whole 
project  was  new  and  unfamiliar,  and  much  of  it  had 
to  be  drafted  in  the  dark  and  under  the  highest  pres- 
sure of  time.  There  was  neither  opportunity  nor 
knowledge  for  balancing  and  adjusting;  the  one 
thought  was  the  supreme  opportunity  and  the  supreme 
need  for  haste. 

The  final  figures  were  astounding  in  those  days  of 
limited  aviation  activities.  Whereas  the  Government 
possessed  less  than  300  planes,  the  new  programme 
called  for  22,625,  including  12,000  of  types  never  even 
seen  here.  Whereas,  in  all  the  years  before  the  war, 
not  $16,000,000  had  been  appropriated  for  aviation, 
over  $700,000,000  was  now  called  for.  Twenty-fou 
new  flying  fields  to  train  1,000  men  a  month,  as  well  as 
parks,  supply  depots,  machine  shops  and  fields  i 
France,  were  needed. 

France's  request  to  have  4,500  American  pilots  in 
France  by  the  following  spring  was  worked  out  in 
detail.  Beginning  in  August,  1917,  with  540  gradu- 
ates, pilots  were  to  be  turned  out  from  the  primary 
training  schools  to  the  number  of  4,650  by  May  15  and 
6,210  by  July  15, 1918.  On  January  1, 1918,  advanced 
training  was  to  begin  on  2,500  De  Haviland-4  planes 
and  high-speed  training  on  800  each  of  the  SE-5, 
Sopwith  and  Spad  types.  "  It  is  entirely  within  our 
ability/'  reads  the  official  summary,  "to  meet  the 
request  of  France,  provided  immediate  action  is  taken 
toward  building  the  500  primary  training  machines 

67 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

necessary."  Beyond  this  total  of  4,900  primary,  ad- 
vanced and  fighting  planes,  12,000  service  planes  and 
24,000  service  engines  were  called  for  by  June  30, 
1918,  including  6,667  fighting  airplanes,  4,000  recon- 
naissance and  artillery-control  planes,  and  1,333 
bombers.  The  exact  types  were  unspecified  as  yet 
owing  to  lack  of  information  from  abroad,  but  no 
doubt  was  expressed  that  the  figures  could  be  lived 
up  to. 

The  best  way  to  estimate  just  how  difficult  a  pro- 
gramme  France  had  placed  before  this  country  is  to 
examine  France's  own  aviation  figures.  Data  obtained 
from  their  Mission  showed  that  * i  the  French  have  now 
1,700  airplanes  on  the  front  and  they  are  doing  their 
best  to  increase  this  number  to  2,600.  They  have 
3,000  training  planes  behind  the  lines. "  The  United 
States,  therefore,  was  asked  to  develop  in  one  year, 
from  practically  nothing,  an  aerial  force  three  times 
the  size  of  that  which  France  had  developed  in  three 
.years  of  bitter  warfare. 

The  drawing  up  of  the  programme  merely  marked 
the  beginning  of  the  difficulties.  As  yet,  it  must  be 
remembered,  the  project  lay  entirely  within  the  Sig- 
nal Corps.  Obviously,  it  was  going  to  require  ex- 
treme measures  to  secure  the  endorsement  of  both  the 
General  Staff  and  of  Congress,  for  neither  had  been 
in  the  slightest  degree  prepared  for  a  project  so 
large,  and  both  had  good  reasons  for  opposing  it.  It 
was  fully  realized  that  the  military  authorities,  who 
regarded  aviation  as  but  one  part  of  the  military  estab- 
lishment, would  not  appreciate  a  programme  which 
virtually  erected  the  Air  Service  into  a  third  arm  not 
incomparable  with  the  Army  and  the  Navy  themselves, 

68 


COMING  OF  THE  FOREIGN  MISSIONS 

and  allowed  it  not  only  to  play  its  minor  part  on  the 
American  front,  but  to  become  a  great  international 
striking  force.  At  that  time  nearly  all  line  officers 
felt  that  the  Service  was  wholly  unjustified  in  its 
claims  by  any  experience  abroad. 

The  opposition  expected  from  the  General  Staff  was 
fully  encountered.  Quite  apart  from  its  anticipated 
skepticism,  the  General  Staff  was  simply  smothered  in 
work.  The  whole  American  military  establishment 
was  in  upheaval,  as  the  foreign  Missions  had  com- 
pletely revolutionized  America's  plans  for  leisurely, 
rather  small-scale  preparation,  and  had  brought  about 
a  general  reconstruction,  sending  American  troops 
abroad  six  months  ahead  of  schedule.  Aviation, 
naturally,  could  be  considered  only  as  an  incident. 
The  General  Staff,  moreover,  had  at  that  time  to  con- 
sider not  only  the  military,  but  also  the  industrial 
phases  of  the  problems  confronting  them.  Real  alarm 
was  expressed  by  Brigadier-General  Joseph  E.  Kuhn, 
Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  lest  this  great  aviation  pro- 
gramme should  dislocate  the  other  more  vital  phases 
of  war  preparation.  A  detailed  correspondence  with 
Mr.  Coffin  and  with  the  General  Munitions  Board, 
however,  reassured  him  on  this  score,  and  secured  a 
clearance  for  the  programme  so  far  as  its  industrial 
side  was  concerned. 

Meanwhile  invaluable  time  was  being  lost.  General 
Squier,  chafing  under  the  delay,  went  directly  to 
Secretary  Baker,  saying  that  he  felt  sure  he  could  get 
the  bill  through  Congress  if  he  could  once  get  it  intro- 
duced. Thereupon  the  Secretary  took  the  unprece- 
dented step  of  sending  the  bill  to  Congress  without 
formal  action  on  it  by  the  General  Staff,  but  with  his 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

personal  endorsement  as  head  of  the  War  Department. 
This  summary  action,  believed  unavoidable  in  the 
avalanche  of  work  at  that  time,  was  criticized  later  in 
Congress,  but  without  effect.  In  a  sense  the  Air  Ser- 
vice had  now  broken  out  from  the  general  military 
establishment ;  it  was  henceforth  to  run  its  own  course, 
until  a  year  later  its  programme  was  shown  to  have 
been  impossible. 

As  public  opinion  was  being  prepared  on  a  scale 
never  before  attempted  by  a  Government  agency,  the 
final  bill  was  put  into  the  hands  of  Chairman  Dent  of 
the  House  Committee  on  Military  Affairs  on  July  4. 
Here  also  another  precedent  was  broken,  which  was 
later  criticized  in  Congress,  in  that  the  bill,  carrying 
an  appropriation  of  nearly  two-thirds  of  a  billion 
dollars,  was  presented  to  the  Committee  on  Military 
Affairs  rather  than  to  the  Committee  on  Appropria- 
tions. The  bill  was  introduced  in  the  House  on  the 
6th,  though  without  any  intimation  of  the  amount  of 
money  involved  in  the  appropriation,  and  was  re- 
ferred back  immediately  to  the  Committee  on  Military 
Affairs. 

The  Committee  held  exactly  two  meetings  with  War 
Department  officials.  Despite  early  consternation  at 
the  size  of  the  programme,  the  essential  logic  of  its 
presentation,  the  romance  of  aviation  itself,  and  the 
wide  publicity  already  secured  created  a  very  favor- 
able atmosphere.  General  Squier  and  Major  Foulois 
carried  the  first  meeting.  General  Squier 's  statement, 
written  around  Premier  Ribot's  cablegram,  so  well 
shows  the  attitude  at  the  time,  the  confidence  of  execu- 
tion, the  appeal  for  haste,  and  the  pressure  on  Con- 
gress, that  it  is  here  given  in  full : 

70 


COMING  OF  THE  FOREIGN  MISSIONS 

The  foregoing  cablegram  is  based  on  military  necessity, 
and  from  a  military  point  of  view,  is  conclusive  and  without 
question. 

The  French  Government,  without  doubt,  urgently  needs 
vital  assistance  from  the  United  States  before  the  spring 
campaign  of  1918. 

We  can  produce,  in  the  United  States,  the  5,000  pilots 
and  50,000  mechanicians  by  May  15,  1918,  provided  the 
funds  are  forthcoming  for  the  manufacture  and  purchase  of 
training  machines  heretofore  mentioned. 

We  cannot  produce  or  provide  the  necessary  service  air- 
planes and  engines  for  these  5,000  pilots  unless  funds  are 
also  immediately  forthcoming  for  their  manufacture  and 
purchase. 

The  estimate  for  service  airplanes  and  engines  is  based 
upon  the  cablegram  from  the  Premier  of  France,  in  which 
he  states  that  this  country  should  construct  2,000  airplanes 
and  4,000  engines  each  month.  Based  upon  this  figure  there 
should  be  produced,  by  the  United  States,  12,000  airplanes 
and  24,000  engines  during  the  period  January  1,  1918,  to 
June  30, 1918. 

It  is  my  opinion,  that  the  Premier  of  France  is  fully 
cognizant  of  the  military  needs  of  this  country,  and  would 
not  make  such  an  important  request  unless  he  believed  it  of 
absolute  military  importance  to  the  cause  of  the  Allies. 

It  is  further  my  personal  opinion,  that  a  country,  which 
has  been  carrying  the  burden  of  the  greatest  war  in  history, 
is  fully  cognizant  of  the  enormous  military  value  of  air- 
planes in  actual  war,  and  when  that  country  asks  the  United 
States  to  assist  in  maintaining  the  supremacy  of  the  air  by 
the  utilization  of  its  enormous  wealth  and  resources,  I  do 
not  believe  that  any  official,  military  or  civil,  in  this  coun- 
try, is  in  a  position  to  say  that  such  assistance  should  be 
withheld,  unless  this  country  intends  to  act  in  a  perfunctory 
manner  in  its  cooperation  with  its  Allies  in  war. 

I,  therefore,  urgently  recommend  that  the  estimates,  as 
submitted,  be  approved,  in  order  that  this  country  may  be 
in  a  position  to  render  valuable  and  necessary  assistance, 
to  its  Allies,  with  the  least  delay. 

71 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

The  second  meeting  of  the  Committee  was  with  the 
foreign  aviation  officers  who  had  come  over  direct  from 
the  battle  front  with  the  Missions.  Colonel  Rees, 
Major  Tulasne,  Captain  de  la  Grange  and  others  all 
told  of  their  actual  experiences  at  the  front  and  sup- 
ported the  American  officers'  claims  in  every  way. 
Their  presence  was  most  stimulating,  as  it  was  the 
first  time  officers  of  the  Allied  armies  had  appeared 
before  a  Congressional  Committee. 

Every  fact  and  figure  in  the  possession  of  the  Signal 
Corps  was  supplied  to  the  Committee,  but  naturally 
on  a  project  so  new  and  unfamiliar  the  discussion  had 
to  deal  largely  in  estimates  and  approximations.  If  it 
be  said  that  the  whole  attitude  was  over-optimistic, 
it  may  be  answered  that  the  aviation  officials  were 
gambling  for  enormous  stakes  at  the  request  of  the 
Premier  of  France,  and  that  if  they  had  not  been 
utterly  fearless  themselves,  they  could  never  have  ven- 
tured forth  on  such  a  programme. 

In  record  time  the  bill  was  rushed  through  the 
Committee,  and  on  June  13,  a  week  after  its  receipt 
from  the  House,  it  was  reported  unanimously.  Only 
one  amendment  of  any  importance  was  made  by  Chair- 
man Dent's  Committee,  that  of  adding  Section  10 : 

That  for  the  purpose  of  carrying  this  Act  into  effect  the 
sum  of  $640,000,000  is  hereby  appropriated. 

The  report  concludes: 

The  report  of  the  Committee  is  unanimous.  Expedition 
in  the  passage  of  the  bill  was  considered  also  of  the  utmost 
importance.  English,  French  and  Italian  officers  appeared 
before  the  Committee  in  addition  to  our  own  and  all  con- 
curred in  the  conclusion  that  the  control  of  the  air  was  at 
this  time  at  least  the  most  important  thing  that  could  be 

72 


COMING  OF  THE  FOREIGN  MISSIONS 

done.  In  fact  it  was  boldly  stated  that  the  control  of  the 
air  would  naturally  result  in  reducing  to  a  large  extent 
the  number  of  men  necessary  in  the  trenches. 

For  the  reasons  above  stated  the  Committee  unanimously 
and  earnestly  urge  the  passage  of  this  bill. 


73 


CHAPTER  V 

THE  ADOPTION  OF  THE  NEW  PROGRAMME 

The  campaign  for  public  and  Congressional  sanction  —  Pub- 
licity methods  of  the  Aircraft  Production  Board  —  The 
press  enlisted  in  support  of  the  programme  —  Public  state- 
ments of  Mr.  Coffin,  General  Squier,  Secretary  Baker,  and 
President  Wilson  —  Extent  of  editorial  support  —  Effect 
on  public  opinion  of  the  publicity  campaign  —  The  bill  in 
Congress  —  The  debate  in  the  House  —  Mr.  Mann 's 
speech  —  Debate  limited  to  an  hour  and  a  half  —  The  bill 
passed  without  amendment  and  without  roll  call  —  The 
debate  in  the  Senate  —  Final  passage  and  enactment  — 
The  programme  launched  —  The  seeds  of  later  disappoint- 
ment sown  in  the  optimism  of  the  early  publicity. 

The  great  task  of  securing  public  and  Congressional 
approval  for  this  unprecedented  programme  now  re- 
mained, and  the  campaign  through  which  it  was 
accomplished  forms  one  of  the  most  extraordinary 
chapters  both  in  governmental  and  in  American  legis- 
lative history.  Obviously,  $640,000,000  could  not  be 
asked  for  in  those  days  of  small  appropriations,  and 
still  smaller  knowledge  of  aviation,  without  a  very 
special  preparation  of  the  public  mind.  The  step  was 
so  startling,  even  to  those  close  to  it,  that  it  was  fully 
realized  that  the  way  must  be  carefully  prepared. 

Fortunately  the  time  was  fully  ripe.  Aviation  had 
been  born  in  this  country,  possessed  a  romantic  appeal 
to  the  American  imagination,  and  had  been  the  most 
fully  reported  phase  of  the  then  distant  struggle, 
especially  because  of  the  famous  Lafayette  Escadrille. 
The  Air  Service  was  uppermost  in  the  minds  of  news- 
paper correspondents  and  of  the  public,  and  both  were 

74 


ADOPTION  OF  THE  NEW  PROGRAMME 

eager  for  all  information  possible.  Moreover,  the  Ser- 
vice, through  its  very  newness  and  its  civilian  per- 
sonnel in  the  Aircraft  Production  Board,  was  very 
responsive.  Already,  even  before  the  big  programme 
was  drawn  up,  there  had  been  considerable  publicity, 
and  on  May  21,  Mr.  Coffin  had  made  "  the  first  au- 
thoritative statement  of  America's  war  policy  in  the 
air, ' '  showing  that  at  that  time  3,500  planes,  including 
both  training  and  battle  planes,  was  the  limit  contem- 
plated six  weeks  after  the  declaration  of  war. 

For  the  next  two  weeks  the  situation  remained 
unchanged  to  outside  view,  while  within  the  War 
Department  the  French  cablegram  was  being  amplified 
into  the  big  programme.  On  June  2  Mr.  Coffin  issued 
a  somewhat  more  insistent  statement : 

France  and  Great  Britain  have  made  it  plain  again  and 
again  that  they  expect  aircraft  and  aviators  to  be  one  of 
America's  greatest  contributions  to  success  in  the  war. 
America  is  responsible  for  the  intention  of  both  the  sub- 
marine and  the  airplane.  In  the  development  of  both  she 
has  allowed  Europe  to  outstrip  her.  It  is  for  us  to  show 
that  we  can  yet  surpass  both  our  enemy  and  our  Allies  in 
the  development  of  the  two  great  mechanical  inventions  for 
which  we  ourselves  are  responsible. 

Mr.  Coffin,  however,  had  no  illusions  about  the 
industrial  difficulties  of  supplying  planes  for  the  500 
cadets  who  were  to  begin  flying  instruction  on  July  20. 
"  It  is  just  possible,"  he  said,  "  we  cannot  get  a  full 
equipment  of  airplanes  within  the  time,  but  we  shall 
have  enough  to  get  a  part  of  the  men  in  the  air,  and 
shall  not  be  seriously  handicapped  the  first  few  weeks 
if  we  do  not  have  our  full  quota. '  ' 

A  great  change  in  publicity  methods  had  now  come 
75 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

with  the  final  working  out  of  the  details  of  the  new 
programme.  Aggressiveness  was  needed,  first,  to  make 
the  appropriation  at  all  possible,  and  second,  to  put  it 
through  at  emergency  speed.  Accordingly,  a  confiden- 
tial luncheon  was  held  in  New  York  on  June  8,  at 
which  were  a  score  of  the  most  powerful  editors  of  the 
United  States.  Its  purpose  was  frankly  confessed  by 
Mr.  Conin : 

Gentlemen,  if  you  agree  with  the  logic  of  the  statements 
which  I  am  making  to  you  today,  it  will  lie  within  the  power 
of  the  comparatively  small  group  of  men  here  in  this  room 
to  do  more  towards  the  passage  of  this  bill  through  Con- 
gress, to  do  more  to  carry  this  programme  to  a  successful 
conclusion,  than  can  be  accomplished  by  any  other  agency 
in  this  country.  The  future  history  of  the  world's  nations 
may  be  influenced  by  your  action. 

Grosvenor  B.  Clarkson,  Secretary  of  the  Council 
of  National  Defense,  who  presided,  was  equally  frank 
in  his  statement  that  "  this  story  is  surely  coming 
down  to  the  question  of  the  people  of  the  country 
calling  for  and  getting  behind  and  pushing  the  bill, 
perhaps  for  a  startling  sum,  that  will  be  presented  to 
Congress  to  bring  into  being  a  sufficient  Air  Service." 
The  hope  was  not  so  much  to  secure  immediate  pub- 
licity as  to  lay  a  groundwork  in  the  minds  of  the  men 
there  present  that  would  be  receptive  for  the  an- 
nouncements shortly  to  come  from  Washington.  Edi- 
torial discussion  was  very  much  desired,  and  the 
statement  was  made  by  Mr.  Coffin  that  "  a  smashing 
series  of  news  stories"  on  aviation  matters  were  in 
prospect. 

Mr.  Coffin  promised  a  means  <c  to  help  the  foreign 
situation  and  help  it  immediately,  certainly  within  90 

76 


EXPERT    WELDING  ON    CAPRONI   FITTINGS,    STANDARD   AERO    CORPORATION 


ROUGHING  OUT  THE  DE  HAVILAND-4  PROPELLER 


ADOPTION  OP  THE  NEW  PROGRAMME 

days  or  four  months  at  the  outside. ' '    He  summarized 
the  situation  as  follows : 

Now,  if  we  can  do  this  thing,  and  beginning  with  the  first 
of  January,  start  sending  air  men  to  Europe  for  finished 
training  on  the  European  fields  with  the  fast  types  of  ma- 
chines, we  will  have  done  more  to  make  a  dent  in  this  great 
struggle  in  which  we  are  involved  on  the  other  side  of  the 
water  than  we  can  in  feeding  any  number  of  troops  of  the 
line  into  that  maelstrom  on  the  western  front.  If  the 
United  States  can,  as  its  contribution  to  the  cause  of  democ- 
racy, give  to  the  Allied  forces  the  supremacy  of  the  air 
and  can  maintain  that  supremacy  for  the  duration  of  the 
war,  I  think  we  may  take  it  for  granted  that  the  length  of 
the  war  will  be  very  much  shortened  and  the  lives  of  hun- 
dreds of  thousands  of  Americans  and  of  all  other  nationali- 
ties saved. 

We  have  seen  Germany  repeatedly  shift  a  million  of  the 
finest  troops  in  the  world  from  the  east  to  the  west  fronts 
without  even  making  a  dent  in  the  Allied  line.  Mere  num- 
bers of  men  count  little  in  this  great  struggle.  The  land 
may  be  trenched  and  mined;  guns  and  bayonets  form  an 
impossible  barrier.  The  sea  may  be  mined  and  netted  and 
the  submarine  lurks  in  its  depths.  But  the  highways  of  the 
air  are  free  lanes,  unconquered  as  yet  by  any  nation. 
America's  great  opportunity  lies  before  her.  The  road  to 
Berlin  lies  through  the  air.  The  eagle  must  end  this  war. 

Mr.  Deeds,  in  a  similar  speech,  said :  * '  If  we  start 
immediately,  we  can  put  10,000  aviators  on  the  French 
front  by  this  time  next  year  and  win  the  war.  We  I 
are  convinced  of  this.  If  we  can  put  through  the  pro- 
gramme as  provided  in  the  bill,  soon  to  be  introduced 
to  Congress,  we  will  get  over  there  next  spring  in  time 
to  win."  Major  R.  C.  Boiling,  in  urging  the  vital 
necessity  for  speed,  said  that  "  every  day  lost  in  sup- 
porting this  thing,  every  day  lost  in  bringkig  our  full 
forces  to  bear,  means  three  or  four  thousand  more 

77 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

Americans  that  will  not  come  back  at  all,  or  will  come 
back  crippled  and  of  no  use  at  all.  That  is  what  we 
are  facing — time — and  first  of  all  time. ' !  The  British 
and  French  aviators  who  had  already  been  so  in- 
fluential with  Congress  were  also  called  upon.  Colonel 
Rees  gave  a  graphic  story  of  the  romance  of  air  fight- 
ing, and  Captain  de  la  Grange  stated  that  the  Battle 
of  the  Marne  had  been  won  by  airplanes  reporting  the 
huge  concentration  in  Belgium,  and  predicted  that  if 
America  put  her  whole  heart  into  aviation,  "before 
next  Spring  we  will  put  out  the  eyes  of  the  beast 
before  we  try  to  kill  it." 

This  meeting  had  a  tremendous  effect.  Editorials 
began  to  appear  all  over  the  country,  all  demanding, 
first,  a  huge  air  fleet,  and  second,  all  speed  in  Congress. 
Later,  when  the  promised  announcements  came  forth 
from  Washington,  they  were  given  the  very  best  possi- 
ble display  in  the  press  and  were  often  accompanied 
by  editorial  support.  At  this  time  also  the  Aero  Club 
of  America,  which  long  had  been  urging  aerial  prepa- 
ration, and  which  had  endorsed  previous  official  state- 
ments, came  out  on  July  9,  through  a  letter  from  its 
President,  Allen  R.  Hawley,  to  Chairmen  Dent  and 
Chamberlain  of  the  House  and  Senate  Committees  on 
Military  Affairs,  for  an  appropriation  of  half  a  billion 
dollars  to  supply  40,000  planes  and  10,000  aviators. 
"This  may  seem  and  is  large,  but  it  seems  to  be  the 
most  economical  way  of  striking  Germany." 

On  June  14  Mr.  Coffin  sounded  the  opening  call  of 
a  series  of  public  statements  in  a  forceful  announce- 
ment that  the  American  people  "must  be  prepared  to 
enter  the  war  in  the  air  to  an  extent  hitherto  unheard 
of  if  their  power  is  to  have  any  effect  on  the  result 

78 


ADOPTION  OF  THE  NEW  PROGRAMME 

of  the  war  during  the  next  year."  The  American 
authorities  had  been  informed  by  the  Allies  that  if 
airplanes  and  aviators  commensurate  with  the  coun- 
try's resources  were  supplied  immediately,  a  greater 
contribution  to  the  success  of  the  Allied  cause  would 
be  made  than  by  the  sacrifice  of  thousands  of  Ameri- 
can lives  in  the  trenches  later  on.  Two  days  later" 
General  Squier  issued  a  public  appeal  to 

put  the  Yankee  punch  into  the  war  by  building  an  army 
in  the  air,  regiments  and  brigades  of  winged  cavalry 
mounted  on  gas-driven  flying  horses.  .  .  .  $600,000,000 
is  negligible  against  the  certainty  of  victory  thus  offered. 
.  .  .  Sweep  the  Germans  from  the  sky,  blind  the  Prussian 
cannon,  and  the  time  will  be  ripe  to  release  an  enormous 
number  of  flying  fighters  to  raid  and  destroy  military 
camps,  ammunition  depots,  military  establishments  of  all 
kinds. 

A  dispatch  form  Paris  that  Germany  intended  to 
bring  3,500  planes  into  action  in  1918  offered  Mr. 
Coffin  the  opportunity  to  issue  another  statement : 

Our  plan  contemplates  nothing  less  than  driving  the  Ger- 
man fliers  out  of  the  air  and  maintaining  a  constant  raiding 
patrol  over  the  territory  for  fifty  miles  back  of  the  fighting 
lines.  If  we  build  the  quantities  of  machines  for  which  we 
have  the  capacity  and  train  our  thousands  of  available  men, 
we -can  tear  up  the  enemy  communication  lines  and  prevent 
the  movement  of  troops  and  supplies. 

Immediately  afterwards  Secretary  Baker,  on  June 
18,  issued  a  statement  that  "the  War  Department  is 
behind  the  aircraft  plans  with  every  ounce  of  energy 
and  enthusiasm  at  its  command."  An  air  service, 
he  said,  could  be  trained,  equipped  and  transported 
more  quickly  than  infantry  or  artillery  and  at  the 

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THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

same  time  be  proportionally  more  effective.  Aviation 
"furnishes  our  supreme  opportunity  for  immediate 
service,  and  may  spell  the  whole  difference  between 
victory  and  defeat."  Aerial  domination  must  be 
secured  for  the  Allies  during  the  year. 

On  June  21  the  Aircraft  Production  Board  stated 
that  it  would  attempt  to  standardize  airplane  manu- 
facture along  somewhat  the  same  lines,  though  ob- 
viously not  to  the  same  degree,  that  automobiles  had 
been  standardized.  At  the  same  time  the  announce- 
ment was  made  that  speed  scout  machines  would  not 
be  made  here  because  of  the  distance  from  the  front, 
and  information  was  allowed  to  escape  that  2,000 
engines  would  be  delivered  monthly,  beginning  in 
November  of  1917. 

Then,  with  the  bill  actually  presented  to  Congress, 
President  Wilson  himself  was  called  upon.  On  June 
23  the  following  letter  to  Secretary  Baker  was  pub- 
lished : 

I  have  your  letter  of  yesterday  about  the  production  of 
aircraft  and  the  training  of  men  to  operate  them,  and  want 
to  say  that  I  am  entirely  willing  to  back  up  such  a  pro- 
gramme as  you  suggest.  I  hope  that  you  will  present  it  in 
the  strongest  possible  way  to  the  proper  committees  of  the 
Congress. 

On  the  same  day  Orville  Wright,  who  had  been  put 
in  charge  of  the  great  Government  flying  field  at 
Dayton,  where  he  and  his  brother  made  their  first 
experiments,  issued  a  statement  in  Washington : 

If  the  Allied  armies  are  equipped  with  such  a  number  of 
airplanes  as  to  keep  the  enemy  planes  entirely  back  of  the 
lines  so  that  they  are  unable  to  direct  gunfire  or  observe  the 
movements  of  the  Allied  troops  —  in  other  words,  if  the 

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ADOPTION  OF  THE  NEW  PROGRAMME 

enemy's  eyes  can  be  put  out  —  it  will  be  possible  to  end 
the  war.  This  is  not  taking  into  account  what  might  be 
done  by  bombing  German  sources  of  ammunition  supplies 
such  as  Essen,  which  is  only  150  miles  behind  the  fighting 
lines. 

Meantime  much  individual  publicity  was  being  had. 
On  July  1,  for  instance,  the  New  York  Times  printed 
two  jnteryiewsT  one  with  QrviUfi  .Wright  and  the  other 


with  General  Squier,  the  ^ter  stating  that  "we_can 
make  the  Kiel  Canal  itself  useless"  with  airplanes. 
Dr.  Joseph  S.  Ames,  an  eminent  scientist,  came  out  on 
the  5th  for  20,000  planes  and  10,000  aviators,  and  on 
the  7th  reports  stated  that  Germany  would  be  defeated 
within  a  few  months  of  the  completion  of  the  22,625 
planes  called  for  in  the  $639,000,000  programme, 
which  it  was  estimated  could  be  turned  out  at  the  rate 
of  3,500  a  month. 

During  early  July  also  the  foreign  aviators  here 
were  brought  into  the  publicity.  Captain  de  la 
Grange,  in  a  series  of  three  interviews  issued  by  the 
Committee  on  Public  Information,  pointed  out  the 
great  value  of  aviation,  the  enormous  strides  made  in 
Europe,  and  the  fact  that  America  could  here  give  its 
most  immediate  and  vital  assistance.  These  inter- 
views went  into  great  detail  and  gave  many  figures, 
but  did  not  convey  the  impression  that  the  task  was 
difficult.  Colonel  Rees,  of  the  British  Royal  Flying 
Corps,  also  aided  in  outlining  the  needs  of  the 
situation. 

Something  of  the  effect  of  all  this  publicity  may  be 
seen  in  the  series  of  editorials  run  in  the  New  York 
Times.  "While  this  paper  was  one  of  the  most  con- 
sistent supporters  of  aviation,  many  others  were 

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THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

almost  equally  earnest.      Its  editorial  page  for  that 
short  period  shows  the  following  articles : 

<    June    5 :  "  Belated  Recognition." 

10 :  "  First  of  All  Airplanes." 

15 :  "  For  Air  Supremacy." 

16 :  "  Give  Our  Airmen  a  Chance." 

18:  "Build  More  Airplanes." 

JL)  20 :  "  Give  Us  Airplanes  and  Airmen." 

22:  "The  Aeroplane  Program." 

26:  "  Call  for  Recruits." 

July    5:  "Aviation  Plans  Must  Not  Be  Delayed." 

8:  "  Get  the  Airplanes  Ready." 

9 :  "  American  Aviators  Needed." 

10:  "  Squadron  Flights." 

17 :  "  Aviation  Appropriation  Bill." 

20 :  "  Hampering  the  Government." 

23 :  "  At  Last  the  Airplanes." 

Thus  aviation,  in  an  amazingly  short  time,  was 
brought  to  the  very  forefront  of  American  public 
attention  as  the  quickest  and  least  onerous  method  of 
defeating  Germany  It  is  not  too  much  to  say  that 
when  the  unprecedented  estimate  of  $640,000,000  was 
presented  to  Congress,  public  opinion  at  large  stood 
as  a  solid  unit  not  only  for  its  enactment,  but  for  its 
enactment  immediately. 

The  bill  was  now  before  Congress.  Up  to  the  time 
of  its  presentation  aviation  had  figured  but  slightly 
there,  although  there  had  been  some  discussion  of  a 
Department  of  Aeronautics  under  a  civilian  Secretary. 
Immediately  after  the  House  Committee  on  Military 
Affairs  had  unanimously  reported  the  bill,  on  July  13, 
Mr.  Coffin  issued  a  statement  calling  the  Committee's 
action  "almost  unprecedented  in  its  promptness  and 
thoroughness,"  and  praising  "its  complete  non- 
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ADOPTION  OF  THE  NEW  PROGRAMME 

partisanship  or  dissention  of  any  kind/7  as  well  as 
the  great  speed  with  which  all  details  had  been  pre- 
pared by  the  War  Department.  The  great  remaining 
need,  he  said,  was  for  similar  speed  in  the  two  Houses 
of  Congress  and  throughout  the  industries. 

The  next  day  the  bill  was  debated  in  the  House. 
Chairman  Dent  met  the  only  setback  in  the  course  of 
the  appropriation  when  his  request  to  limit  debate  to 
one  hour  was  refused.  His  introduction  was  a  model 
of  brevity : 

Mr.  Chairman,  the  report  that  accompanies  this  bill 
states  substantially  everything  that  I  could  fully  and  justly 
state  on  the  floor  of  the  House.  This  bill  provides  for  the 
temporary  increase  of  the  Signal  Corps,  particularly  the 
Aviation  Section  thereof.  It  is  limited  to  the  existing 
emergency.  It  authorizes  the  President  in  general  terms 
to  organize  this  temporary  force  into  divisions,  brigades, 
regiments,  wings,  squadrons,  battalions,  companies  and 
flights.  The  act  itself  does  not  fix  the  number  of  any  of 
these  different  organizations,  but  leaves  that  entirely  to  the 
discretion  of  the  President.  The  object  of  that,  Mr.  Chair- 
man, is  readily  seen.  If  by  law  Congress  should  undertake 
to  fix  the  number  of  machines  that  will  be  constructed  and 
to  declare  the  number  of  men  that  will  be  employed  in  this 
temporary  additional  service,  and  all  of  the  details  with 
regard  to  the  same,  it  would  destroy  the  very  purpose  of 
this  legislation.  It  would  give  to  the  enemy  the  very  thing 
that  the  enemy  ought  not  to  know.  The  bill  does  carry  a 
lump-sum  appropriation  of  $640,000,000. 

A  desultory  debate,  aimed  less  at  the  matter  of  the 
bill  than  at  several  rather  extraneous  considerations 
followed.  Representative  Miller,  for  instance,  said  he 
was  informed  "that  the  War  College  has  never  passed 
on  these  details."  Mr.  Burnett  asked  if  the  appro- 
priation were  sufficient  "to  enable  the  Bureau  to 

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THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

answer  letters  addressed  to  them  by  members  of  Con- 
gress," and  several  members  criticized  the  great 
secrecy  demanded  of  Congress  in  contrast  to  the  full 
publicity  recently  issued. 

In  the  midst  of  this  desultory  skirmishing  Republi- 
can Mmof  if  y  Leader  Mann  rose  to  his  feet.^  He  asked 
ME  Dent  for  two  or  three  minutes'  time  and  was 
granted  as  much  as  he  desired.  His  attitude  as 
Minority  Leader  in  a  close  House  was  pivotal.  He 
spoke  as  follows: 

Mr.  Chairman,  I  have  seen  no  information  published  by 
the  Council  of  National  Defense  or  in  the  papers  either, 
which  gave  any  accurate  information  as  to  what  the  plans 
were  in  reference  to  aviation.  Of  course  the  amount  of 
the  estimate  was  made  public.  The  amount  of  the  appro- 
priation is  carried  in  the  bill.  I  wish  it  were  possible  for 
that  to  be  concealed.  With  the  amount  of  appropriation 
carried  in  the  bill,  it  is  inevitable  that  people  will  speculate 
as  to  what  will  be  done  with  it,  as  to  how  it  will  be  ex- 
pended, what  will  be  the  organization  of  the  Aviation  Corps, 
the  number  of  aviators,  the  number  of  machines,  the  char- 
acter of  the  flying  machine,  and  all  that.  But  that  will  be 
speculation. 

Now,  as  to  the  Army,  the  matters  in  connection  with  the 
Army  are  fairly  well  known  throughout  the  world  as  to 
all  armies.  There  are  two  new  things  in  this  war  among 
others  —  in  fact,  there  are  many  others  beside  the  two  — 
but  the  two  which  stand  out  prominently  are,  first,  the  sub- 
marine, through  which  Germany  is  endeavoring  to  starve 
out  England,  and  thereby  win  the  war,  and,  second,  the  use 
of  flying  machines  of  some  sort  for  the  control  of  the  air. 
Those  are  matters  of  speculation.  We  know  but  little  about 
them.  If  my  information  is  correct,  the  men  at  the  head  on 
the  part  of  our  Government  and  the  Allies  know  but  little 
concerning  the  submarines  of  Germany  —  the  number,  and 
for  that  matter,  the  later  type,  although  we  see  statements 
in  the  newspapers  from  time  to  tune.  I  can  see  today  no 

84 


ADOPTION  OP  THE  NEW  PROGRAMME 

way  within  the  near  future  of  starving  out  Germany.  I 
can  see  no  way  in  the  near  future  of  starving  out  the 
allies  —  England  or  France.  I  can  see  no  way  for  the  Ger- 
man Army  breaking  through  the  line  into  France  on  the  C 
west  front.  I  can  see  no  way  for  the  allied  army  breaking 
through  the  German  Army  on  the  west  front  under  any 
existing  standards  of  warfare.  But  here  is  an  unknown 
quantity  —  the  use  of  flying  machines.  No  one  knows  what 
can  be  accomplished  by  it.  No  one  knows  its  limitations. 
No  one  knows  its  possibilities.  Did  you  ever  buy  a  pig 
in  a  poke  and  take  chances  on  it?  Sometimes  it  turns  out 
very  fortunately;  sometimes  with  the  loss  of  the  money  in- 
vested. And  I  believe  that  the  time  has  arrived  with  our 
country  when  we  can  afford  to  spend  an  immense  sum  of 
money  in  trying  out  the  control  of  the  air  [applause]  and 
see,  first,  whether  that  will  give  us  control  of  the  battle 
front ;  second  whether  it  will  strike  demoralization  and  pro- 
duce revolution  in  Germany  itself.  [Applause.] 

If  I  had  my  way  about  it,  I  would  pass  this  bill  without 
saying  a  word.  [Loud  applause,  and  cries  of  "  Vote ! " 
"Vote!"] 

There  has  been  no  information  yet  published  which  will 
be  worth  much  to  the  German  Army.  But  every  particle  of 
information  which  is  furnished  to  this  House  or  to  this  Con- 
gress will  find  its  way  into  the  powers  that  control  the  or- 
ganization of  the  fighting  machine  of  Germany.  And  I 
would  not  give  them  any  information  until  they  learned  it 
in  the  field.  [Loud  and  prolonged  applause,  and  cries  of 
"Vote!"  "Vote!"] 

The  effect  was  electrical.  The  House  for  a  moment 
was  swept  off  its  feet.  It  was  obvious  that  the  bill 
would  pass  as  it  stood  and  that  further  debate  would 
be  but  perfunctory.  With  cries  of  ' '  Vote ! " ' '  Vote ! ' ', 
Mr.  Dent  succeeded  in  having  the  debate  limited  by 
unanimous  consent  to  one  hour  and  a  half. 

Mr.  Fitzgerald  (Democrat),  in  a  long  attack  on  the 
mechanics  of  the  bill,  objected  that  it  was  unconstitu- 

85 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

tional  because  unlimited  in  time,  that  though  an  ap- 
propriation bill  it  had  been  sent  to  the  Committee  on 
Military  Affairs,  and  that  it  made  no  provision  for 
raising  money.  Mr.  Miller  (Republican)  said:  "We 
ought  to  know  that  it  has  the  endorsement  and  ap- 
proval not  respecting  plan  alone,  but  detail  as  well, 
of  the  War  College  and  the  General  Staff.  Decidedly 
it  has  not  so  come."  Mr.  Gillett  (Republican)  cen- 
sured the  War  Department,  which  "in  defiance  of  the 
law,  sent  in  no  estimate,  but  privately  asked  the 
Military  Affairs  Committee  for  it."  He  believed 
the  secrecy  exaggerated,  possibly  "to  excuse  the 
usurpation  of  the  Military  Committee, ' '  but  agreed  to 
waive  his  objections  "because  I  believe  that  our  best 
chance  of  speedy  success  is  to  promote  actively  our 
aeroplane  development. ' ' 

"Delay  is  not  justified,"  Mr.  Thomas  (Democrat) 
said.  "I  want  to  see  this  bill  passed  quickly,  for  I 
have  confidence  in  the  general  belief  that  no  single 
act  can  do  so  much  towards  winning  a  speedy  vic- 
tory." Mr.  Wood  (Republican)  reiterated  this  be- 
lief, and  Mr.  Fess  (Republican)  said  that  "in  the 
unshaken  faith  of  American  achievement  I  willingly 
vote  today  authority  for  unlimited  expenditure  of 
money  to  harness,  through  American  energy,  the  possi- 
bilities of  the  air  to  stop  this  world  tragedy."  Said 
Mr.  Sherley  (Democrat) : 

I  have  an  abiding  faith  in  the  part  that  warfare  in  the 
air  is  to  play  in  the  determination  of  this  war.  You  have 
reached  a  peculiar  condition  in  both  land  and  sea  warfare, 
a  condition  largely  of  stalemate.  In  the  air  you  fight  in 
three  dimensions.  We  alone  are  in  a  position  to  bring  into 
the  scale  great  resources,  and  by  bringing  them  in  give  such 

86 


I 
£ 

HCD 


ADOPTION  OF  THE  NEW  PROGRAMME 

a  predominance  as  to  unquestionably  have  a  very  marked 
and,  I  believe,  a  speedy  determination  of  the  issue. 

The  skepticism  with  which  all  great  new  steps  in 
human  development,  such  as  the  discovery  of  America, 
of  cotton,  of  vaccination,   etc.,  had  been  regarded, 
was  described  by  Mr.   Hulbert    (Democrat),  whose 
great  objection  to  the  bill  was  that  it  did  not  go  far 
enough  in  providing  a  separate  Department  of  Aero- 
nautics.     The  secrecy  demanded  was  again  justified 
by  Mr.  Kahn   (Republican),  who  severely  criticized 
those  who  seemed  l '  to  be  intent  on  going  to  war  as  if 
we  intended  to  go  hunting  ducks  with  a  brass  band." 
Mr.  Quin  (Democrat)  said:    "One  aeroplane  is  wortKH 
according  to  the  testimony,  at  least  one  regiment  of  I 
cavalry.      It  is  worth  as  much  as  12,000  to  15,000  I 
cavalrymen  or  private  soldiers. " 

A  phase  which  was  in  every  one 's  mind  was  brought 
out  by  Mr.  Gard  (Democrat)  : 

I  am  in  favor  of  this  bill  because  I  think,  first,  the  plan 
contained  therein  will  win  the  war,  and  for  the  additional 
reason  that  it  is  one  of  war's  abhorrent  activities  which 
will  have  a  commercial  residue  of  value.  When  war  shall 
have  ceased,  the  result  of  invention  and  industry  will  have 
been  such  that  the  development  of  the  flying  machine  will 
be  no  development  of  hazard,  sport  or  slaughter,  but  afford 
a  new  and  effective  means  of  transportation  in  times  of 
peace,  bringing  increased  efficiency  and  happiness  to  all 
people. 

Alone  of  all  the  speakers,  Mr.  La  Guardia  (Republi- 
can) said  he  did  not  agree  "with  what  has  been  said 
about  this  war  being  won  with  the  airplanes  we  pro- 
vide today.  This  war  will  be  won  in  a  much  more 
cruel  and  less  spectacular  manner/'  He  particularly 

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THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

asked  Congress  not  to  hamper  the  War  Department 
by  any  unnecessary  restrictions  or  by  asking  favors. 
At  this  moment  Mr.  McKeown  (Democrat),  the  only 
dissentient,  offered  an  amendment  to  cut  the  appro- 
priation in  half,  but  it  was  immediately  voted  down. 
Chairman  Dent  requested  a  report  on  the  bill,  which 
was  read  a  third  time  and  passed  without  roll  call. 
"I  ask  unanimous  consent,"  Mr.  Hulbert  said,  "that 
the  records  show  that  there  was  no  member  voted  *k 

against  the  passage  of  the  aeroplane  plan."      "Let       rsy 
the  records  show  it, ' '  the  Speaker  ruled,  thus  passing 
through  the  House  with  the  briefest  debate  the  largest 
appropriation  for  a  single  purpose  in  the  history  of 
Congress. 

The  ^effect  upon  the  public  was  most  salutary. 
Seldom  before  had-  such  an  example  of  solidarity  been 
presented.  Nevertheless,  rumors  at  once  arose  that 
the  bill  was  to  be  held  up  in  the  Senate.  This  brought 
forth  an  outburst  of  editorials,  which  made  some 
members  of  Congress  charge  that  the  bill  was  being 
railroaded  through. 

On  July  16  the  bill  was  reported  to  the  Senate  and 
referred  to  the  Committee  on  Military  Affairs,  who 
reported  it  out  the  next  day,  without  amendment,  at 
a  session  lasting  only  45  minutes.  Senator  Chamber- 
lain, on  the  18th,  introduced  it  with  the  following  very 
brief  remarks : 

The  bill  is  so  plain  in  its  terms  that  it  does  not  seem  to 
me  to  be  necessary  nor  advisable  in  the  crisis  which  con- 
fronts our  country  to  undertake  to  analyze  the  several  sec- 
tions of  it  or  to  discuss  the  bill  at  any  length.  It  speaks 
for  itself.  The  House  Committee  on  Military  Affairs  en- 
tered into  extensive  hearings  with  reference  to  the  bill,  and 

88 


ADOPTION  OF  THE  NEW  PROGRAMME 

after  the  hearings  it  was  carefully  revised,  reported  to  the 
House,  and  passed,  without  a  dissenting  vote  and  with  very 
little  discussion.  When  it  came  to  the  Senate  it  was  at  once 
referred  to  the  Committee  on  Military  Affairs,  and  after 
some  discussion  the  Committee  felt  that  while  there  was 
much  in  the  measure  that  might  just  as  well  have  been  left 
out,  yet  in  view  of  the  urgency  of  the  situation,  concluded 
to  report  to  the  Senate  without  any  amendment  whatsoever. 

The  greatest  objection  was  to  the  applicability  of 
the  draft  provided  in  the  bill,  which  was  brought  into 
question  by  Senators  Curtis  (Republican),  Hardwick 
(Democrat)  and  Vardaman  (Democrat)  ;  the  latter 
stated  also  that  the  appropriation  appeared  "ridicu- 
lously large,  but  that  is  in  keeping  with  the  prodigal- 
ity with  which  public  moneys  are  being  expended  by 
Congress.  It  looks  like  a  pretty  heavy  burden  on  the 
toiler  when  you  realize  that  for  this  purpose,  and  this 
alone,  a  tax  of  about  $30  for  the  head  of  every  family 
of  the  United  States  is  levied."  A  real  national 
danger  in  the  lack  of  safeguard  for  the  money  appro- 
priated was  seen  by  Senator  Owen  (Democrat),  who 
urged  a  special  committee  for  this  purpose.  Senator 
Jones  (Republican)  feared  "the  appointment  of 
Brigadier  Generals  and  Major  Generals  almost  with- 
out number/'  while  Senator  Reed  (Democrat)  re- 
expressed  the  views  of  the  Committee  —  that  though 
some  features  were  objectionable,  "the  bill  ought  to 
be  passed  immediately  without  amendment,  in  order 
to  get  the  work  under  way. ' ' 

On  the  19th  Senator  Williams  (Democrat)  again 
urged  haste,  stating  "there  are  two  things  going  on 
now  that  are  attracting  the  attention  of  the  world  — 
talk  in  the  Senate  and  the  war  in  Europe. "  On  the 
next  day  Senator  Owen  voiced  the  opinion  of  many 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

other  Senators  in  protesting  against  what  they  con- 
sidered to  be  a  steam-roller  process.  Finally,  how- 
ever, on  July  21,  one  week  after  the  bill  had  passed 
the  House,  it  was  passed  by  the  Senate.  Here  again 
there  was  no  disapproval  of  the  main  purpose  of  the 
bill,  no  amendment,  no  roll  call,  and  debate  only  on 
very  extraneous  issues. 

Mr.  Coffin  and  General  Squier  at  once  met  the  re- 
quest of  the  press  for  statements.  The  former  said 
that  "all  world's  records  for  industrial  development 
of  a  new  art  must  be  broken,"  and  issued  a  word  of 
caution  that  a  few  months  must  necessarily  elapse 
before  the  outward  results  of  our  industrial  efforts 
would  show  in  the  shape  of  quantities  of  finished 
fighting  machines.  General  Squier,  in  refusing  to 
give  out  details,  said  that  "the  determination  of  the 
Allies  is  to  enter  Germany  by  the  air  route,"  but 
swift  opportunism  might  necessitate  many  changes  of 
programme  to  counter  the  moves  of  Germany. 

On  July  24,  15  weeks  after  the  declaration  of  war, 
the  great  programme  was  launched  with  President 
Wilson's  signature  of  the  Aviation  Act.1  Its  whole'' 
record  so  far  had  been  extraordinary.  It  had  re- 
quired six  weeks  to  draw  up  the  programme,  one  week 
to  put  it  through  the  House  Committee  on  Military 
Affairs,  one  day  to  put  it  through  the  House,  and  seven 
days  to  put  it  through  the  Senate,  or  less  than  two 


months  in  all  to  expfrr^  fo«%  ISQ.wqrd  p.ablp.  f  rom  Jhe 
Premier  of  France  into  an  appropriation  of  $640,- 
000,000  establishing  a  new  art  and  a  new  industry  in 
the  tlnited  States. 


i  The  full  text  of  the  Aviation  Act  of  July  24,  1917,  is  given 
in  Appendix  I. 

90 


ADOPTION  OF  THE  NEW  PROGRAMME 

The  sharpest  criticism  has  centered  about  the  early 
publicity  and  its  optimism.  Beyond  all  doubt  the 
hopes  expressed  at  that  time  were  not  later  fulfilled, 
but  it  is  only  fair  to  take  all  phases  of  the  situation 
into  consideration  —  the  unfamiliarity  of  every  one 
concerned  with  the  intricacies  of  the  task,  the  obvious 
necessity  for  haste,  and  the  temptation  to  be  enthusi- 
astic about  a  subject  already  dangerously  romantic. 
Whatever  be  the  grounds  for  criticism,  the  fact  re- 
mains that  an  enormous  programme  was  launched  in 
wholly  unprecedented  time,  and  the  great  aerial  army 
which  later  developed  set  far  ahead  on  its  long  road  of 
preparation. 


91 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE  UPBUILDING  OF  THE  FLYING  FORCE 

The  situation  at  the  passage  of  the  Aviation  Act  —  Limited 
foundations  for  expansion  under  the  new  programme  — 
Aircraft  Production  Board  personnel  transferred  to  the 
Signal  Corps  —  Equipment  Division  created  under  Colonel 
E.  A.  Deeds  —  Creation  of  the  Aircraft  Board  —  Difficul- 
ties of  organization  —  Their  reaction  upon  production  — 
The  problem  of  personnel  —  Impossibilities  of  the  manu- 
facturing programme  —  Advanced  and  primary  training 
delayed  by  lack  of  planes  —  Recruitment  of  the  flying 
force  —  Essential  qualifications  of  military  aviators  — 
Quality  of  the  army  of  volunteers  —  Selection  of  candi- 
dates —  Aviation  examining  boards  —  Physical  tests  — 
Eecruitment  of  non-flying  officers  —  Status  of  flying 
cadets  —  Organization  and  functions  of  the  ground 
schools  —  Their  courses  of  instruction  and  services  — 
Structures  to  house  the  air  army  —  Location  and  rental 
of  the  flying  fields  —  Their  design  and  construction  — 
Flying  fields  increased  from  two  to  18  in  the  first  eight 
months  of  the  war  —  Construction  overseas. 

Three  and  a  half  months  after  the  declaration  of 
war,  America's  enormously  enlarged  aerial  pro- 
gramme was  finally  launched.  It  is  necessary  to 
keep  this  date  in  mind,  for  it  serves  to  explain  what 
has  been  described  as  very  slow  progress. 

Up  to  the  signing  of  the  Aviation  Act  on  July  24, 
solid  foundations  had  indeed  been  laid,  but  on  a 
limited  scale.  The  ground  schools  and  two  new  flying 
fields  had  been  put  in  operation;  the  Aircraft  Pro- 
duction Board  had  been  formed  to  handle  what  was 
now  to  appear  by  comparison  a  rather  small  problem ; 
the  Liberty  motor  had  passed  its  first  test ;  and  there 
had  been  sent  overseas  a  few  cadets  for  training  and 
a  technical  commission  to  see  what  a  battle  plane 

92 


UPBUILDING  THE  FLYING  FORCE 

really  was.  Lines  of  policy  had  been  laid  down,  per- 
sonalities adjusted,  and  other  wholly  preliminary 
work  done. 

Compared  with  the  problem  ahead,  however,  this 
beginning  was  not  imposing.  During  these  15  weeks 
from  the  outbreak  of  war,  the  increase  in  size  of  the 
Service,  for  instance,  had  been  limited.  Indeed,  a 
week  after  the  Act  was  signed  the  personnel  stood  at 
127  flying  officers,  84  non-flying  officers,  2,300  under 
or  awaiting  instruction,  and  10,107  enlisted  men. 

Naturally  the  expansion  first  became  apparent  in 
"Washington,  about  the  Aircraft  Production  Board. 
With  all  the  vital  industrial  work  originating  there, 
the  Signal  Corps  soon  found  itself  in  the  impossible 
position  of  being  wholly  dependent  in  its  most  critical 
function  upon  a  branch  committee  of  a  Committee 
which  was  itself  purely  advisory.  In  order  to  remove 
this  anomaly,  Mr.  Deeds  and  Mr.  Montgomery  of  the 
Board  were  taken  over  into  the  Aviation  Section  as 
colonels,  Mr.  Cable,  Secretary  of  the  Board,  as  cap- 
tain, and,  later,  Mr.  Currier  as  major.1  On  August 

i  The  Aircraft  Production  Board  nevertheless  continued  to 
function  in  an  advisory  capacity,  mainly  with  the  same  per- 
sonnel. It  was  given  a  new  status  by  Act  of  Congress  of 
October  1,  1917,  which  created  the  Aircraft  Board  and  thus 
defined  its  functions  and  powers: 

[SEC.  1.]  That  for  the  purpose  of  expanding  and  coordinat- 
ing the  industrial  activities  relating  to  aircraft,  or  parts  of 
aircraft,  produced  for  any  purpose  in  the  United  States,  and 
to  facilitate  generally  the  development  of  air  service,  a  board 
is  hereby  created,  to  be  known  as  the  Aircraft  Board,  herein- 
after referred  to  as  the  board. 

SEC.  2.  That  the  board  shall  number  not  more  than  nine  in 
all,  and  shall  include  a  civilian  chairman,  the  Chief  Signal 
Officer  of  the  Army,  and  two  other  officers  of  the  Army,  to  be 
appointed  by  the  Secretary  of  War;  the  Chief  Constructor  of 
the  Navy  and  two  other  officers  of  the  Navy,  to  be  appointed 
by  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy ;  and  two  additional  civilian  mem- 

93 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

29,  nearly  five  months  after  the  outbreak  of  war, 
Colonel  Deeds  was  formally  placed  by  General  Squier 
in  charge  of  the  Equipment  Division,  entrusted  with 
producing  the  thousands  of  planes  and  engines  neces- 
sary in  a  few  brief  months  and  with  spending  upwards 
of  $350,000,000.  Colonel  Deeds  was  able  to  start  at 
this  late  date  with  a  force  of  only  14  officers  and  111 
civilians,  which  inside  half  a  year  grew  to  300  officers 
and  2,700  civilians. 

It  is  apparent  from  these  dates  and  figures  that  no 
matter  how  well  the  bigger  industrial  work  had  been 
done  in  the  first  few  months  of  the  war,  a  wholly  in- 
sufficient organization  had  been  built  up  for  the  needs 
that  were  now  to  appear.  The  smallness  of  the  orig- 
inal programme,  the  very  limited  ideas  with  which 
the  new  men  called  to  Washington  first  began  to  work, 
and  the  lack  of  quick  realization  of  what  the  new  pro- 
gramme was  to  mean,  all  contributed  to  this  slowness 

bers.  The  chairman  and  civilian  members  shall  be  appointed 
by  the  President,  by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the 
Senate. 

SEC.  3.  That  said  board  and  tenure  of  office  of  the  members 
thereof  shall  continue  during  the  pleasure  of  the  President,  but 
not  longer  than  six  months  after  the  present  war.  The  civilian 
members  of  the  board  shall  serve  without  compensation. 

SEC.  4.  That  the  board  is  hereby  empowered,  under  the  direc- 
tion and  control  of  and  as  authorized  by  the  Secretary  of  War 
and  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  respectively,  on  behalf  of  the 
Departments  of  War  and  Navy,  to  supervise  and  direct,  in 
accordance  with  the  requirements  prescribed  or  approved  by 
the  respective  departments,  the  purchase,  production,  and  manu- 
facture of  aircraft,  engines,  and  all  ordnance  and  instruments 
used  in  connection  therewith,  and  accessories  and  materials 
therefor,  including  the  purchase,  lease,  acquisition,  or  construc- 
tion of  plants  for  the  manufacture  of  aircraft,  engines  and 
accessories:  Provided,  That  the  board  may  make  recommenda- 
tions as  to  contracts  and  their  distribution  in  connection  with 
the  foregoing,  but  every  contract  shall  be  made  by  the  already 
constituted  authorities  of  the  respective  departments. 

94 


UPBUILDING  THE  FLYING  FORCE 

in  organization,  which  in  itself  held  up  the  whole  de- 
velopment by  just  that  length  of  time. 

In  the  personnel  and  the  training  side  of  the  Ser- 
vice, the  expansion,  though  less  noticeable  from  the 
outside,  was  very  much  greater  because  of  the  need 
for  men  for  training,  for  the  flying-field  organizations, 
and  for  the  ever  increasing  overseas  demand.  New 
fields,  new  examining  boards,  new  schools,  and  new 
camps  began  to  spring  up  all  over  the  country  in  quick 
succession.  Naturally,  however,  the  division  in  charge 
of  this  work  went  through  the  same  difficulties  as 
the  Equipment  Division.  Hardly  had  the  various 
sections  been  formed  and  their  duties  delineated  than 
they  again  outgrew  their  limits,  and  another  reorgan- 
ization was  necessary.  Officers  were  forced  to  divide 
and  subdivide  their  work,  to  move  from  building  to 
building,  and  to  see  constant  shifts  in  administration. 
General  Foulois,  for  instance,  who  had  seen  the  whole 
organization  grow  from  one  room  to  nearly  a  whole 
building,  left  for  Europe  in  October,  and  he  was  fol- 
lowed during  the  year  by  other  officers  who  had 
largely  put  the  machinery  together. 

Constant  change,  growth  and  development  along  lines 
very  difficult  to  foresee  thus  took  place,  both  in  per- 
sonnel and  in  equipment.  Only  by  actual  experience 
can  one  appreciate  what  an  endless  amount  of  time 
such  readjustments  require  and  how  difficult  it  is  to 
fit  to  one  another  new  personalties,  new  plans  and 
new  ambitions.  The  time  lost  in  developing  the 
mechanism  of  organization  formed  one  of  those  im- 
ponderable elements  which  no  one  had  discounted  in 
advance.  The  next  six  months,  therefore,  must  be 
looked  upon  in  a  double  light,  as  months  of  creating  an 

95 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

organization  as  well  as  months  of  creating  aviators 
and  planes.  Obviously  the  two  were  interdependent 
and  interacting,  each  delaying  and  holding  up  the 
other. 

Wholly  unexpected  problems  arose  on  all  sides,  for 
matters  were  being  dealt  with  which  were  entirely 
new  to  everyone  concerned.  It  was  not  foreseen,  for 
instance,  in  the  rush  of  other  work,  that  the  whole 
plane  programme  might  be  held  up  for  lack  of  acetate 
of  lime,  any  more  than  it  was  foreseen  that  difficulties 
abroad  would  more  than  double  training  difficulties 
here.  Knowledge  had  to  be  acquired  by  bitter  ex- 
perience and  disappointment,  the  best  hopes  often 
meeting  with  sharp  disillusion,  and  fears  hardly  ex- 
pressed often  developing  into  realities.  Meanwhile, 
days  were  slipping  by  into  weeks  and  weeks  into 
months,  while  still  the  fulfillment  of  the  early  prom- 
ises always  seemed  just  over  the  crest. 

The  only  possible  way  to  appreciate  just  what  the 
first  year  of  the  Air  Service  was  is  to  go  straightway 
into  the  details  and  explore  its  manifold  ramifications 
and  complexities.  To  recreate  all  those  new  and  un- 
expected problems  will  give  an  idea  of  just  what  work 
was  done  and  what  mistakes  were  made.  It  is  a 
romance,  whether  it  be  called  a  success  or  a  failure, 
which  will  bear  comparison  with  any  in  the  war. 

To  begin  at  the  beginning,  the  problem  of  personnel 
for  this  great  new  aerial  force,  of  pilots,  observers, 
photographers,  bombers,  engineers,  instrument  repair 
men,  and  the  like,  opened  up  a  wholly  new  field  which 
deepened  in  complexity  with  every  step  taken  into  it. 
Never  had  this  country  had  any  experience  to  reveal 
how  difficult  it  would  be  to  man  an  aerial  army,  or  to 

96 


UPBUILDING  THE  PLYING  FORCE 

indicate  into  how  many  by-ways  of  science  and  organ- 
ization the  work  would  lead.  The  problem  was  ap- 
proached, therefore,  without  a  full  realization  of  its 
pitfalls.  Nevertheless,  it  required  very  little  imagina- 
tion to  realize  that  to  train  1,000  fliers  a  month,  at 
first  almost  without  planes,  fields  or  teachers,  would 
necessitate  a  complete  abandonment  of  the  previous 
small-scale,  free-and-easy  system  in  use  here  when  less 
than  100  men  were  under  instruction. 

Plans  were  drawn  up  on  as  comprehensive  a  scale 
as  possible,  always  subject,  however,  to  the  inescapable 
fact  that  equipment  lagged  far  behind  personnel.  As 
the  work  unfolded,  one  quick  change  in  policy  after 
another  was  adopted  in  an  endeavor  to  cut  corners  and 
keep  abreast  of  an  almost  impossible  schedule.  The" 
programme  presented  to  Congress  with  the  $640,000,- 
000  appropriation,  however,  barely  outlived  the  de- 
bates, for  it  became  evident  at  once  that  the  pro- 
jected number  of  planes  could  not  be  manufactured 
in  the  time  available,  especially  the  2,500  De  Havi- 
lands  and  the  2,400  Spads,  Sopwiths,  and  SE-5's 
needed  by  January  for  advanced  training.  Just  at 
this  time  the  foreign  Missions  offered  the  hope  o£— 
giving  advanced  training  behind  the  lines  abroad,  and 
a  quick  change  of  policy  was  made  which  counted  on 
having  this  training  done  overseas.  Only  too  soon, 
however,  it  became  apparent  that  the  hundreds  of 
cadets  who  had  been  sent  across  were  likewise  without 
planes  and  that  America  would  have  to  solve  the 
advanced-training  problem  here  as  well. 

The  problem  of  primary  training  likewise  wavered 
back  and  forth.     Whereas  the  original  Congressional 
programme  called  for  540  graduates  monthly  in  mid- 
97 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

August,  September  and  October,  with  660  more  by 
November  15,  only  598,  or  just  one-quarter  of  the 
total,  were  graduated  by  November  3,0.  This  delay 
was  very  largely  traceable  to  the  shortage  of  planes, 
for  instead  of  600  by  August  1,  744  by  October  1, 
1,536  by  November  1,  and  1,824  by  December  1,  as 
estimated,  the  actual  deliveries  were  from  one-third  to 
one-half  of  these  figures,  being  230  by  August  1,  401 
by  October  1,  492  by  November  1,  and  866  by  De- 
cember 1.  Just  at  this  point,  fortunately,  a  sharp 
corner  was  cut.  The  plan  for  southern  schools  for 
winter  training  had  been  adopted  since  the  Congres- 
sional debates,  and  a  considerable  acceleration  over 
that  programme  took  place.  Indeed,  the  sharp  drop 
to  285  graduates  predicted  during  the  months  from 
November  15  to  January  15  was  largely  avoided. 

The  element  of  the  whole  air  programme  in  which 
the  least  difficulty  was  experienced  was  in  securing 
applicants  for  flying  service.  Despite  the  well  adver- 
tised danger,  men  volunteered  by  thousands.  Con- 
stant reports  of  deaths  of  famous  aviators  abroad 
were  far  outbalanced  by  the  romance  of  the  service 
and  the  opportunities  for  individuality.  Aerial  ex- 
ploits from  the  very  first  days  of  August,  1914,  when 
Garros  was  supposed  to  have  crashed  head  foremost 
into  a  German  plane  to  destroy  it,  had  fired  America 's 
imagination  to  a  forgetfulness  of  the  dangers  in- 
volved, and  from  July  14, 1914,  to  June  2, 1918,  a  total 
of  38,770  men  sought  admission  to  the  Air  Service 
as  fliers.  This  army  of  volunteers  appears  quite 
extraordinary  when  it  is  realized  that  the  whole  mili- 
tary establishment  of  the  United  States  a  year  before 
was  only  four  times  as  large. 

98 


UPBUILDING  THE  FLYING  FORCE 

« 

The  difficulty,  however,  lay  in  securing,  not  enough, 
but  the  right  type  of  men.  One  who  is  to  fly  three  or 
four  miles  up  in  the  air  must  have  perfect  heart  and 
lungs;  to  master  aerial  navigation,  reconnoissance, 
wireless,  and  machine  gunnery  he  must  have  a  clear 
mind;  and  to  pick  out  and  send  down  important  in- 
formation he  must  have  judgment  and  a  sense  of 
responsibility.  Many  men  have  one,  perhaps  two,  of 
these  characteristics,  but  only  a  limited  number  have 
all  three. 

At  first  the  quality  of  applicants  was  remarkable. 
Indeed,  the  very  flower  of  America's  youth  came  for- 
ward at  the  outbreak  of  war,  with  the  feeling  that 
trench  warfare  did  not,  after  all,  give  a  true  oppor- 
tunity for  full  expression  of  their  ability.  Three  or 
four  months  later,  however,  the  quality  began  to  fall 
off,  with  the  draining  of  the  first  enthusiasts  and  the 
attraction  of  other  good  material  to  the  Officers' 
Training  Camps,  until  in  October  corrective  steps  were 
necessary.  Very  soon  the  plan  was  proposed  of 
securing  the  larger  proportion  of  candidates  from  the 
Officers'  Training  Camps.  This  plan  at  first  broke 
down,  for  the  camp  commanders,  largely  old  line  offi- 
cers, turned  over  to  the  Air  Service  men  not  qualified 
for  line  work ;  but  it  was  corrected  by  a  sharp  protest 
that  all  requests  for  transfer  be  decided  by  the 
Adjutant-General,  * '  without  prejudice,  and  not  by  the 
Commanding  Officer,  who  will  naturally  be  loath  to 
lose  efficient  young  officers. "  As  a  result  of  this  and 
other  measures,  the  quality  again  picked  up,  and  by 
early  February  of  1918  a  great  reservoir  of  candidates 
had  accumulated  which  it  was  realized  would  fill  the 
schools  for  at  least  four  months;  after  that  it  was 

99 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

i 

planned  to  take  men  from  the  ranks  rather  than  from 
civil  life.  On  February  9  all  examinations  were 
temporarily  discontinued,  and  on  February  23  final 
instructions  were  issued  that  "no  further  examina- 
tions will  be  made  of  civilian  applicants  for  flying  or 
non-flying  commissions. ' ' 

The  task  of  sorting  the  desirable  applicants  was 
recognized  from  the  start  as  one  on  which  the  efficiency 
of  the  Service  largely  rested.  An  extensive  and  quick- 
moving  machinery  was  required,  to  operate  in  a  field 
scarcely  touched  by  psychologists.  A  network  of 
examining  boards  had  to  be  set  up  all  over  the  coun- 
try the  moment  the  size  of  the  personnel  required 
became  apparent.  When  the  United  States  entered 
the  war,  there  was  only  one  aviation  examining  board, 
that  at  Washington,  founded  in  October,  1916,  and 
sufficient  to  serve  the  needs  of  the  entire  country  until 
January,  1917.  In  that  month  a  second  was  added, 
and  a  third  and  a  fourth  in  April  and  May.  In  June, 
after  the  United  States  had  been  in  the  war  eight 
weeks  and  the  new  programme  had  begun  to  loom  up, 
four  more  boards  were  created,  with  a  ninth  in  Sep- 
tember. October,  however,  with  the  main  programme 
finally  launched,  saw  the  number  of  boards  more  than 
doubled,  with  12  new  ones  added  during  the  month. 
The  increase  continued  with  five  in  November,  seven 
in  December,  and  three  in  January,  till  a  total  of  36 
boards,  located  in  practically  every  large  city  in  the 
country,  were  in  operation ;  during  the  same  time  30 
Divisional  Boards  had  been  set  up  at  cantonment 
headquarters.  These  examining  boards  naturally  re- 
quired physicians  of  the  very  best  type.  Hundreds 
volunteered  their  services  without  charge,  and  a  large 

100 


UPBUILDING  THE  FLYING  FORCE 

force  of  specialists  was  quickly  built  up  to  safeguard 
the  Service  to  the  greatest  possible  degree  in  its  human 
material.  In  many  cases  hospitals  and  dispensaries 
also  volunteered  their  facilities  for  this  work. 

Some  idea  of  the  problems  thrust  upon  this  new 
organization  may  be  had  from  the  fact  that  in  the 
single  week  of  December  19,  1917,  2,999  candidates 
volunteered  for  examination.  The  work  could  not  be 
in  any  degree  perfunctory ;  on  the  contrary,  it  had  to 
be  most  painstaking  and  careful,  both  for  the  good  of 
the  man  himself  and  for  the  good  of  the  Service.  A 
candidate  temperamentally  or  physically  unfit  would 
be  as  well  a  danger  to  himself  as  a  financial  loss  to  the 
Government.  Consequently,  the  examination  was 
most  rigid. 

Each  man's  general  character,  presence,  athletic 
ability,  responsiveness,  agility  ;c<£  :mind,  an4  .past 
record  were  gone  into  as  caref  ally  as 'possible*  by  a 
main  examining  board  to  se$  if  JSe  appeared  °£ 
type.  Those  who  were  sluggisn, '  awkward  or ' 
were  thrown  out.  As  the  War  Department  put  it : 

The  candidate  should  be  naturally  athletic  and  have  a 
reputation  for  reliability,  punctuality  and  honesty.  He 
should  have  a  cool  head  in  emergencies,  good  eye  for  dis- 
tance, keen  ear  for  familiar  sounds,  steady  hand  and  sound 
body  with  plenty  of  reserve;  he  should  be  quickwitted, 
highly  intelligent  and  tractable.  Immature,  high  strung, 
overconfident,  impatient  candidates  are  not  desired. 

The  medical  examination  was  most  thorough.  After 
tests  of  heart,  lungs,  and  blood  pressure,  came  tests 
against  obstructions  in  the  nose  and  throat,  which 
might  cause  vertigo  or  nausea  to  a  man  passing  sud- 
denly through  wide  ranges  of  temperature,  and  ex- 

101 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

amination  with  the  Jennings  self-recording  color- 
sense  testor  to  assure  good  powers  of  observation. 
Most  unusual,  however,  was  the  balance  test,  in  which 
the  candidate  was  spun  rapidly  around  in  a  revolving 
chair  and  then  asked  to  put  his  finger  on  a  definite 
object.  The  spinning  had  set  in  motion  the  fluid  in 
the  labyrinth  of  the  inner  ear  which  controls  the  sense 
of  equilibrium.  If  the  candidate  was  normal,  he 
would  point  slightly  to  one  side  of  the  object,  and  the 
disturbance  noticeable  in  his  eyes  would  last  26  sec- 
onds. If  he  fulfilled  this  test,  he  would  stand  a  good 
chance  of  bringing  an  airplane  out  of  a  spiral  or 
falling  leaf. 

Practically  one  man  in  every  two  was  rejected  in 
these  examinations;  to  be  exact,  18,004  out  of  the 
38,770  candidates  were  thrown  out.  Possibly  mis- 
takes w,ere  raafle  iizcgotae  instances,  but  by  and  large 
it  is « safe  ta  say  that  the.  United  States  was  saved  an 
i$oun$  of  grief  and  expense  by  a  system 
stoppled  at  the  gates  men  temperamentally  or 
physically  unfit.  The  efficiency  of  the  later  training 
was  correspondingly  increased  by  the  greater  speed 
allowed  in  working  with  a  very  carefully  selected 
personnel. 

At  the  same  time  the  examining  ooards  had  to  sort 
out  nearly  10,000  applicants  for  non-flying  commis- 
sions, men  for  office  work,  production  necessities,  and 
administrative  duties  in  squadrons.  This  was  not  aii 
easy  task,  for  many  men  came  recommended  by  Con- 
gressmen and  others  who  had  to  be  handled  with  con- 
siderable care.  In  the  period  from  July  14,  1917,  to 
June  2, 1918,  6,470  such  applicants  were  accepted  and 
3,225  rejected,  mostly  for  physical  reasons. 

102 


UPBUILDING  THE  FLYING  FORCE 

During  the  year,  it  may  not  be  amiss  to  state,  the 
mechanism  of  examination  changed  with  the  general 
change  of  policy  of  the  Service.  When  the  reservoir 
of  cadets  had  accumulated  in  February,  1918,  ex- 
amination was  suspended  at  22  of  the  boards.  In 
March  five  more  boards  ceased  to  examine,  leaving 
eight  still  open  for  occasional  work.  Later  still  the 
ruling  that  practically  all  new  cadets  would  be  taken 
from  Army  camps  rather  than  from  civil  life  concen- 
trated the  work  in  the  Divisional  Boards  at  canton- 
ments and  brought  practically  to  an  end  the  work  of 
the  urban  boards  which  had  so  finely  met  the 
emergency. 

Successful  applicants  for  flying  service  at  once 
passed  into  the  Signal  Enlisted  Reserve  Corps  for 
training.  In  the  first  weeks  of  the  war  their  status 
was  uncertain,  but  on  July  13  Secretary  Baker  author- 
ized payment  to  them  of  $100  a  month  and  75  cents 
daily  for  rations ;  on  August  21  they  were  put  on  the 
same  status  as  members  of  the  Officers'  Training 
Camps;  and  on  October  29  they  were  designated  as 
" flying  cadets,"  entitled  to  wear  a  white  pique  hat 
band.  This  status  they  held  until  they  either  passed 
the  R.  M.  A.  (reserve  military  aviator)  test  for  a 
commission  or  were  discharged  as  unfit. 

The  first  assignment  of  the  successful  applicant  was 
to  one  of  the  t '  ground  schools, ' '  established,  as  previ- 
ously described,  at  six  large  engineering  colleges,  and 
increased  on  July  5  to  eight  by  the  addition  of  Prince- 
ton University  and  the  Georgetown  University  School 
of  Technology.  The  colleges  provided  quarters, 
lecture  rooms,  teachers  and  certain  equipment;  the 
Government  provided  uniforms,  military  instructors, 

103 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

and  a  tuition  fee  at  first  of  $65  per  pupil,  and  later, 
by  an  agreement  of  March,  1918,  of  $10  per  week  per 
pupil  for  the  first  four  weeks  and  $5  per  week  there- 
after. The  purpose  of  these  schools  was'twof  old,  first, 
to  provide  a  basic  knowledge  of  the  sciences  under- 
lying aviation,  and  second,  to  uncover  those  who  were 
shown  in  this  more  lengthy  examination  to  be  unfit  to 
become  aviators.  That  the  latter  provision  was  neces- 
sary is  shown  by  the  fact  that  one  man  was  discharged 
for  every  four  graduated  from  the  ground  schools. 

During  a  crowded  eight  weeks'  course  the  cadets 
were  given  preliminary  instruction  in  the  principles 
and  theory  of  flight,  radio,  codes,  aerial  photography, 
meteorology,  cooperation  with  the  land  forces,  recon- 
naissance, etc.,  and  taught  to  take  an  engine,  plane 
and  machine  gun  apart  and  put  it  together  again. 
The  curriculum  included  190  hours  in  military  sub- 
jects, 55  in  engines,  52  in  machine  gunnery,  41  in 
airplanes,  41  in  signalling  and  radio,  14  in  map  read- 
ing, 14  in  artillery  observation,  12  in  aerial  tactics,  six 
in  photography,  four  in  instruments  and  compasses, 
and  three  in  meteorology.  Perhaps  the  most  unique 
educational  device  was  the  ' '  miniature  range,  ' '  which, 
viewed  from  a  balcony  above,  exactly  simulated  a 
sector  of  the  battle  front.  The  cadets,  seated  aloft 
as  in  a  plane,  "spotted"  various  lights  made  to  flash 
on  and  off  on  the  range,  and  developed  speed  and 
accuracy  in  observation  and  in  wirelessing  their  in- 
formation to  the  instructor  below. 

These  schools  were  of  greatest  value  in  acclimating 
the  men  in  aviation  and  in  supplying  the  all-important 
theoretical  knowledge  before  actual  flying  began.  In 
a  sense  they  gave  a  complete  view  of  the  whole  aerial 

104 


THE      MINATURE      RANGE      FOR     TESTING     AND     DEVELOPING     SPEED     AND 
ACCURACY    OF    OBSERVATION 


UPBUILDING  THE  FLYING  FORCE 

problem,  as  well  as  a  familiarity  with  its  details  which 
were  aimed  to  instill  the  confidence  that  always  comes 
with  knowledge.  First  conceived  on  April  30,  1917, 
and  the  first  six  actually  opened  on  May  14,  they  had 
by  May  23,  1918,  admitted  16,620  cadets.  Of  these, 
10,503  had  graduated,  2,718,  or  one-quarter  as  many, 
had  been  discharged  as  unfit,  and  3,394,  about  one- 
half  the  maximum  capacity,  were  enrolled.  Of  the 
graduates,  8,373  had  gone  to  American  flying  schools 
and  1,791  to  flying  schools  overseas.  The  recollection 
that  only  85  men  were  in  training  at  the  outbreak  of 
the  war  will  give  some  idea  of  the  distance  traveled 
the  first  year. 

The  second  step  in  an  aviator's  training  was  taken 
at  one  of  the  new,  large  flying  fields  which  had  sprung 
up  almost  overnight  about  the  country.  The  building 
of  these  fields  was  so  large  a  part  of  the  early  aerial 
programme  and  had  such  big  future  possibilities  in 
establishing  a  strategic  aerial  network  over  the  coun- 
try that  it  is  well  to  digress  here  to  give  a  summary 
description  of  this  work.  For  this  single  phase  of  the 
programme  $72,500,000  was  appropriated,  to  be  spent 
by  Colonel  C.  G.  Edgar,  engineer  and  contractor,  who 
had  been  put  in  charge  of  construction  work  on  March 
21.  Within  a  year's  time  over  $60,000,000  had  been 
obligated,  including  $11,700,000  for  a  school,  eight 
motor-assembling  shops,  aerodromes,  hangars,  repair 
shops,  and  concentration  camps  in  France.  During 
this  first  yeaj^^^Lainjrojects  werejpegun  in  the 
United  States,  of  which  35  were  completed.  An  idea 
of  the  size  of  the  establishment  needed  to  house  the 
new  air  army  may  be  had  from  the  fact  that  there 
were  completed  in  this  first  year  15  single-unit  flying 

105 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

fields  and  four  double  units,  five  supply  depots,  three 
concentration  camps,  three  balloon  schools,  two  repair 
depots,  one  experiment  station,  one  radio  laboratory, 
and  one  quarantine  camp.  At  the  end  of  the  year 
there  were  also  under  way  six  single-unit  fields,  two 
supply  and  one  repair  depots,  one  mechanics'  school, 
and  two  special  stations. 

The  location  of  the  flying  fields  was  a  most  delicate 
matter,  for  in  this  most  romantic  of  all  phases  of  the 
war  much  pressure  was  exercised  in  favor  of  various 
localities,  and  great  difficulty  was  experienced  in  mak- 
ing unbiased  decisions  in  the  limited  time  available. 
Sites  were  chosen  by  a  board  of  officers  and  approved 
by  the  Chief  Signal  Officer,  the  Aircraft  Production 
Board,  and  the  Secretary  of  War.  The  saving  ele- 
ments in  the  situation  were  the  rigid  requirements  as 
to  landing  space  and  the  necessity  of  locating  many 
camps  in  the  Southwest  to  enable  winter  training. 
In  the  haste  of  selection  a  three-years  lease  with  option 
to  buy  at  a  fixed  price  was  adopted  as  the  contractual 
basis  the  most  equitable  for  the  Government.  Under 
this  arrangement  the  Government  could  either  aban- 
don the  field  without  prejudice  or  purchase  it  at  any 
time  within  three  years  at  its  unimproved  value. 
Rentals  ran  all  the  way  from  $1  a  year,  charged  for 
Eberts  Field  at  Lonoke,  Arkansas,  to  $20,000  a  year 
for  Wilbur  Wright  Field  at  Dayton,  Ohio.  So  also 
construction  costs  ran  from  $800,000  for  a  four- 
squadron  field  to  double  that  amount,  dependent  prin- 
cipally upon  the  cost  of  leveling  and  drainage. 

The  initial  need  for  a  standard  set  of  plans  for  plot 
layout,  heating,  lighting,  water,  sewerage,  barracks, 
and  the  like  had  been  met  by  calling  in  Albert  Kahn, 

106 


UPBUILDING  THE  FLYING  FORCE 

architect,  of  Detroit,  and  his  entire  staff.  In  10  days 
they  laid  out  standard  specifications  on  the  lines 
especially  of  the  Canadian  fields,  which  were  then 
sent  to  the  Lumber  Committee  of  the  Council  of 
National  Defense  for  revision  for  the  most  economical 
use  of  lumber.  The  standard  form  of  contract  of  the 
Council  of  National  Defense  was  adopted,  and  the 
contractor,  usually  a  local  man,  was  named  by  the 
Emergency  Construction  Committee  of  that  Council, 
aided  in  all  cases  by  a  Government  superintendent  of 
construction,  with  two  or  more  assistants  to  oversee 
the  whole  and  check  prices. 

Fields  shortly  began  to  open  all  over  the  country. 
Self  ridge*^  (Mount  Clemens,  Michigan),  Chanute/" 
(Rantoul,  Illinois),  and  Wilbur  Wright  (Dayton, 
Ohio)  opened  on  July  14 ;  Kelly  ^San  Antonio,  Texas) 
and  PostvfFort  Sill,  Oklahoma)  on  August  11  and 
24;  ScottvtBelleville,  Illinois)  on  September  12;  the  / 
three  Taliaferro  camps  (Hicks,  Texas)  and  Love  ' 
(Dallas,  Texas),  on  November  17  and  24;  Call 
(Wichita  Falls,  Texas),  Park  (Willington,  Tennessee), 
and  Rich  (Waco,  Texas)  on  December  1;  and  Elling-v 
ton  (Houston,  Texas)  and  Gerstner  (Lake  Charles, 
Louisiana)  on  December  15.  Thus  by  mid-December, 
eight  months  after  the  United  States  entered  the  war, 
the  number  of  fields  where  flying  was  actually  taking 
place  had  increased  from  two  to  18,  and  large-scale 
instruction  was  in  full  swing.  By  this  time  also 
there  had  begun  to  develop  needs  for  other  types  of 
buildings  to  house  the  rapidly  growing  personnel  and 
equipment.  First  came  Langley  Experimental  Field 
(Hampton,  Virginia) ;  then  assembly  warehouses  for 
interior  use,  at  Dayton,  and  for  overseas  use,  at  Rich- 

107 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

mond,  Virginia,  serving  Newport  News,  and  at  Middle- 
town,  Pennsylvania,  serving  New  York,  Baltimore  and 
Philadelphia ;  and  finally,  concentration  camps  at 
ports  of  embarkation,  a  series  of  central  engine  and 
repair  depots,  and  a  chain  of  Mexican-border  and 
Atlantic-coast  stations. 

All  this  construction  work  in  the  United  States  was 
necessarily  paralleled  overseas.  By  the  end  of  the  first 
year  37  construction  companies  had  been  organized, 
trade-tested,  equipped,  drilled,  and  sent  across  to 
build  in  England  and  France  the  big  fields,  aero- 
dromes and  shop  for  which  Allied  labor  was  lacking. 
Large  quantities  of  American  material  were  sent  also, 
so  that  when  the  American 'air  forces  began  to  move 
overseas,  they  found  complete  housing  arrangements 
constructed  largely  by  American  workmen  and  of 
American  material. 


108 


CHAPTEE  VII 

THE  TRAINING  OP  THE  FLIERS 

Courses  of  instruction  for  aviators  —  Primary  training  — 
Three  stages  in  the  flying  course:  dual  work,  solo  work, 
cross-country  work  —  The  "  Eules  of  the  Air  "  —  Cadets 
graduated  as  reserve  military  aviators  —  Advanced  train- 
ing —  Three  specialized  classes  of  pilots  —  Kecruitment  of 
aerial  observers  —  Training  of  observers  and  army-corps 
pilots  —  Training  of  bombers  and  bombing  pilots  —  Train- 
ing of  pursuit  pilots,  the  fighting  force  —  Training  of  in- 
structors—  Aerial  gunnery  —  Its  development  through 
synchronizing  the  machine  gun  with  the  airplane  propeller 
: —  Eoyal  Flying  Corps  system  of  training  adopted  —  Aerial 
Gunnery  Schools  —  Casualties  in  training  —  Their  number 
and  causes  —  Status  of  the  training  system  at  the  end  of 
the  first  year. 

When  the  cadets  came  from  the  ground  schools  to 
these  new  flying  fields,  they  found  a  course  of  in- 
struction all  worked  out  in  the  most  minute  detail  — 
every  hour  filled  with  work,  every  source  of  danger 
warned  against.  From  the  very  beginning  the  train- 
ing of  the  fliers  was  prescribed  with  the  utmost  care, 
leaving  just  as  little  to  chance  as  was  humanly  pos- 
sible in  a  science  depending  so  largely  upon  the  in- 
dividual. Step  by  step  the  cadet  went  on,  always 
held  back  until  he  was  doubly  skilled  in  the  present 
phase  and  doubly  eager  for  the  next. 

From  six  weeks  to  two  months  was  required  to  give 
a  pilot  his  wings,  dependent  largely  upon  his  own 
ability.  Besides  the  actual  instruction  in  flying,  he 
was  given  at  least  96  hours  in  aerial  machine  gunnery, 
65  hours  on  planes  and  motors,  40  on  radio,  24  on 
map  reading,  miniature  range,  and  photographic  in- 

109 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

terpretation,  40  on  military  matters,  12  on  drill,  and 
20  minutes  daily  in  calisthenics.  So  far  as  possible 
all  indoor  work  was  concentrated  on  rainy  days,  when 
flying  was  impracticable. 

The  flying  course  proper,  that  is,  the  primary  train- 
ing, was  divided  into  three  distinct  phases,  succes- 
sively undertaken  with  the  increase  in  the  flier's  skill. 
First  was  the  dual  work,  in  which  the  cadet  went  up 
into  the  air  with  the  instructor  and  was  given  oppor- 
tunity to  accustom  himself  to  the  feel  of  the  plane. 
At  the  start  he  was  largely  a  passenger,  now  and 
again,  however,  operating  the  controls  as  the  in- 
structor started,  landed,  or  swept  about  the  field  at  an 
altitude  of  about  500  feet.  As  rapidly  as  his  skill 
warranted,  he  was  given  charge  of  the  machine  until 
he  was  able  to  get  it  up,  down,  and  around  with  safety. 
All  this  time  he  was  encouraged  to  advance,  and  at 
the  same  time  he  was  protected  against  worry  or 
nervousness  by  having  impressed  upon  him  the 
naturalness  and  simplicity  of  the  whole  performance. 

After  from  four  to  nine  hours  of  this  work  came  the 
second  stage,  when  the  cadet  first  went  into  the  air 
alone.  At  the  start  he  repeated  each  phase  of  his 
dual  work,  and  then  he  began  to  extend  it  until  he 
was  making  figure  eights  at  a  45-degree  angle  and 
gliding  down  with  motor  throttled  from  about  1,500 
feet  towards  a  previously  designated  mark.  Next  he 
was  taught  to  make  accurate  turns  with  the  banks 
approaching  the  vertical,  to  climb  steeply  to  the  verge 
of  a  stall,  and  to  land  in  a  very  small  circle.  All  of 
this  work  required  another  24  hours  in  the  air.  All 
through  the  solo  work  the  cadet  was  directed  with 
great  detail.  Before  each  flight  he  received  exact 

110 


THE  TRAINING  OF  THE  FLIERS 

instructions  as  to  the  evolutions,  altitude  and  landing 
places,  and  after  each  flight  he  reported  to  the  in- 
structors for  criticism.  Never  was  more  than  two 
hours  of  flying  a  day  allowed  to  any  cadet,  nor  could 
flights  be  less  than  20  or  more  than  40  minutes  in 
length.  Occasionally  the  instructor  went  up  during 
this  part  of  the  training,  to  correct  any  bad  form 
that  might  have  developed.  At  the  end  of  this  solo 
work  the  cadet  was  master  of  the  plane  for  simple 
flying  over  a  prescribed  field. 

As  the  final  step  in  this  primary  training  came  the 
cross-country  work,  beginning  with  a  flight  around  a 
triangle  10  miles  to  a  side,  to  give  familiarity  with 
prominent  landmarks.  Three  flights,  each  30  miles 
out  and  30  miles  back,  then  followed,  at  altitudes  of 
at  least  2,000  feet,  the  cadet  receiving  detailed  in- 
structions as  to  routes,  landing  places,  and  map.  As 
much  instruction  in  compass  work  and  map  reading 
was  given  as  was  possible  with  the  number  of  planes 
on  hand. 

Perhaps  this  training  can  be  visualized  most  vividly 
by  going  over  a  part  of  the  maze  of  instructions, 
covering  14  closely  printed  pages,  with  which  it  was 
necessary  to  surround  it.  The  li Rules  of  the  Air" 
prescribed,  for  instance,  that  there  was  no  right  of 
way,  but  that  every  pilot  must  be  wide  awake  at  all 
times  and  see  not  only  that  he  himself  made  no  mis- 
takes, but  that  the  other  men  as  well  made  none.  An 
interval  of  200  yards  had  to  be  allowed  in  passing 
another  machine  in  the  same  direction,  150  yards  in 
passing  head  on,  and  50  yards  in  passing  above  or 
below. 

Cadets  were  directed  not  to  go  up  in  a  plane  with- 
111 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

out  inspecting  every  detail  of  it  and  seeing  that  the 
tail-skid  belt  was  safe-tied,  all  nuts  cotter-keyed, 
braces  taut,  fuselage  free  from  waste  or  rags,  landing 
gear  in  good  shape,  and  so  on  over  the  whole  plane. 
If  anything  appeared  wrong,  strict  orders  were  given 
"not  to  let  your  enthusiasm  overcome  your  good  judg- 
ment." A  final  inspection  of  throttle,  switch,  gaso- 
line, oil  and  air  pressure,  and  other  instruments  and 
controls  was  ordered  before  flight.  The  cadet  was 
then  directed  to  look  in  front,  on  both  sides,  behind, 
and  above  to  make  sure  that  no  other  plane  was  rising 
or  landing.  Thereupon  he  was  ready  to  open  the 
throttle,  taxi  straightaway  down  the  field,  and  take 
off  directly  into  the  wind,  never  forcing  the  machine 
up  until  it  was  fully  ready  to  go.  Special  caution  was 
given  against  too  steep  a  climb,  too  much  rudder,  and 
not  enough  bank. 

All  the  time  in  the  air  the  cadet  was  held  responsi- 
ble both  for  himself  and  for  others,  as  collisions  were 
usually  fatal.  Flights  were  always  around  the  outer 
edge  of  the  field  so  that  the  cadet  might  be  able  to 
glide  home  in  case  of  trouble,  and  detailed  instruc- 
tions were  given  against  the  machine's  sliding  in  or 
out,  or  into  a  nose  dive  or  a  tail  spin.  Spirals  and 
glides  were  to  be  taken  at  about  2,000  feet  altitude, 
with  a  bank  of  45  degrees  but  without  too  rapid 
descent.  At  1,000  feet  the  plane  was  to  be  straight- 
ened out  and  made  to  glide  downward  to  earth  into 
the  wind.  Cadets  were  told  not  to  land  while  on  a 
turn,  which  would  throw  the  wing  into  the  ground. 
If  the  landing  place  were  found  occupied  at  the  last 
moment,  full  power  ahead  was  ordered  so  as  to  circle 
back  to  make  another  try.  After  each  landing  the 

112 


THE  TRAINING  OF  THE  FLIEKS 

cadet  was  told  to  ask  himself  if  lie  had  landed  too  fast, 
leveled  off  too  high  or  too  low,  glided  too  steep  or  too 
fast,  used  too  much  rudder,  or  violated  any  rules  of 
the  air.  On  landing  the  plane  was  taxied  to  the 
dead  line  with  elevator  held  forward  to  lessen  the 
weight  on  the  tail,  except  on  soft  ground  or  with  a 
tail  or  side  wind.  The  machine  had  to  be  pointed  into 
the  wind  and  the  propeller  left  horizontal,  so  as  to 
prevent  its  being  broken  off  if  the  plane  were  blown 
over. 

For  cross-country  work  cadets  had  to  see  that  their 
radiators  and  gasoline  tanks  were  full,  barometers  at 
zero,  emergency  kit,  map  and  blank  telegrams  ready, 
and  instruments  and  controls  functioning  properly. 
In  case  the  cadet  got  lost  or  had  trouble,  a  field  Vas  to 
be  picked  out,  preferably  one  already  flown  over,  and 
a  landing  made  after  circling  about  several  times  to 
look  for  obstacles.  No  attempt  was  to  be  made  to 
rise  until  a  very  careful  examination  of  the  ground 
had  been  made. 

This,  in  brief,  was  the  preliminary  training  of  a 
flier.  After  the  60-mile  cross-country  flight  and  an 
altitude  test  of  10,000  feet,  the  cadet  was  considered 
to  have  passed  his  reserve  military  aviator  require- 
ments, which  gave  him  his  commission  and  the  right 
to  wear  his  wings.  He  was  now  skilled  in  all  ordinary 
flying  and  was  ready  to  go  on  to  the  advanced  schools 
for  acrobatics  and  specialized  training  for  war  work. 

Up  to  May  23, 1918,  a  total  of  4,094  reserve  military 
aviators  had  been  graduated  from  these  schools,  a 
number  which  may  be  compared  with  the  total  of  85 
in  training  a  year  before.  Of  this  number  it  is  in- 
teresting to  note  also  that  3,222  had  been  graduated 

113 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

since  January  1,  and  that  a  weekly  output  had  been 
reached  of  180  for  the  final  week.  At  that  date  3,997 
cadets  were  in  training  at  the  28  fields.  Planes  had 
been  in  the  air  for  this  primary  work  alone  274,255 
hours,  which  at  80  miles  an  hour  means  that  21,- 
940,000  miles  had  been  covered.  The  selective  process 
begun  in  the  examining  boards  and  continued  through 
the  ground  schools  was  maintained  also  at  the  flying 
fields.  Carefully  chosen  as  the  men  had  been,  it  was 
inevitable  that  many  should  prove  unfit  for  flying 
when  actually  put  to  the  test.  Up  to  May  23  a  total 
of  372  cadets  were  discharged,  about  one  to  every  11 
graduated. 

After  graduation  from  the  primary  schools  the 
R.  M.  A.  pilots  were  sent  on  to  advanced  schools  for 
final  and  specialized  training  which  should  fit  them 
for  actual  war  service  in  France.  This  training, 
which  it  was  at  first  hoped  could  be  had  in  France, 
was  greatly  delayed  by  the  lack  of  equipment,  as  a 
very  much  finer  materiel  was  needed  for  this  work 
than  for  the  primary  training.  Nevertheless,  shift 
was  made  with  what  materiel  was  available,  and  the 
schools  were  able  to  do  very  appreciable  work  before 
the  end  of  the  first  year. 

So  far  as  possible,  pilots  were  allowed  their  choice 
as  to  specialized  training,  which  fell  into  three  dis- 
tinct categories.  First  was  the  pursuit  pilot  of  a 
single-seater  plane,  whose  business  it  was  to  fight  on 
every  occasion,  usually  at  a  high  altitude;  next  was 
the  pilot  of  the  heavy  bombing  plane,  who  was  to  go 
across  country  to  the  enemy's  strategic  points,  more 
often  than  otherwise  at  night ;  and  finally,  the  army- 
corps  pilot,  whose  business  it  was  to  travel  about  with 

114 


THE  TRAINING  OF  THE  FLIERS 

the  aerial  observers  in  search  of  information  and 
photographs  —  only  occasionally  of  battle.  Obviously 
these  divisions  of  aerial  warfare  were  entirely  differ- 
ent and  required  very  different  types  of  men.  A  pilot 
hopelessly  sluggish  for  pursuit  work  might  make  a 
very  good  bombing  or  observation  pilot,  and,  on  the 
other  hand,  a  good  observation  pilot  might  not  have 
the  peculiar  characteristics  of  a  bomber.  Within  the 
limits  of  the  service,  however,  the  men  were  given  as 
free  choice  as  possible. 

First  let  us  take  the  aerial  observers  and  the  army- 
corps  pilots.  Very  early  it  had  been  recognized  that 
the  former  must  be  special  men,  not  necessarily  of  the 
Air  Service,  who  were  familiar  with  artillery  fire  and 
who  could  interpret  and  direct  it  from  the  air.  The 
observer  therefore  had  to  be  an  artillery  specialist, 
driven  by  an  army-corps  pilot. 

Early  in  September,  1917,  an  observers'  school  was 
in  operation  at  Post  Field,  but  only  on  a  limited 
scale,  largely  because  of  the  lack  of  planes  and  the 
difficulty  of  obtaining  suitable  personnel.  The  only 
definite  source  of  observers  at  that  time  was  volun- 
teers from  the  ground  schools,  who  were  very  scarce 
because  of  the  greater  attraction  of  pilot's  work.  An 
attempt  during  October  to  supply  this  scarcity  from 
National  Guard  officers  and  enlisted  men  failed.  On 
December  14,  however,  a  clean-cut  plan  was  an- 
nounced, when  the  Chief  of  Staff  directed  25  men  to 
be  sent  weekly  to  Fort  Sill  from  among  the  officers 
assigned  as  observers  to  the  artillery  in  the  various 
divisional  camps.  This  plan  was  later  found  to  dis- 
organize the  sending  of  the  divisions  overseas,  and  it 
was  modified  on  January  24,  1918,  so  that  all  officers 

115 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

so  selected  were  definitely  detailed  to  the  Signal  Corps 
in  the  proportion  of  15  artillery,  seven  staff  and 
cavalry,  and  three  infantry.  On  February  15  Secre- 
tary Baker  directed  that  the  men  chosen  "  be  only 
the  most  desirable  type  of  young  officers;  men  who 
are  capable,  efficient  and  quick  to  learn.  The  success 
of  the  artillery  operations  and  of  the  infantry  attack 
in  France  may  depend  on  the  efficiency  and  the  char- 
acter of  the  artillery  and  infantry  observers. " 

About  January  1,  1918,  a  complete  curriculum  for 
the  observers '  course  was  drawn  up  in  conference  with 
four  members  of  the  Royal  Flying  Corps  and  two 
of  the  French  Air  Service.  This  provided  for  two 
weeks  at  the  School  of  Aerial  Fire  at  Fort  Sill,  six 
weeks  at  the  observers'  school,  and  two  weeks  more 
at  an  aerial-gunnery  school.  It  was  required, 
roughly,  that  an  observer  be  able  to  send  and  receive 
eight  words  a  minute  by  radio,  make  12  good  aerial 
photographs  on  18  assigned  locations,  locate  and 
direct  artillery  fire  against  enemy  batteries,  and  con- 
duct a  prearranged  shoot  without  error. 

Meanwhile,  of  course,  arrangements  were  made  for 
pilots,  to  be  known  as  "army-corps  pilots, "  to  operate 
the  observation  machines.  They  were  chosen  from 
the  R.  M.  A.  graduates,  and  were  given  a  joint  course, 
though  for  only  four  weeks,  with  the  observers,  the 
instruction  being  by  permanent  teams  of  two.  Con- 
tinuing their  study  of  radio  and  gunnery,  they  added 
in  their  flights  with  the  observers  the  instruction 
given  the  latter  in  aerial  liaison  with  the  infantry  and 
artillery,  going  on  with  them  later  for  two  weeks  at 
the  aerial-gunnery  school. 

By  May  23,  1918,  observers'  schools  were  in  sub- 
116 


THE  TRAINING  OF  THE  FLIERS 

stantial  operation  at  Post  and  Langley  Fields. 
Handicapped  though  they  had  been  by  lack  of  planes 
and  delay  in  securing  material  to  build  Langley  Field, 
they  nevertheless  had  graduated  335  observers  and 
255  pilots,  and  had  a  present  attendance  of  232. 
observers  and  107  pilots.  Of  the  observers  one  had 
been  discharged  for  every  three  graduated,  which  well 
illustrates  the  early  inferiority  in  personnel.  During 
the  course  a  total  of  10,130  hours  had  been  flown. 

A  second  distinct  course  was  that  for  bombers. 
"What  little  work  had  been  done  along  this  line  was 
stimulated  into  a  definite  programme  by  a  cablegram 
from  General  Pershing  about  January  1,  1918,  estab- 
lishing that  fliers  should  be  trained  in  the  ratio  of 
five  pursuit  aviators,  three  observers,  and  two 
bombers.  This  cablegram  gave  the  bombing  pro- 
gramme a  clean-cut  status,  and  permitted  its'  develop- 
ment as  fast  as  equipment  could  be  secured. 

Ellington  Field  opened  for  bombing  instruction  on 
March  1  with  50  cadet  bombers  and  50  cadet  pilots, 
followed  by  40  more  of  each  on  March  18.  The  men 
were  trained  throughout  in  teams  of  two,  always 
working  together  so  as  to  have  as  perfect  unison  as 
possible  between  pilot  and  bomber  and  to  build  up  a 
competitive  scientific  esprit  between  teams.  The 
course  was  one  month  in- length,  with  instruction  in 
bombs,  bomb  sights,  releases,  day  and  night  flying, 
formation  flying,  and  study  of  enemy  tactics.  On 
graduation  came  two  weeks  of  advanced  aerial  gun- 
nery school,  followed  by  practice  in  dropping  live 
bombs  selected  as  samples  from  those  sent  to  the 
Ordnance  Proving  Grounds  at  Aberdeen,  Maryland. 

This  course,  requiring  the  most  delicate  materiel, 
117 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

was  seriously  delayed  by  lack  of  such  equipment  as 
sighting  mechanisms,  dummy  bombs,  flares,  field 
glasses,  telescopes,  recording  barographs,  Very  pistols 
and  cartridges;  moreover,  the  JN-4H  plane,  a 
primary-training  model,  had  to  be  used  in  default  of 
regular  bombing  planes.  Nevertheless,  by  May  23, 
1918,  69  teams  had  graduated  and  160  pilots  and  115 
bombers  were  in  attendance.  A  total  of  1,904  hours 
were  flown  at  that  single  school  in  the  week  ending 
on  that  date,  or  150,000  miles. 

A  third  type  of  school  was  that  for  pursuit  pilots, 
fliers  operating  small,  fast,  single-seater  machines  high 
above  the  battle  lines,  ready  at  any  moment  to  drop 
down  to  attack  a  foe  or  aid  a  friend.  Naturally  the 
men  selected  for  this  work  were  those  of  stout 
physique  and  instant  action,  able  both  to  stand  the 
strain  of  high  altitudes  and  to  move  with  lightning- 
like  rapidity,  in  an  emergency.  The  curriculum, 
worked  out  in  conference  with  the  British  and  French 
Missions,  was  very  advanced,  but  the  lack  of  actual 
battle-front  single-seater  planes  and  the  substitution 
of  the  Thomas-Morse,  American  type,  made  it  im- 
possible to  carry  it  through  as  far  as  desired.  The 
first  16  of  these  planes  had  been  received  just  after 
New  Year's  of  1918,  with  a  total  of  92  up  to  June  1. 

All  sorts  of  acrobatics  and  formation  flying  were 
prescribed,  till  the  flier  worked  his  way  up  through 
simulated  battles  with  his  instructor,  with  a  two- 
seater  plane  and  with  another  pupil,  to  final  combat 
practice  in  formation.  Special  stress  was  laid  on 
organization  of  the  enemy  front,  enemy  practice  and 
machines,  the  theories  of  combat  as  individuals  and 
in  formation,  and  the  effects  of  altitude,  as,  for  in- 

118 


THE  TRAINING  OF  THE  FLIERS 

stance,  on  carburation.  This  training  centered  at 
Gerstner  Field.  Up  to  May  23,  1918,  101  pursuit 
pilots  had  been  graduated,  18  transferred,  and  two 
killed.  The  attendance  on  that  date  was  140,  and  the 
hours  flown  in  the  final  week  were  1,335,  or  more  for 
that  single  advanced  school  than  for  the  whole  Air 
Service  in  the  fiscal  year  1915. 

To  train  all  these  men  required  a  large  number  of 
instructors  in  many  kinds  of  work.  At  first  the  ser- 
vice was  greatly  crippled  by  lack  of  such  men,  but  as 
the  first  classes  began  to  graduate,  many  of  them 
largely  by  teaching  themselves,  fliers  of  instructor 
caliber  became  available.  Later  special  instructors' 
schools  were  opened  at  Gerstner,  Brooks  (San  An- 
tonio, Texas)  and  Kelly  II,  where  a  certain  propor- 
tion of  graduates  were  given  special  training  to  fit 
them  to  take  over  later  classes.  Up  to  May  23,  1918, 
252  men  had  graduated,  and  there  had  been  a  flying 
total  of  23,245  hours. 

After  completing  the  specialized  courses,  all  air- 
men were  sent  to  the  aerial-gunnery  schools  for 
training  in  what,  for  offensive  work,  was  the  most  vital 
part  of  the  programme.  A  pursuit  pilot  in  a  single- 
seater  plane  would  have  been  entirely  worthless,  and 
other  pilots,  such  as  observers  and  bombers,  would 
have  been  largely  helpless  against  attack,  if  unskilled 
in  aerial  machine  gunnery. 

This  science,  like  aerial  photography  and  radio,  was 
a  development  of  the  early  days  of  the  European 
War.  The  first  British  planes  were  wholly  unarmed 
except  for  the  revolvers  of  their  pilots,  who  occasion- 
ally took  pot  shots  at  enemy  aviators,  and  not  until 
the  Battle  of  the  Marne  was  a  British  pilot  wounded 

119 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

from  another  airplane.  It  remained  for  the  famous 
German  Fokker  plane  to  harness  the  machine  gun 
to  an  airplane.  Here  was  developed  the  synchronizing 
device  which  allowed  a  stream  of  bullets  pouring  forth 
at  the  rate  of  500  a  minute  to  travel  between  the  arms 
of  a  propeller  whirling  around  at  a  speed  of  1,400 
revolutions  per  minute.  This  development  revolution- 
ized aerial  strategy  and  enabled  offensive  warfare  on 
a  large  scale. 

By  the  time  the  United  States  entered  the  war, 
aerial  gunnery  had  been  reduced  to  a  science  abroad. 
All  the  complicated  interrelations  of  speed  and  de- 
flections had  been  worked  out,  and  calculations  made 
as  to  how  a  machine  traveling  at  a  speed  of  over  120 
miles  an  hour  in  one  direction  could  hit  another 
machine  traveling  equally  fast  in  another,  making  due 
allowance  for  the  curve  of  the  bullet's  course.  The 
difficulty  of  aerial  gunnery  lay  in  applying  these 
principles  rapidly  enough  in  all  the  different  dimen- 
sions, directions  and  speeds  in  which  the  enemy  might 
flash  by. 

During  the  early  months  of  the  war  there  was  very 
little  time  and  no  equipment  or  knowledge  to  make 
much  headway  in  aerial-gunnery  training  here.  Some 
instruction  was  given  at  ground  and  flying  schools, 
and  on  February  4,  1918,  a  central  school  to  teach 
instructors  the  mechanism  and  construction  rather 
than  the  operation  of  machine  guns  was  established 
at  Ellington  Field,  graduating  15  officers  and  300 
men  on  March  15.  On  January  4,  however,  the  whole 
of  the  gunnery  training  was  consolidated,  and  on 
the  7th  Captain  R.  S.  Potter,  a  graduate  of  the  Royal 
Flying  Corps  school  at  Camp  Borden,  Canada,  was 

120 


THE  TRAINING  OF  THE  FLIERS 

placed  in  charge,  assisted  by  Major  Wilson,  R.  F.  C., 
formerly  one  of  the  chief  instructors  at  the  Central 
School  in  England,  and  10  other  officers  training  at 
Camp  Borden.  The  policy  had  been  adopted  of  taking 
over,  in  its  entirety,  the  Royal  Flying  Corps  system 
on  the  recommendation  of  the  American  Expedition- 
ary Force  that  it  was  far  superior  to  any  other.  No 
attempt  was  made  to  evolve  a  system  here,  nor  were 
any  changes  to  be  allowed  until  the  system  was  work- 
ing and  could  be  modified  without  loss  of  time.  Com- 
plete notes,  stencils,  methods  of  instruction  and 
appliances  of  the  Royal  Flying  Corps  were  on  hand, 
as  well  as  four  R.  F.  C.  officers  and  six  R.  F.  C.  non- 
commissioned officers,  with  six  more  officers  requested, 
and  a  quick  system  of  liaison  was  established  with 
England. 

The  aerial-gunnery  training  began  at  the  ground 
schools  with  52  hours  of  work  on  the  mechanism, 
stripping,  care,  cleaning,  causes  of  stoppage,  loading 
and  testing  of  the  guns,  but  with  no  range  mark. 
This  was  followed  in  the  flying  schools  by  76  hours, 
introducing  actual  firing  on  the  range,  practicing 
against  clay  pigeons  and  silhouettes  of  enemy  planes, 
and  using  the  camera  gun,  which  enabled  the  cadet 
to  photograph  instead  of  shoot  at  a  nearby  plane. 
This  instruction  continued  in  the  advanced  schools, 
varying  in  degree  with  the  needs  of  the  different  types 
of  pilots. 

Just  at  the  end  of  the  first  year,  in  mid-May  of 
1918,  plans  made  some  time  before  to  give  special 
machine-gun  training  to  1,000  men  a  month  were  car- 
ried out  with  the  institution  of  special  courses  in 
aerial  gunnery  which  all  advanced-school  graduates 

121 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

had  to  attend  before  finally  going  overseas.  Here  for 
three  weeks  the  pilots  concentrated  entirely  on  this 
work  with  many  new  elements  added,  especially 
target  practice  both  from  the  air  and  from  the  ground 
at  objects  towed  on  the  water  or  in  the  air  behind 
other  airplanes.  This  series  of  schools  was  seriously 
delayed  by  lack  of  equipment,  for  up  to  May  not  a 
gunnery  plane  had  been  delivered.  While  much  time 
was  required  to  make  machine  guns,  even  more  was 
needed  to  make  the  synchronizing  devices  enabling 
them  to  fire  through  the  propeller  and  the  advanced 
training  planes  to  carry  them.  Finally,  however, 
on  May  18  a  school  was  opened  at  Selfridge  Field 
for  observers,  and  on  the  25th  schools  at  Ellington, 
for  bombers,  and  Taliaferro,  for  pursuit  pilots,  each 
with  a  somewhat  different  programme. 

In  concluding  this  survey  of  the  various  courses 
through  which  a  flier  must  go,  it  may  not  be  amiss  to 
discuss  the  question  of  casualties  in  training.  Almost 
every  day  the  press  reported  another  fatal  accident, 
sometimes  several,  till  criticism  began  to  be  heard  in 
several  quarters  and  both  Congress  and  the  Aircraft 
Board  ordered  investigations. 

The  most  vivid  way  to  throw  training  casualties 
into  proper  perspective  is  to  say  that  for  every  fatality 
a  distance  equal  to  seven  times  around  the  Equator 
was  traveled.  In  other  words,  planes  were  in  the 
air  2,319.57  hours  per  fatality,  which  at  80  miles  an 
hour  speed  makes  185,000  miles.  It  is  doubtful  if  so 
great  a  distance  could  have  been  traveled  more  safely 
in  any  other  way.  In  terms  of  men  trained,  however, 
the  figures  were  less  favorable,  as  one  death  occurred 
for  every  64.58  men  to  receive  their  R.  M.  A.  wings. 

122 


THE    MOUNTING    OF    THE    MACHINE    GUN 


THE    BOMBS    AND    THEIR    RELEASING    DEVICE 


THE  TRAINING  OP  THE  FLIERS 

This,  perhaps,  gives  a  truer  picture  of  the  actual 
degree  of  danger  in  primary  training ;  it  well  justified 
continuing  to  class  aviation  as  a  dangerous  but  by  no 
means  foolhardy  service. 

The  causes  of  accidents  were  very  interesting.  Of 
the  103  fatalities  from  January  1  to  June  3,  1918,  30 
occurred  as  the  result  of  tail  spin,  in  which  the  engine 
stalled  and  the  plane  spun  downward  to  the  earth. 
The  second  highest  number,  23,  resulted  from  col- 
lisions, due  to  sudden  fright  or  disobedience  of  orders, 
which  are  part  of  the  human  element  very  difficult 
to  eradicate.  Nose  dives,  in  which  the  pilot  shot  down 
too  steeply  and  did  not  have  power  to  right  himself, 
stood  third  on  the  list,  with  19  fatalities;  stalled 
engine,  fourth,  with  six;  sideslip,  fifth,  with  four; 
fire,  sixth,  with  three;  and  steep  bank,  collapse  of 
plane,  upside  down,  and  hit  by  propeller,  next  with 
one  each,  leaving  14  undetermined. 

This,  in  brief,  shows  the  training  of  an  airman. 
Whereas  in  May,  1917,  there  had  been  85  students 
under  instruction,  there  were  a  year  later  3,997  in 
primary  work,  193  in  pursuit,  223  in  bombing  pilotage, 
185  in  bomb  dropping,  266  in  aerial-observation  work, 
and  138  in  army-corps  pilots'  work.  Over  800  instruc- 
tors had  been  trained  and  25,800  men  organized  in 
squadrons  at  the  fields.  The  primary  training  had 
been  reduced  to  a  routine  and  the  three  types  of 
advanced  training  well  established,  though  still  handi- 
capped by  lack  of  equipment.  By  the  end  of  the  first 
year  America  had  in  operation  a  most  extensive  and 
detailed  system  of  instruction,  capable  of  giving  her 
aviators  all  the  training  needed  before  their  actual 
finishing  work  at  the  front. 

123 


CHAPTER  VIII 


THE  TRAINING  OF  THE  GREAT  GROUND  FORCE 

Ground  force  required  to  keep  a  plane  in  the  air  —  Require- 
ments  and  training  of  non-flying  officers  —  Supply  Officers ' 
School  —  Adjutants '  School  —  Engineer  Officers '  School  — • 
Armament  Officers '  and  Armorers '  School  —  School  for 
Compass  officers  —  Training  in  aerial  navigation  —  De- 
velopment of  aerial  photography  —  Photographic  Section 
created  in  the  Signal  Corps  at  the  instance  of  the  Com- 
mittee on  Public  Information  —  School  of  Military  Cinema- 
tography —  First  schools  of  aerial  photography  at  Langley 
Field  and  Cornell  University  —  Advanced  courses  in  map 
compilation  and  interpretation  for  photographic  intelli- 
gence officers  — Kodak  Park  established  by  the  Eastman 
Kodak  Company  —  Courses  of  instruction  —  Aerial  pho- 
tography at  the  flying  fields  —  Training  of  pilots  and  ob- 
servers —  Development  of  aerial  radio -telegraphy  —  Eadio 
instruction  entrusted  to  the  Signal  Corps  —  Training  of 
radio  officers  —  Training  of  radio  operators  and  mechanics 
—  Eadio  Section  created  —  Standardized  courses  of  in- 
struction —  Importance  of  the  ground  force  of  me- 
chanics —  Difficulties  and  methods  of  recruitment  —  Neces- 
sity for  specialized  training  —  Schools  at  industrial  estab- 
lishments—  Winter  schools  at  Northern  flying  fields  — 
Kelly  Field  mechanics  school  —  Training  at  vocational 
schools. 

The  training  of  fliers,  in  all  their  various  grades,  by 
no  means  completed  the  new  air  army.  If  it  required 
specialists  to  operate  the  planes,  it  equally  required 
specialists  to  keep  them  up.  In  Europe  it  was  com- 
monly estimated  that  47  trained  men  were  needed  on 
the  ground  for  every  man  in  the  air.  It  is  just  this 
fact,  the  apparent  disproportion  of  the  results  to  the 
effort  made,  that  will  for  a  long  time  cause  a  lack  of 
appreciation  of  the  true  difficulties  and  accomplish- 
ments of  the  Air  Service. 

124 


TKAINING  THE  GROUND  FORCE 

First  in  point  of  emergence  was  the  need  for  non- 
flying  officers  to  do  all  the  technical  and  adminis- 
trative work  necessary  both  at  the  flying  schools  and 
for  squadrons  in  service.  These  included  engineer 
officers  to  see  that  the  planes  and  equipment  were  kept 
in  first-class  condition;  supply  officers  to  see  that  the 
proper  amounts  of  ammunition,  food,  clothing,  spare 
parts  and  other  equipment  were  on  hand;  and  ad- 
jutants to  keep  the  records  and  make  the  necessary 
reports. 

The  first  school,  that  for  adjutants  and  supply 
officers,  was  opened  at  Kelly  Field  in  mid-September, 

1917,  the  first  class  graduating  after  seven  weeks  on 
November  7.    The  early  classes  were  commissioned  as 
first  lieutenants,   and   considerable   displeasure  was 
caused  when  the  shortage  in  that  rank  made  it  neces- 
sary to  commission  the  later  classes  as  second  lieuten- 
ants.     Very   shortly,   however,    it   was   decided   to 
abandon  the  Kelly  Field  school,  which  to  January  12, 

1918,  had   turned   out    522    adjutants   and   supply 
officers. 

The  supply  officers'  school  was  transferred  to  the 
Georgia  School  of  Technology,  opening  on  January 
12  for  an  eight  weeks'  course  on  the  equipment  and 
problems  of  motor  transport,  planes,  engines,  machine 
gunnery,  radio  and  photography.  On  May  11,  when 
the  whole  foreseeable  demand  for  officers  of  this  type 
had  been  filled,  the  school  was  finally  discontinued, 
after  having  graduated  852  men  and  discharged  105. 

The  adjutants'  school  was  opened  at  the  Ohio 
State  University,  also  on  January  12,  for  an  eight 
weeks'  course.  Up  to  May  25, 1918,  719  men  had  been 
graduated  as  second  lieutenants  and  88  discharged. 

125 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

The  attendance  had  been  reduced  to  90  at  that  time  as 
the  needs  were  being  filled  adequately. 

The  engineer  officers'  school,  shortly  after  opening 
at  Kelly  Field,  was  transferred  to  Massachusetts  In- 
stitute of  Technology,  where  the  technical  facilities 
were  excellent.  Only  men  familiar  with  technical 
work  were  admitted,  preferably  technical-school  grad- 
uates with  engineering  and  administrative  experience 
in  engines,  carburetors,  magnetos,  or  shops  working 
with  wood,  fabrics,  metal,  dope,  wire,  welding,  vul- 
canizing or  brazing.  The  first  class,  entering  on  Jan- 
uary 5, 1918,  with  only  23  men,  was  forced  to  graduate 
considerably  ahead  of  time,  beginning  February  15, 
to  meet  the  great  existing  need,  but  on  March  20  the 
course  was  definitely  lengthened  to  three  months  with 
a  considerably  more  detailed  curriculum.  The  high 
standard  set  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  up  to  May  25 
there  had  been  discharged  214  men  as  against  448 
graduated.  At  that  time  the  enrollment  was  325,  and 
the  object  was  to  meet  General  Pershing's  request 
of  April  20  for  50  such  officers  a  month. 

Another  course  was  that  for  armament  officers  and 
armorers  to  do  the  highly  important  work  of  testing 
and  tuning  all  armament  and  of  seeing  that  all  ma- 
chine guns  and  bombs  were  in  good  condition.  The 
necessity  for  this  work  can  only  be  appreciated  when 
it  is  realized  that  scores  of  good  aviators  have  been 
killed  by  reason  of  guns'  jamming  just  at  the  critical 
moment.  An  armament  officer  with  a  score  of  men 
was  needed  for  every  squadron,  to  examine  this  equip- 
ment immediately  before  and  after  each  flight.  On 
April  22,  therefore,  a  school  was  opened  at  Fairfield, 
Ohio,  with  76  Signal  Corps  officers  and  19  Ordnance 

126 


TRAINING  THE  GROUND  FORCE 

officers,  and  500  Signal  Corps  and  80  Ordnance  en- 
listed men.  The  course  was  to  be  six  weeks  in  length, 
and  to  include  a  complete  study  of  machine  guns, 
sights,  interrupter  gears,  and  the  attachment,  storage, 
upkeep  and  dangers  of  bombs. 

Another  curious  development  was  the  school  for 
compass  officers,  originated  by  a  cablegram  of  Febru- 
ary 4,  requesting  50  such  men  as  soon  as  possible. 
Experience  had  shown  that  the  delicate  mechanism 
of  these  instruments  was  thrown  out  of  true  with  the 
magnetic  pole  both  by  the  magneto  and  other  parts 
of  the  plane  and  by  jars  on  landing,  and  an  elaborate 
system  of  correction  had  been  developed,  especially 
by  the  British.  About  April  10  Captain  Fripp,  R.  A. 
F.,  arrived  here  to  establish  a  compass  course  at  Camp 
Dick,  Dallas,  Texas.  Fifty-five  graduates  of  the  engi- 
neer officers'  school  were  sent  there  with  an  equip- 
ment consisting  of  two  planes,  a  number  of  bar 
magnets,  compensating  magnets,  etc.  The  course 
lasted  only  10  days,  after  which  50  of  the  graduates 
went  overseas  and  two  remained  here  for  instructional 
purposes.  From  that  time  on  the  curriculum  was 
consolidated  with  the  regular  engineer  officers'  course. 

Somewhat  similar  was  the  course  in  aerial  naviga- 
tion carried  on  at  Camp  Dick  at  the  same  time,  largely 
because  of  England's  serious  experience  in  losing 
many  pilots  and  planes  through  loss  of  direction. 
Each  of  the  25  flying  schools  sent  an  officer  who  had 
been  in  charge  of  cross-country  flying  for  ten  days' 
instruction.  These  men  later  returned  to  the  flying 
fields  to  disseminate  what  they  had  learned  so  that 
each  pilot  thereafter  would  have  the  best  navigating 
instruction.  It  was  expected  at  the  time  that  one  man 

127 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

would  be  specially  selected  as  navigating  pilot  for 
each  squadron. 

In  addition  to  these  courses  for  specialized  officers 
were  courses  for  the  photographic,  radio  and  enlisted 
personnel  which  formed  the  great  bulk  of  the  Air 
Service.  The  photographic  and  radio  work  was  given 
both  as  a  cross-section  running  through  the  airman's 
training  and  as  special  instruction  for  both  officers  and 
men  on  the  ground.  These  features  were  so  vital  to  the 
programme  that  they  are  worthy  of  special  de- 
scription. 

One  of  the  most  striking  developments  of  aviation 
in  the  Great  War  has  been  aerial  photography.  From 
the  mere  casual  taking  of  single  photographs  from 
over  the  side  of  individual  planes  there  had  grown 
up  a  regular  patrol  of  photographic  squadrons  on 
both  sides  of  the  line,  keeping  almost  up  to  the  minute 
a  composite  photographic  reproduction  of  the  whole 
enemy  front  and  rear.  Not  a  new  trench  could  be  dug 
or  a  new  battery  open  fire  but  the  piercing  eye  of  the 
camera  above  engraved  it  with  scientific  infallibility 
on  the  General  Staff  maps.  During  the  single  month 
of  September,  1917,  the  British  alone  reported  taking 
15,837  aerial  photographs.  Under  the  system  as  de- 
veloped every  sector  of  the  front  was  divided  into 
squares  about  half  a  mile  to  a  side,  each  one  numbered 
and  entrusted  to  a  squad  of  photographers,  who  be- 
came fully  familiar  with  it.  As  fast  as  photographs 
were  made,  they  were  developed,  reduced  or  enlarged 
to  a  standard  scale,  and  fitted  into  their  proper  places 
on  a  large  composite  map.  Cases  were  on  record  in 
which  only  20  minutes  elapsed  from  the  time  a  photo- 
graph was  taken  over  the  enemy 's  lines  till  it  had  been 

128 


FRENCH  AERIAL  PHOTOGRAPHIC  MAP  OF  AN  AREA  OF  96  SQUARE 
KILOMETRES  IN  THE  PERONNE  SECTOR,  MADE  BY  PIECING  TOGETHER 
AND  "  INTERPRETING  "  HUNDREDS  OF  SINGLE  AIRPLANE  PHOTO- 
GRAPHS. THE  HEAVY  BLACK  LINE  INDICATES  THE  GERMAN 
TRENCHES.  THE  ARROWS  SHOW  THE  DIRECTION  OF  FIRE  FROM 
ACTIVE  GERMAN  BATTERIES;  MANY  INACTIVE  BATTERIES,  BOTH 
NEW  AND  OLD,  ARE  LOCATED.  WAVY  LINES  INDICATE  BARRAGE 
FIRE.  SEVERAL  CONVOYS  ARE  SHOWN  AND  THEIR  DIRECTION  OF 
TRAVEL  INDICATED.  IN  THE  LOWER  RIGHT-HAND  CORNER  ARE 
INDICATED  THREE  BALLOONS  PROTECTED  BY  NINE  AIRPLANES. 

129 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

brought  in,  developed,  printed,  and  interpreted,  and 
the  batteries  given  the  range  and  ordered  to  begin 
firing. 

At  the  outbreak  of  war  the  United  States  had  abso- 
lutely no  facilities  or  knowledge  for  this  work.  All 
the  highly  developed  methods  abroad  had  been  kept 
from  this  country  as  a  neutral,  and  there  was  on  hand 
in  military  circles  here  little  but  the  knowledge  of  the 
existence  of  this  science.  Commercial  companies  who 
had  endeavored  to  get  some  inkling  of  it  had  also 
failed.  Moreover,  aerial  photography  was  necessarily 
a  late  step  in  America's  development,  which  could 
not  be  taken  until  the  immense  preparatory  work  of 
building  fields,  training  planes,  and  the  like  had  been 
completed. 

Nevertheless  the  framework  on  which  all  this  devel- 
opment was  to  be  erected  was  put  together  in  the  early 
days  of  the  war,  though  for  a  somewhat  different  pur- 
pose. The  Committee  on  Public  Information,  eager 
for  official  photographs  of  America's  participation  in 
the  war,  had  during  May,  1917,  investigated  the  Allied 
methods  and  urged  the  Chief  Signal  Officer  to  estab- 
lish a  regular  system  for  taking  all  official  pictures. 
A  request  to  this  effect  was  made  on  June  2  to  the 
War  College,  which  on  June  17  approved  it,  and  two 
days  later  Secretary  Baker  entrusted  the  taking  of  all 
official  photographs,  both  for  publication  and  for  his- 
torical work,  to  the  Signal  Corps.  Accordingly,  on 
August  2  a  Photographic  Section  was  organized  for 
this  purpose. 

To  complete  this  subject  at  this  time,  lists  already 
prepared  of  motion-  and  still-picture  operators  were 
carefully  gone  through,  the  best  men  picked  out  and 

130 


TEAINING  THE  GROUND  FORCE 

commissioned,  and  a  series  of  teams  built  up  to  take 
the  immediately  needed  photographs  of  the  early  war 
work.  This  organization,  however,  proved  insufficient, 
so  a  School  of  Military  Cinematography  was  opened 
at  Columbia  University  for  a  six  weeks'  course,  grad- 
uating 114  men  by  May  23,  1918.  From  this  school 
sections  were  formed  of  one  second  lieutenant,  one 
sergeant  and  one  private,  who  were  ordered  wherever 
photographers  were  desired.  This  force  grew  during 
the  year  to  40  officers  and  nearly  300  men,  taking 
thousands  of  pictures  and  laying  a  large  groundwork 
for  the  pictorial  history  of  the  war.  With  the  separa- 
tion of  the  Air  Service  from  the  Signal  Corps  proper, 
that  photographic  service  stayed  with  the  Land  Divi- 
sion of  the  latter. 

Meanwhile,  the  question  of  aerial  photography  was 
coming  to  the  fore.  In  the  fall  of  1917  Major  C.  D.  M. 
Campbell,  R.  F.  C.,  and  Lieutenant  Rene  Michel  of  the 
French  Flying  Service  arrived  in  Washington  to  give 
this  country  the  benefit  of  the  Allied  experience  in 
this  work.  The  mass  of  information  which  they  offered 
proved  invaluable,  and  in  a  broad  way  it  became 
evident  that  both  officers  and  men  would  have  to  be 
trained  in  taking,  developing,  printing,  enlarging,  and 
interpreting  aerial  photographs,  and  as  personnel  both 
for  overseas  squadrons  and  for  the  small  instructional 
"  huts  "  at  the  flying  fields. 

A  technical  school  to  furnish  personnel  to  train, 
observers  in  aerial  photography,  map  interpretation 
and  the  use  of  apparatus  was  opened  on  September  19, 
1917,  at  Langley  Field  with  Sergeant-Major  Haslett, 
R.  F.  C.,  supervising  and  with  a  composite  system  of 
instruction,  using  the  British  equipment  and  instruc- 

131 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

tional  methods  and  the  French  system  of  map  inter- 
pretation. Very  shortly  the  capacity  of  150  men 
proved  insufficient  and  a  second  school  -was  planned, 
but  never  opened,  at  Fort  Sill.  A  total  of  228  men 
were  graduated  up  to  March  2, 1918,  when  the  balance 
were  transferred  to  the  new  Kodak  Park  and  Langley 
Field  closed  for  this  work. 

Another  source  of  instruction  was  found  at  Cornell 
University,  which  had  a  splendid  photographic  equip- 
ment. On  November  22,  1917,  it  was  agreed  that 
Cornell  should  allow  the  use  of  its  photographic  lab- 
oratories and  enlarging  cameras,  and  quarter,  ration, 
and  give  military  training  to  30  men  beginning  Decem- 
ber 1,  while  the  Government  was  to  furnish  the  neces- 
sary chemicals,  plates,  trays,  instructors  and  curricu- 
lum, and  $10  tuition  fee  for  each  student  for  the 
first  four  weeks  and  $5  weekly  thereafter  up  to  a 
maximum  of  $65.  This  school,  opening  on  January  7, 
1918,  turned  out  its  first  seven  graduates  on  February 
9,  and  by  May  4  had  graduated  320  men  and  dis- 
charged 68.  On  that  date  the  school  was  converted 
into  an  advanced  school  with  a  six  weeks7  course 
in  map  compilation  and  interpretation  to  train  the 
most  successful  graduates  of  Kodak  Park  as  photo- 
graphic intelligence  officers. 

Still  were  needed,  however,  the  hundreds  of  devel- 
opers, printers,  and  laboratory  experts  for  the  great 
ground  force  which  should  make  all  this  material 
available.  Plans  were  made  to  open  large  schools  at 
Ohio  State  and  Princeton  Universities,  when  an  old 
offer  made  on  July  14,  1917,  by  the  Eastman  Kodak 
Company  of  Rochester,  New  York,  was  recalled,  and 
a  letter  was  sent  them  on  January  14  asking  what 

132 


TRAINING  THE  GROUND  FORCE 

facilities  they  had  available.  The  Company  at  once 
renewed  its  offer  to  provide  for  six  months  without 
charge  a  whole  new  building  and  the  instructional 
force  necessary  for  a  school  of  1,000  men  and  to  ar- 
range for  rations  at  the  standard  Army  rate  of  90 
cents  a  day.  This  plan  was  approved  by  the  Secretary 
of  War  on  January  21,  and  by  March  10  several  hun- 
dred specially  qualified  men  had  been  sorted  out, 
courses  outlined,  additional  instructors  secured,  and 
the  quarters  arranged,  so  that  the  school  opened  on 
May  25  with  575  students. 

The  course  lasted  five  weeks  and  followed  three 
main  lines.  First  came  the  laboratory  and  dark- 
room instruction,  especially  designed  for  fast  news 
photographers  familiar  with  developing,  printing,  en- 
larging, retouching  and  panchromatic  photography, 
who  were  to  be  able  to  take  a  plate  from  an  airman 
and  develop  it  within  ten  minutes  in  large  motor  lor- 
ries or  cellars  close  behind  the  front.  Next  was  taught 
how  to  fit  these  finished  prints  into  their  proper  places 
in  the  photographic  reproduction  of  the  German  front, 
requiring  men  familiar  with  map  compilation  and 
interpretation,  topographical  science,  and  drafting. 
Third  was  instruction  necessary  to  keep  all  this  equip- 
ment in  good  condition,  requiring  camera  and  optical 
construction  and  repair  men,  lens  experts,  cabinet- 
makers, instrument  makers,  and  other  careful  and 
expert  workers. 

The  first  class  of  462  men  was  graduated  on  May 
11.  Most  of  them  went  straightway  to  overseas  squad- 
rons or  to  the  photographic  i  l  huts  ' '  which  were  now 
assuming  very  appreciable  form  at  all  the  flying  fields. 
The  most  successful  students,  however,  were  sent  on  to 

133 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

the  photographic  intelligence  officers'  school  at  Cor- 
nell, where  they  had  advanced  work  in  map  compila- 
tion and  interpretation  and  in  actual  conditions  of 
field  operations. 

As  fast  as  the  graduates  of  these  various  schools  had 
become  available,  aerial  photographic  "  huts  "  had 
been  opened  at  the  flying  fields  for  the  double  purpose 
of  instructing  the  future  airmen  in  this  science  and  of 
giving  continued  and  advanced  work  to  the  photo- 
graphic personnel.  At  first  these  "  huts  "  were  some- 
what alien  to  the  flying  course  and  had  to  make  shift 
with  any  quarters  and  equipment  available,  but  as  the 
work  developed,  their  buildings  became  part  of  the 
standard  plans  of  the  fields  and  their  personnel  was 
established  as  one  officer  and  24  men.  With  such 
facilities  built  up,  flying  cadets  at  the  primary  schools 
were  given  instruction  in  camera  types  and  mech- 
anisms, methods  of  obtaining  continuous,  overlapping, 
line  photographs,  the  difference  between  vertical  and 
oblique  photographs,  importance  of  flying  level,  stereo- 
scopic photography,  identification,  and  mosaics.  For 
observers,  who  were  to  be  very  largely  dependent  upon 
this  science,  an  advanced  course  was  given,  going 
deeply  into  questions  of  plotting,  orientation,  shadows, 
centers  of  resistance,  trenches,  listening  posts,  ma- 
chine-gun emplacements,  and  the  like. 

The  work  in  aerial  photography  was  delayed 
throughout  by  faults  of  personnel  and  organization. 
Starting  first  as  a  separate  division,  it  did  not  succeed 
in  either  winning  or  forcing  a  sympathetic  hearing, 
and  four  chiefs  in  one  year  followed  one  another  until 
the  work  was  finally  absorbed  in  the  Air  Division. 
For  a  long  time  information  was  not  available  on 

134 


TRAINING  THE  GROUND  FORCE 

which  to  lay  down  a  definite  programme,  either  from 
here  or  from  overseas,  and  authority  was  lacking  also 
for  such  important  elements  as  the  "huts."  By  the 
end  of  the  first  year,  however,  the  big  school  at  Roch- 
ester, the  advanced  school  at  Cornell,  and  the  "  huts  " 
at  the  flying  fields  were  in  good  operation  and  the 
groundwork  was  firmly  laid. 

An  even  more  complex  system  or  series  of  systems 
was  the  instruction  in  radio-telegraphic  work,  which 
not  only  followed  the  airman  through  the  successive 
steps  of  his  training,  but  also  required  a  large  separate 
ground  force.  Not  only  was  it  essential  for  every  avia- 
tor, especially  the  observer,  to  be  able  to  send  and 
receive  messages  in  the  air,  but  special  radio  officers 
and  operators  were  necessary  to  set  up  and  maintain 
the  equipment,  to  serve  at  receiving  stations,  and  to 
do  all  the  instruction  work  necessary. 

Aerial  radio  had  developed  to  an  amazing  degree 
during  the  war.  Although  all  nations  had  experi- 
mented with  it  as  far  back  as  1912,  it  was  not  in  use 
in  the  first  days  of  the  war.  Instead  aerial  signalling 
was  done  by  dropping  tinsel  or  smoke  bombs  or  by 
making  curious  evolutions  in  the  air.  Very  shortly, 
however,  radio  apparatus  was  installed  on  all  military 
planes  and  the  scope  of  the  air  service  enormously 
increased. 

On  America's  entry  into  the  war,  there  were  here, 
as  elsewhere  in  the  air  programme,  no  facilities  on 
hand,  neither  equipment,  schools,  instructors  nor  ex- 
perience. The  importance  of  training  in  radio  work, 
however,  was  manifest  at  the  moment  the  first  ground 
schools  were  opened,  and  it  was  made  a  basic  part  of 
the  instruction  there.  In  October  of  1917,  it  became 

135 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

evident  that  this  training  must  be  greatly  supple- 
mented at  the  flying  fields,  and  the  curriculum  of 
November  14  provided  for  a  minimum  of  40  hours. 
Due  to  lack  both  of  instructors  and  of  equipment, 
however,  this  early  training  was  very  elementary  and 
inadequate. 

To  meet  the  lack  of  instructors  and  radio  personnel, 
plans  were  made  for  a  six  weeks'  course  to  graduate 
operators  and  repairmen  at  the  rate  of  100  a  week, 
but  no  action  was  taken.  Shortly  it  developed  that 
the  Signal  Corps  proper  had  such  schools  in  operation, 
and  a  cooperative  plan  was  agreed  upon  on  November 
22  whereby  a  school  was  opened  at  Ellington  Field 
in  January,  1918,  with  a  limited  equipment  and 
civilian  radio  amateurs  enlisted  as  instructors,  which 
turned  out  117  graduates  by  May  23.  By  December, 
1917,  the  difficulties  of  radio  personnel  and  training 
had  begun  to  clarify  and  the  needs  became  more 
sharply  defined.  A  series  of  conferences  developed 
the  fact  that  36  officers  and  760  operators  and 
mechanics  would  be  needed  for  training  and  upkeep 
at  flying  fields  here  and  113  officers  and  1,059  men  for 
squadrons  overseas.  A  standardized  plan  for  a 
school  with  a  capacity  of  1,200  was  drawn  up,  but  it 
was  not  adopted  because  of  a  decision  again  to  entrust 
all  this  work  to  the  Signal  Corps  proper.  Thereupon 
the  Signal  Corps  undertook  the  training  of  air  person- 
nel at  two  officers'  and  three  operators'  and  mechanics' 
schools. 

For  the  officers'  school,  men  of  technical,  electrical 
or  mechanical  education  were  sent  for  a  13  weeks' 
course  at  Maryland  Agricultural  College  or  Columbia 
University,  the  former  graduating  47  officers  by  May 

136 


GROUND   SCHOOL  RADIO    INSTRUCTION,   RECEIVING  AND   SENDING   IN    CODE 


GROUND     SCHOOL     INSTRUCTION      IN      MACHINE-GUN     ASSEMBLY     BLIND- 
FOLDED,  REQUIRING    70   SECONDS 


TRAINING  THE  GROUND  FORCE 

23,  1918,  and  the  latter  having  134  under  instruction 
on  that  date.  Another  school,  run  by  the  Air  Division 
at  Fort  Sill,  graduated  30  officers.  These  radio  officers 
were  returned  after  graduation  to  the  Air  Service  and 
sent  to  an  observation  school  for  a  month 's  field  course. 
Here  they  were  required  to  organize  and  conduct  a 
complete  puff-target  shoot,  supervise  the  installation 
and  adjustment  of  various  types  of  radio  apparatus 
on  planes,  set  up  and  direct  the  ground  receiving 
station,  check  the  work  of  the  observer  in  the  plane 
and  the  receiving  operator  on  the  ground  from  a 
central  receiving  station,  and  work  a  puff-target  shoot 
from  the  air.  After  this  training  they  were  ready  for 
actual  service  in  the  field,  at  flying  schools,  or  in 
instruction. 

For  radio  operators  and  mechanics  enlisted  men 
were  sought  who  had  been  telegraphers,  electricians, 
and  amateur  radio  operators  in  civil  life.  They 
were  sent  for  an  11  weeks'  course  at  Carnegie  Insti- 
tute of  Technology,  Pittsburgh,  the  University  of 
Texas,  or  Texas  Agricultural  and  Mechanical  College, 
which  opened,  respectively,  on  March  1,  April  1,  and 
April  15,  1918.  By  May  23  Carnegie  Institute  had 
graduated  100  men  and  had  245  under  instruction, 
250  were  under  instruction  at  the  University  of  Texas, 
and  300  at  Texas  Agricultural  College.  Many  of  these 
men  were  sent  overseas  at  once ;  others  went  to  flying 
schools,  where  they  gave  primary  instruction  and 
received  advanced  instruction  as  nearly  simulating 
field  conditions  as  possible. 

With  the  turning  out  of  these  graduates  came  the 
opportunity  to  standardize  radio  instruction  through 
the  various  stages  in  a  flier's  training  in  a  way  not 

137 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

possible  before.  Whereas  previously  each,  ground 
school  and  each  flying  school  had  had  charge  of  its  own 
radio  work,  it  was  now  decided  to  establish  a  Radio 
Section  which  should  be  wholly  responsible  for  a  pro- 
gressive and  coordinated  scheme  of  training  through 
the  various  stages. 

Beginning  with  the  ground  schools,  the  curriculum 
laid  down  on  April  1  provided  for  43  hours  of  radio 
work  concentrated  entirely  on  efficient  signaling  from 
an  airplane  to  the  complete  exclusion  of  other  phases 
of  telegraphy.  The  whole  emphasis  of  the  course 
was  upon  accuracy  rather  than  speed,  at  first  entirely 
by  sound  and  later  entirely  by  ear.  Actual  practice 
was  afforded  in  spotting  artillery  bursts  on  the  minia- 
ture range. 

The  flying-field  curriculum  was  similarly  revised  on 
April  13,  when  an  elaborate  set  of  directions  was  sent 
out  to  each  field.  By  these  all  radio  instruction  was 
to  be  put  into  the  hands  of  the  Radio  Officer  of  the 
school,  who  was  to  be  entirely  responsible  for  equip- 
ment and  training  and  was  to  be  assisted  in  the  in- 
struction work  by  four  radio  officers  and  four  radio 
mechanics,  just  then  becoming  available  from  the  radio 
training  schools.  The  curriculum  called  for  a  mini- 
mum of  40  hours  and  a  maximum  till  qualified.  Be- 
fore a  pilot  could  receive  his  R.M.A.,  he  was  required 
to  be  able  to  send  and  receive  Morse  code  accurately 
at  the  rate  of  10  words  a  minute  for  three  minutes, 
to  send  at  the  rate  of  eight  words  a  minute  from  a 
plane  in  flight,  read  service  panneaux  from  a  plane  in 
flight  at  the  rate  of  four  code  words  a  minute,  and  let 
out  and  rewind  antennae  five  times  from  a  plane  in 
flight. 

138 


TRAINING  THE  GROUND  FORCE 

When  the  flier  went  on  to  the  advanced  schools,  he 
found  additional  and  advanced  radio  work  awaiting 
him,  both  to  keep  him  in  practice  and  to  perfect  what 
he  already  knew.  The  pursuit  pilots  and  bombers  were 
given  but  40  hours'  work,  but  the  observers,  who  would 
have  to  be  in  constant  touch  with  the  ground,  were 
given  66  hours,  25  in  receiving,  20  in  sending,  and  21 
in  lectures.  By  the  time  a  flier  was  ready  for  the 
front,  he  was  fully  qualified  in  sending  and  receiving 
wireless  messages  in  an  airplane. 

Thus  by  May  23,  1918,  the  whole  radio  programme 
had  been  concentrated  and  specialized.  A  continuous 
training  system  for  fliers,  with  adequate  instructors 
and  equipment,  had  been  built  up,  schools  for  special- 
ized radio  officers  and  men  established,  and  radio  offi- 
cers and  operators  distributed  on  a  set  plan  through 
the  various  flying  fields  and  squadrons;  indeed,  the 
foundations  had  been  generously  and  completely  laid. 
The  work  throughout  was  handicapped,  however,  at 
the  start  by  lack  of  equipment  and  of  information 
from  overseas,  and  later  by  confusion  in  policy  as  be- 
tween the  Air  Division  and  the  Land  Division  of  the 
Signal  Corps,  which  was  not  to  be  finally  cleared  up 
until  the  divorce  of  the  two  services  by  the  reorganiza- 
tion of  May,  1918. 

Undoubtedly  one  of  the  most  serious  problems,  and 
one  not  early  appreciated,  was  that  of  providing  the 
great  ground  army  of  mechanics  needed  to  keep  the 
planes  and  all  their  delicate  equipment  always  in  good 
condition.  When  it  is  remembered  that  a  battle  plane 
is  the  closest  possible  compromise  between  speed  and 
safety,  that  it  has  been  stripped  down  to  the  last  ounce 
of  weight,  and  that  a  slight  error  in  any  one  place 

139 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

may  mean  death,  a  little  idea  of  the  vital  importance 
of  this  force  may  be  had.  Indeed,  without  a  good 
ground  force  the  airmen  would  be  useless.  If  the  men 
in  the  dromes  and  repair  shops  have  not  done  their 
work  well,  no  amount  of  courage  and  skill  will  avail. 
As  soon  as  anything  happens  to  the  plane,  the  aviator 
is  as  helpless  as  a  bird  with  a  crippled  wing.  He  has 
only  one  course  before  him,  to  alight  at  the  earliest 
possible  moment.  Many  a  famous  flier  has  been  killed 
in  a  defective  plane. 

The  problems  of  securing  this  necessary  ground 
force  were  very  great.  The  drain  upon  skilled 
mechanics  had  been  tremendous ;  thousands  had  gone 
in  the  draft,  and  other  thousands  had  been  attracted 
by  unprecedented  wages  to  war  industries.  During 
the  first  few  months  of  the  war  no  special  arrange- 
ments were  made  for  increasing  personnel,  but  by  the 
middle  of  October,  1917,  the  need  of  greatly  increasing 
the  number  of  men  became  apparent.  A  special  re- 
cruiting section  was  then  formed,  which  received 
greatly  added  impetus  when  it  was  announced  that 
no  more  voluntary  enlistments  would  be  permitted 
after  December  15.  An  extensive  publicity  campaign 
was  also  inaugurated,  which  utilized  225,000  posters, 
125,000  booklets,  and  newspaper  and  magazine  arti- 
cles, distributed  through  draft  boards,  recruiting 
offices,  post  offices,  clubs,  garages,  and  the  like. 

Other  methods  of  recruiting  were  instituted  at  about 
the  same  time.  General  Pershing  cabled  urging 
immediate  steps  for  "  conserving  personnel  especially 
suitable  Air  Service,"  and  on  November  1  a  memo- 
randum was  sent  the  Chief  of  Staff  that  * '  the  difficul- 
ties of  obtaining  an  adequate  and  suitable  personnel 

140 


TRAINING  THE  GROUND  FORCE 

confirm  this  judgment.'7  It  was  "  of  pressing  im- 
portance, "  therefore,  that  5,000  mechanics  be  trans- 
ferred at  once  from  the  National  Army  to  the  Air 
Service.  This  was  approved  on  November  22,  the 
same  day  that  another  memorandum  was  sent  to  the 
Chief  of  Staff  requesting  the  induction  of  9,000  men 
monthly  for  the  five  months  from  December  to  May  to 
complete  the  45,000  men  needed  of  the  87,000  author- 
ized by  December  1,  1917. 

During  all  this  time  the  number  of  men  needed  was 
increasing.  On  October  16  came  authority  to  enlist 
12,000  motor  mechanics  to  release  for  airplane  work 
a  similar  number  of  Frenchmen  engaged  in  the  trans- 
port service.  On  December  17  came  orders  to  secure 
9,900  men  for  the  spruce  forests;  on  December  21, 
orders  for  12  companies  of  bricklayers  to  build  avia- 
tion schools  in  England;  and  on  March  20,  1918, 
orders  for  27  more  companies  of  bricklayers  and  con- 
struction men,  totaling  9,750.  This  brought  the  au- 
thorized strength  of  the  Air  Service  to  11,011  officers 
and  120,737  men,  nearly  as  much  as  the  whole  Regular 
Army  before  the  war.  As  a  result  of  all  these  demands 
and  methods  of  filling  them,  the  enlisted  strength  of 
the  Air  Service  went  up  by  leaps  and  bounds. 
Whereas  on  August  1  it  stood  at  10,107,  on  September 
1  at  19,598,  and  on  November  1  at  22,067,  by  December 
1  it  had  jumped  to  36,234,  by  January  1,  1918,  to 
87,425,  by  March  1  to  109,372,  by  April  1  to  128,569, 
and  by  May  31  to  137,972,  of  whom  38,889  were  in 
France.  Indeed,  the  enlisted  strength  had  so  far 
exceeded  what  was  authorized  for  the  Air  Service 
that  on  March  13  all  inductions  and  enlistments  were 
ordered  to  cease. 

141 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

Mere  numbers,  however,  were  not  sufficient.  As  a 
memorandum  of  December  3, 1917,  put  it : 

Investigation  shows  that  it  is  practically  impossible  to 
obtain  welders,  there  is  no  such  thing  as  airplane  mechan- 
icians to  be  had ;  the  few  armorers  in  the  country  cannot  be 
spared  from  their  work  of  manufacturing ;  to  take  propeller 
makers  from  the  airplane  factories  would  interfere  with 
their  airplane  production.  It  is,  therefore,  suggested  that 
some  definite  means  be  taken  to  train  men  for  the  special 
work  required,  preferably  men  from  industries  closely  allied, 
and  men  whose  training  and  experience  has  been  along 
somewhat  similar  lines. 

The  problem  was  only  half  solved,  therefore,  with 
the  enlistment.  First  was  required  the  inculcation  of 
a  care  and  a  thoroughness  wholly  foreign  to  American 
quantity-production  methods.  The  men  had  to  be 
educated  to  a  new  standard  in  the  delicate  work  called 
for  in  order  to  guard  against  the  little-evident  wear 
and  tear  on  a  mechanism  already  lightened  to  the 
breaking  point.  Obviously  this  new  perception  could 
come  to  the  workmen  only  with  constant  effort  and 
experience. 

Early  in  October,  1917,  the  first  step  towards  a 
comprehensive  system  of  mechanical  instruction  was 
taken  by  sending  letters  to  a  score  of  specialized  fac- 
tories, asking  if  they  would  admit  squads  of  soldiers 
for  training  purposes.  It  is  a  tribute  to  American 
industry  that  this  request  was  most  willingly  complied 
with,  although  many  of  the  factories  were  using  special 
processes  and  all  would  be  considerably  inconven- 
ienced. The  first  squad  of  25  men  was  sent  to  an 
oxy-acetylene  company  on  November  11  for  a  three 
weeks'  course  in  welding,  which  had  been  alarmingly 

142 


TRAINING  THE  GROUND  FORCE 

unrepresented  among  the  recruits.  Within  two  weeks 
300  men  had  been  scattered  in  small  squads  among  14 
different  companies  and  the  Royal  Flying  Corps  camp 
at  Toronto  for  courses  of  from  three  to  eight  weeks 
in  armament,  ignition,  airplane  motors,  propellers, 
machine  guns,  instruments,  sailmaking,  vulcanizing, 
cabinet  work,  copper  work,  motorcycles  and  motor 
trucks. 

These  schools  proved  very  successful,  and  on  Janu- 
ary 15, 1918,  three  more  were  added  to  give  instruction 
in  airplane  construction,  airplane  motors,  and  tire 
work.  Later  on,  as  the  general  scheme  of  mechanical 
training  began  to  develop  on  a  broad  scale  through 
the  establishment  of  several  large  schools,  it  was  de- 
cided to  cease  instruction  of  small  scattered  groups  at 
the  factories  and  to  consolidate  the  whole  training 
under  more  thoroughly  military  conditions.  In  March, 
therefore,  the  Chief  Signal  Officer  ruled  that  these 
smaller  schools,  which  had  served  so  well  in  the 
emergency  and  turned  out  over  2,000  specialists, 
should  be  abandoned  as  rapidly  as  other  facilities 
became  available. 

But  further  facilities  for  instruction  were  necessary 
from  the  start.  Some  became  available  when  the  com- 
ing of  winter  closed  the  five  Northern  flying  fields 
of  Scott,  Chanute,  Selfridge,  Hazelhurst  and  Wilbur 
Wright.  With  the  pilots  gone  and  much  equipment 
remaining,  it  was  decided  on  November  1  to  employ 
these  schools  during  the  winter  for  mechanical  instruc- 
tion. First,  however,  it  was  necessary  to  secure  in- 
structors. To  this  end  a  circular  was  sent  to  leading 
airplane  and  engine  factories  and  garages  asking  men 
experienced  in  motors,  carburation,  ignition,  or  planes, 

143 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

especially  foremen  used  to  handling  men,  to  apply 
for  this  work.  A  special  examining  board  picked  out 
17  civilians  as  first  and  second  lieutenants,  48  in  ranks 
from  corporal  to  master  signal  electrician,  and  five  as 
aviator  mechanicians.  These  men  were  given  an  in- 
tensive three  weeks'  training  at  Self  ridge  Field  begin- 
ning December  8  and  then  distributed  through  the 
various  fields  as  an  instructional  force.  The  schools 
themselves  opened  on  January  1,  1918,  with  about  315 
students  and  a  curriculum  covering  woods,  propellers, 
wing  repair,  fabrics,  wire  work,  soldering,  tires,  align- 
ment, fuselage,  motors,  and  later  motor  transport. 
Though  delayed  somewhat  by  quarantine  for  measles 
and  by  slow  shipments,  these  schools  by  April  1,  when 
they  were  closed  because  of  the  reopening  of  flying 
instruction,  had  graduated  30  welders,  574  motor 
mechanics,  1,120  airplane  mechanics,  and  939  motor- 
transport  men. 

Meanwhile,  Kelly  Field,  the  great  Texas  concentra- 
tion camp,  was  also  developing  as  a  mechanics'  in- 
struction center.  A  school  had  been  opened  there  in 
mid-November  to  give  as  much  training;  as  possible 
under  the  disadvantageous  conditions  then  prevailing, 
but  on  December  29  it  was  reported  as  unsatisfactory 
because  the  teachers  were  inexperienced,  the  equip- 
ment insufficient,  the  courses  not  specialized,  students 
transitory,  and  the  officers  overworked.  In  March 
the  whole  school  was  reorganized,  the  instructors 
given  an  additional  intensive  course,  and  the  school 
reopened  on  the  18th  with  a  capacity  of  1,000  men. 
To  June  30  it  graduated  195  chauffeurs,  419  airplane 
mechanics,  and  300  motor  mechanics. 

Not  even  these  schools  all  in  operation  together  were 
144 


TRAINING  THE  GROUND  FORCE 

sufficient  for  the  increasing  needs,  and  it  was  decided 
that  the  whole  mechanical  instruction  must  be  very 
much  further  amplified.  Accordingly,  three  large 
vocational  schools  were  turned  to  early  in  December, 
1917,  to  undertake  the  work  on  a  broad,  centralized 
basis.  The  first  trial  detachment  was  sent  on  Decem- 
ber 10  to  Dunwoody  Industrial  Institute  at  St.  Paul, 
Minnesota,  split  into  five  groups  of  five  men  each  to 
try  out  various  courses.  The  facilities  were  found  to 
be  adequate,  and  the  Liberty  Ignition  School,  which  it 
had  been  proposed  to  open  at  the  Dayton  Engineering 
Laboratory,  was  transferred  here  and  opened  on 
January  1  with  50  students  and  five  of  the  Company's 
best  technical  men.  Meanwhile  negotiations  had 
been  completed  on  a  broader  scale  with  Pratt  Insti- 
tute in  Brooklyn  and  the  David  Ranken  School  of 
Mechanical  Arts  at  St.  Louis,  and  on  January  5  au- 
thority was  asked  to  train  a  total  of  2,160  men  at  a 
cost  of  $41,000,  or  $18  each,  at  these  three  schools  in 
the  interim  before  Kelly  Field  reopened  in  June. 
This  plan  was  approved  on  January  15. 

Dunwoody  Institute  originally  offered  to  train  400 
men  a  month  free  of  charge  till  April  1  and  then  to 
charge  $3.50  per  man  per  week.  The  plan  developed 
rapidly,  however,  until  authority  was  secured  to  train 
2,000  men  at  45  cents  each  daily  and  to  spend  $254,500 
for  quarters.  The  school  opened  on  March  1,  giving 
instruction  in  airplanes,  motors,  motor  transport,  igni- 
tion, sailmaking,  vulcanizing,  cabinet  work,  carpentry, 
motorcycles,  metal  work,  and  instruments.  Shortly 
it  was  taken  over  by  the  Government  and  it  was  later 
retained  as  one  of  the  two  Government  mechanics 7 
schools.  Pratt  Institute,  though  delayed  in  opening 

145 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

by  a  search  for  quarters  and  the  necessity  of  remodel- 
ing the  building,  opened  on  March  18  with  200  men 
for  a  four  weeks '  course  for  carpenters,  cabinetmakers, 
and  motor  mechanics  under  an  agreement  to  take  not 
over  1,000  men  before  June  1  at  $4  each.  David 
Ranken  School,  also  delayed  by  lack  of  equipment  and 
instructors,  opened  on  March  1  with  141  men  for  a 
four  weeks '  course  for  carpenters,  blacksmiths,  electri- 
cians, metal  workers,  propeller  men,  and  motor 
mechanics  under  an  agreement  to  take  360  men  before 
June  1  at  a  cost  of  $10,000.  A  fourth  school  of  the 
same  type  was  opened  at  the  Carnegie  Institute  of 
Technology  on  January  25  with  60  men,  without 
charge  to  the  Government,  for  a  four  weeks'  course 
for  coppersmiths,  blacksmiths,  and  motor  and  air- 
plane mechanics. 

Thus  the  training  of  mechanics,  so  vital  to  the  suc- 
cess of  the  Air  Service,  developed  through  various 
stages  under  great  difficulties.  Nearly  a  score  of 
small  schools  opened  at  special  factories  to  meet  the 
first  needs  turned  out  about  2,000  men  and  were  then 
abandoned.  The  Northern  flying  fields,  opened  for 
this  work  in  the  winter  months,  turned  out  another 
2,500  men  before  the  return  of  flying  in  the  spring. 
Four  large  vocational  schools,  next  turned  to,  grad- 
uated another  5,500  men  before  the  end  of  the  first 
year  of  war,  when  the  Government  was  considering 
abandoning  them  in  favor  of  two  complete  Govern- 
ment schools  at  Kelly  Field  and  St.  Paul,  Minnesota, 
with  three  months '  courses.  All  the  way  through  this 
work  was  greatly  handicapped  by  lack  of  equipment, 
tools,  planes,  engines,  space,  quarters  and  instructors, 
and  delay  in  securing  authority  to  go  ahead.  Never- 

146 


TEAINING  THE  GROUND  FORCE 

theless,  by  May  1, 1918,  over  10,000  men  had  been  sent 
within  6y2  months  through  17  different  courses  at  34 
different  schools,  and  the  immediate  pressing  needs 
both  for  overseas  and  for  the  flying  fields  had  been 
met. 


147 


CHAPTEE  IX    ^ 

REACHING  BACK  FOB  RAW  MATERIALS 

Complexity  of  the  industrial  problems  of  materiel  —  Mobiliza- 
tion of  raw  materials  and  creation  of  now  industries  by 
the  Government  —  Spruce  the  foundation  of  the  airplane  — 
Spruce  forests  of  Oregon  and  Washington  —  The  logging 
industry  at  the  outbreak  of  war  —  Its  reorganization  under 
Government  control  —  The  I.  W.  W.  and  the  labor  situa- 
tion —  Thirteen  thousand  troops  sent  into  the  spruce 
forests  —  Spruce  Production  Division  organized  under 
Colonel  B.  P.  Disque  —  Loyal  Legion  of  Loggers  and  Lum- 
bermen created  —  Wage  adjustments  —  Spruce  require- 
ments and  production  methods  —  Substitutes  for  spruce 
adopted  —  Kiln  drying  of  lumber  —  Eeorganization  of 
lumber  transportation  —  Linen  for  airplane  wings  — 
Failure  of  the  Irish  supply  —  Development  of  a  cotton 
substitute  —  Shortage  of  airplane  dope  —  Development  of 
supply  of  acetate  of  limo  and  other  constituents  —  Engine 
lubricants  —  Castor  oil  an  essential  for  rotary  engines  — 
A  hundred  thousand  acres  planted  to  castor  beans  —  De- 
velopment of  a  standard  mineral  lubricant  —  The  Liberty 
Aero  Oil  and  the  tragedy  of  its  consummation  —  The 
problem  of  special  equipment,  instruments  and  accessories. 

Complex  as  were  the  training  and  personnel  prob- 
lems of  the  Air  Service,  they  did  not  require  the  extent 
of  preparation  and  the  time  that  the  material  and 
industrial  elements  required.  Given  a  man  physically 
qualified,  his  training  can  begin  as  soon  as  fields  and 
equipment  are  ready,  but  jo  build_a  plane  or  an  jmgine 
one  must  go  far  back  into  the  sources  of  raw  materials 
and  the  basic,  preliminary  industries.  Consequent^, 
in  a  country  replete  with  man  power  but  very  deficient 
in  all  the  industries  that  go  to  make  up  an  Air  Ser- 
vice, industrial  development  was  certain  to  make  a  far 
slower  start  than  the  recruitment  and  training  of 
personnel. 

148 


REACHING  BACK  FOR  RAW  MATERIALS 

Of  all  the  vital  industrial  preparation  of  the  first 
year,  probably  the  most  fundamental  and  far-reaching 
factor  was  the  mobilization  under  direct  Government 
control  of  essential  raw  materials  and  accessories,  the 
scarcity  of  which  bade  fair  to  stop  the  whole  aerial 
programme  before  it  even  got  under  way.  The  Gov- 
ernment, beginning  slowly  and  cautiously,  was  driven 
on  step  by  step  by  undeniable  and  unprecedented  de-. 
mands  until  it  finally  found  itself  directing  and  financ- 
ing a  whole  series  of  industries  of  the  widest  diversity. 
In  any  estimate  of  this  first  year  of  aerial  preparation," 
it  is  essential  to  understand  that  no  one  at  the  outset 
realized  that  it  would  be  necessary  to  send  thousands 
of  soldiers  into  the  forests  to  get  out  spruce,  provide 
millions  of  dollars  for  dope  factories,  plant  100,000 
acres  to  castor  beans,  or  develop  wholly  new  lines  in 
linen,  barometers,  and  a  dozen  other  materials  and 
instruments.  Undoubtedly  had  the  scope  of  all  this 
preliminary  preparation  been  foreseen,  a  very  much 
larger  organization  would  have  been  created. 

Spruce  is  avpry  good  P^SP !  in  point.  Toughest  of"" 
the  soft  woods,  with  unsurpassed  shock-absorbing 
qualities,  and  not  apt  to  splinter  under  bullet  fire,  it 
was  early  recognized  as  the  very  foundation  of  the 
airplane.  No  other  wood  so  well  combined  the  essen- 
tial qualities  of  lightness,  strength  and  resiliency,  or 
came  in  such  long,  clear  lengths  free  from  knots. 

Spruce  of  the  size  needed  grew  only  on  the  moisture^ 
laden  Cascade  Range  slopes  of  Oregon  and  Washing- 
ton, where  in  immense  primeval  forests  giant  trees  a 
dozen  feet  in  diameter  and  300  feet  in  height  flourished 
in  apparent  safety.  Only  about  one-third  of  the  11 
billion  feet  of  Sitka  spruce,  however,  was  dense  enough 

149 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

or  near  enough  to  possible  logging  operations  to  be 
available,  and  the  difficulty  was  greatly  increased  by 
the  fact  that  only  a  very  small  proportion  of  the  tree 
as  cut  could  be  used  in  airplane  work.  As  a  matter  of 
fact,  about  14  per  cent,  of  the  original  tree  was  sent 
to  the  mills,  and  of  this  only  one-third,  or  4%  per  cent, 
of  the  lumber  cuf7was~oFthe  desired  quality.  A  very 
large  cut  had  to  be  made,  therefore,  to  get  out  a  very 
smaTT  amount  of  airplane  spruce. 

At  the  time  the  United  States  entered  the  war,  a 
small  and  unorganized  industry  was  working  in  at  the 
edges  of  this  western  spruce  tract  under  rather  chaotic 
conditions.  The  Allied  Governments,  England, 
France  and  Italy,  competing  ruthlessly  against  each 
other  through  lumber  brokers,  had  sent  prices  up  to 
the  extravagant  figure  of  $250  per  thousand  feet. 
The  forests,  moreover,  were  seething  with  labor  unrest, 
the  method  of  cutting  was  very  primitive  and  waste- 
ful, standard  specifications  were  entirely  lacking,  and 
shipments  east  by  commercial  freight  wasted  months 
of  time. 

The  Government  at  once  realized  that  with  the 
United  States  also  in  the  market  the  situation  would 
become  impossible.  As  a  first  step  a  representative  of 
the  Lumber  Committee  of  the  Council  of  National 
Defense  was  sent  to  the  Pacific  Coast  in  May,  followed 
in  July  by  an  educational  mission  o'f  French,  British 
and  Italian  aviators,  personifying  the  close  connection 
between  forest  and  battle  front.  Early  in  the  latter 
month  the  40  leading  operators  agreed  to  let  no  more 
contracts  until  the  Government's  needs  were  known, 
and  later  the  Aircraft  Production  Board  announced 
that  all  airplane  spruce  would  be  purchased  by  the 

150 


A   GIANT    OF  THE    OREGON    SPRUCE    FORESTS 


BEACHING  BACK  FOR  RAW  MATERIALS 

Government.  In  August  the  Emergency  Spruce  Coun- 
cil and  the  Pacific  Aircraft  Spruce  Production  Board 
were  formed  on  the  Coast,  knitting  together  all  the 
previously  scattered  interests,  and  on  October  5  a  com- 
mittee was  appointed  by  the  Government  to  place  all 
contracts  over  a  period  of  18  months,  to  establish 
prices,  and  to  recommend  advances. 

Finally,  also  in  October,  came  one  of  the  most 
drastic  steps  yet  taken  by  the  Government  in  the  war. 
The  enormous  amount  of  spruce  needed  under  the  new 
American  programme  and  the  impossibility  of  supply- 
ing it  under  present  conditions  had  become  increas- 
ingly evident.  In  the  emergency  Colonel  Brice  P. 
Disque,  who  had  recently  achieved  considerable  re- 
nown as  acting  warden  of  the  Michigan  State  "Prison, 
and  who  had  been  sent  out  to  the  Coast  to  investigate 
the  spruce  situation,  recommended  the  sending  of  a 
force  of  Government  troops  into  the  forests  to  assure 
an  adequate  supply  of  spruce  against  all  eventual- 
ities. 

The  labor  situation  at  the  time  was  desperate.  Not 
only  had  a  large  number  of  woodsmen  been  taken  off 
by  the  draft,  by  voluntary  enlistment,  and  by  the 
opportunity  of  higher  wages  in  the  shipping  and 
munitions  industries,  but  the  remainder  were  infected 
with  the  pacifist  and  anarchistic  views  of  the  I.  W.  W. 
Some  idea  of  the  situation  may  be  had  from  Colonel 
Bisque's  report  of  November  2  that  the  I.  "W.  W.  had 
reduced  the  spruce  output  by  30  per  cent,  by  '  '  draw- 
ing water  from  boiler  and  then  firing  to  white  heat, ' ' 
"  placing  emery  powder  in  bearing  and  cylinders," 
and  "  cutting  fine  spruce  logs  into  short  lengths.*' 
Similar  conditions  were  reported  by  the  President's 

151 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

Mediation  Commission  on  November  9,  with  the  state- 
ment: 

This  basic  world  industry  suffered  a  breakdown  of  several 
months  in  the  summer  of  1917,  and  is  still  in  a  state  of 
seething  unrest,  woefully  short  of  its  productivity,  for  while 
the  strike  of  1917  was  broken  and  the  men  went  back  beaten 
for  the  moment,  the  conflict  was  only  postponed  and  not 
composed.  Some  of  the  men  practiced  "  conscious  with- 
drawal of  efficiency,"  the  so-called  "  strike  on  the  job,"  and 
there  is  every  expectation  that  unless  present  conditions  are 
changed,  a  complete  strike  will  take  place  in  the  Spring. 

The  I.  W.  W.  was  described  as  "  a  band  of  groping 
fellowship/'  filling  the  vacuum  caused  by  conditions 
at  the  camps,  a  migratory  drifting  labor,  and  the 
hostility  of  the  employers  to  labor  unions.  The  only 
solution  was  said  to  be  the  eight-hour  day,  accepted 
in  all  other  coast  industries. 

The  plan  to  send  troops  into  the  woods,  which  it  was 
feared  by  some  might  be  interpreted  as  an  attempt  to 
coerce  labor,  and  by  others  as  productive  rather  of 
casualties  than  of  spruce,  was  approved  by  the  Air- 
craft Board  on  October  11  and  by  the  Chief  of  Staff  on 
October  17.  Colonel  Disque  was  put  in  charge  of,  the 
Spruce  Production  [Division  on  November  6,  with  a 
force  of  66  squadrons,  or  nearly  10,000  men. 

The  first  step  taken  was  to  attempt  to  win  the  con- 
fidence of  the  woodsmen  by  instituting  the  Loyal 
Legion  of  Loggers  and  Lumbermen,  an  entirely  volun- 
tary organization  under  Government  patronage,  aim- 
ing to  improve  conditions,  establish  an  esprit  de  corps, 
and  instill  the  feeling  of  patriotic  service.  Washington 
and  Oregon  were  divided  into  seven  districts,  an 
officer  was  sent  into  each  to  arrange  for  the  organiza- 

152 


BEACHING  BACK  FOR  RAW  MATERIALS 

tion  of  locals,  and  on  November  30  the  first  local 
opened  at  Wheeler,  Oregon,  with  110  members  in  a 
camp  of  110  men.  A  sanitation  officer  was  later  sent 
to  each  camp  to  survey  living  conditions,  and  two 
officers  with  motion  pictures  were  sent  about  to  relieve 
the  boredom  of  lumber-camp  life.  By  May,  1918, 
75,000  men  had  been  enrolled,  minute  conditions  of 
sanitation  prescribed,  and  sabotage  brought  practically 
to  an  end. 

Wage  conditions,  however,  remained  to  be  settled. 
On  February  27  a  conference  of  all  the  employers  was 
called  to  consider  the  men's  chief  demand,  the  basic 
eight-hour  day,  over  which  the  industry  had  been 
split  for  over  a  year.  The  decision  was  finally  put 
into  the  hands  of  the  Government,  and  on  March  1 
the  whole  industry  went  on  a  basic  eight-hour  day 
for  a  six-day  week,  with  time  and  a  half  for  overtime. 
' '  The  life  of  your  nation  and  the  safety  of  the  world, '  * 
said  the  announcement,  "is  largely  dependent  on 
spruce  production, ' '  and  ' '  reduction  of  production  by 
wilful  neglect  on  the  part  of  either  employer  or  em- 
ployee is  no  less  treason  than  would  be  a  strike  or 
disobedience  of  orders  among  soldiers  or  sailors. ' ' 

Troops  were  now  arriving  in  large  numbers.  By 
February  1,  4,600  had  reached  Vancouver  Barracks,  ^-- 
Washington,  1,100  of  whom  already  in  the  woods  hacr 
greatly  stabilized  conditions.  By  June  13,000  men 
were  on  hand,  with  8,000  in  the  forests.  These  men 
were  assigned  in  multiples  of  25  to  lumber  companies 
producing  Government  airplane  spruce,  the  Govern- 
ment paying  their  wages  as  soldiers  and  the  com- 
panies refunding  that  sum  to  the  Government  and 
paying  the  men  the  difference  between  the  Army  rate 

153 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

and  the  prevailing  civilian  pay  for  similar  work. 
The  men,  who  were  under  military  discipline,  with 
their  living  conditions  prescribed  by, the  Government 
in  detail,  kept  on  good  terms  with  the  civilians  work- 
ing alongside  them. 

Meanwhile  the  demands  for  spruce  kept  running 
continually  and  alarmingly  ahead  of  the  supply. 
Whereas  26  million  feet  had  been  turned  out  in  1916, 
the  estimate  kept  mounting  from  36  million  feet 
annually  in  May,  1917,  to  11%  million  feet  monthly v 
in  September,  14  million  feet  monthly  in  December, 
and  a  final  figure  of  23  million  feet  a  month  in  June, 
1918.  The  early  production  estimates  in  August, 
1917,  gave  a  maximum  of  75  million  feet  annually. 
It  was  obvious  that  many  other  measures  for  increas- 
ing production  must  be  taken. 

First  in  point  of  time  was  the  drafting  of  standard 
specifications  for  cutting,  through  which  it  was  hoped 
that  waste  could  be  reduced  both  at  the  mills  and  at 
the  factories.  Before  the  war  there  had  been  no 
definite,  uniform  standards,  and  as  a  result  a  great 
amount  of  good  wood  was  cut  in  unusable  lengths, 
this  causing  also  a  large  loss  in  transportation 
efficiency.  The  Government  laid  down  standard 
specifications  applicable  to  all  mills,  scientifically 
worked  out  to  cut  the  logs  in  the  most  economical 
way. 

Closely  allied  was  the  Government  "cut-up"  mill, 
the  largest  sawmill  in  the  world,  designed  especially 
to  economize  lumber  through  a  new  arrangement  of 
saws  which  could  work  far  more  efficiently  than  the 
conventional  saws  in  use  at  ordinary  commercial 
mills.  Twelve  separate  log  carriages  conveyed  the 

154 


•->     V 

IS 


REACHING  BACK  FOR  RAW  MATERIALS 

logs  to  12  head  saws,  back  of  each  of  which  was  a 
full  equipment  of  edgers  and  cut-up  saws,  each 
driven  by  a  separate  electric  motor.  By  this  ar- 
rangement the  airplane  spruce  cut  from  a  given  log 
was  increased  from  five  to  10  per  cent.  The  mill 
was  begun  on  December  24,  1917,  and  completed  in 
45  days.  Construction  was  carried  out  largely  by 
volunteers  from  the  soldiers  at  the  barracks;  rails 
for  spur  tracks  were  secured  from  sidings  torn  up 
some  distance  away;  and  unavailable  machinery  was 
turned  out  on  special  designs  by  local  foundries. 
The  mill  covered  five  acres,  and  its  full-time  ca- 
pacity was  lumber  for  1,000  planes  a  day,  with  a 
labor  force  of  1,940  soldiers  working  in  three  eight- 
hour  shifts. 

An  expedient  adopted  in  November,  1917,  against 
all  traditional  practice  but  necessary  to  keep  up  the 
flow  of  wood  while  roads  and  tracks  were  being  built 
further  into  the  forest,  was  the  1 1  riving, ' '  or  splitting 
longitudinally  by  driving  in  wedges,  of  logs  cut  to 
the  proper  length.  Thus  trees  otherwise  wholly  in- 
accessible were  reached  and  the  rived  sections  taken 
out  where  the  whole  logs  could  not  have  been.  This 
system,  in  splitting  the  logs  lengthwise,  at  once  dis- 
closed any  bad  grain,  but  it  involved  a  wastage  of  70 
per  cent,  of  the  rest  of  the  tree,  which  had  to  be  left 
where  cut. 

Substitutes  for  spruce  were  also  adopted.  On  De- 
cember 26  fir,  which  is  heavier  and  stronger  but  more 
subject  to  splintering  than  spruce,  was  authorized  for 
all  training  planes  as  soon  as  available,  spliced  spruce 
being  used  in  the  meantime.  On  ^byn^yy  $r  1918. 
it  w^s_approvec[  fp^lh^JD 

155 


THE  AMERICAN  AIE  SERVICE 

except  for  the  interplane  struts,  wing  beams,  landing- 
gear  struts,  longerons  and  rudder  post,  and  on  March 
23  some  of  these  exceptions  were  abolished.  Again, 
on  April  24  several  other  kinds  of  woods  were  au- 
thorized, such  as  Port  Orford  cedar,  yellow  poplar, 
western  white  pine,  western  hemlock,  western  yellow 
pine,  ambilis  fir,  grand  fir,  noble  fir,  and  eastern 
white  pine. 

Kiln  drying  of  lumber  was  largely  developed. 
Whereas  before  the  war  weather  drying  had  required 
two  years  and  kiln  drying  had  caused,  in  the  case  of 
the  Curtiss  Company,  for  instance,  40  to  60  per  cent, 
rejection  of  lumber,  in  February  a  new  system  was 
ordered  installed  at  Vancouver  Barracks,  at  a  cost 
of  $350,000,  which  completely  obviated  these  difficul- 
ties. Beam  struts  were  finished  in  12  days,  and 
smaller  struts  in  seven.  The  decrease  in  weight  by 
one-third  of  wood  kiln-dried,  the  prevention  of  mould 
and  decay,  and  the  saving  of  space  caused  this  process 
to  be  suggested  for  all  shipments,  including  those  to 
the  Allies  overseas. 

Moreover,  transportation  problems  were  greatly 
simplified.  Previously  it  had  taken  60  to  190  days 
to  cross  the  continent,  and  in  many  cases  lumber  had 
piled  up  to  such  an  extent  that  the  mills  had  to  be 
closed.  The  policy  of  individual  car  shipments  was 
discontinued,  and  aircraft  shipments  were  consoli- 
dated with  other  Government  lumber  for  direct  ship- 
ment through  to  eastern  points  in  special  trains  on 
Government  priority.  The  time  of  transit  was  thus 
reduced  to  an  average  of  15  days.  At  the  same  time 
control  and  distribution  of  the  limited  car  supply 
was  also  assumed,  in  order  to  provide  a  just  distribu- 

156 


BEACHING  BACK  FOR  RAW  MATERIALS 


tion  of  cars  and  relieve  mills  of  congestion  with  com- 
mercial lumber. 

Throughout  the  Government  acted  as  general  pur- 
chasing agent  for  the  mills  and  operators  of  the  sec- 
tion. So  far  as  possible  the  equipment  required  by 
different  companies  was  standardized  to  expedite  pro- 
duction and  ordered  wholesale  on  Government 
priority.  What  this  work  was  may  be  seen  in  pur- 
chases up  to  June,  1918,  of  six  million  feet  of  wire 
rope,  200  miles  of  rails,  175  logging  engines,  10  tons 
of  wedge  steel,  and  innumerable  jacks,  steel  cranes, 
and  electric  motors. 

As  a  result  of  all  the  efforts  put  into  spruce  pro- 
duction the  following  shipments,  which  give  a  graphic 
idea  of  the  progress  of  increase,  were  made : 


Cars  of 
Spruce  and 
Fir  Shipped 

Spruce  Shipped 
by  Mills,  feet 

Fir  Shipped 
by  Mills,  feet 

1917: 
August 

9 

202,264 

September 

121 

2,638,329 

October 
November 
December 
1918: 
January 
February 
March 
April 

154 
245 

184 

242 
352 
471 

3,400,611 
3,212,325 
3,519,823 

3,507,290 
10,846,420 
9,317,929 
11,216,859 

43,006 

1,587,744 
1,344,053 

2,533,565 
7,178,136 
3,423,960 
5,404,000 

This,  in  brief,  is  the  story  of  spruce,  beginning  in 
labor  troubles,  lack  of  organization,  and  incompetent 
methods,  and  running  through  to  a  most  promising, 
though  not  yet  completely  satisfactory,  production. 
In  the  first  year  of  war  labor  trouble  had  been  wiped 

157 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

out  by  the  eight-hour  day  and  good  living  conditions ; 
the  scattered  operators  had  been  knit  together  under 
Government  direction;  Government  standards,  a 
cut-up  mill,  and  purchasing  facilities  had  been  estab- 
lished; 13,000  soldiers  had  been  set  to  work;  and  a 
production  of  11  million  feet  of  spruce  per  month,  or 
nearly  half  that  of  all  of  1916,  together  with  over  five 
million  feet  of  fir,  had  been  reached  in  the  single 
month  of  April,  1918. 

Next  most  serious  of  the  shortages  of  raw  materials 
was  that  in  linen,  the  only  fabric  discovered  abroad 
for  covering  the  wings  and  other  parts  of  airplanes 
that  combined  the  essential  qualities  of  lightness, 
strength,  resistance  to  tear  by  bullets,  and  affinity 
for  dope.  Practically  the  only  source  of  supply  was 
Ireland,  which  had  an  extensive  linen  industry  based 
on  flax  grown  there,  in  Belgium  and  in  Russia. 

Early  in  the  war,  on  May  5, 1917,  the  United  States 
began  negotiations  with  Great  Britain  to  secure  of 
this  Irish  linen  the  1,500,000  square  yards  required 
for  the  limited  programme  of  3,000  planes  then  con- 
templated. Great  Britain  at  that  time  had  been 
forced  by  the  growing  scarcity  of  linen  to  take  over 
the  whole  supply  and  allocate  it  among  the  Allies  in 
accordance  with  their  needs.  Under  this  arrange- 
ment the  United  States  was  allotted  its  proportion, 
the  initial  orders  being  placed  on  June  5.  At  first 
the  Government  tried  to  interfere  as  little  as  possible 
with  the  regular  linen  importers,  but  shortly  it  de- 
veloped that  indiscriminate  buying  abroad  was  not  de- 
sirable. Accordingly,  Peter  Fletcher,  representative 
in  England  of  a  leading  American  firm,  was  named 
as  representative  of  the  Government  and  the  trade. 

158 


BEACHING  BACK  FOR  RAW  MATERIALS 

Great  Britain  soon   afterwards   requested   that   the 
American   Government  itself,  instead  of  individua^/^ 
firms,  place  all  orders  through  Mr.  Fletcher  and  then 
allocate  the  shipments  as  it  saw  best  among  airplane 
manufacturers. 

By  July,  however,  the  linen  situation  had  taken  a 
more  serious  turn.  On  the  one  hand,  American  needs 
had  grown  with  the  new  programme  to  the  large 
figure  of  1,800,000  yards  for  the  six  months  ending 
December  31,  1917,  and  10,000,000  yards  for  the  year 
1918.  On  the  other  hand^  the  jratting_off jof  the 
Russian  flax  supply  by  the  revolution  and  a  series  of 
strikes  in  Ireland  greatly  reduced  the  supply  of  linen 
available,  so  that  shipments  became  more  and  more 
irregular.  It  became  apparent  that  some  substitute 
must  be  found,  especially  as  cables  in  December  re- 
quested the  use  of  substitutes  in  training  planes. 

Cotton  was  unquestionably  the  logical  choice,  but 
strangely  enough  neither  England  nor  France,  despite 
their  high  development  of  the  textile  art,  had  made 
any  advance  in  this  direction.  Both  nations  had 
developed  "fine  goods"  fabrics,  which  were,  of  course, 
wholly  unsuitable,  and  had  taken  the  first  steps  in 
mechanical  fabrics  with  typewriter  ribbons,  corset 
cloth,  and  automobile  tire  cloth.  There,  however,  they 
had  stopped.  A  purchase  of  40,007  yards  of  best 
British  cotton  fabric,  at  the  urgency  of  that  Govern- 
ment, proved  wholly  unfit  for  airplane  covering. 

Thus  the  Air  Service  was  confronted  with  the 
necessity  of  developing  a  suitable  airplane  cotton  from 
first  principles.  As  there  was  no  one  in  the  Signal 
Corps  who  had  any  special  knowledge  of  this  work, 
Albert  Tilt,  a  textile  expert,  was  commissioned  cap- 

159 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

tain  about  August  1,  1917,  to  have  it  in  charge. 
Considerable  progress,  it  was  discovered,  had  already 
been  made  in  experiments  conducted  for- over  a  year 
by  the  Bureau  of  Standards  and  the  National  Ad- 
visory Committee  for  Aeronautics.  Aided  by  the 
knowledge  already  gained  and  in  further  cooperation 
with  these  two  bodies,  the  Signal  Corps  began  a  series 
of  tests  of  various  fabrics  already  developed,  both  at 
Langley  Field  and  at  several  cotton  mills.  The 
problem  was  to  develop  a  cotton  fabric  lighter,  less 
liable  to  rip  or  become  loose  under  tension,  and  with  a 
greater  affinity  for  dope  and  varnish  than  any  of 
those  then  available.  One  fabric  after  another  was 
tested,  not  for  appearance  or  other  superficial 
features,  but  for  actual  tensile  strength,  durability 
under  exposure,  non-stretching  qualities,  and  the 
effects  of  surface  friction.  Gradually  the  desired 
characteristics  were  developed  one  after  another  un- 
til a  definite  foundation  of  experience  had  been 
built  up. 

The  knowledge  gained  from  all  these  experiments 
was  put  into  the  form  of  specifications,  and  the 
Ponemah  and  the  Pierce  Mills  were  induced  in  Sep- 
tember to  break  into  their  regular  work  to  turn  out 
10,000  yards  each,  with  the  Nashewena  Mills  added 
later.  On  September  15  $12,000  was  allotted  for 
experimental  work  in  conjunction  with  the  Bureau 
of  Standards  and  the  Department  of  Agriculture,  and 
a  corps  of  four  textile  experts  were  placed  at  the  mills 
to  conduct  spinning  tests  with  different  grades  of 
yarn.  Samples  as  fast  as  developed  were  placed  upon 
machines  at  Langley  Field  and  Pensacola  and  tested 
before  representatives  of  the  Allies  and  the  airplane 

160 


EEACHING  BACK  FOR  RAW  MATERIALS 

manufacturers,  who  agreed  that  highly  satisfactory 
results  were  obtained. 

At  last,  with  a  suitable  fabric  developed,  the  best 
mills  were  asked  to  submit  samples  according  to  speci- 
fications, and  on  October  11  the  first  quantity  orders 
were  placed  for  500,000  yards  among  five  mills  at  a 
price  from  55  to  62  cents  per  square  yard,  consider- 
ably less  than  the  cost  of  imported  linen.  On  Novem- 
ber 16  new  and  improved  specifications  were  issued 
and  orders  placed  for  1,000,000  yards,  and  three  more 
orders  followed  on  December  27  for  500,000  yards 
each.  Up  to  May  23,  1918,  the  great  %ureLJ^ 
15,933,600  yards  had  been  ordered  from  11  companies 
at  a  cost  of  about  $9,000,000.  A  total  of  1,875,877 
yards  had  been  delivered  to  that  date,  with  460,563 
yards  produced  in  the  final  week,  an  annual  pro- 
duction rate  of  23,000,000  yards.  Importations  of 
British  linen,  which  totaled  3,865,351  yards  by  June 
1,  were  no  longer  necessary,  so  that  it  may  be  said 
that  at  the  end  of  the  first  year  the  country  had  not 
only  met  all  its  needs  in  this  basic  element  of  the  air 
programme,  but  had  also  established  a  new  and  very 
economical  substitute  for  linen,  equal  in  all  respects 
and  superior  in  many,  costing  about  half  as  much, 
and  certain  of  having  a  very  large  peace-time  value. 

Another ^basie  material  alarmingly  short  was  air-H 
plane  dope,  a  varnish-like  composition  for  coating  The  / 
fabric  on  planes  to  give  it  a  smooth,  taut,  waterproof,/ 
non-inflammable  surface,  resistant  to  the  weather  and? 
also  to  oil  and  gasoline.     Under  the  great  demands* 
of  the  new  American  programme,  it  was  obvious  that 
the  supply,  which  had  been  short  even  for  the  Allies 
alone,   would   be   wholly   inadequate.      Indeed,   the 

161 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

situation  was  so  critical  that  a  call  was  sent  out  for 
meetings  of  manufacturers  and  representatives  of  the 
British  War  Mission  and  the  Bureau  of  Standards 
on  November  13  and  20,  1917,  which  developed  that 
only  106,000  long  tons  of  acetate  of  lime  was  avail- 
able  to  supply  not  alone  airplane  needs  of  the  Allies 
and  the  United  States,  but  also  the  Ordnance,  Navy, 
medical  and  other  departments'  requirements  of 
170,000  long  tons.  All  supplies  were  therefore  com- 
mandeered by  the  "War  Department  on  December  28. 

The  story  of  dope  is  largely  that  of  its  constituents, 
especially  acetate  of  lime,  for  which  no  substitute  was 
available.  The  supply  of  this  product,  generally 
made  with  methyl  alcohol  in  the  distillation  of  hard 
wood,  could  not  be  increased  by  existing  plants,  which 
were  already  being  run  at  capacity,  nor  by  building 
new  plants,  as  the  supply  of  cut  wood  was  largely 
exhausted  and  the  use  of  wet  or  artificially  dried  wood 
was  not  successful.  The  one  exception  to  this  rule 
was  the  Tennessee  Valley  Iron  and  Railroad  Com- 
pany, which  was  advanced  $1,102,000  to  build  a  new 
wood  distillery  where  the  charcoal  by-products  would 
be  a  permanent  asset  in  the  iron  industry  nearby. 

New  sources,  therefore,  were  imperative.  First 
projected  was  the  utilization  of  molasses,  alcohol  and 
vinegar  at  the  United  States  Industrial  Chemical 
plant  at  Baltimore,  originally  constructed  for  the 
British  but  not  operating  because  of  failure  to  agree 
on  terms.  Next  was  the  use  of  the  black  liquor  from 
pulp  mills  at  two  plants  to  be  erected  by  the  West 
Virginia  Pulp  and  Paper  Company  with  Government 
advances  of  $4,600,000.  Third  was  the  use  of  the 
waste  of  sawmills  at  a  plant  to  be  erected  by  the 

162 


REACHING  BACK  FOR  RAW  MATERIALS 

American  Wood  Reduction  Company  with  a  Govern- 
ment advance  of  $1,800,000.  Cotton-seed  hulls  and 
blighted  corn  were  also  developed  as  sources  of 
acetate. 

Other  dope  constituents  were  also  badly  needed, 
especially  acetic  anhydride,  glacial  acetic  acid,  and 
cellulose  acetate.  These  materials  were  manu- 
factured here  on  a  small  scale  wholly  inadequate  to 
meet  the  demand,  and  the  situation  required  investi- 
gation  of  very  technical  and  intricate  chemical  ' 
problems,  for  which,  fortunately,  some  of  the  very 
best  specialists  were  available.  On  December  21, 
1917,  a  meeting  of  representative  manufacturers  Was 
held,  and  various  other  steps  to  assure  the  necessary 
production  were  taken. 

By  May  25,  1918,  a  total  of  204,000  gallons  of  dope 
was  on  order  from  10  sources  created  by  the  Govern- 
ment at  a  cost  of  $7,520,000,  producing  acetate  of 
lime,  acetone,  methyl  alcohol,  glacial  acetic  acid, 
and  methylethylketone  acetate.  Up  to  that  time  .^ 
108,135  gallons  had  been  delivered,  with  a  total  for 
the  final  week  of  5,210  gallons,  an  annual  rate  of^. 
250,000  gallons.  In  the  week  ending  May  31,  40,760 
gallons  were  released  to  manufacturers,  and  84,000 
gallons  were  on  hand  to  meet  the  June  requirements 
of  80,000  gallons. 

Another  very  important  material  that  threatened 
to  run  short  was  castor  oil,  which  alone,  because  of  its 
not  being  affected  by  the  gasoline  slipping  into  the 
crankcase,  could  be  used  to  lubricate  rotary  airplane 
motors.  At  the  outset,  moreover,  it  was  expected 
that  castor  oil  would  be  used  in  the  Liberty  Motor 
also,  and. a  total  of  3,000,000  gallons  was  reported  to 

163 


THE  AMEEICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

Secretary  Baker  on  October  12,  1917,  as  necessary     , 
above  the  700,000  gallons  in  sight  up  to  July  1,  1918.  * 

Steps  were  immediately  taken  to  -safeguard  the 
available  supply  of  castor  oil  by  an  embargo  on  ex- 
portation and  prohibition  of  its  use  in  making  trans- 
parent soap  and  other  non-essentials.  All  that  could 
be  located  about  the  country  was  bought  up  at  a 
stated  day  and  hour,  roughly  190,000  gallons.  In 
November  an  unexpected  addition  was  secured 
through  the  purchase  of  1,200,300  gallons  of  the 
1917  Indian  crop  crushed  at  Hull,  England.  The 
greatest  step,  however,  was  the  decision  of  Novem- 
ber 2  to  plant  crops  of  castor  beans  sufficient  to 
produce  3,000,000  gallons.  Seeds  were  imported  by 
a  special  ship  which,  although  already  loaded  at 
Bombay,  India,  was  released  for  this  purpose  by 
Great  Britain  and  which  arrived  here  on  January  7. 
Arrangements  had  been  made  in  the  meantime  to 
plant  100,000  acres  to  castor  beans  in  this  country, 
the  Dominican  Republic,  Haiti  and  the  "West  Indies, 
at  a  guaranteed  price  of  $3.50  per  bushel.  Thus  an 
industry  which  had  previously  flourished  in  this  coun- 
try but  which  had  been  killed  by  cheaper  importations 
from  India  was  restored  on  land  ruined  for  cotton 
by  the  boll  weevil  or  in  orchards  planted  with  citrus 
trees. 

Later,  but  eventually  more  important,  appeared  the 
need  for  a  satisfactory  mineral-oil  lubricant. 
Strangely  enough  little  study  had  been  given  to  the 
subject  of  engine  lubricants,  and  the  practice  varied 
with  each  engine  and  manufacturer.  About  22 
different  oils  were  in  use  at  the  different  fields,  some 
of  them  worthless  after  five  to  10  hours'  run.  The 

164 


BEACHING  BACK  FOR  KAW  MATERIALS 

whole  question  of  lubrication  was  so  little  understood 
that  half  a  million  dollars  worth  of  planes  were  ruined 
by  defective  oil  at  Kelly  Field.  Hence  arose  the 
problem  of  developing  a  standardized  oil,  especially 
for  the  new  Liberty  Motor. 

An  oil  survey  of  all  standard  types  was  begun  on 
November  1,  under  direction  of  Captain  0.  J.  May, 
an  oil  expert,  who  supervised  37  engine  tests  in  25 
days  in  a  laboratory  supposed  to  have  about  half  that 
capacity.  From  these  tests,  and  from  advice,  sug- 
gestions and  records  supplied  by  all  oil  companies, 
present  practices  were  found  to  be  widely  varying, 
with  no  allowance  for  the  change  in  character  of 
oil  after  even  an  hour's  use.  Altitude  tests  in  par- 
ticular were  necessary,  and  these  were  made  in  a 
sealed  room  at  the  Bureau  of  Standards  from  which 
it  was  possible  to  exhaust  the  air  to  any  degree 
desired.  Here  Captain  May  stood  watch  for  65  con- 
secutive hours  without  sleep;  shortly  afterwards  he 
took  cold  and  gave  up  his  life  practically  from 
exhaustion. 

Captain  May's  work,  however,  survived  in  the  new 
"Liberty  Aero  Oil,"  shortly  announced  as  the  Gov- 
ernment standard.  It  was  based  on  the  necessity  of 
providing  a  lubricant  that  would  change  in  constitu- 
tion as  little  as  possible  through  the  absorption  of 
gasoline;  that  would  leave  the  engine  clean  and  well 
lubricated,  with  any  objectionable  carbon  of  a  loose 
and  flakey,  rather  than  a  hard  and  adhesive,  char- 
acter ;  and  that  would  be  capable  of  reclamation  and 
reuse  after  removal  nightly  from  the  engines.  It  was 
estimated  that  the  new  oil,  in  addition  to  giving  far 
greater  engine  efficiency,  would  save  millions  of 

165 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

dollars  through  its  use  in  the  engines  for  which  it 
was  available,  both  because  of  an  original  cost  one- 
quarter  that  of  castor  oil  and  because  of  the  fact  that 
50  per  cent,  of  it  could  be  reclaimed  and  reused. 

A  problem  far  more  complex  and  many-sided  was 
that  of  the  equipment,  instruments  and  accessories 
required  for  every  plane,  totaling  several  thousand 
dollars  in  cost  for  each.  These  included  the  instru- 
ments to  navigate  the  plane,  the  armament  to  make  it 
an  offensive  and  defensive  machine,  and  the  equip- 
ment to  enable  the  pilot  to  go  to  great  heights  and 
to  take  photographs  and  send  radio  messages.  When 
the  development  of  the  American  programme  began, 
practically  none  of  these  vital  accessories  was  being 
produced  here  in  quantity  and  most  of  them  were 
not  being  produced  at  all.  A  large  majority  were 
developed  from  'foreign  models,  which  in  turn  were 
constantly  changing  and  improving;  the  rest  were 
adapted  from  American  designs.  An  enormous 
amount  of  experimentation  was  therefore  necessary. 

In  navigating  instruments,  for  instance,  there  was 
the  tachometer  to  show  the  speed  of  the  propeller ;  the 
air-speed  indicator  to  show  the  speed  of  the  plane  in 
relation  to  the  air  rather  than  to  the  earth;  the  alti- 
meter to  show  the  height  above  the  ground;  the 
radiator  thermometer  to  show  the  temperature  of  the 
engine;  the  banking  indicator  to  show  the  plane's 
relation  to  the  horizontal ;  the  Aldis  sight  for  use  in 
firing  through  the  propeller;  and  the  airplane  com- 
pass, clock,  gasoline-  and  oil-pressure  gauges,  and 
lights  and  flares  for  night  flying.  For  the  pilot  there 
had  to  be  provided  apparatus,  helmets  and  tank  for 
oxygen  to  enable  him  to  go  above  15,000  feet  altitude, 

166 


THE     MOUNTING    OF    THE    CAMERA    ON    BRITISH     OBSERVATION     PLANES 


OBSERVER    IN    THE    "  CAMERA   OBSCURA "    USED    ON    BOMBING    PLANES,    IN 

WHICH,   BY   AN  ARRANGEMENT   OF   LENSES   AND  MIRRORS,   A  PANORAMA 

OF    EXTERNAL    OBJECTS    IS    PROJECTED    UPON    A    SHEET    OF 

WHITE     PAPER 


REACHING  BACK  FOR  RAW  MATERIALS 

safety  belts  to  keep  him  in  the  plane  during  acro- 
batics, and  electrically  heated  clothing  to  keep  him 
from  freezing  in  the  rarified  air.  For  radio  work 
were  needed  receiving,  transmitting,  combination,  and 
interphone  sets ;  and  for  aerial  photography,  observa- 
tion cameras,  enlarging  cameras,  camera  guns,  and 
unit-section  equipment.  For  offensive  work  were 
needed  three  types  of  machine  guns,  two  types  of 
interrupter  gears  for  firing  through  the  propeller, 
gun  mounts,  gun  sights,  gun  yokes,  and  other  acces- 
sories, as  well  as  two  types  of  incendiary  bombs,  six 
types  of  high-capacity  bombs,  two  other  types  of 
bombs,  and  six  types  of  bomb  sights  and  releases. 
This  armament,  as  it  happened,  was  provided  by  the 
Bureau  of  Ordnance. 

Very  early  it  was  realized  that  all  these  delicate 
instruments  and  accessories  must  be  standardized, 
and  the  Signal  Corps  took  over  their  supply  to  all 
airplane  makers,  thus  providing  one  center  of  pur- 
chase and  putting  an  end  to  the  disorganization  of 
the  market  by  the  Government  and  the  airplane 
manufacturers'  competing  against  each  other.  The 
Government  thus  established  a  monopoly  in  these 
lines,  selling  the  instruments  to  the  manufacturers 
at  cost  as  fast  as  planes  were  ready  for  them.  For- 
tunately, considerable  free  time  was  available  while 
the  planes  themselves  were  being  built,  which  allowed 
the  mobilization  of  resources  and  a  far  greater 
standardization  of  types  than  prevailed  in  Europe. 
By  the  end  of  the  first  year  quantity  production  had 
been  reached  for  the  simpler  instruments  and  was 
in  sight  for  the  more  advanced. 


167 


CHAPTER  X       . , 

THE   MANY-SIDED  PROBLEM   OF  ENGINES 

Engines  the  limiting  element  on  expansion  of  the  Air  Ser- 
vices—  Aviation-engine  manufacture  in -the. -United  States 
before  the  war  —  Engines  for  training  planes  —  The  OX5 
and  the  A7A  —  The  Hispano-Suiza  —  The  Gnome  and  the 
La  Rhone  —  Battle-plane  engines  the  heart  of  the  aviation 
problem  —  State  of  "design  at  the  time  the  United  States 
entered  the  war  —  Efforts  to  adapt  foreign  models  —  The 
Olerget  and  the  Lorraine-Dietrich  —  The  Bolls-Koyce  —  The 
Bugatti  —  The  project  for  an  all- American  high-powered 
motor  —  Reasons  for  its  adoption  — •  The  Liberty  JSlotor 
designed  —  The  first  unit  assembled  within  a  month  —  The 
motor  proved  in  tests  —  Choice  of  manufacturers  —  Diffi- 
culties of  manufacture  —  The  skilled-labor  problem  — 
Abandonment  of  the  eight-  and  adoption  of  the  12-cylinder 
type  —  Its  power  under  test  —  Production  estimates  and 
performance  —  Demands  of  foreign  Governments  and  other 
American  services  —  Causes  of  delays  in  production  — 
Changes  in  design  —  Exacting  and  rigid  specifications  — 
Difficulties  of  inspection  —  Lack  of  tools,  jigs  and  gauges 
—  Lack  of  coal  and  difficulties  of  transportation  —  De- 
velopment of  new  types  of  the  Liberty  —  Its  technical 
performance. 

All  through  the  war  the  great  limiting  element  on 
the  size  of  the  various  Air  Services  had  been  the 
difficulty  of  obtaining  satisfactory  aviation  engines 
in  quantity.  Where  it  required  six  months  jtp  put  a 
new  plane  without  engine  into  production,  it  required 
at  least  a  year  to  put  the  engine  itself  into  production. 
Moreover,  with  every  day  that  passed  the  difficulty 
increased  with  the  relentless  increase  in  power  de- 
manded of  airplane  engines. 

Up  to  the  time  when  America  entered  the  war,  the 
extremely  light,  very  powerful  aviation  engine  needed 
for  battle-plane  work  had  never  been  produced  in 

168 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  ENGINES 


this  country.  Four^^pani^v^fi-Hall-Scott  Com- 
pany, the  Curtiss  Aeroplane  and  Motor  Company,  the 
Wright-Martin  Company,  and  the  General  Vehicle 
Company,  had  produced  aviation  engines,  but  de- 
signed along  lines  of  durability  rather  than  great 
power  combined  with  lightness,  and  adaptable  there- 
fore only  to  training  planes.  The  problem,  there- 
fore,  was  a  double  one  —  first,  to  increase  enormously 
the  manufacture  of  existing  types  to  meet  the  greatly 
expanded  training  programme,  and  second,  either  to 
develop  here  or  adapt  from  abroad  a  wholly  new 
type  of  engine  for  battle-plane  work.  The  two  ele- 
ments of  the  problem  were  entirely  distinct  and 
should  not  be  confused. 

The  story  of  training-plane  engines  is  short,  but 
deserving  of  more  consideration  than  has  been  given 
it  in  the  concentration  of  thought  on  the  Liberty 
Motor.  At  the  very  first  meeting  of  the  Aircraft 
Production  Board,  on  May  18,  1917,  purchase  was 
recommended  of  700  Curtiss  0X5  90-horse  power 
engines  for  installation  in  the  JN-4D  plane,  followed 
on  May  24  by  the  recommendation  of  1,000  Hall- 
Scott  A7A  100-horse  power  engines  for  the  Standard 
SJ-1  planes.  These  two  planes,  as  it  happened,  had 
been  selected  as  the  best  immediately  available  for 
training,  and  as  they  had  been  especially  designed 
around  their  respective  engines,  the  engine  orders 
followed  automatically.  Additional  orders  were 
placed  with  these  two  companies  to  the  limit  of  their 
capacity,  and  new  sources  were  found  in  the  Nordyke 
and  Marmon  Company,  Willys-Overland,  Incorpo- 
rated, and  the  Wright-Martin  Company.  By  the  end 
of  thft-flnrt™yp*g*iM||j|  fntal  nf  795.Q  QX5  and  2.250 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

ATA  engines  had  been  ordered,  with  4,340  and  2,054, 
respectively,  delivered.  There  was  nothing  spectacu- 
lar" in  this  work,  but  it  represented  a  very  sound 
enlargement  of  facilities  which  made  possible  the 
whole  preliminary-training  programme  and  tided 
over  the  time  until  the  more  powerful  engines  could 
be  developed  and  put  into  manufacture. 

Another  engine,  used  for  advanced  training  and 
later  developed  into  higher  power  for  battle-plane^/ 
work,  was  the  Hispano-Suiza.  ThjL  HdgM-llartin 
Company  had  just  jeached  production,  on  the.J,50- 
horse  power  type  for  the  French  Government  wJien 
the  United  States  entered  the  war.  Some  time  was 
consumed  in  securing  a  waiver  of  the  French  patent 
rights,  but  as  soon  as  possible,  on  July  7,  1917,  an 
order  was  placed  for  500,  with  another  order  when 
the  French  contract  was  finished  on  October  1.  ,JfoL 
May  23,  1918,  3,500  had  been  ordered  and  1,685  de- 
livered for  use  in  advanced  training  planes,  where 
greater  power  was  needed  than  could  be  developed  by 
the  lighter  engines. 

Two  other  types  of  this  engine  were  also  developed 
during  the  first  year  but  not  produced  in  quantity. 
First  was  the  180-horse  power  engine  for  advanced 
training,  of  which  3,000  were  authorized,  and  second, 
the  300-horse  power  engine,  of  which  300  were 
ordered  for  lighter  battle-plane  work  than  that  of  the 
Liberty  Motor.  The  first  two  experimental  engines  of 
the  second  type  proved  successful  and  promised  well 
for  the  series.  Work  on  the  Hispano-Suiza  through- 
out, however,  was  handicapped  by  lack  of  data  from 
France  and  the  differences  in  metallurgical  practice. 

Here  also  should  be  mentioned  two  other  engines, 
170 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  ENGINES 

the  Gnome  and  the  Le  Rhone,  both  100-horse  power 

rotary  motors.  These  the  Allies  asked  shortly  after 
our  entry  into  the  war  to  have  manufactured  here 
for  them  for  use  in  advanced-training  planes  and 
light  speed-scouts.  American  manufacturers,  how- 
ever, were  loath  to  manufacture  the  rotary  type  of 
engine  as  they  considered  it  impracticable  and  had 
seen  every  one  who  tried  it  lose  money.  The  General 
Vehicle  Company,  as  a  single  exception,  had  been 
producing  90-horse  power  Gnomes  on  a  small  scale, 
and  the  General  Motors  Company  was  induced  after 
much  argument  to  combine  with  them  to  manufacture 
5,000  of  this  type.  Just  then  General  Pershing 
cabled  that  they  were  no  longer  needed,  and  as  a 
result  the  combination  was  broken  up.  The  General 
Vehicle  Company,  however,  as  the  only  organization 
skilled  in  this  work,  was  kept  intact  for  a  time  by 
small  orders,  and  later,  when  financially  embarrassed, 
it  was  practically  bought  up  by  the  Government  for 
about  $1,500,000.  Up  to  Mav_23.  1918.  mtotal  of  24g 
100-horse  power  engines  had  been  ordered  and  177 
delivered,  and  work  had  been  begun  on  100  110- 
horse  power  engines  for  use  in  the  Thomas-Morse 
single-seater  pursuit-training  plane. 

The  Le  Rhone  had.  a  more  checkered  career.  Three 
times  the  Union  Switch  and  Signal  Company  agreed 
to  take  an  order  for  2,500  and  each  time  asked  to  be 
excused.  At  last,  in  September,  1917,  they  set  to 
work,  but  with  very  incomplete  drawings  and  such 
inaccurate  metal  specifications  that  a  complete  new 
analysis  had  to  be  made.  Production  had  just  begun 
by  May  23,  1918,  with  every  promise  that  it  would 
soon  become  appreciable  and  allow  a  considerable 

171 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

margin  over  what  were  needed  for  the  Thomas-Morse 
scouts  to  be  shipped  overseas. 

We  now  come  to  the  battle-plane  engine  situation, 
the  heart  of  the  aviation  problem,  a  tangle  of  romance, 
extreme  technique,  abuse  and  praise,  practically  never 
as  yet  explained  in  full.  Around  this  one  element 
surged  the  great  American  hopes  and  the  whole  public 
discussion  of  the  Air  Service.  Probably  not  for  a 
generation  will  all  the  scattered  pieces  be  fitted  into 
the  true  mosaic  of  history. 

The  entry  of  the  United  States  into  the  war  found 
the  aviation  engine  just  ready  to  break  forth  into  a 
great  development.  Whereas  in  August,  1914,  80 
horse  power  had  been  the  maximum,  two  engines 
had  by  now  developed  275  horse  power  and  for  the 
engines  being  planned  400  horse  power  was  antici- 
pated. Nothing  at  the  time,  however,  approached 
that  power.  Of  the  existing  battle-plane  engines,  the 
Hispano-Suiza  150-horse  power  was  being  produced  ~'.v-'- 
in  the  largest  numbers,  while  the  200-horse  power 
type  was  as  yet  unproved.  The  Clerget  130-horse 
power  rotary  motor  was  well  spoken  of, .and .the_Boils- 
Royce  275-horse  powrer  and  the  Lorraine-Dietrich 
270-horse  power  engines  were  in  small  production. 
Obviously,  this  situation  was  not  promising  in  view 
of  the  repeated  cables  that  engines  developing  400 
to  500  horse  power  were  needed.  Moreover,  18 
months  was  estimated  as  necessary  to  redraw 
European  designs  and  begin  production  in  American 
factories,  for  the  fine  hand  tooling  abroad  was  entirely 
different  from  standardized  machine  work  here, 
especially  as  foreign  specifications  did  not  express  the 
European  system  of  "tolerances." 

172 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  ENGINES 

Nevertheless,  steps  were  taken  at  once  to  put  these 
foreign  types  into  production.  The  Hispano-Suiza, 
already  on  order  for  France  at  the  Wright-Martin 
Company,  was  increased  to  capacity.  Negotiations 
were  entered  into  with  the  French  for  patent  rights 
of  the  Clerget  and  the  Lorraine-Dietrich,  which  it 
required  until  June  30,  1917,  to  unravel.  When  at 
last  the  Clerget  blueprints  and  specifications  were 
received  here,  they  were  so  incomplete  that  satis- 
factory results  could  not  be  promised;  by  that  time 
also  the  low-powered  motor  had  become  even  more 
out  of  date,  and  adequate  arrangements  had  been 
made  to  have  the  Gnome  and  the  Hispano-Suiza  made 
here  and  other  motors  bought  abroad.  The  Lorraine- 
Dietrich  also  was  delayed  until  it  was  replaced  by 
the  Liberty  Motor. 

This  leaves  the  Rolls-Royce,  the  only  high-powered 
motor  immediately  available,  which  it  was  endeavored 
by  every  possible  effort  to  have  developed  here. 
Claude  Johnson,  General  Manager  of  Rolls-Royce, 
Incorporated,  and  a  half  a  dozen  of  their  foremost 
officials  were  received  here,  offered  one  of  the  best 
automobile  plants,  and  encouraged  in  every  possible 
way.  During  the  summer  of  1917,  however,  the 
Liberty  Motor  with  all  its  capacity  for  quantity  pro- 
duction was  proved,  while  the  Rolls-Royce  offered  an 
output  of  only  2,000  engines  a  year  beginning  eight 
months  off.  Consequently,  on  September  22,  a 
decision  was  reached  not  to  include  the  Rolls-Royce 
with  its  expense  of  $15,000,000  to  $20,000,000  in  the 
American  programme,  but  to  afford  all  facilities  for 
its  independent  manufacure  here  if  desired. 

One  other  foreign  high-powered  motor  must  be 
173 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

mcntionedjto  show  that  the  United ..  States_did  not 

pin  its  whole  faitli  to  the  Liberty  Motor.  That  was 
the  Bugatti,  a  16-cylinder,  1,075-pound,  500-horse 
power  engine  just  completing  experiments  in  France, 
the  machine  introducing  the  novel  feature  of  a  1.25- 
inch  cannon  firing  through  the  propeller.  Rights 
to  this  engine  were  secured,  a  sample  was  sent  over, 
and  2,000  were  ordered  from  the  Duesenberg  Motor 
Corporation.  The  niotor^hojvveyer^  was  jound_to  be 
nowhere  near  so  thoroughly  proved  as  it  was  under- 
stood to  be,  and  wholesale  changes  in  design,  some  of 
them  fundamental,  were  necessary.  By  the  end  of 
the  year  1917  the  greater  part  of  this  work  had  been 
done  and  production  was  expected  to  begin  on  a  small 
scale  within  a  short  time. 

Now  comes  the  Liberty  Motor,  the  central  hope  of 
the  Air  Service's  friends  and  the  storm  center  of  its 
enemies,  a  venture  truly  American  in  its  fearlessness, 
its  speculativeness,  its  publicity,  and  eventually  its 
carrying  through.  Offering  in  theory  the  one  means 
of  winning  the  war  through  the  air,  it  was  surrounded 
with  the  possibility  of  desperate  failure  and  of  certain 
condemnation.  Nevertheless,  its  very  boldness  of 
conception  assured  it  the  support  of  all  elements 
pledged  to  win  the  war. 

The  United  States,  faced  by  the  double  necessity 
of  developing  engines  of  much  greater  horse  power 
and  enormously  greater  volume  of  production  than 
ever  before  attained,  dedicated  itself  in  the  first  six 
weeks  of  the  war  to  the  attempt  to  develop  a  stand- 
ardized high-powered  motor  capable  of  infinite  repro- 
duction. The  reasons  were  undeniably  cogent  once 
the  possibility  of  success  was  admitted.  The  Allies 

174 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  ENGINES 

had  allowed  their  manufacturers  to  scatter  with  60 
different  engines  and  had  arrived  nowhere;  the 
Germans  had  concentrated  largely  on  one  and  had 
achieved  good-sized  production.  The  United  States 
as  a  Government  could  assemble  for  the  designers  the 
best  of  all  foreign  and  domestic  experience,  unavail- 
able for  the  usual  commercial  competitive  methods 
and  practically  unknown  here.  Moreover,  the  de- 
signing of  a  new  motor  here  could  be  carried  out  more 
quickly  than  the  adaptation  of  an  existing  foreign 
engine  with  all  the  differences  in  design  and  manu- 
facture. The  repair  problem  across  the  ocean  could  be 
met  only  by  standardized,  interchangeable  parts,  and 
horse  power  could  be  increased  over  the  150  maximum  , 
here  and  the  275  maximum  in  Europe  to  the  400  de- 
manded only  by  the  pooling  of  all  resources  and 
knowledge  in  one  supreme,  all-American  effort. 

Colonels  Deeds  and  Waldon  had  just  arrived  at 
this  conclusion  when  two  of  the  country's  foremost 
aeronautical  engineers  arrived  in  Washington.  J.  G. 
Vincent,  who  in  the  three  years  since  the  spring  of 
1914  had  developed  at  an  expense  of  about  $400,000 
a  successful  242-horse  power  aviation  engine  for  the 
Packard  Motor  Car  Company,  had  come  to  propose 
a  standardized  motor.  E.  J.  Hall,  of  the  Hall-Scott 
Company,  which  had  developed  the  aviation  motor 
of  that  name,  brought  a  wide  practical  experience 
and  a  complete  knowledge  of  foreign  engines.  As  it 
happened,  these  two  men  had  never  met.  At  once, 
however,  the  four  motor  experts  got  together,  and  on 
May  29,  1917,  the  proposal  of  a  standardized,  ail- 
American  motor  was  discussed  at  a  formal  conference 
with  General  Squier  and  others.  Two  days  later  the 

175 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

two  engineers  presented  detailed  proposals  to  the  Air- 
craft Production  Board  and  the  Joint  Army  and 
Navy  Technical  Board,  which  immediately  approved 
the  project.  Thereupon  Hall  and  Vincent  shut  them- 
selves up  in  Colonel  Deeds'  suite  in  the  Hotel  Willard 
for  five  days  of  uninterrupted  designing,  at  the  end 
of  which,  on  June  4,  they  brought  out  finished  plans 
of  the  so-called  Liberty  Motor. 

On  June  6  the  sum  of  $250,000  was  requested  by 
the  Aircraft  Production  Board  to  carry  on  this  de- 
velopment, and  by  June  30  a  force  of  30  draftsmen 
had  been  collected  from  the  various  automobile  manu- 
facturers, without  charge,  and  set  to  work  at  the 
Bureau  of  Standards.  Suggestions  and  criticism 
were  freely  given  by  many  engine  specialists,  and 
trade  secrets  and  processes  were  readily  divulged  in 
the  striving  for  a  perfect  mechanism.  As  fast  as 
designs  for  parts  were  ready,  orders  for  their  im- 
mediate manufacture  were  sent  to  12  different  plants 
best  equipped  to  turn  them  out.  By  July  3,  28  days  . 
after  the  drawings  were  begun,  these  parts  had  been 
assembled  at  the  Packard  plant  in  Detroit  into  the 
first  eight-cylinder  model,  and  shipped  on  to  Wash- 
ington by  special  car  in  charge  of  four  young  men  in 
the  record  time  of  21  hours. 

This  engine  was  a  composite  of  the  best  proved 
elements  of  engine  design,  with  nothing  new  or  experi- 
mental included.  Blueprints  of  all  foreign  and 
domestic  motors  and  the  experience  of  the  British, 
French  and  Italian  representatives  as  well  as  Ameri- 
can manufacturers  were  freely  available.  The_ 
Packard  engine  was  strongly  represented  in  the 
c}Tlinder,  cam  shaft,  and  wa5rT)elt;  the  Hall-Scott  _, 

176 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  ENGINES 

in  the  cam-shaft  drive,  pistons,  jDrj^eller  hub,  bore, 
andTstroke ;  and  other  types  in  various  other  features. 
Almost  from  the  outset  there  has  been  dispute  over 
the  credit  for  the  main  inspiration  for  the  motor 
which  bids  fair  to  increase  in  intensity  with  its 
success. 

The  preliminary  designing,  however,  was  but  the 
beginning.  The  exhaustive  series  of  tests  which  was 
to  follow  proved  out  the  principles  of  the  engine 
even  beyond  hope,  while  necessitating,  of  course,  some 
changes  in  details.  Tests  in  August  at  10,000  feet 
altitude  at  the  summit  of  Pike's  Peak,  in  snow,  rain, 
wind,  and  hail,  and  in  a  special  chamber  of  rarified 
air  at  the  Bureau  of  Standards  showed  no  weakness  ^ 
at  high  altitudes.  On  July  23  the  first  standardized 
eight-cylinder  unit  was  run  at  the  Packard  plant,  and 
on  August  29  the  first  flight  with  a  Liberty  Motor 
was  made;  this  first  airplane  installation  later  broke 
the  American  altitude  record. 

About,: this- time  arose  the  question  of  the  choice  of 
manufacturers.  Obviously  the  extreme  accuracy  re- 
quired precluded  the  employment  of  any  concerns 
but  those  possessing  the  largest  capacity  and  the  most 
skilled  organization,  and  these,  for  the  very  reason 
of  their  success,  were  loath  to  leave  a  safe  for  a  very 
uncertain  field.  Nevertheless,  contracts  with  the 
Packard  Motor  Car  Company,  the  Lincoln  Motor  Cor- 
poration, and  the  Nor  dyke  and  Marmon  Company 
were  placed  on  September  1,  the  first  of  a  total  of 
20,500  contracted  for  by  November  1,  and  the  assem- 
bly of  tools,  jigs  and  gauges  begun. 

The  quality  of  the  companies  selected  is  interesting. 
The  Packard  Company,  which  had  been  doing  experi- 

177 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

mental  work  in  aeronautics  for  three  years,  bore  the 
brunt  of  the  final  experimenting.  The  Lincoln  Motor 
Corporation  had  been  organized  and  built  its  factory 
within  three  months  through  the  interest  of  Henry  M. 
Leland,  who  had  developed  the  Cadillac  car.  The 
Ford  Motor  Company  had  a  capacity  for  quantity 
production  unequalled  in  the  world,  as  well  as  a 
special  cylinder  process.  The  Nordyke  and  Marmon 
Company  were  proved  motor  manufacturers,  and  the 
Trego  Motors  Corporation  had  had  experience  in 
heavy  aviation-motor  experiments.  In  addition  many 
other  standard  companies  were  engaged  on  parts.  J[t_ 
is  not  extreme  to  say  that  the  best  mptor-manuf  actur- 
ing  facilities  in  the  United  States  were  enrolled. 

That  this  was  essential  is  shown  by  the  fact  that 
even  these  companies  required  at  least  a  month  to 
become  proficient  in  the  final  assembly  and  test.  The 
first  six  motors  turned  out  by  the  Packard  Company 
developed  a  tightness  of  fit  that  caused  the  parts  to 
jam  and  break  the  engines  beyond  repair,  and  the 
same  thing  happened  with  the  first  four  Lincoln  en- 
gines. The  operatives  required  much  training  to 
appreciate  the  fine  degree  of  adjustment  necessary, 
and  the  work  became  practically  a  tool-room  job,  re- 
quiring the  most  highly  skilled  labor,  rather  than  an 
ordinary  production  job  using  ordinary  mechanics. 
This  condition  greatly  discouraged  the  manufacturers, 
and  it  was  met  only  by  establishing  special  training 
courses  for  workmen. 

The  labor  supply,  moreover,  had  been  seriously 
drained.      The  draft,  voluntary  enlistment,  and  the/ 
sudden  demands  of  the  new  munitions  plants  brought 
about  as  early  as  September  a  threatening  shortage 

178- 


THE    LIBERTY    MOTOR    AT    THE    SUMMIT    OF    PIKE  S    PEAK    FOR    ITS    FIRST 
ALTITUDE    TEST,    AUGUST,    1917 


OUTDOOR   TEST    SHED   AT    THE    LIBERTY    MOTOR    PLANT    OF    THE    NORDYKE 
AND    MARMON    COMPANY,    APRIL,   1918 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  ENGINES 

in  skilled  toolmakers,  patternmakers  and  machine- 
tool  operators  which  held  up  the  work  appreciably. 
The  withdrawal  of  one  man  from  an_engjne  factory 
may  involve  a  wholly  disproportionate  loss  and 
weaken  the  whole  organization.  At  one  time  it  was 
feared  that  Detroit  would  be  stripped  of  its  essential 
laborers,  and  recourse  was  had  to  releasing  skilled 
men  already  in  military  service.  By  the  end  of  the 
first  year  a  complete  system  of  industrial  exemptions 
was  being  established  so  that  the  Air  Service  might 
not  be  unnecessarily  crippled  in  its  weakest  element. 
With  the  placing  of  the  first  contracts  began  the 
long,  hard,  uphill  road  to  actual  production.  It  was 
not  as  though  these  companies  could  begin  work  at 
once  in  turning  out  Liberty  Motors ;  instead  they  had 
first  to  go  far  back  and  assemble  the  tools,  jigs, 
gauges,  materials,  and  skilled  labor  for  the  work  and 
greatly  enlarge  their  plant  facilities.  MejjiwJiilfi 
also  changes  in  design  were  found  necessary  in 
further  experiments,  which  appreciably  delayed  the 
progress  towards  production.  The  most  vital  change 
of  all  was  the  abandonment  in  early  December  of  the 
eight-cylinder  type  of  the  motor  in  favor  of  the  12. 
This  resulted  from  a  cable  from  General  Pershing  of 
July  13  and  the  relentless  demands  for  increased 
horse  power,  together  with  the  fact  that  the  12- 
cylinder  type  best  suited  the  planes  actually  assigned 
to  production.  Nevertheless,  it  considerably  upset 
the  manufacturers,  as  the  eight-cylinder  type  was  sim- 
pler and  was  well  along  towards  beginning  produc- 
tion. The  decision  had  to  be  changed  about  10 
months  later  when  the  need  for  this  intermediate 
power  developed. 

179 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

The  first  experimental  12,  completecLjm  August  13,_,. 

official 


passed  the  50-hour  test  on  August  25  with  the 
report  that  "the  design  had  passed  frpm  the  experi- 
mental stage  to  the  field  of  proven  engines/'  The 
test  was  in  a  series  of  runs,  the  last  two  of  10  hours 
each,  with  no  stops  during  runs  and  no  adjustments 
between  them.  The  mojxir--4eyelopjed^l4-318  horse 
power  and  was  plainly  capable  of  an  appreciable  in- 
crease, which  a  month  later  was  estimated  to  be  to 
445  horse  power.  On  October  21  the  first  flight  of 
the  12  was  made  with  much  satisfaction  in  a  Curtiss 
fl}dng  boat,  and  on  October  29  it  was  flown  in  a  De 
Haviland-4,  an  American-designed  and  American- 
built  motor  in  an  American-reproduced  plane. 

After  this  sensationally  quick  start  came  months  of 
inconspicuous,  unseen  organization  and  upbuilding  of 
plants,  with  further  perfecting  of  the  motor.     J?he 
first^ciiedulesjof^produetion  were  found  to  have  beena 
over-optimistic  and  the  date  of  quantity  production^ 
was  further  and  further  postponed.      On  November 
1,  1917,  for  instance,  it  wasestimated  that  55  engines     ~ 
would  be  turned  out  in  that  month,  280  in  December^/ 
725  in  January,  1918,  1,250  in  March,  2,310  in  April, 
and  4,800  in  May.     This_gayjB-a-total-to  June  1  of 
9,420,  whereas  as  a  matter  of  fact  the  total  production 
to  May  25,  1918; ;  was  but  1,110. 

The  development,  although  slower  than  expected, 
was  not  the  less  substantial  and  progressive.  On  De- 
cember 8  the  Packard  Company  turned  out  its  first 
two  machine-made  motors;  on  January  30,  1918,  the 
Lincoln  Corporation  turned  out  its  first,  and  from 
then  on  progress  was  steady.  On  January  10,  in 
answer  to  alarming  rumors  abroad  that  the  motor 

180 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  ENGINES 

was  a  failure,  three  Liberties  were  shipped  overseas, 
followed  at  intervals  by  others  for  demonstration 
purposes  and  for  the  design  of  planes  to  carry  them 
when  quantity  production  should  be  reached. 

All  this  time  foreign  Governments  were  seeking 
contracts  for  delivery  of  the  motor  in  large  numbers, 
for  their  plane  capacity  far  exceeded  their  engine 
capacity.  Italy  asked  for  2,000  in  November,  later 
raising  it  to  3,000,  and  England  asked  for  300  on  De- 
cember 14,  also  later,  on  January  23,  1918,  raising 
it  to  3,000.  France  likewise  was  in  the  market, 
though  awaiting  final  tests  before  actually  contract- 
ing. The  Navy  Department  on  September  27  called 
for  7,000  motors  for  its  heavy  seaplanes  in  anti- 
submarine work,  and  the  Bureau  of  Ordnance  wanted 
over  1,000  for  its  tanks.  Early  in  the  production 
work,  therefore,  it  became  evident  that  the  demands 
would  be  far  greater  than  those  of.  the  American  Air 
Service  alone. 

The  delays  in  production  that  were  to  come  were 
consequently  all  the  more  aggravating.  To  try  to 
enumerate  them  all,  to  explain  them,  and  to  show 
their  inevitableness  would  in  itself  require  a  volume 
which  would  be  so  technical  as  to  baffle  all  but  the 
engineer.  The  most  important  fact  to  bear  in  mind, 
perhaps,  is  that  they  depended  upon  no  one  major 
reason  or  line  of  reasons,  but  rather  upon  a  general 
combination,  including  broadly  both  technical  prob- 
lems of  design  and  industrial  problems  of  manu- 
facture. 

A  number  of  changes  in  design  startling  to  the 
layman  but  not  at  all  surprising  to  the  engineer  who 
has  seen  a  new  motor  in  its  growing  pains  undoubt- 

181 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 


edly  was  one  large  cause.      The  Packard 
for   instance,    reported   that   there   had   been    1,022  /  x- 
changes  between  September  4,  1917,  and  February  9, 
1918.      The  Ford  Company  reported  949  changes  to 
March  21,  some  parts  being  modified  six  or  seven 
times,  until  they  felt  justified  in  saying  that  future  ; 
changes  would  be  ignored  and  that  "we  are  going  to  \ 
shut  our  eyes  and  produce  as  we  stand  equipped  \ 
today."      This  succession   of   changes,   they  wrote, 
1 '  raises  havoc  with  the  morale  of  our  subcontractors, '  ' 
so  that  "it  would  be  suicide  to  put  across  any  more." 
Nevertheless,  it  was  admitted  that  improvements  were 
constantly  effected  by  these  changes. 

A  large  number  of  the  changes  were  found  in 
continued  experiments  vitally  necessary  to  improve 
performance,  facilitate  manufacture,  correct  clerical 
errors,  and  widen  material  specifications ;  and  an  even 
larger  number  were  suggested  by  the  manufacturers 
themselves  as  their  experience  in  production  increased. 
The  experience  wholly  new  to  American  industry  was 
early  presented  of  all  the  different  manufacturers 
getting  together  in  weekly  conferences,  aiding  and 
making  suggestions  to  each  other,  and  offering  im- 
provements in  design  or  methods  of  manufacture. 
Undoubtedly  the  concentrated  thought  and  effort  of 
these  actual  leaders  of  industry  not  only  spurred 
on  the  actual  development  of  the  motor,  but  also  made 
it  distinctly  an  ail-American  rather  than  a  wholly 
governmental  product. 

The  specifications,  especially  for  steel,  were  felt  by 
the  manufacturers  to  have  been  made  unnecessarily 
rigid,  but  in  this  connection  it  must  be  remembered 
that  an  engine  more  delicate  than  any  ever  before 

182 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  ENGINES 

built  was  required,  and  that  it  was  better  to  lean  to 
the  side  of  safety  rather  than  of  speed  of  production. 
Undoubtedly,  as  knowledge  and  skill  came  with  ex- 
perience, it  would  be  found  possible  to  ameliorate 
many  of  these  requirements  and  considerably  ac- 
celerate production,  but  at  the  start  it  was  deemed 
best  to  take  no  chances.  The  inspection  of  the  ma- 
terials and  of  the  finished  motors  also  presented  diffi- 
culties, for  there  was  in  the  United  States  no  skilled 
force  capable  of  doing-  this  painstaking  and  judicial 
work.  The  manufacturers  charged  that  they  were 
being  held  up  by  incompetent,  impractical  inspectors 
with  conflicting  judgments  and  changing  opinions. 
This  difficulty  also  was  largely  unavoidable  in  the 
general  confusion  and  shortage  of  skilled  men. 

One  of  the  most  serious  causes  of  delay  at  the  start 
was  the  lack  of  all  the  tools,  jigs  and  gauges  essential 
to  the  work.  Indeed,  it  was  estimated  that  produc- 
tion was  held  up  50  per  cent,  by  this  cause.  Before 
the  intricate  parts  of  the  motor  could  be  turned  out, 
an  immense  amount  of  the  most  accurate  machinery 
had  to  be  brought  together  and  adjusted.  That  ma- 
chinery could  not  be  hurried  but  had  to  be  developed 
with  the  utmost  care.  All  through  the  first  year 
shortages  arose  in  various  lines,  notably  in  thread 
gauges,  which  could  be  secured  only  slowly  and  with 
the  utmost  difficulty.  Trouble  was  experienced  also 
with  cylinder  grinders,  water  jackets,  spark  plugs, 
and  insulators,  which  well  illustrates  how  far  back  into 
industry  such  manufacture  must  reach. 

During  the  winter  months  of  1917-18  the  coal  short- 
age and  transportation  difficulties  caused  loss  of  time. 
Delay  in  receiving  special  alloy  steels  and  other  funda- 

183 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 


mental  materials  was  marked  during  the 
gestionT^airS^ariiimber  of  plants  were  closed  or  crip- 
pled "by  lack  of  coal  or  gas  under  the  order  shutting 
down  non-war  factories.  Here  again  the  actual  loss 
is  difficult  to  figure,  but  undoubtedly  it  was  serious. 

Despite  these  and  other  causes  of  delay,  however,  a 
great  industrial  foundation  began  gradually  to  form, 
and  attention  was  turned  to  other  types  of  the  Liberty. 
It  was  apparent  that  the  12-cylinder  could  not  supply 
all  engine  needs  for  all  types  of  planes,  that  it  was  too 
heavy  for  the  single-seater  speed-scout,  and  later  that 
it  would  be  surpassed  in  power  by  engines  then  in  the 
development  stage.  Consequently  a  series  of  experi- 
ments were  carried  on  until  six  different  types  of 
Liberties  were  in  contemplation.  By  mid-April  of 
1918  two  sample  four-cylinder  engines  had  been 
built  and  proved  successful  ;  two  sample  six-cylinders, 
especially  for  a  series  of  engines  for  heavy  bombers, 
had  been  ordered;  the  eight-cylinder  was  again  in 
development  thought  felt  to  be  difficult  to  build  a 
plane  about  ;  and  besides  the  12-cylinder  direct-drive, 
two  geared  and  one  duplex  12-cylinders  had  been 
built,  both  to  develop  over  500  horse  power.  Thus 
the  Liberty  principle  bade  fair  to  answer  a  series  of 
widely  different  requirements  on  a  standardized, 
quantity-production  basis  with  a  single  stream  of 
repair  parts. 

During  the  first  year,  moreover,  the  technical  de- 
velopment had  been  very  gratifying.  Rated  at  314 
horse  power  in  the  initial  tests,  the  12-cylinder  Lib- 
erty had  risen  to  395  in  October  and  to  450  at  1,800 
revolutions  per  minute  by  May,  1918.  This,  with  a 
weight  of  825  pounds,  gave  a  power  of  1.8  horse 

184 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  ENGINES 

power  per  pound,  ^«>Jn£LjJ]£j^ibfir*y-  .-thft...l%hiflgf. 
engine  per  horse  power  in  the  world.  The  fuel  con- 
sumption of  0.5  pound  per  horse  power  was  also  very 
low.  During  the  year'  serious  troubles  in  ignition, 
radiation,  carburation,  and  lubrication  were  over- 
come; the  latter  required  a  let-up  in  production  for 
over  a  week  in  March  and  the  substitution  of  a  forced- 
feed  for  a  scupper  system. 

It  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  the  Liberty  Motor 
by  the  end  of  the  first  year  had  proved  itself  by 
every  test  it  was  possible  to  put  it  to  in  this  country. 
Despite  the  storm  which  beat  about  it,  the  manu- 
facturers who  were  making  it  and  the  foreign  Gov- 
ernments who  were  relying  upon  it  stood  strongly  to 
its  support.  Within  less  than  12  months  quantity 
production  of  an  engine  developing  over  400  horse 
power  had  been  achieved  and  a  rate  of  output  reached 
five  times  that  of  the  Rolls-Royce  with  only  a  small 
part  of  the  organization  in  production.  The  first 
needs  of  the  Army  and  the  Navy  had  been  met  and 
the  first  motors  sent  to  the  Allies  overseas.  Mr.  Ryan, 
who  was  later  to  take  over  all  this  work,  said : '  *  There 
is  no  motor  on  either  side  that  compares  with  it." 

Perhaps  the  story  of  the  Liberty  Motor  may  best 
be  closed  by  the  proud  telegram  from  the  Packard 
and  Lincoln  companies  to  President  Wilson  on  May 
17,  less  than  12  months  after  the  first  conference : 

We  announce  with  solemn  thankfulness  that  yesterday 
marked  the  completion  and  shipment  of  the  first  thousand 
Liberty  engines.  The  period  of  essential  preparation  is 
bearing  fruit.  Within  the  year,  designs  have  been  com- 
pleted, equipment  provided,  the  motor  perfected,  and  quan- 
tity production  achieved. 

185 


CHAPTER  XI 

THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  PLANE  CONSTRUCTION 

Training  and  battle  planes  two  distinct  elements  in  the  problem 
of  planes  —  Primary-training  planes  —  The  Curtiss  JN-4D 
and  the  Standard  J-l  —  Advanced-training  planes  —  Adap- 
tation of  the  JN.-4D —  The  Thomas-Morse  scout  —  Battle 
and  bombing  planes  —  Reasons  for  the  discrepancy  between 
expectation  and  accomplishment  in  their  production  —  Lack 
of  technical  knowledge  —  Difficulties  of  communication  — 
Lack  of  manufacturing  facilities  —  Unexpected  intricacy  of 
the  work  —  The  best  Allied  planes  chosen  for  American 
reproduction  —  The  Spad  —  The  De  Haviland  the  mainstay 
of  the  American  programme  —  Preliminary  experiments 
and  organization  of  manufacture  —  Complications  between 
types  * f  4 ' '  and  ' '  9 ' '  —  Optimism  and  disappointments  in 
regard  to  production  —  The  first  De  Haviland-4's  ordered 
overseas  —  The  manifold  problems  of  equipment  —  Produc- 
tion of  ' '  4  's ' '  at  the  end  of  the  first  year  —  Defects  of  the 
early  planes  —  Continued  development  of  the  De  Havi- 
land-9  —  The  Bristol  scout  —  Its  redesign  for  the  Liberty 
Motor  —  Its  disappointing  career  —  Night-bombing  planes 
—  The  Handley-Page  —  The  cooperative  agreement  with 
England — The  Caproni — Its  adaptation  to  the  Liberty 
Motor  —  Plans  for  an  all-American  plane  —  Planes  ordered 
and  produced  overseas  —  The  situation  at  the  end  of  the 
first  year. 

The  problem  of  planes,  like  that  of  engines,  divides 
itself  sharply  into  two  distinct  elements,  training  and 
battle  planes,  both  vitally  essential  but  wholly  dis- 
tifict  from  each  other. 

When  the  United  States  entered  the  war,  the  over- 
whelming immediate  need  was  for  training  planes  to 
give  primary  instruction  to  the  hundreds  of  cadets 
coming  through  the  examining  boards  and  the  ground 
schools.  At  that  time  only  one  company  in  the_ 
United  States,  the  , Curtiss  Company,  was  in  any  ap- 
preciable production,  turning  out  about  100  planes  a 

186 


PLANE  CONSTRUCTION 

month  for  the  British.  It  was  decided  at  the  second 
meeting  of  the  new  Aircraft  Production  Board  on 
May  18  to  crowd  this  company  to  the  limit,  and  a 
recommendation  for  700  of  their  JN-4D  type  was 
accordingly  made,  with  an  additional  800  recom- 
mended on  May  21.  As  the  number  of  0X5  engines 
available  for  this  plane  was  limited,  another  plane  was 
necessary  to  meet  the  immediate  training  demands. 
The  J  type  of  the  Standard  Aero  Corporation,  built 
about  the  Hall-Scott  ATA  engine  and  then  in  small 
production,  was  selected,  although  frankly  not  so 
satisfactory  as  the  JN-4D.  Nevertheless,  it  helped 
tide  over  the  early  alarming  shortage  and  kept  the 
training  programme  from  very  serious  embarrassment. 
Even  with  these  two  main  companies  at  work  to 
their  capacity,  new  sources  of  manufacture  for 
primary-training  planes  were  imperative.  Less  than 
a  dozen  other  airplane  companies  were  listed  in  the 
whole  United  States,  and  those  merely  small,  experi- 
mental  companies  wedded  to  their  own  individual 
models  and  to  hand  work.  As  rapidly  as  possible, 
however,  new  orders  were  placed,  and  on  May  25, 
1918,  seven  companies  were  working  on  the  JN-4D 
and  four  on  the  J-l,  most  of  them  new  to  airplane 
work  but  capable  of  large  production. 

naturally  came  very  slqwly, 


first  was  of  six  Curtiss  planes  in.  June,  1917,  the  entire 
output  of  the  United  States  in  the  third  month  of  the 
war.  In  July  the  number  increased  to  78  ;  in  August 
to  83;  in  September  to  164;  in  October  to  274;  in 
November,  with  five  more  companies  reaching  pro- 
duction, to  394;  and  in  December  to  656.  By  the 

end  of  the  first  year  2,837  JN-4D  and  1,600  J-l  planes 

- 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

had  been  delivered,  more  than  enough  to  meet  the 
primary^tTarning  demands. 

This  leads  us  to  the  problem  of  advanced-training 
planes.  Obviously  these  two  primary  planes  with 
their  speed  of  only  80  miles  an  hour  and  their  lack 
of  equipment  could  not  fill  the  requirements  of  train- 
ing in  aerial  machine  gunnery,  bomb  dropping,  forma- 
tion flying,  pursuit  work,  and  single-seater  fighting. 
The  early  expectation  was  that  a  series  of  foreign 
battle  planes,  notably  the  British  De  Haviland,  could 
be  manufactured  here  in  time  to  begin  advanced 
training  in  January,  1918,  but  that  proved  wholly  out 
of  the  question.  The  J^-4D  plane,  therefore,  had  to 
be  changed  over,  equipped  with  the  150-horse  power 
Hispano-Suiza  engine  and  as  much  special  gunnery, 
bomb-dropping,  and  other  equipment  as  possible,  and 
used  as  a  temporary  makeshift.  Up  to  May  25,  1918, 
1,504  had  been  ordered  and  501  delivered,  all  from 
the  Curtiss  Company,  thus  allowing  some  progress  to 
be  made  in  the  advanced-training  work. 

For  single-seater  pursuit  training  a  special  plane 
was,  of  course,  necessary.  Considerable  delay  was 
involved  in  the  decision  between  the  Thomas-Morse 
scout,  already  in  limited  production  here,  and  the 
British  Bristol,  highly  spoken  of  in  the  cables  but 
necessarily  requiring  another  six  months  to  reach 
production.  The  former  was  finally  decided  on  in 
September,  1917,  and  by  the  end  of  the  first  year  500 
had  been  ordered  and  130  delivered,  sufficient  to  meet 
a  large  part  of  the  demand  at  that  time,  as  most  of 
this  single-seater  training  was  scheduled  for  France. 

Now  we  come  to  the  second  element  of  the  plane 
problem,  that  of  battle  and  bombing  planes,  the  most 

188 


PLANE  CONSTRUCTION 

t 

complex  of  the  whole  Air  Service,  requiring  not  only 
far  more  manufacturing  facilities  than  the  training 
programme,  but  in  addition  a  wealth  of  scientific 
knowledge  that  was  wholly  lacking.  It  must  be  borne 
in  mind  that  these  two  problems  were  quite  distinct 
but  nevertheless  interacting  on  each  other,  and  that 
they  persisted  with  varying  intensity  throughout  the 
whole  first  year. 

The  discrepancy  between  constant  expectation  and 
actual  accomplishment  in  these  programmes  is  one 
of  the  fascinating  phases  of  the  Air  Service  story, 
which  can  be  appreciated  only  by  an  intensive  study 
of  a  maze  of  dates  and  details.  Roughly,  four  card- 
inal reasons  were  responsible:  America's  utter  lack 
of  knowledge  of  battle  planes,  the  total  absence  of 
facilities  to  manufacture  them,  the  distance  from  the 
front  with  all  the  difficulties  of  .communication,  and 
the  wholly  unsuspected  intricacy  of  the  problems 
involved. 

At  the  outbreak  of  the  war  no  one  in  this  country 
had  any  adequate  knowledge  of  what  a  battle  plane 
actually  was.  Not  only  had  none  ever  been  built  here, 
but  only  a  handful  of  technically  trained  Americans 
had  even  seen  one.  Their  secrets  had  been  guarded 
by  the  belligerents  with  the  utmost  care,  so  that  the  ,  . 
information  from  the  military  attaches  abroad  was 
negligible  as  a  basis  for  reproduction  of  mechanisms 
so  highly  complicated.  This  was  doubly  unfortunate 
in  that  it  concealed  the  true  compexity  of  the  problem'. 

The  difficulties  of  communication  with  Europe  and 
the  confusion  of  cabling  complicated  the  situation 
immeasurably.  With  the  first  nine  weeks  of  the  war 
occupied  in  the  preliminary  organization  and  in  map- 

189 


1 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

9 
ping  out  the  enlarged  programme,  Colonel  Boiling's 

technical  commission  did  not  sail  overseas  until  June 
17,  1917.  Naturally  considerable  time  was  required 
for  them  to  gain  the  confidence  of  foreign  officials,  to 
weigh  all  the  conflicting  claims  abroad,  and  prepare 
definite  recommendations  to  this  country.  The  out- 
standing fact  is  that  four  months  elapsed  from  our 
entry  into  the  war  before  the  first  De  Haviland  model 
arrived  in  this  country,  and  five  months  before  the 
first  Bristol  arrived.  Thus  over  a  third  of  the  first 
year  was  consumed  in  the  mere  physical  task  of 
getting  foreign  planes  and  plans  to  this  country. 

Once  here  their  duplication  was  complicated  by 
the  utter  lack  of  engineering  and  manufacturing 
facilities.  Airplane  designers  and  engineers  familiar 
with  European  battle  planes  were  practically  non- 
existent, and  the  inadequate  physical  facilities  are 
shown  by  the  fact  that  the  De  Haviland  was  adapted 
to  American  reproduction  as  the  factory  was  being 
built  over  it,  and  the  work  on  the  Bristol  took  place 
first  in  an  unheated  sheet-iron  hangar  and  later  on 
the  main  floor  of  a  crowded  factory.  Furthermore, 
the  preparations  for  manufacture  necessitated  the 
construction  of  practically  new  plants  and  the  assem- 
bly of  a  class  of  labor  and  a  kind  of  material  seldom 
before  brought  together. 

The  intricacy  of  the  work  was  its  most  unsuspected 
pitfall.  The  extreme  accuracy  of  workmanship,  the 
delicacy  of  balance,  the  consideration  of  such  details 
as  whether  escape  was  allowed  for  heated  air  in  the 
wings,  all  combined  to  create  a  series  of  interrelated 
problems  which  paralleled  no  experience  in  this 
country.  Worst  of  all  was  the  equipment,  all  the 

190 


PLANE  CONSTRUCTION 

navigating  instruments,  armament,  and  the  like,  con- 
stantly changed  by  cable  and  constantly  requiring 
readjustments  and  modifications. 

The  best  way  to  appreciate  the  difficulties  met  and 
the  rise  and  fall  of  hope  is  to  retrace  the  history  of 
the  separate  types.  Here  it  may  not  be  amiss  to  state 
that  the  United  States  did  not  base  its  programme 
on  any  new,  capricious  developments  but  adopted  the 
best  Allied  planes.  The  De  Haviland,  Bristol,  Hand- 
ley-Page  and  Caproni  were  taken  over  bodily,  subject 
only  to  such  changes  as  were  necessary  because  of 
American  manufacturing  methods  and  the  installation 
of  the  Liberty  Motor.  Their  selection  was  agreed 
upon  by  a  technical  mission  to  Europe,  the  Allied 
aviation  missions  here,  and  the  Joint  Army  and  Navy 
Technical  Board. 

Take  first  the  case  of  the  Spad,  the  famous  French 
single-seater  scout  that  was  making  such  an  enviable 
record  at  the  front  and  that  later  became  a  storm 
center  in  the  American  programme.  This  plane  was 
decided  on  for  American  reproduction,  a  model  se- 
cured, a  contract  let  to  the  Curtiss  Company  on 
September  19,  1917,  for  3,000  planes,  a  large  force 
of  draftsmen  set  to  work,  the  drawings  90  per  cent, 
finished,  materials  collected  and  work  about  to  begin, 
when  the  following  cablegram  from  Colonel  Boiling 
on  November  8  upset  the  whole  programme : 

Single-seater  fighters  will  probably  become  obsolete  gen- 
eral use  next  year,  although  small  number  will  always  be 
used  for  special  purposes.  Recommend  you  produce  num- 
ber already  under  contract  and  started.  Believe  we  can 
obtain  here  all  this  type  required  future  above  number 
actually  contracted  here  and  America. 

191 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

The  Curtiss  work  was  immediately  interrupted  and 
some  time  spent  in  seeking  the  best  way  out.  Colonel 
Deeds  cabled  the  suggestion  that  the  Spad  bodies  be 
built  here  with  engines  installed  in  France,  bu£J3ren: 
eral  Pershing  on  December  15  flatly  opposed  this 
plan,  saying,  ' '  United  States  should  leave  production 
of  single-seater  fighter  to  Europe.''  Thus,  on  definite 
orders  from  overseas,  the  fast  single-seater  scout  was 
abandoned,  with  all  the  work  that  had  gone  into  it, 
the  number  thought  necessary  ordered  in  France,  and 
the  Service  laid  open  to  the  bitter  charge  that  it  was 
building  no  "  battle  planes." 

The  De  Haviland  two-seater  combination  fighter 
and  day  bomber  was  from  the  start  the  mainstay  of 
the  American  programme.  This  plane  had  been 
adopted  in  the  first  Joint  Army  and  Navy  Technical 
Board  programme  of  May  22,  endorsed  by  Colonel 
Rees  of  the  British  Mission  on  June  4  as  "  the  latest 
word  in  bombing  machines,"  recommended  by  the 
American  technical  mission  to  Europe  in  cables  of 
July  13  and  31  and  August  7,  and  included  to  a 
total  of  8,000  in  the  first  manufacturing  programme 
of  August  2. 

Four  months,'  as  stated  above,  elapsed  before  the       , 
first  De  Haviland  model  arrived  in  this  country,  and   / 
it  dioT^noTlLctualiy  become  available  for  American v 

production  until  it  reached  Dayton  on  August 26. 

The^drawings  accompanying^ Jt  wjere  , very  .meagre 
indeed,  and  no  information  was  at  hand  about  balance 
or  equipment.  These  conditions,  with  the  necessity 
of  adapting  the  plane  to  the  heavier  Liberty  Motor, 
necessitated  the  construction  of  an  experimental 
model.  This  first  American-built  De  Hayil ancLwith 

192 


PLANE  CONSTRUCTION 

the  new  Liberty  Motor  made  its  first  flight  on  October 
28,  two  months  after  the  work  of  reproduction  had 
begun.  Both  engine  and  plane  functioned  well,  and 
the  promise  of  very  early  and  quick  production 
seemed  well  grounded.  Rapidly  as  the  work  to  date 
had  gone,  however,  it  was  unfortunately  far  more 
preliminary  than  was  suspected,  and  it  gave  rise  to 
hopes  which  later  complexities  were  to  destroy. 

Meanwhile,  manufacturing  sources  were  being  se- 
cured. The  Dayton-Wright  Company,  which  bore  the 
brunt  of  the  experimental  work,  was  recommended 
by  the  Aircraft  Production  Board  on  September  5 
for  a  contract  to  build  2,000  De  Havilands,  the  "  go- 
ahead  "  on  the  first  250  being  given  on  October  18. 
The  Fisher  Body  Corporation,  one  of  the  largest  auto- 
mobile-body makers  in  the  world,  were  shortly  secured 
as  a  second  source  of  manufacture  with  a  contract 
for  3,000,  so  that  facilities  for  very  large  production, 
once  it  had  got  under  way,  were  assured. 

The  situation  all  during  these  early  winter  months 
was  further  complicated  between  the  De  Haviland-4 
and  the  De  Haviland-9.  The  latter,  a  more  advanced 
model  in  development  in  England,  was  adopted  in 
all  the  early  American  programmes  here  while  the 
''4"  was  actually  being  redesigned.  The  British, 
however,  met  one  disappointment  after  another  with 
this  type,  which  was  necessarily  reflected  in  its  con- 
tinual postponement  on  the  programme  here.  On 
September  27  the  American  mission  abroad  answered 
a  cable  from  here  that  2,000  "  9's  "  were  in  the  pro- 
gramme with  the  statement  that,  although  no  tests 
of  that  type  had  yet  been  made  overseas,  the  number 
should  be  doubled.  In  mid-September  very  meagre 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

"  9  "  drawings  arrived,  leading  to  a  cable  that  the 
new  programme  included  6,000  of  that  type  with 
shipment  beginning  in  November.  On  October  17  the 
mission  abroad  urged  that  the  number  be  increased 
to  8,000,  but  on  November  13  it  was  found  necessary 
to  cable  that  as  the  sample  "  9  "  and  the  completed 
drawings  had  not  arrived,  work  was  going  ahead  on 
the  "  4  "  in  order  to  secure  production  of  something. 
This  brought  the  answer  that  the  British  model  had 
not  yet  been  completed,  and  it  was  not  for  another 
two  months,  on  January  5,  1918,  that  the  drawings 
actually  arrived. 

Optimism  for  the  "  4  "  meanwhile  was  running 
high.  On  November  30  a  programme  was  sent  to  the 
manufacturers  requiring  50  planes  in  January,  1918, 
350  in  February,  1,100  in  March,  and  1,800  in  April. 
In  December  a  cable  was  sent:  "  Everything  seems 
most  promising.  Expect  to  ship  first  De  Haviland-4 
complete  January  15.  Its  performance  excellent. 
Have  had  120  miles  an  hour/*  On  January  3,  1918, 
despite  delays,  a  total  of  1,475  De  Havilands  was 
predicted  by  cable  to  be  ready  for  shipment  by  April 
1.  From  this  date,  however,  the  really  fine  work,  with 
all  its  adjustments  and  balances,  began,  and  the  sched- 
ule slipped  further  and  further  back  as  each  unex- 
pected difficulty  cropped  up.  Warjun£_jEas_mblfid 
overseas  on  January  26 :.  "  De  Haviland-4  just  barely 
in  production.  Schedule  will  fall  below  estimates 
previously  given  you."  How  serious  this  was  may 
be  seen  from  the  reply  that  it  was  essential  to  rush 
shipments  as  the  contracts  for  battle  planes  in  France 
and  Italy  had  been  practically  wiped  out  by  local 
dangers. 

194 


PLANE  CONSTRUCTION 

At  last  on  January  30,  1918,  four  De  Havilands 
were  ordered  overseas,  which  led  to  the  War  Depart- 
ment's unfortunate  statement  that  American  battle 
planes  were  en  route  to  the  front,.  Only  one  of  these 
planes  was  actually  shipped,  however,  because  of  lack 
of  synchronizing  devices.  Thisjplane  left  Dayton  on 
February  5  but  was  not  floated  at  Hoboken  until 
March  15.  But  despite  the  constant  delays,  optimism 
was  felt  that  as  the  first  planes  had  come  through, 
large-scale  production  would  shortly  follow. 

In  mid-February  the  whole  schedule  was  once  more 
thrown  entirely  askew,  this  time  by  a  very  detailed 
letter  from  General  Foulois  on  every  phase  of  the 
equipment  and  armament.  As  one  of  the  engineers 
wrote : 

All  matters  in  connection  with  the  De  Haviland-4  had 
already  been  settled  and  full  information  sent  to  Dayton- 
Wright  on  January  31,  more  than  two  weeks  before,  so 
that  a  practically  new  start  had  to  be  made,  and  all,  or  prac- 
tically all  the  work  done  previously  altered  or  changed  in 
such  a  manner  as  to  cause  a  very  serious  delay. 

This  whole  matter  of  equipment  was  summarized 
thus  by  Colonel  Vincent : 

People  ordinarily  think  an  airplane  is  composed  of  a 
plane  and  an  engine,  but  the  big  delay  in  getting  out  mili- 
tary airplanes  in  this  country  has  been  due  to  lack  of  equip- 
ment rather  than  planes  or  engines.  I  believe  the  De 
Haviland-4  could  have  been  in  production  by  January  1  if 
they  had  had  complete  information  regarding  equipment  by 
the  first  of  October. 

An  indication  of  the  care  and  attention  to  detail 
necessary  may  be  had  from  a  letter  from  the  British 
Mission  on  March  11  that  the  following  requirements 

195 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

found  essential  in  British  experience  were  changed 
in  the  American  De  Haviland : 

Aluminium  washers  are  being  used  instead  of  steel;  air 
pressure  is  being  used  for  the  gasoline  system;  cable  is 
being  used  for  interplane  bracings  instead  of  stream-line 
wires;  storage  for  cutting  on2  ignition  is  not  provided 
in  rear  seat;  rudder  control  wires  are  not  duplicated;  alti- 
tude corrector  is  not  being  used;  radiator  shutters  are  not 
fitted. 

While  these  changes  were  being  made,  another 
serious  difficulty  arose  with  the  overheating  of  the 
radiator  at  high  altitudes.  To  illustrate  the  vicious 
circle  of  airplane  construction,  if  a  radiator  satisfac- 
tory on  the  ground  overheats  at  altitude  and  has  to  be 
changed,  the  new  radiator  will  very  probably  be  of  a 
different  shape  or  weight  and  require  in  its  turn  a 
complete  alteration  of  the  fuselage  and  balance  of 
the  plane.  By  March  28,  however,  the  Ideal  radiator 
had  gone  up  21,000  feet  in  one  hour  to  a  temperature 
of  eight  degrees  below  zero  Fahrenheit  without  boil- 
ing, and  the  Livingston  radiator  had  answered  all 
requirements. 

Finally,  on  April  8, 1918,  one  year  after  the  United ' 
States  entered  the  war  and  seven  months  after  the  j 
first  De  Haviland  model  arrived  in  this  country,  the 
first  fully  equipped  military  plane  flew  with  four 
machine  guns,  bombs,  equipment,  camera  rack,  oxygen 
apparatus,  and  heating  generator,  and  on  the  same 
day  it  was  finally  decided  that  no  further  changes  in 
the  first  2,000  planes  should  be  made.  Just  as  art 
indication  of  the  complexity  of  the  work  it  is  interest- 
ing to  list  the  various  subjects  covered  in  a  12-page 
report  in  a  conference  on  this  date : 

196 


PLANE  CONSTRUCTION 


Special  fittings 

Camera  mount 

Tail  light 

Battery  box  and  telephone 

control 

Shutter  underneath  camera 
Wimperis  bomb  sight 
Camera  operating  handle 
Trapdoor  for  above 
Oxygen  nipple 
Joy  stick 
Wireless 

Air-speed  indicator 
Aneroid 
Oxygen  tubing 
Oxygen  bottles 
Battery  box  for  telephone 

receiving  set  only 
Gasoline  tank 
Bonding 

Reinforced  cowling 
Livingston  radiator 
Radiator  shutter 
Oil  lead  to  synchronizer 

generator 

Aluminium  heel  plates 
Altitude  adjustment 
Synchronizing  reservoir 
Oxygen-helmet  connections 
Elevating  wheel 
Cartridge  chutes 
Upholstering 
Pilot's  seat 
Radiator 
Very  pistol 
Oxygen  apparatus 
Holt  flare 
Generators 
Ignition  switch 


Tail 

Splice  in  fuselage 

Magazine  rack  for  lewis  gun 

Interphone  box 

Scarff  mount 

Doors  on  side  of  fuselage 

Negative  lens  in  gunner's 
cockpit 

Clothing-heating  plug 

Telephone  plugs 

Gunner's  seat 

Antennae  reel 

Radio  box 

Lights  for  instrument  boards 

Camera  plate  holders 

Filter  boxes  for  wireless 

Bomb-dropping  lever 

Spark  and  throttle  controls 

Exhaust  pipes 

Wiring 

Engine  controls 

Propeller 

Front  brace  wire  fitting 

Sperry  compass 

Fire  wall 

Instrument  board 

Front  stick 

Battery  box 

Gun  brackets 

Pilot's  safety  belt 

Front  and  rear  windshields 

Shutter  control  for  radiators 

Fire  extinguishers 

Negative  lens  in  pilot's  cock- 
pit 

Wing  lights 

Low-tension  ignition 

Wing  bonding 

Aileron  pulleys 


197 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

Bomb-dropping  rails  Shock  absorbers  on  wheels 

Wires  between  wings  Wing  skid 

Water-pump  suction  line  Overhead  gas  tank 

Oil  tubes  under  oil  tank  Veneer  sidewalk  on  wings 

Production  even  now,  however,  did  not  go  as  fast 
as  expected.  It  was  found  necessary  to  design  a  new 
type  of  bomb  gear  to  handle  the  American  style  of 
bombs  and  a  pilot's  cowling  and  gun  support  for 
the  Marlin  guns,  together  with  the  synchronizing 
mechanism  and  its  attachment  to  the  Liberty  Motor. 
The  design,  location  and  installation  of  certain  of  the 
equipment  required  a  wholly  unexpected  amount  of 
time,  especially  the  radio  and  telephone  sets  with 
their  generators,  brackets  and  instruments,  the  light- 
ing and  heating  apparatus  with  generator,  brackets, 
lights,  wiring  and  heated  clothing  for  the  aviator,  and 
all  the  paraphernalia  for  oxygen  supply  at  high 
altitudes. 

Nevertheless,  by  the  end  of  the  first  year  the  De 
Haviland-4  was  in  appreciable  production.  In  the 
week  of  May  25,  1918,  48  were  turned  out  with  the, 
Dayton-Wright  Company  alone  in  production.  Up 
to  that  time  155  had  been  delivered,  of  which  133  had 
been  sent  to  Hoboken  and  49  actually  floated  overseas, 
and  the  promise  of  fast  production  from  then  on  was 
certain.  The  first  American-built  De  Haviland,  with 
the  Liberty  Motor,  took  the  air  in  France  on  May  17 
and  was  reported  as  "  entirely  satisfactory."  Ap- 
parently the  planes  stood  the  shipment  overseas  well, 
giving  assurance  that  the  work  done  in  this  country 
was  well  done.  If  production  were  several  months 
behind  expectation,  nevertheless  the  De  Haviland-4 
seemed  to  prove  that  the  great  major  problems  of 

198 


PLANE  CONSTRUCTION 

securing  scientific  knowledge  and  of  building  up  an 
industry  were  overcome. 

This  by  no  means  signifies,  however,  that  the  De 
Haviland  as  then  produced  was  a  complete  success. 
On  the  contrary,  the  first  several  hundred  produced 
were  bitterly  criticized  by  different  fliers  for  different 
reasons.    The  radius  of  flight,  only  about  two  hours, 
had  to  be  increased  by  the  use  of  a  much  heavier 
gasoline  tank.     The  seating  of ^he_j^ois_JKaSuJp0or 
alike  for  observation,  bomb  dropping  and  machine 
gunnery,  all  of  which  defects  were  remedied  in  the 
"  9  "  type.    The  tail  was  weak,  the  linen  subject  to 
ripping  off,  and  various  parts  not  well  balanced.    Bu 
all  these  difficulties  were  open  to  remedy,  and  the  basi 
soundness  of  the  plane  was  shown  in  General  Persh 
ing's  request  that  it  be  placed  on  the  priority  list  jo 
overseas  shipment. 

The  "  9  "  type  meanwhile  was  developing  rapidly. 
Despite  all  the  vexing  early  delays  in  securing  a  model 
and  plans,  when  at  last  they  came  they  were  complete. 
As  one  of  the  designers  said,  the  De  Haviland-9  was 
"  the  first  military  airplane  ever  redesigned  in  this 
country  with  the  necessary  information  on  hand  to 
enable  the  job  to  be  done. ' '  As  soon  as  possible  with- 
out delaying  production,  this  type  was  to  be  substi- 
tuted for  the  "  4." 

The  Bristol  battle  plane  was  far  less  successful. 
Designed  as  a  two-seater  pursuit  plane  with  two 
machine  guns  and  the  maximum  amount  of  vision 
for  the  pilot,  this  type  had  been  very  successful  with 
the  British.  It  was  recommended  for  the  American 
programme  in  the  cables  of  July  13  and  31  and 
August  7,  and  appeared  in  the  first  schedule  of 

199 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

August  2  to  the  number  of  1,000.  But  four  months 
and  one  week  elapsed  after  America's  entry  into  the 
war  before  the  first  model  left  England,  with  another 
three  weeks  before  it  reached  Washington'  on  Septem- 
ber 5. 

It  was  at  once  seen  that  the  machine  would  have  to 
be  largely  redesigned  to  carry  the  Liberty  Motor, 
which  was  very  differently  shaped  from  and  weighed 
165  pounds  more  than  the  200-horse  power  Rolls- 
Royce  for  which  the  plane  had  been  planned.  In- 
deed, the  greater  length  of  the  Liberty  and  the  carry- 
ing forward  of  the  center  of  gravity  required  the 
whole  engine-suporting  structure  to  be  changed  and 
the  wing  area  to  be  increased.  The  drafting  facilities 
for  this  work  were  very  bad;  at  first  only  three  or 
four  draftsmen  were  on  hand,  but  they  increased 
later  to  35  or  40.  During  October,  moreover,  the 
sheet-iron  hangar  beside  the  Smithsonian  Institution 
where  the  work  was  done  was  uncomfortably  chilly, 
and  relief  was  obtained  only  by  curtaining  off  half  the 
building  and  putting  in  oil  stoves  and  gas  heaters. 
The  British  drawings  which  accompanied  the  plane 
were  found  to  be  useless,  as  they  were  half  British, 
half  metric  system,  and  gave  no  details  of  equipment. 

The  Curtiss  Company  was  early  selected  as  the 
manufacturer  of  this  type,  and  the  original  model 
was  sent  to  them  on  November  6,  though  without  the 
power-plant  parts  and  with  incomplete  Signal  Corps 
prints  which  not  until  November  27  gave  enough  data 
for  the  construction  of  a  model.  During  December 
the  remaining  prints  were  delayed  at  Dayton  by  other 
work,  and  it  was  not  till  January  11,  1918,  four 
months  after  the  plane  had  been  received  here,  that 

200 


PLANE  CONSTRUCTION 

the  final  prints,  so  far  as  the  Signal  Corps  could  carry 
them,  were  delivered.  Meanwhile,  Colonel  Clark,  who 
had  developed  the  plane  so  far,  was  taken  off  the  work, 
and  the  Curtiss  Company  was  largely  entrusted  with 
fulfilling  it. 

Here  again  early  hopes  ran  high.  A  cable  of  Sep- 
tember 22  predicted  the  first  shipment  would  be  in 
January,  1918,  and  another  of  January  3  forecast 
300  planes  by  April  1.  This  estimate  was  more  than 
halved,  however,  in  the  schedules  placed  in  the  shops 
on  January  16,  which  called  for  25  in  February,  100 
in  March,  175  in  April,  300  in  May,  450  in  June,  and 
475  each  in  July  and  August. 

The  period  of  changes  and  difficulty  with  equipment 
was  now  on.  On  January  27  many  changes  were  or- 
dered and  anxiety  was  expressed  because  of  lack  of 
wireless,  camera,  and  other  accessories.  On  February 
16  came  General  Foulois'  letter,  upsetting  the  whole 
armament  and  equipment  programme  and  moving 
back  the  schedule  another  month.  The  designing 
was  delayed,  moreover,  by  the  Curtiss  Company's 
attempt  to  do  the  delicate  reproduction  work  on  the 
open  floor  of  the  main  factory. 

At  last  came  the  time  for  test.  After  some  delay, 
arising  from  a  poorly  aligned  tail  skid,  the  drilling 
out  of  the  holes  for  hinge  pins  on  the  wing  beams  by 
spies,  and  too  much  oil  in  the  engine,  the  first  short 
flight,  five  minutes  in  length,  was  made  on  March  5. 
Here,  as  all  through  the  Bristol's  career,  the  facilities 
were  bad,  there  being  no  spare  parts,  portable  tools, 
telephone,  or  heating  at  the  field  hangar.  No  further 
flight  took  place  until  March  22,  when  the  plane  was 
up  15  minutes.  On  the  24th  a  flight  of  57  minutes 

201 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR   SERVICE 

was  made,  with  an  altitude  of  15,000  feet  and  a 
speed  of  121%  miles  an  hour.  Three  days  later  the 
"  go-ahead  "  was  given  on  the  first  25  planes;  on 
March  28  the  number  was  increased  to  400,  and  on 
April  4  an  estimate  of  525  by  June  30  was  cabled 
overseas. 

The  plane,  however,  was  not  yet  satisfactory.  The~l 
redesign  for  the  Liberty  Motor  and  American  equip- 
ment had  not  yet  been  fully  worked  out.  Indeed,  it 
became  necessary  because  of  rumors  reaching  the 
American  Expeditionary  Force  to  cable  on  April  13 : 
"  Tests  so  far  made  cast  some  doubt  on  its  quick 
manoeuvring  ability.  Judgment  should  be  withheld, 
however,  till  tests  have  gone  considerably  further." 
A  possible  solution  of  these  difficulties  had  been  hit 
upon  in  changing  over  from  the  Liberty  to  the  His- 
pano-Suiza  300-horse  power  motor.  On  March  16  the 
first  test  flight  of  this  new  model  was  held  at  Dayton ; 
an  altitude  of  22,000  feet  and  a  speed  of  125  miles 
an  hour  were  reached.  This  motor,  however,  was 
very  slow  in  production,  and  another  effort  was  de- 
cided upon  in  substituting  the  eight-cylinder  Liberty 
for  the  12. 

By  the  end  of  the  first  year,  after  losing  five  months 
in  getting  the  Bristol  to  this  country  and  much  more 
time  through  poor  facilities  in  the  Government  and 
the  Curtiss  shops,  the  American  Bristol  was  still  un- 
proved. All  the  way  through,  as  one  man  expressed 
it,  the  Bristol  had  needed  a  friend.  A  great  amount 
of  work  had  been  done,  but  it  still  remained  to  be 
shown  whether  the  plane  would  be  serviceable  with 
the  eight-cylinder  Liberty  or  the  Hispano-Suiza  motor. 
Later  it  was  found  necessary  to  abandon  entirely  the 

202 


PLANE  CONSTRUCTION 

thought  of  putting  the  12-cylinder  Liberty  in  the 
Bristol.  Whereas  the  original  Bristol  plane  had 
weighed  2,910  pounds,  the  American  reproduction 
weighed  3,360.  The  plane  was  weak  in  many  particu- 
lars and  eventually  cost  the  lives  of  four  pilots.  Not 
only  was  much  time  lost  and  part  of  the  Curtiss  Com- 
pany's facilities  kept  idle,  but  $6,482,000  was  spent 
on  this  work,  only  a  part  of  which  could  be  salvaged. 

The  heavy  night-bombing  machines,  such  as  the 
Handley-Page  and  the  Caproni,  represent  a  later 
development  than  the  battle  planes.  Atjhe  time  the 
United  States  entered  the  war,  they  were  still  in  an 
experimental  stage  abroad,  with  their  tactical  value 
unproved.  The  Italians  alone  had  demonstrated  their 
practicability  with  the  Caproni,  while  the  British  were 
experimenting  with  the  Handley-Page,  the  French 
with  the  Letort,  and  the  Russians  with  the  Sikorsky. 

The  American  technical  mission  to  Europe  ran  full 
into  the  midst  of  this  uncertainty  and  indecision, 
which  was  reflected  in  a  series  of  conflicting  cables  as 
between  the  Handley-Page  and  the  Caproni.  On 
November  10  a  cable  read :  * l  Advise  concentrate  your 
efforts  on  Caproni  without  regard  to  Handley-Page, 
because  not  in  position  send  Handley-Page  machine 
and  preferable  adopt  one  type  night  bomber. ' '  Then, 
by  contrast,  on  November  22  another  cable  read: 
"  Recommend  withhold  further  consideration  of 
Caproni  until  we  obtain  complete  drawings  night 
bomber  from  Caproni  or  elsewhere  designed  for  Lib- 
erty engine  making  substantial  advance  over  present 
Handley-Page." 

The  Handley-Page  plane  was  first  proposed  to  the 
United  States  in  May,  1917,  a  few  weeks  after  the 

203 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

outbreak  of  war.  A  representative  of  the  company 
endeavored  to  sell  the  rights  to  the  White  Motor  Car 
Company  for  £40,000  and  later  to  the  Government 
for  $250,000  and  one  per  cent,  royalty.  Inquiry  de- 
veloped that  the  British  Government  had  not  taken 
much  interest  in  the  type  as  then  developed,  and  after 
some  trouble  with  the  British  Secret  Service,  the  offer 
was  withdrawn  on  August  11.  By  September,  how- 
ever, negotiations  for  a  later  type  had  been  carried 
through  successfully  on  the  other  side,  and  early  in 
the  month  the  first  set  of  plans  arrived  in  this 
country.  Die  makers  were  at  once  set  to  work  and  a 
big  start  made,  when  in  mid-October  a  second  set  of 
plans  arrived  cancelling  the  first.  The  work  on  these 
was  almost  completed  when  a  third  set  arrived  on 
December  29,  together  with  seven  Handley-Page  ex- 
perts, requiring  a  third  start  to  be  made. 

Meanwhile,  with  this  type  definitely  proved  in 
actual  service  and  night  bombing  accepted  as  one  of 
the  really  new  elements  of  warfare,  negotiations  were 
on  foot  in  England  for  assembly  of  American-built 
parts  there  on  an  enormous  scale.  On  August  23 
Handley-Page  had  proposed  a  large  assembly  plant 
in  France,  and  on  December  5  came  the  cable  that  an 
unlimited  number  could  be  assembled  in  England. 
Finally,  on  January  28, 1918,  came  the  famous  Hand- 
ley-Page agreement,  whereby  the  two  countries  were 
to  cooperate  to  furnish  30  American  Handley-Page 
night-bombing  squadrons.  The  United  States  agreed 
to  supply  all  parts  and  motors,  12,000  laborers  to 
built  the  five  airdromes  and  three  acceptance  parks 
necessary,  and  the  operating  personnel,  and  England 
agreed  to  furnish  the  factories  and  skilled  labor  for 

204 


PLANE  CONSTRUCTION 

assembly  of  150  planes  a  month.  This  was  to  cost 
$5,000,000  for  construction,  $4,000,000  for  plants,  and 
$300,000  monthly  for  assembly.1 

This,  of  course,  greatly  stimulated  the  Handley- 
Page  effort  here,  and  made  the  selection  of  plants  a 
very  important  matter.  After  considerable  discus- 
sion the  Grand  Rapids  Airplane  Company  was  recom- 
mended on  March  14  for  an  order  for  1,000  wooden 
parts,  and  the  Standard  Aero  Corporation  on  March 
19  for  the  metal  parts  and  assembly  of  500  sets.  Thus, 
by  the  end  of  this  first  year  the  Handley-Page  had 
been  definitely  established.  Plans  and  engineers  had 
arrived  from  England;  the  first  plane  was  all  but 
ready  to  fly;  sources  of  supply  were  secured  and  set 
to  work ;  and  an  agreement  had  been  made  for  whole- 
sale assembly  in  England.  From  now  on  it  was  but 
a  matter  for  development,  with  the  possibility  that  the 
steps  already  taken  might  become  among  the  most 
vital  in  bombing  Germany  out  of  the  war. 

The  Caproni  made  an  earlier  start  than  the  Hand- 
ley-Page, not  only  because  the  plane  itself  was  further 
developed,  but  because  the  Italians  had  the  good  judg- 
ment to  send  two  of  the  planes  to  this  country  for 
demonstration.  When  the  two  monsters,  a  triplane 
and  a  biplane,  flew  from  Hampton  Roads  to  "Washing- 
ton early  in  September,  1917,  the  sensation  they 
created  was  reflected  in  the  Aircraft  Production 
Board's  approval  on  September  5  of  a  proposal  to 
build  250  of  them. 

Meanwhile  the  American  mission  had  gone  down 
into  Italy,  made  a  long  flight  to  the  front,  and  been 

i  Further  details  of  the  development  of  this  project  are 
given  in  Chapter  XVI. 

205 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

very  much  surprised  at  aviation  developments  there 
in  contrast  to  what  they  had  been  led  to  expect.  They 
were  enthusiastic  about  the  Caproni  and  recommended 
its  manufacture  here.  Shortly,  however,  the  Handley- 
Page  demonstrated  its  value,  while  much  difficulty  was 
experienced  in  securing  Caproni  plans.  On  November 
22,  therefore,  they  cabled  to  hold  up  the  Caproni  until 
proved  superior  and  until  complete  plans  were  se- 
cured. A  few  days  later,  on  December  3,  came 
an  important  conference  at  Paris  with  Caproni  repre- 
sentatives, who  proposed  that  they  establish  at  Bor- 
deaux, France,  a  huge  assembly  plant  for  1,000 
American  Capronis  monthly,  manned  by  25,000 
refugee  Italian  workmen  who  were  to  be  trained  at 
the  Caproni  plant  at  Milan  at  the  rate  of  1,000  a 
month,  under  an  agreement  to  give  Caproni  a  small 
profit  in  lieu  of  royalty.  The  plan  was  then  discussed 
of  large-scale  assembly  of  the  Handley-Page  in  Eng- 
land and  of  Capronis  in  France,  which  would  meet  the 
critical  shipping  shortage  and  the  urgent  need  for 
hundreds  of  night  bombers. 

Arrangements  were  then  made  to  send  Captain  U. 
V.  d'Annunzio,  director  of  the  new  Caproni  plant  at 
Taliedo,  to  the  United  States.  Signer  Caproni,  in  his 
letter  of  introduction  said:  "  "We  believe  firmly  that 
only  the  United  States  will  be  able  to  accomplish, 
by  means  of  the  materiel,  etc.,  at  its  disposal,  the  big 
question  of  aerial  bombardment."  He  also  added: 
"I  do  not  wish  that  any  modifications  whatsoever, 
even  in  the  slightest  detail,  be  undertaken  by  the 
American  manufacturers  without  formal  permission 
from  the  engineer  d'Annunzio."  Captain  d'An- 
nunzio,  with  19  engineers,  two  sets  of  Van  Dyke 

206 


•<     03 

a 

H    W 

03     1-5 


PLANE  CONSTRUCTION 

drawings  and  three  sets  of  blue  prints,  and  a  600- 
and  a  450-horse  power  plane,  with  parts,  samples,  and 
stamps  for  reproduction,  the  gift  of  Italy  to  the 
United  States,  arrived  in  New  York  on  January  17, 
1918,  and  began  work  on  January  25  at  the  Standard 
Aero  Corporation  plant  at  Elizabeth,  New  Jersey, 
which  had  replaced  the  Curtiss  Company  for  this 
work,  on  an  experimental  machine  with  three  Liber- 
ties, a  speed  of  100  miles  an  hour,  five  hours'  flight, 
and  a  useful  capacity  of  4,600  pounds. 

On  December  4  Italy  had  requested  2,000  sets  of 
Caproni  parts,  3,000  Liberty  Motors,  and  5,000  tons 
of  Austin  steel,  but  on  March  20,  1918,  General  Tozzi 
canceled  the  order  because  deliveries  were  not  due 
until  July.  It  was  then  proposed  to  drop  the  whole 
Caproni  project,  but  this  was  not  done  because  of  the 
appeals  from  overseas  for  all  night  bombers  possible, 
the  endorsement  of  the  Joint  Army  and  Navy  Tech- 
nical Board,  and  the  progress  made  and  the  expense 
incurred  by  Captain  d'Annunzio. 

Finally,  on  April  10,  at  a  conference  in  Washing-  \f 
ton,  the  definite  decision  was  made  to  build  the 
Caproni  in  quantity,  this  ending  the  uncertainty. 
Shortly  verbal  orders  were  given  the  Fisher  Body 
Corporation  to  prepare  for  250  Capronis,  with  possible 
increase  to  1,000,  on  promise  to  start  delivery  five 
months  after  90  per  cent,  of  the  plans  had  been  re- 
ceived and  to  reach  a  production  of  10  a  day.  Thus 
at  the  end  of  the  first  year  the  adapted  American 
Caproni  was  just  on  the  verge  of  being  completed 
at  the  Standard  plant,  quantity  production  had  been 
arranged  for,  and  preparations  for  assembly  in  France 
were  being  made. 

207 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

As  all  these  foreign  types  were  being  adapted  to 
American  production,  considerable  experimental  work 
to  turn  out  an  all-American  plane  was  under  way. 
The  United  States,  assured  of  very,  good  foreign 
types,  had  reached  the  point  where  it  was  possible  to 
develop  its  own.  With  the  Liberty  Motor  proved, 
attempts  were  being  made  to  build  new  types  of  planes 
about  it,  a  problem  in  a  sense  simpler  than  trying 
to  adapt  an  existing  type.  The  plans  included 
armored  planes,  planes  carrying  cannon,  fighters,  ob- 
servers and  bombers,  and  they  reached  a  high  state  of 
development  during  the  year,  with  every  promise  for 
the  future. 

All  this  work  in  the  United  States  does  not,  how- 
ever, exhaust  the  plane  programme.     The  American      S 
mission  had  placed  orders  overseas  to  the  limit  of  the  ^ 
available  facilities,  so  that  if  American  factories  failed 
utterly,  there  would  be  a  very  appreciable  supply 
of  the  best  Allied  planes. 

First,  of  course,  was  the  need  for  training  planes 
for  the  hundreds  of  cadets  in,. France.  A  total  of 
2,279  were  on  order  by  April  30,  with  1,264  delivered. 
This  was  far  less  than  the  number  needed  and  ac- 
counted for  the  long  period  of  inactivity  of  so  many 
of  the  cadets  sent  overseas.  The  French  factories 
had  been  strained  to  the  limit  to  meet  their  own  pro- 
gramme and  supplied  the  unparalleled  flood  of  Ameri- 
can students  as  fast  as  possible. 

Of  battle  planes  5,816  were  ordered,  enough  for  a 
very  large  programme.  This  included  2,000  pursuit 
and  1,500  observation  Spads,  1,000  bomber  and  500 
observation  Breguet,  500  S.I. A.  Italian  day  bombers, 
and  200  Capronis.  Unfortunately,  the  deliveries  here 

208 


PLANE  CONSTRUCTION 

also  were  very  late,  the  French  because  Germany's 
accelerated  programme  called  for  a  great  increase  in 
France's  own  force,  and  the  Italians  because  of  the 
Caporetto  defeat.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  only  271 
planes  had  been  delivered  on  these  orders  up  to  April 
30,  this  showing  that  others  besides  the  Americans 
were  having  difficulty  in  meeting  their  programmes. 
The  value  of  these  planes,  however,  was  very  great, 
as  they  allowed  the  first  American  squadrons  to  ap- 
pear on  the  front. 

Thus  in  the  first  year  of  war  the  United  States  had 
adapted  successfully  three  of  the  best  foreign  types, 
the  De  Haviland,  Handley-Page,  and  Caproni,  and 
had  failed  with  the  Bristol.  The  first-named  had 
reached  quantity  production  and  was  being  shipped 
overseas.  An  industrial  organization  capable  of  un- 
equaled  production  had  been  built  up  and  all  the 
technical  experience  of  the  Allies  in  three  years  of 
warfare  acquired,  so  that  America  could  begin  inde- 
pendent development.  Very  large  assembly  facilities 
had  been  arranged  overseas  and  large  orders  placed 
there.  If  accomplishment  was  enormously  behind 
expectation,  the  groundwork  laid  was  none  the  less 
thorough. 


209 


CHAPTER  XII 


DISRUPTION  AND  THE  NEW  START 

Freedom  of  the  Air  Service  from  criticism  during  the  first  ten 
months  —  The  Service  first  involved  in  the  general  attack 
on  the  war  administration  —  The  War  Department  's  un- 
fortunate announcement  of  shipments  of  American 
planes  —  Difficulties  within  the  Air  Service  —  Investiga- 
tions ordered  by  the  War  Department  and  the  Aircraft 
Board  —  The  Service  on  the  defensive  —  Public  confidence 
destroyed  by  indiscriminate  attacks  in  the  press  and  in 
Congress  —  Charges  of  Gutzon  Borglum  —  Headlong  dis- 
ruption under  way  —  The  first  reorganization  under  John 
D.  Eyan  and  General  William  L.  Kenly  —  Investigation 
demanded  —  Borglum  discredited  —  Charles  E.  Hughes 
selected  to  cooperate  with  the  Department  of  Justice  — 
The  final  reorganization  —  Bureau  of  Aircraft  Production 
and  Division  of  Military  Aeronautics  created  —  The  first 
Air  Service  administration  completely  obliterated  —  Esti- 
mate of  their  difficulties,  failures  and  achievements  —  Mr. 
Hughes'  findings  —  Unfulfillment  of  early  hopes  and 
promises  —  The  unforeseen  difficulties,  physical  and 
human  —  The  substantial  achievement  —  Production  of 
training  and  battle  planes  and  engines  —  Production  of 
raw  materials  and  accessories  —  Personnel  of  the  Air 
Service  —  Training  of  pilots,  observers,  and  other  officers  — 
Training  of  the  ground  force  —  The  force  overseas  —  The 
situation  at  the  new  start. 

For  practically  the  first  ten  months  of  the  war  the 
Air  ^(L  p11  ri  mi  s  '  v 


along  as  January,  1918,  when  the  great  billion-dollar 
Air  Service  estimate  submitted  by  General  Squier.  for 
the  fiscal  year  1919  was  before  Congress,  there  had 
been  a  remarkable  absence  of  trouble-  —  this,  too, 
despite  the  fact  that  the  political  situation  was  highly 
electric,  that  Secretary  Baker  was  being  hard  pressed, 
that  Senator  Chamberlain  had  charged  the  Govern- 
ment with  a  general  breakdown,  and  that  President 

210 


DISRUPTION  AND  THE  NEW  START 

Wilson  had  accepted  the  challenge  of  his  critics  by 
refusing  to  support  the  War  Cabinet  or  Ministry  of 
Munitions  bills.  Aviation,  indeed,  had  from  the  outset 
been  highly  favored,  as  was  shown  in  the  passage  of 
the  $640,000,000  bill  without  a  roll  call.  In  a  sensejt 
rathej^j^xiojisjegling  had  grown  up  that  America's 
good  name  was  bound_jip-j£uits  pmeflffis,  and  conse- 
quently  no  one  caredjo^ontemplate  its  failure.  More- 
over, the  Air  Service  appeared  largely  civilian  in 
character,  and  as  it  was  somewhat  set  off  by  itself 
from  the  rest  of  the  War  Department,  it  did  not  offer 
so  good  a  mark  for  criticism.  At  the  same  time  the 
upheavals  in  the  Ordnance  and  Quartermaster's  de- 
partments kept  attention  focused  elsewhere. 
What  criticism  there  was  in  the 


ings  during  January  *nd  ^fly  y^rnary  followed  two 
main  lines.  First  was  that  seeking  to  draw  from  the 
work  of  the  Air  Service  instances  of  the  general  break- 
down of  the  war  administration,  as  in  overgorging  the 
railroads  with  indiscriminate  priorities,  concentrating 
all  contracts  within  one  cramped  area,  or  being  unco- 
ordinated with  the  rest  of  the  war  work.  The  other 
related  to  individual  contracts  or  fields,  either  because 
they  had  been  carried  out  injudiciously  or  because 
they  had  not  been  carried  out  as  desired.  On  the  vital 
problems  of  the  Service  itself  neither  knowledge  nor 
interest  was  then  shown.  Rather  startling  statements 
by  Colonel  Deeds  and  Mr.  Coffin  that  the  aircraft 
programme  was  45  to  60  days  behind  schedule  aroused 
little  discussion,  even  in  the  press. 

Most  serious,  perhaps,  was  the  situation  in  regard 
to  Colonel  Deeds  and  the  insidious  charges  that  be- 
cause he  was  formerly  President  of  the  Dayton  Elec- 

211 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

trie  Laboratories  Company,  general  manager  of  the 
National  Cash  Register  Company  of  Dayton,  and  an 
organizer  of  the  Dayton- Wright  Airplane  Company, 
there  was  something  criminal  in  the .  fact  that  the 
Wilbur  Wright  Flying  Field,  the  McCook  Experi- 
mental Field,  and  a  large  part  of  the  battle-plane 
construction  work  had  been  located  in  his  home  city. 
With  pressure  being  brought  to  bear  on  the  New  York 
Tribune  to  print  these  insinuations,  Colonel  Deeds  laid 
the  whole  situation  before  the  Senate  Committee  on 
Military  Affairs,  showing  that  when  he  had  entered 
the  Army  he  had  written  Secretary  Baker  and  the 
Aircraft  Production  Board  a  full  statement  detailing 
and  resigning  all  affected  business  interests.  The 
Committee,  after  considerable  grilling,  became  thor- 
oughly satisfied  and  thanked  Colonel  Deeds  for  his 
explanation.  Likewise  the  Tribune  withheld  publica- 
tion, and  the  matter  was  dropped  for  the  time. 

On  February  21  came  the  Wajt*JDepartmenl!s_state- 

"  en  route  to  the  front  in  France,"  released  on-a  day 
of  scanty  news  and  front-paged  everywhere.  Unfor- 
tunately, the  whole  purpose  of  the  statement,  first 
to  show  that  planes  had  only  then  begun  to  go  in 
small  numbers,  and  second  to  explain  the  difficulties 
encountered  and  do  away  with  the  100,000  airplanes 
myth,  was  entirely  lost  in  a  careless  implication  that 
American  planes  were  five  months  ahead  of  schedule. 
Not  only  was  the  whole  purpose  thus  perverted,  but, 
more  serious  still,  the  facts  themselves  were  found 
later  to  have  been  grossly  premature.  The  same  day 
also  came  an  Associated  Press  story  from  France, 
surprising  both  for  its  editorial  nature  and  for  its 

212 


DISRUPTION  AND  THE  NEW  START 

passing  the  censor,  which  said  that  German  planes 
"  come  and  go  over  the  American  lines  almost  at 
will,1'  and  asked  desperately  when  American  planes 
would  be  received. 

Meanwhile  matters  were  going  ill  within  the  Air 
Service.  Mr.  Coffin,  greatly  alarmed  at  the  slow  prog- 
ress and  growing  rumors  of  criminality,  suggested  to 
Acting  Secretary  of  War  Crowell  a  complete  investi- 
gation. On  March  12,  without  warning  to  the  Signal 
Corps,  the  War  Department  announced  the  appoint- 
ment of  an  investigating  committee  headed  by  H/ 
Snowden  Marshall  to  "  make  a  broad  survey  of  the 
Government's  aeronautical  programme  with  particu- 
lar reference  to  the  industrial  phases."  At  the  same 
time  the  Aircraft  Board  announced  that  W.  S.  Gifford, 
Director  of  the  Council  of  National  Defense,  would 
act  in  a  similar  capacity  for  the  Board. 

On  the  very  next  day  came  the  most  serious  charge 
yet  made  against  the  Service.  Following  the  first 
confidential  conference  between  the  War  Council  and 
the  Senate  Committee  on  Military  Affairs,  an  Asso- 
ciated Press  dispatch,  widely  featured,  declared:  "  In 
some  respects,  the  Senator  said,  notably  in  the  aviation 
programme,  there  has  been  great  delay  and  the  War 
Council  had  initiated  an  investigation  to  determine  the 
cause.  Another  member  of  the  Committee  said  the 
aviation  programme  was  74  per  cent,  behind  schedule 
and  that  over-sanguine  reports  were  being  inquired 
into."  At  the  same  time  Senator  Hitchcock  issued  a 
statement  that  "  the  aviation  programme  is  bad;  it  is 
very  far  behind." 

Thus  for  the  first  time  the  Air  Service  was  put  on 
the  defensive.  These  statements,  coupled  with  the 

213 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

general  confusion  as  to  the  Marshall  and  Gifford  ap- 
pointments, called  forth  a  series  of  conflicting  and 
haphazard  newspaper  stories  which  undermined  the 
whole  public  confidence  in  the  air  programme  and 
gradually  mounted  in  sensationalism  until  the  whole 
structure  was  swept  away.  It  is  doubtful  if  a  more 
headlong  breakup  than  that  of  the  next  few  weeks 
ever  occurred. 

The  New  York  Times,  most  relentless  of  all  critics, 
reported  that  one  Senator,  on  learning  the  true  situa- 
tion, "  put  his  head  on  the  committee  table  and  wept 
from  disappointment  and  chagrin. "  On  March  18 
the  Boston  Herald  broke  out  into  bold  headlines: 
' '  Breakdown  Threatens  Vast  Aircraft  Programme  — 
Congressmen  Aghast. ' '  Other  papers,  half  convinced 
almost  against  their  wills,  pleaded  for  a  frank  state- 
ment of  facts  that  never  came.  A  temporary  respite 
only  was  secured  by  an  Associated  Press  dispatch  of 
March  16  that  American-built  planes,  despite  the  de- 
lays, would  be  in  France  in  sufficient  force  in  July, 
when  originally  due. 

The  fact  that  only  one  battle  plane  had  been  shipped 
to  France  when  the  War  Department-issued  its  state- 
ment, was  now  confirmed  officially.  Hinted  at  by  the 
New  York  Times  and  definitely  stated  on  March  20  by 
the  Providence  Journal,  it  was  admitted  to  be  true  by 
a  Signal  Corps  officer  testifying  before  the  Senate 
Committee.  This  disclosure  was  very  disastrous  in- 
deed, for  it  fell  close  on  the  heels  of  a  growing  distrust 
of  the  aviation  publicity.  Undoubtedly  that  an- 
nouncement of  the  War  Department  was  one  of  the 
worst  mistakes  made.  Given  out  at  the  time  the  first 
De  Havilands  had  finally  come  through  into  produc- 

214 


IUFLE   PRACTICE   OK  CLAY  PIGEONS  FROM   A  TOWER,  TO  SIMULATE   HEIGHT 


DISRUPTION  AND  THE  NEW  STAET 

tion  and  when  four  had  been  ordered  overseas,  it 
later  developed  that  three  were  held  in  this  country 
for  further  equipment,  and  that  the  solitary  plane  to 
go  left  Dayton  on  February  5  and  arrived  at  Hoboken 
in  sections  some  five  weeks  later.  Secretary  Baker 
personally  was  wholly  ignorant  of  the  details,  and 
did  not  for  a  moment  suspect  that  the  Signal  Corps 
officers  who  approved  the  story  were  straining  with 
long-deferred  hope  and  over-optimism. 

And  now,  also,  Gutzon  Borglum,  a  personal  friend 
of  President  Wilson,  who  since  mid-January  had 
been  making  a  secret  investigation  into  the  air  pro- 
gramme under  authority  of  a  letter  from  the  Presi- 
dent, came  forward  with  a  burst  of  sensationalism 
which  swept  away  the  last  remnants  of  judgment  on 
the  aircraft  situation.  Detailed  extracts  from  his 
report,  charging  every  kind  of  inefficiency  and  crim- 
inality and  bitterly  assailing  the  patriotism  of  Colonel 
Deeds,  were  given  to  the  New  York  World  and  pub- 
lished in  two  sections  on  March  21  and  22.  The  effect 
was  electrical,  removing  all  elements  of  doubt  that 
something  was  seriously  wrong. 

On  March  26__the  uproar  shifted  to  the  floor  of  the 
Senate.  Senator  New  Stated  that  instead  of  12,000^ 
there  would  be  but  37  American-built  battle  planes  in 
France  %^r^rjT "-J ,  ft ^  q  t "r  Poindexter  bitterly  as- 
sailed the  Aircraft  Board  for  refusing  to  build  any 
'  *  battle  planes  ' '  at  all.  Senator  Hitchcock  gave  voice 
to  the  rumors  of  graft,  corruption  and  sabotage.  Sen- 
ator Lodge  said  that  the  "  heavy  Liberty  Motor  " 
might  be  satisfactory  for  heavy  planes,  but  that  the 
"  light  "  Liberty  was  unsuited  for  combat  work.  The 
next  day  followed  another  outburst,  when  some  air- 

215 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

plane-manufacturing  pictures  were  rushed  out  by  the 
Committee  on  Public  Information  with  grossly  exag- 
gerated captions  due  to  the  lack  of  distinction  in  the 
writer's  mind  between  training  planes  and  battle 
planes.  On  March  28  Senator  Overman  brought  in 
another  sensational  element  with  broad  charges  that 
spies  had  seriously  delayed  manufacture.  On  April 
3  Alan  R.  Hawley,  President  of  the  Aero  Club  of 
America,  wrote  to  President  Wilson  that  the  whole 
programme  was  on  the  point  of  collapse ;  on  the  next 
day  the  World  published  the  first  of  two  very  damag- 
ing stories  that  over-refinement  in  design  had  caused 
enormous  losses  in  time  and  money  with  the  Liberty 
Motor;  and  on  the  5th  the  Aeronautical  Society  held 
a  vigorous  public  meeting  of  protest  and  condem- 
nation. 

The  upheaval  was  now  under  way  with  all  the  speed 
and  relentlessness  of  a  newspaper  trial  and  with  every- 
one joining  in.  The  Aero  Club  and  the  Aeronautical 
Society  came  to  blows  over  the  degree  of  failure,  and 
an  automobile  manufacturer  offered  $10,000  to  the 
Red  Cross  if  anyone  could  prove  that  the  Liberty 
Motor  was  originated  by  another  automobile  manu- 
facturer. The  World  secured  a  damaging  statement 
from  W.  A.  Morgan,  formerly  Vice-President  of  the 
Curtiss  Company,  as  to  the  unwisdom  of  giving  up 
the  single-seater  fighter,  while  meanwhile  the  storm 
continued  to  beat  about  the  Liberty  Motor. 

Next  came  the  reports  of  the  Senate  Committee,  the 
majority  flatly  contradicting  the  minority.  Rushed 
through  at  great  speed,  the  majority  report,  claiming 
a  "  substantial  failure  "  of  the  programme  and  charg- 
ing "  procrastination  and  indecision,"  appeared  in 

216 


DISRUPTION  AND  THE  NEW  START 

time  for  the  afternoon  papers  of  April  10.  The 
minority  report,  following  closely  on  its  heels  in  time 
for  the  next  day's  morning  papers,  called  the  record 
one  "  of  which  every  American  can  be  justly  proud," 
and  said  of  the  Aircraft  Board  that  "  in  face  of 
unparalleled  difficulties  it  is  accomplishing  an  unpar- 
alleled task  with  characteristic  American  energy, 
capacity,  patriotism,  and  enthusiasm."  Those  who 
had  not  been  perplexed  before  were  left  utterly  at 
sea  by  these  two  diametrically  opposed  official  reports. 

On  April J34JVesident  Wilson  cut  the  Gordianjgiot 
with  a  brief  statement  reorganizing  the  whole  aircraft 
administration  so  far  as  was  then  possible.  John'lX 
Ryan,  President  of  the  Anaconda  Copper  Company 
and  widely  known  as  one  of  America's  captains  of 
industry,  was  placed  in  charge  of  all  aircraft  produc- 
tion for  the  Army.  A  Division  of  Military  Aeronautics 
for  the  training  of  aviators  and  the  military  use  of 
airplanes  was  organized,  headed  by  Major-General 
William  L.  Kenly,  just  back  from  France.  General 
Squier,  previously  head  of  both  these  branches  of  the 
Service,  was  directed  to  devote  his  attention  to  the 
Signal  Corps  proper. 

The  sensations,  however,  were  by  no  means  over. 
On  April  29  Gutzon  Borglum  demanded  a  criminal  in- 
vestigation, and  on  the  following  day  a  fiery  debate 
broke  out  in  the  Senate.  On  May  1  the  Aeronautical 
Society  gave  out  its  full  report,  bitterly  condemning 
the  former  aviation  authorities,  and  on  May  2  a 
Senator  charged  that  they  had  played  a  "  gigantic 
confidence  game  upon  the  country  in  the  creation  of 
the  Liberty  Motor,  so-called. ' '  Obviously  the  situation 
was  not  to  quiet  down  with  the  reorganization.  An 

217 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

investigation  was  imperative;  the  only  question  was 
as  to  the  kind.  Congress  was  very  anxious  for  its  own, 
even  over  the  President  's  protest  that  the  Department 
of  Justice  could  better  handle  it.  On  May  8  Attorney- 
General  Gregory  announced  that  the  Department 
would  begin  its  investigation  at  once,  under  the  direc- 
tion of  his  assistant,  William  L.  Frierson,  but  this  did 
not  satisfy  Congress,  and  Senator  Chamberlain  an- 
nounced that  an  investigation  by  a  subcommittee  of 
his  Committee  would  continue  unaffected. 

Then  came  the  startling  publication  at  the  White 
House  of  sworn  statements  intimating  that  Gutzon 
Borglum  had  sought  personal  profit  in  the  aircraft 
field.  He  was  said  to  have  named  as  an  asset  "  his 
personal  friendship  with  President  Wilson,  whom  he 
stated  he  could  do  anything  with."  These  affidavits, 
coming  from  the  Military  Intelligence  Bureau  and 
given  out  at  the  White  House,  created  an  enormous 
sensation,  and  were  at  once  branded  by  Mr.  Borglum 
as  a  "  scurrilous  frame-up.  "  A  hardly  less  startling 
announcement  remained  to  be  made.  With  the  Senate 
still  determined  on  its  own  inquiry,  President  Wilson 
called  upon  Charles  Evans  Hughes,  former  Justice 
of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  who  as  the 
Republican  nominee  had  almost  defeated  him  for  the 
Presidency  the  previous  fall,  to  cooperate  with  the 
Department  of  Justice  in  its  investigation.  Mr. 
Hughes  promptly  accepted  and  at  once  took  over  the 
work,  enlarging  its  scope  so  as  to  cover  not  only  ques- 
tions of  criminality,  but  questions  of  efficiency  and 
judgment  as  well. 

The  ,Jna]  jstep  -was  taken  on  May  21.    On 


a  Presidential  order  was  issued  invoking  the  full  power 

218 


DISRUPTION  AND  THE  NEW  START 

of  the  newly  enacted  Overman  Act  to  reorganize  the 
Air  Service  in  a  thorough  manner.  The  Signal  Corps 
proper,  under  which  aviation  had  developed,  was 
now  entirely  divorced  from  that  work.  Two  new 
branches  of  the  War  Department  were  created,  the 
Bureau  of  Aircraft  Production  and  the  Division  of 
Military  Aeronautics,  handling,  respectively,  the 
equipment  and  the  operations  phases.  At  the  same 
time  Colonels  S.  D.  Waldon,  R.  L.  Montgomery  and 
E.  A.  Deeds  were  temporarily  relieved  of  their  avia- 
tion duties  and  ordered  to  cooperate  with  Mr.  Hughes 
in  his  investigation. 

Of  the  men  who  had  originally  laid  out  and  carried 
through  the  first  year  the  enlarged  American  air  pro- 
gramme, General  Squier  had  been  assigned  to  Signal 
Corps  work  only,  Mr.  Coffin  had  resigned  on  April  23 
and  been  replaced  by  Mr.  Ryan  on  the  Aircraft  Board, 
Colonels  Deeds,  Waldon  and  Montgomery  had  been 
assigned  to  the  Hughes  committee,  and  Colonel  Boiling 
had  been  killed  in  France.  Thus  came  to  an  end, 
practically  a  year  after  the  receipt  of  the  cable  from 
the  Premier  of  France  on  which  the  whole  air  project 
was  based,  the  first  administration  which  had  carried 
the  burden  of  its  development  from  practically  noth- 
ing to  an  organization  nearly  as  large  as  the  whole 
Army  before  the  war.  Bitterly  criticized  and  almost 
undefended,  they  were  made  to  give  way  to  new  and 
fresh  men  who  were  to  carry  on  under  a  new  organ- 
ization the  structure  they  had  begun. 

Some  day  history  will  weigh  their  work  and  say 
whether  they  did  well  or  ill  with  the  great  responsibil- 
ities, the  great  powers,  the  great  problems  entrusted  to 
them.  Such  a  clear-cut  decision  is  not  for  the  present, 

219 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

with  all  its  lack  of  perspective  and  understanding. 
The  best  that  can  be  done  now  is  to  attempt  to  face 
their  problems  as  they  faced  them,  in  order  that  we 
may  gain  a  fairer  measure  of  judgment: 

EvenJMr.  Hughes,  after  examining  280  witnesses 
and  taking  17,000  pages  of  testimony,  does  not  offer 
a  final  summation  in  his  report  submitted  on  October  f 
25.  Throughout  he  calls  attention  to  indecision,  delay, 
and  conflict  of  judgment,  discussing  especially  lack 
of  knowledge  and  experience,  defective  organization, 
lack  of  information  as  to  the  equipment  required  for 
service  planes,  changes  in  design  and  equipment,  and 
conditions  in  plants  both  as  to  lack  of  experience  and 
shortage  of  trained  mechanics.  The  gratifying 
feature  of  his  report  was  the  dispelling  of  all  the 
hysterical  rumors,  which  had  found  voice  even  in 
Congress,  that  the  Service  had  been  honeycombed  with 
corruption  and  pro-Germanism.  As  a  matter  of  fact, 
Mr.  Hughes  recommended  the  court-martial  of  Colonel 
Deeds  for  '  *  acting  as  confidential  adviser  of  his 
former  business  associate "  and  for  issuing  "a  false 
and  misleading  statement  with  respect  to  the  progress 
of  aircraft  production,"  and  criminal  prosecution  of 
three  other  officers  under  the  statute  prohibiting  any 
officer  or  agent  of  the  United  States  from  transacting 
business  with  any  concern  in  which  he  is  financially 
interested.  This  finding^however, ^  w^as_triyjal.jGQm- 
pared  with  what  many  persons  had  expected.  Two 
of  the  three  officers  recommended  for  prosecution  were 
shortly  pardoned  by  President  Wilson  on  the  ground 
that  their  offenses  were  wholly  technical  and  not -in 
any  sense  serious.  The  evidence  against  Colonel 
Deeds  was  submitted  to  a  special  War  Department 

220 


DISRUPTION  AND  THE  NEW  START 

board  of  review,  which  after  examining  these  and  all 
other  available  facts  recommended  against  his  trial 
by  court-martial  on  any  of  the  grounds  suggested. 
Secretary  Baker  announced  his  approval  of  this  find- 
ing on  January  16,  1919. 

In  attempting  here  a  brief  word  picture  of  the  air- 
craft development,  it  may  be  well  to  begin  by  calling 
attention  to  how  immeasurably  difficult  it  now  is  to 
recreate  the  atmosphere  of  those  first  days  of  the  war. 
Everything  at  that  time  came  hard  and  slow.  Only 
the  fringe  of  the  country  was  interested  in  the  strug- 
gle; universal  service  was  first  questioned  and  then 
haltingly  adopted ;  the  idea  of  sending  a  small  expedi- 
tion to  France  was  put  forward  timorously ;  business 
leaders  were  giving  only  part  time  to  the  Government ; 
industry  was  wholly  unorganized;  and  Federal  au- 
thority was  still  slim.  The  atmosphere  of  big  things 
accomplished  in  a  big,  ruthless  way  which  came  with 
the  second  year  of  the  war  was  entirely  lacking,  and 
progress  was  slow  and  halting. 

The  great  outstanding  fact  is  that  the  early  hopes 
and  promises  stood  unfulfilled  at  the  end  of  the  year. 
American  aviation  had  not  turned  the  scale  in  the 
Great  War,  although  the  question  was  still  open  as  to 
whether  it  might  not  later.  The  optimism  and  en- 
thusiasm of  the  year  before,  which  had  forced  the 
adoption  of  such  an  unprecedented  programme  at  such 
an  unprecedented  speed,  now  came  back  as  a  boom- 
erang to  sign  the  death  warrant  of  those  who  had 
voiced  it.  What  the  story  might  have  been  had  there 
been  less  optimistic  publicity  is  a  question. 

First  and  foremost  among  the  delays,  overshadow- 
ing all  others,  was  the  utter  lack  of  appreciation  from 

221 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

one  end  of  the  programme  to  the  other  of  the  difficul- 
ties involved.  The  incessant  up-cropping  of  new 
needs,  new  shortages,  new  problems,  the  necessity  of 
building  up  wholly  new  sciences,  new  industries,  and 
scores  of  new  training  courses,  constantly  threw  the 
date  of  realization  further  and  further  off.  The  men 
responsible  for  the  programme  were  dealing  with  one 
of  the  most  complex  organisms  in  the  history  of 
human  effort,  handicapped  by  complete  lack  of  ex- 
perience, knowledge,  and  organization,  and  separated 
by  3,000  miles  from  the  actual  battle  front.  To  none 
was  the  disappointment  so  keen  as  to  those  in  charge. 
Always  they  had  thought  they  were  just  on  the  verge 
of  success  when  some  new  complication  had  entered 
in.  By  bitter  experience  only  were  they  able  to 
learn  the  intricacies  that  had  through  three  years 
kept  the  Allied  Air  Services  so  small.  Nevertheless, 
in  all  the  flood  of  criticism  they  had  the  knowledge 
that  a  vast  amount  of  work  had  been  done,  which,  if 
not  immediately  manifest,  could  not  fail  to  appear 
later  in  substantial  results. 

Other  causes  more  human  conspired  towards  these 
delays.  The  administrative  personnel,  for  instance, 
was  wholly  inadequate.  With  new  problems  con- 
stantly breaking  out  before  it  was  possible  to  provide 
the  highly  specialized  men  to  meet  them,  the  handful 
of  men  attempting  to  carry  a  burden  always  too  heavy 
often  delayed  fundamental  decisions  to  pass  on  im- 
mediate details.  Moreover,  the  whole  organization 
was  new,  growing,  and  restless.  For  most  of  the 
men  the  work  seemed  merely  temporary ;  for  many  it 
was  a  stepping  stone  of  ambition;  for  the  draft-age 
officers,  with  their  appellations  of  " slackers"  and 

222 


DISRUPTION  AND  THE  NEW  START 

"arm-chair  officers "  wearing  spurs  to  keep  their  feet 
on  their  desks,  it  was  distressing.  Precious  time  was 
lost  in  making  these  human  adjustments  and  more 
in  moving  to  constantly  larger  quarters.  Whereas 
originally  the  whole  Service  had  been  housed  in  four 
rooms,  it  moved  from  one  building  to  another,  some 
officers  as  many  as  six  times,  until  eventually  it  had 
an  enormous  new  temporary  structure  to  itself. 

Nevertheless,  the  foundations  of  an  unparalleled 
development  were  laid  in  this  first  year.  If  the 
finished  edifice  did  not  rise  in  the  time  set,  it  was 
only  because  the  preparatory  work  was  far  more  diffi- 
cult than  the  forecast.  In  a  broad  way,  this  first 
year  developed  an  organization  just  reaching  pro- 
duction in  quantity  in  both  personnel  and  equipment. 
In  the  latter  it  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  a  whole 
new  industry  had  been  built  up.  Whereas  on  the 
outbreak  of  war  but  one  company  had  even  ap- 
proached quantity  production  of  airplanes,  there  were 
at  the  end  of  the  year  over  a  score  engaged  on  a  very 
large  scale,  with  another  15  on  engines,  and  several 
hundred  on  auxiliary  work. 

The  tremendous  problems  of  providing  equipment 
to  train  the  thousands  of  aviators  and  mechanics  had 
been  largely  solved.  Whereas  before  there  had  been 
only  a  handful  of  serviceable  training  planes,  there 
were  now  more  than  were  needed  for  the  primary 
work,  although  planes  were  still  short  for  the  final 
training.  A  total  ^oLjM3I_p_rimary  plan£s_jggjtli 
6,394  enffinea,  and  nf  1,1  fig  Rdvaiuuwl^iifirtB  with 
1,934  engines,  had  been  delivered  to  -May  23.  This 
was  sufficient  to  enable  the  training  of  aviators  on  a 
scale  never  before  attempted,  and  it  was  one  of  the 

223 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

solid  foundation  stones  laid  in  this  first  year.  Un- 
fortunately, it  has  been  almost  wholly  ignored. 

In  combat  planes  the  situation  was  rapidly  clear- 
ing1. After  innumerable  delays  in  g-etting  models 
and  data  from  abroad,  the  De  Haviland-4  battle  plane 
had  reached  quantity  production  with  shipments 
overseas  begun  in  a  promising  way.  The  plane  had 
been  fairly  satisfactory,  with  every  hope  that  the 
"9"  model  would  be  wholly  so.  The  Bristol,  after 
a  rather  confused  career,  offered  only  dubious  hope. 
In  bombers  the  main  difficulties  had  been  overcome; 
both  the  Handley-Page  and  the  Caproni  had  been 
redrawn  for  American  manufacture  and  contracts  let, 
and  the  first  planes  were  due  in  a  short  time. 

The  Liberty  Motor,  much  praised  and  much  criti- 
cized, had  solved  the  problem  of  quantity  production 
of  airplane  motors  and  gave  every  promise  of  setting 
a  good  record  on  the  other  side.  With  only  two  com- 
panies in  production  to  date,  1,110  engines  had  al- 
ready been  turned  out,  with  the  promise  of  350 
a  week  shortly.  The  Allied  Governments  had  pinned 
their  faith  to  the  Liberty  and  had  asked  for  all  that 
could  be  spared.  Other  battle  engines,  the  Bugatti 
500-horse  power  and  the  Hispano  300-horse  power, 
had  long  been  in  process  of  redesign. 

The  major  problems  of  raw  materials  and  acces- 
sories had  been  met.  Half  as  much  spruce  was  being 
turned  out  in  one  month  as  in  all  of  the  year  pre- 
ceding the  war,  largely  by  a  practical  domination 
by  the  Government  of  the  whole  Pacific  Northwest 
lumber  industry.  A  cotton  substitute  for  linen  had 
been  developed  and  reached  quantity  production,  this 
solving  a  problem  that  had  troubled  the  Allies  for 

224 


DISRUPTION  AND  THE  NEW  START 

three  years.  The  shortage  of  dope  had  been  met  by 
drastic  measures;  100,000  acres  of  castor  beans  had 
been  planted  to  make  castor  oil ;  the  Liberty  Aero  Oil 
had  been  developed  as  a  standardized,  economical  and 
effective  lubricant;  and  all  the  equipment,  instru- 
ments, armament,  radio  and  photographic  apparatus, 
and  the  like  designed  and  put  into  production. 

The  personnel  of  the  Air  Service  had  increased 
from  65  officers  and  1,100  men  to  12,846  officers  and 
137,368  men,  nearly  as  many  as  the  whole  Regular 
Army  of  a  year  before.  Twenty-nine  large  flying 
fields  had  been  built  whereas  before  the  war  there 
were  but  two,  and  nearly  a  score  of  other  large 
projects,  such  as  repair  depots,  concentration  camps, 
storage  depots,  and  the  like,  completed,  all  involving 
an  expenditure  of  about  $72,000,000.  The  country, 
indeed,  was  dotted  with  a  system  of  great  flying 
centers  put  up  in  the  quickest  possible  time  and 
bidding  fair  to  have  a  very  permanent  effect  on 
America's  future  in  aviation. 

For_fliers  38,777  men  had  been  examined  by  71 
medical  boards  established  all  over  the  country,  and 
18,004  accepted.  Of  these,  16,622  had  gone  to  the 
ground  schools  for  their  preliminary  work.  Of  the 
10,592  graduates  who  had  then  gone  to  the  primary 
flying  schools,  4,094  had  in  turn  been  graduated  into 
the  advanced  training  courses.  By  contrast  it  is  well 
to  remember  that  a  year  before  there  had  been  85 
men  in  training  in  the  United  States  for  aviation. 
At  the  end  of  the  year  3,997  men  were  in  primary 
training,  with  a  total  of  21,940,000  miles  flown  to 
date.  Beyond  this  a  complicated  system  of  advanced 
flying  schools  had  been  established  for  specialized 

225 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

training.  At  the  end  of  the  year  there  were  in  these 
schools  266  observers,  138  army-corps  pilots,  185 
bombers,  and  193  pursuit  pilots,  all  getting  the  de- 
tailed training  in  the  phases  for  which  they  seemed 
best  qualified  before  taking  their  finishing  training  in 
France. 

The  three  main  lines  besides  flying  needed  for 
military  aviation,  namely,  radio-telegraphy,  photog- 
raphy, and  machine  gunnery,  had  been  standardized 
through  the  fliers'  course,  so  that  each  step  followed 
its  predecessor  in  logical  sequence.  For  this  work  a 
very  large  instructional  and  operating  force,  of  both 
officers  and  men,  had  been  built  up  and  established 
in  photographic  "huts,"  radio  schools,  or  special 
aerial-gunnery  schools  wherever  such  training  was 
being  given.  A  host  of  other  officers  likewise  had 
been  trained,  all  for  specialized  work  found  vital  to 
the  Air  Service  in  European  experience.  These  in- 
cluded 852  supply  officers,  718  adjutants,  448  engi- 
neer officers,  armament  officers  and  men,  52  compass 
officers,  and  25  navigation  officers.  Each  of  these 
Services  required  a  different  type  of  school  and  a 
different  type  of  student. 

Of  the  enlisted  men,  over  10,000  had  been  put 
through  special  training  to  fit  them  for  the  delicate 
work  about  airplanes,  engines,  magnetos,  carburetors, 
and  the  like.  This  alone  had  necessitated  first  a 
score  of  small  schools  scattered  about  in  various 
factories,  then  a  series  of  schools  in  the  Northern  fly- 
ing fields,  and  finally  four  large  schools  in  institu- 
tions already  giving  mechanical  instruction.  The 
graduates  formed  centers  of  larger  instruction  and 
promised  to  give  the  technical,  practical  knowledge 

226 


DISRUPTION  AND  THE  NEW  START 

essential  to  keeping  such  an  intricate  mechanism  as 
that  of  the  Air  Service  in  good  condition. 

Out  of  all  this  effort  a  constantly  mounting  stream 
was  beginning  to  pour  overseas.  A  force  of  38,889 
enlisted  men  had  been  sent  across  to  build  the  air- 
dromes, training  fields  and  production  centers  for 
which  Allied  labor  was  short,  and  to  prepare  the  way 
for  the  great  aerial  force  to  come.  Over  2,500  men^ 
were  in  training  as  fliers  in  England,  France  and 
Italy,  of  whom  287  had  finished  their  courses  and 
gone  to  the  zone  of  advance.  The  first  two  German 
planes  were  brought  down  by  American  Army  fliers 
on  AprilJJ^jusLjacyear^after  our  entry  intp_the_war, 
and  the  first  ATngripAn-hui.lt  battle  planes  arrisecLat 
the  front  a month  later...  No  one  could  doubt  that  the 
pressure,  if  late,  had  begun  on  a  crushing  scale. 

Thus  America  stood  at  the  end  of  the  first  year  of 
the  enlarged  aerial  programme,  equipped  with  an  Air 
Service  nearly  the  size  of  the  original  American 
Army,  with  a  great  organization  of  fields,  schools,  and 
factories  in  this  country,  with  all  the  primary-equip- 
ment needs  supplied  and  the  service  equipment  on 
the  verge  of  production,  and  with  the  foundation  of 
a  great  air  force  in  France,  men,  schools,  shops,  and 
planes.  Steep  and  arduous  as  had  been  the  climb 
uphill,  the  personnel  of  the  Service,  the  thorough- 
ness of  its  preparation,  and  the  magnitude  of  the  in- 
dustrial mechanism  promised  well  as  the  curtain  fell 
at  the  end  of  the  first  year  and  of  the  first  adminis- 
tration. 

Even  yet  the  difficulty  and  complexity  of  the  work 
was  not  generally  realized.  The  amazingly  small 
results  in  actual  battle  planes  over  the  lines  even 

227 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

under  the  best  conditions  seemed  wholly  dispropor- 
tionate to  the  vast  effort  and  expense,  for  only  a 
handful  of  people  had  yet  seen  that  the  finished  air- 
man is  the  tiny  apex  of  an  enormous  pyramid. 
Nevertheless,  America  was  slowly,  if  tragically,  ad- 
justing itself  to  a  clearer  and  a  fairer  perspective  of 
the  long,  arduous  road  to  that  newest  and  most 
romantic  phase  of  warfare. 


228 


CHAPTER  XIII 

THE  REAL  MEANING  OF  THE  PROGRAMME 

Early  problems  of  the  new  administration  —  The  overseas 
programme  —  America  Js  aims  in  aviation  —  Basis  and 
method  of  the  Allies'  demands  —  The  A.  E.  F.  Aviation 
Project  or  Official  Aviation  Programme  —  The  Air  Ser- 
vice conceived  as  a  great  international  striking  force  — 
Gradual  expansion  of  the  A.  E.  F.  Project  —  Its  dispro- 
portion both  to  the  rest  of  the  military  programme  and  to 
British  and  French  ratios  —  Comparison  with  the  total 
Allied  and  enemy  aerial  force  at  the  beginning  of  the  July 
offensive  of  1918  —  Development  of  the  Air  Service  con- 
tinued by  the  new  administration  along  the  original  lines  — 
The  final  steps  in  reorganization :  John  D.  Eyan  appointed 
an  Assistant  Secretary  of  War  —  The  development  along 
individual  lines  during  the  final  months  of  the  war  —  The 
Liberty  Motor  in  service  and  in  production  —  The  Hispano- 
Suiza  and  Bugatti  motors  —  The  plane  problem  still  un- 
settled—- The  S.E.-5,  a  single-seater  fighter,  adopted  — 
Night  bonibers  —  The  Handley-Page  and  the  Caproni  — 
Observation  planes  and  other  bombers:  a  new  Bristol,  the 
Le  Pere,  Loening,  Pomilio,  and  Martin  —  The  De  Haviland 
battle  plane  in  service  and  in  production  —  Raw  materials : 
spruce,'  wing  fabric,  and  dope  —  Equipment  and  acces- 
sories —  The  situation  at  the  termination  of  hostilities  — 
The  business  problems  involved  —  Capitalization  and 
financing  of  airplane  and  engine  companies  —  The  cost- 
plus  arrangement  —  Effect  of  the  effort  on  American  in- 
dustry —  Expenditures  of  the  Air  Service. 

The  reorganized  Service  was  confronted  at  the  out- 
set with  a  condition  of  chaos  and  stagnation  at  Wash- 
ington arising  out  of  the  upheaval  in  administration 
and  the  uncertainty  as  to  the  future.  For  some  time 
the  detailed  administration  had  largely  to  drift  on 
under  its  previous  momentum  while  the  new  lines  of 
major  policy  were  being  laid  down.  Fortunately  there 
were  good  men  at  the  fields  and  in  the  factories  who 

229 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

did  not  hesitate  to  assume  responsibility  during  the 
confusion  of  readjustment,  so  that  although  new 
impetus  from  Washington  was  lacking  for  a  time, 
development  continued  locally  in  both  training  and 
production. 

The  most  vital  problem  to  be  definitely  settled  was 
that  of  the  overseas  programme  to  be  filled.  General 
Kenly  at  once  cabled  the  American  Expeditionary 
Force  and  received  from  General  Pershing  on  May 
20,  1918,  a  very  detailed  reply  summarized  in  the 
statement:  "Developments  to  date  do  not  indicate 
the  necessity  for  any  change  in  my  general  organiza- 
tion and  service  of  the  rear  projects  approved  here 
July  11  and  September  18,  1917,  respectively." 

It  is  fitting  here  to  digress  for  a  moment  to  try 
to  obtain  a  long-range  perspective  of  what  America 
aimed  to  do  in  aviation  on  the  front.  This  is 
peculiarly  difficult  because  of  all  the  crosslights  and 
shadows  that  tend  to  deflect  one's  vision  from  the 
straight  line.  Nevertheless,  it  is  eminently  worth 
while  as  illuminating  a  phase  of  America's  war  effort 
entirely  distinct  from  all  others. 

More  and  more  it  becomes  evident  that  the  Allies, 
confronted  on  America's  entering  the  war  with  her 
almost  unlimited  industrial  resources  and  her  com- 
plete unpreparedness,  both  intellectual  and  physical, 
to  use  these  resources,  were  in  a  grave  dilemma  as  to 
how  best  to  lead  her  to  the  battle  front.  Unquestion- 
ably, in  the  delicate  state  of  public  opinion  in  this 
country,  when  the  mere  declaration  of  war  itself  with- 
out any  thought  of  active  military  participation  was 
considerable  of  a  shock,  it  would  have  been  fatal 
psychology  for  the  Allies  to  demand  of  the  United 

230 


REAL  MEANING  OF  THE  PROGRAMME 

States  at  the  outset  a  large  force  of  ground  troops, 
especially  as  there  was  in  this  country  neither  ade- 
quate army  for  the  purpose  nor  conviction  to  use  it 
even  if  it  were  available.  Consequently,  America 
was  led  on  step  by  stop  as  her  response  seemed  to 
justify  and  as  the  military  situation  of  the  Allies,  at 
first  favorable,  became  more  and  more  difficult. 

Of  all  phases  of  military  activity  calculated  to 
appeal  to  American  imagination,  aviation  stood  out 
incomparable.  Not  only  was  this  country  proud  in 
its  parentage  of  the  science  of  flying  through  the 
work  of  Langley  and  the  Wrights,  but  it  had  felt  a 
constant  thrill  at  the  gallant  work  done,  largely  to  its 
own  credit,  by  those  fearless  men  who  revived  the 
name  of  one  of  America's  founders  in  the  Lafayette 
Escadrille.  Aviation  was  a  typically  American  field, 
far  more  appealing  and  stimulating  than  the  other 
phases  of  warfare,  which  Americans  still  regarded  as 
mechanical  and  professional. 

Hence,  as  already  described,  Premier  Ribot  of 
France  on  May  26,  1917,  seven  weeks  after  the  out- 
break of  war,  sent  the  brief  150-word  cable  calling 
for  5,000  pilots  and  50,000  mechanics,  with  2,000 
planes  and  4,000  engines  monthly  beginning  in  Janu- 
ary, 1918.  The  rapid  amplification  of  this  cable  into 
the  $640,000,000  programme  and  its  passage,  unsup- 
ported by  the  General  Staff,  through  Congress  on  a 
wave  of  popular  enthusiasm  are  a  fitting  testimonial 
to  the  shrewdness  of  the  Allies '  judgment. 

Meanwhile,  as  all  this  work  of  elaboration  was  be- 
ing carried  out  by  the  aviation  authorities  here,  a 
similar  work  was  being  done  by  other  Americans 
overseas.  The  first  aerial  programme  to  be  received 

231 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

here  by  cable  from  the  American  authorities  abroad 
came  on  July  11,  a  week  only,  it  is  significant  to 
note,  after  the  $640,000,000  bill  had  first  been  pre- 
sented to  a  Congress  whose  action  on  such  an  un- 
paralleled demand  could  not  possibly  be  forecast,  and 
nearly  two  weeks  before  the  bill  actually  became  law. 
This  evidences,  of  course,  the  simultaneous  action  of 
two  groups  of  American  aviation  authorities,  one  here 
and  one  in  France,  and  shows  how  clear  the  need 
appeared  to  both  at  the  moment. 

This  July  11  programme,  amended  two  months 
later  by  cable  of  September  18,  1917,  laid  down,  as 
it  was,  almost  in  the  first  hours  of  the  war,  became 
known  both  as  the  A.  E.  F.  Aviation  Project  and  the 
Official  Aviation  Programme.  All  preparations,  both 
here  and  abroad,  were  based  upon  it,  and  the  coun- 
try's resources  were  pledged  to  its  fulfillment,  despite 
the  fact  that  it  was  somewhat  of  a  private  project, 
not  specifically  approved  or  disapproved  by  the  Gen- 
eral Staff  of  the  Army,  but  allowed  to  continue  on 
the  basis  that  as  much  of  it  could  be  carried  out  as 
would  not  disrupt  the  preparations  of  the  general 
military  establishment. 

The  capital  point  of  this  programme  was  that  it 
was  immensely  disproportionate  both  to  any  military 
force  that  the  United  States  ever  expected  to  put  into 
France  and  to  any  ratio  between  airplanes  and  ground 
troops  ever  achieved  by  any  belligerent  power.  It 
provided,  in  short,  for  an  aerial  arm  beyond  the 
most  extreme  needs  of  any  expected  American  army 
and  beyond  any  force  that  Allies  or  enemies  had  been 
able  to  build  —  and  this  in  view  of  no  scientific 
knowledge,  experience,  or  plant  in  this  country  upon 

232 


EEAL  MEANING  OF  THE  PROGRAMME 

which  to  build,  in  view  of  nothing  indeed  but  raw 
materials  and  imagination. 

America  had  been  asked  and  had  agreed  to  maintain 
4,500  planes  on  the  front,  as  against  a  total  of  but 
1,700  French  planes  then  actually  in  the  zone  of 
advance  after  three  years  of  war.  A  total  of  260 
service  squadrons1  (120  pursuit,  80  observation,  and 
60  bombing),  exclusive  of  36  training  and  90  replace- 
ment squadrons,  were  called  for  by  June  30,  1919, 
which,  with  all  the  service  of  the  rear,  it  was  esti- 
mated in  September,  1917,  would  require  a  force  of 
125,837  Air  Service  men  in  France.  This,  it  must 
be  remembered,  was  in  the  days  when  America  was 
talking  of  sending  only  a  small  ground  army  over- 
seas, primarily  to  carry  the  American  flag  to  the 
front,  heighten  Allied  morale,  and  have  a  general 
"moral  effect"  on  the  enemy. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  this  American  air  force  was 
originally  conceived  as  an  American  military  con- 

i  The  composition  and  personnel  of  the  several  types  of  ser- 
vice squadrons  was  as  follows: 

Monoplace  pursuit  squadron:  31  officers,  including  25  fliers, 
181  enlisted  men. 

Biplace  pursuit  squadron:  55  officers,  including  50  fliers, 
181  enlisted  men. 

Observation  squadron:  43  officers,  including  38  fliers,  186 
enlisted  men. 

Day-bombing  squadron:  49  officers,  including  44  fliers,  181 
enlisted  men. 

Night -bombing  squadron,  single-engined  planes:  49  officers, 
including  44  fliers,  181  enlisted  men. 

Night-bombing  squadron,  multi-engined  planes:  27  officers, 
including  22  fliers,  216  enlisted  men. 

Eequirements  of  planes  and  engines  for  replacements  were, 
in  general,  as  follows: 

Planes  operating  in  daylight :  16  machines  per  squadron  per 
month. 

Planes  operating  at  night :  Five  machines  and  seven  engines 
per  squadron  per  month. 

233 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

tribution  entirely  distinct  from  any  other  military 
effort  that  might  be  made.  Pilots  could  be  trained 
in  this  country  and  all  the  maze  of  industries  brought 
to  bear  to  turn  out  over  here  material  that  for  the 
space  required  to  ship  it  would  have  supreme  military 
value.  Obviously  a  thousand  fliers  would  far  out- 
value a  thousand  infantry,  and  their  equipment  would 
require  relatively  small  cargo  space.  Consequently 
the  contemplated  American  Air  Service  began  to  be 
spoken  of  as  a  great  international  striking  force, 
destined  to  turn  the  scale  wherever  it  might  be  sent, 
and  with  only  a  portion,  often  set  at  one-quarter, 
used  with  specific  American  troops. 

The  execution  of  this  original  programme,  how- 
ever, increased  in  difficulty  and  the  programme  itself 
in  size  with  each  elucidation  of  it  made  possible  by 
fresh  information  from  overseas.  For  instance, 
Secret  Document  Number  2  of  April  8,  1918,  esti- 
mated the  total  strength  needed  in  France  by  June 
30,  1919,  at  153,054  officers  and  men,  as  against  the 
September,  1917,  A.  E.  F.  estimate  of  125,837.  The 
total  flying  personnel,  exclusive  of  replacements,  it 
set  at  11,606,  whereas  an  A.  E.  F.  letter  of  June  7 
following  set  it  at  16,550  pilots  and  13,314  observers, 
and  a  Control  Board  analysis  of  June  4,  figuring 
wastage  at  40  per  cent,  for  pursuit  pilots,  20  per 
cent,  for  observers  and  day  bombers,  and  10  per  cent, 
for  night  bombers,  reached  a  total  of  34,572  fliers. 

Even  at  that  time,  even  after  the  enormous  increase 
over  anticipation  of  the  American  ground  army,  this 
air  force  remained  disproportionate  both  to  our  own 
vast  military  programme  and  to  the  British  and 
French  ratios.  The  A.  E.  F.  programme  provided 

234 


REAL  MEANING  OF  THE  PROGRAMME 

672  planes  per  100,000  rifles,  as  against  the  actual 
numbers  in  operation  in  May,  1918,  of  374  with  the 
French  and  294  with  the  British.  On  the  French 
basis  America's  aerial  programme  would  have  been 
sufficient  for  an  army  of  6,000,000  men,  and  on  the 
British  basis,  of  7,000,000.  Indeed,  the  American 
programme  would  have  provided  by  June  30, 1919,  as  s~ 
many  planes  on  the  front  as  all  the  Allies  together  v^ 
had  on  July  30, 1918,  and  nearly  double  the  combined 
airplane  equipment  of  the  German  and  Austrian 
forces. 

Just  at  this  point  it  is  well  to  examine  the  figures 
carefully  in  order  finally  to  explode  the  prevalent 
exaggeration  as  to  total  airplanes  in  use,  an  exaggera- 
tion which  so  seriously  led  astray  both  officials  and 
public  in  this  country.  On  July  30,  1918,  at  the 
inauguration  of  the  Allied  offensive  which  resulted 
in  victory,  the  total  Allied  aerial  force  in  service  from 
the  North  Sea  to  the  Adriatic  was  5,528  planes  and 
164  balloons.  At  the  same  time  the  total  German 
and  Austrian  strength  was  3,309  planes  and  194 
balloons.  The  contrast  between  these  figures  of 
August  1,  1918,  with  unofficial  publicity  campaigns 
in  the  United  States  only  a  year  before  for  "a  fleet 
of  100,000  airplanes "  shows  strikingly  how  preposter- 
ously misinformed  this  country  was.  That  no  official 
attempt  was  made  until  early  in  1918  to  throw  the 
various  Air  Services  into  true  perspective  is  an  indi- 
cation of  official  lack  of  vision  as  to  the  difficulty  of 
the  task  undertaken;  it  was  an  omission  which  cost 
dearly  when  popular  opinion  rose  in  criticism.  The 
contrast  is  all  the  sharper  because  a  year  before  the 
belligerent  services  had  been  very  much  smaller,  the 

235 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

French,  for  instance,  having  increased  40  per  cent, 
within  the  year. 

To  go  into  detail,  the  French  Air  Service,  the 
largest  of  all,  had  but  2,820  active  planes  on  the 
front  on  July  30,  1918,  including  1,440  observation, 
945  pursuit,  225  day-bombing,  and  210  night-bombing.  ,  / 
The  British  had  a  total  of  1,664  active  planes,  with  ^ 
but  390  observation,  911  pursuit,  194  day-bombing, 
and  169  night-bombing.  Italy  stood  next  among  the 
Allies  with  614,  including  277  observation,  282  pur- 
suit, eight  day-bombing,  and  47  night-bombing.  The 
United  States,  which  was  just  beginning  to  appear  on 
the  front,  had  270,  with  126  each  observation  and  pur- 
suit, and  18  day-bombing.  Belgium  had  160  planes, 
including  105  observation,  45  pursuit,  and  10  night- 
bombing.  On  the  enemy  side,  Germany  was  credited 
by  the  French  with  2,592  planes,  including  1,290  ob- 
servation, 1,080  pursuit,  no  day-bombing,  and  222 
night-bombing,  while  Austria  was  credited  by  Italy 
with  717  active  planes,  including  200  observation, 
450  pursuit,  no  day-bombing,  and  67  night-bombing. 
These  figures,  of  course,  take  into  account  only  active 
service  planes,  and  do  not  consider  service  planes  out 
of  commission,  replacements,  or  training  planes;  nor 
do  they  show  the  number  of  pilots,  as  most  of  these 
types  carry  more  than  one  flier  and  all  require  re- 
placement three  or  more  times  a  year. 

Despite  the  unparalleled  expansion  of  the  object 
sought  to  be  attained,  preparations  had  been  made 
in  the  first  year  of  the  programme  on  a  scale  fully 
commensurate  with  it.  These  preparations  had  in- 
deed fallen  very  far  short  of  fulfillment,  but  they 
stood  nevertheless  as  an  outline  of  what  had  to  be 

236 


HEAL  MEANING  OF  THE  PROGRAMME 

done  and  provided  a  basis  both  of  training  and  pro- 
duction facilities.  The  reorganized  Air  Service  had, 
therefore,  to  meet  the  question  whether  to  continue 
in  the  pathway  laid  out  by  the  original  administra- 
tion in  this  first  year  or  to  strike  out  along  radically 
new  lines.  The  bitter  critics  of  what  had  been  done 
to  date  urged  that  the  slate  be  wiped  entirely  clean 
and  a  wholly  fresh  start  made.  In  the  general  chaos 
of  misunderstanding  which  prevailed,  anything  was 
urged  so  long  as  it  was  different. 

Nothing  of  the  kind,  however,  was  done.  Aircraft 
development  was  continued  along  exactly  the  same 
lines  as  those  on  which  it  had  started.  Both  in  pro- 
duction and  in  operations  the  essential  soundness  of 
the  original  foundations  was  recognized.  Weak 
places  were  bolstered  up,  rough  edges  smoothed  off, 
various  necessary  additions  put  on,  and  the  whole 
great  mechanism,  which  had  assembled  almost  by  the 
spontaneity  of  its  individual  elements,  was  adjusted 
into  a  more  smoothly  running  machine.  Indeed, 
perfecting  of  the  existing  machinery  rather  than  the 
institution  of  a  new  one  was  the  end  sought  by  the 
new  administration. 

At  the  very  start,  however,  a  great  difficulty  was 
encountered  in  organization.  The  upheaval  in  the 
higher  administration  which  had  taken  the  Air  Ser- 
vice out  of  the  Signal  Corps  had  not  set  up  a  new  and 
unified  service,  but  had  created  two  mutually  inde- 
pendent bureaus,  Aircraft  Production  and  Military 
Aeronautics.  This  necessitated  the  separation  of 
various  functions  that  previously  had  been  joint,  such 
as  administration  of  finances,  control  of  supply  depots 
and  warehouses,  and  other  business  details.  But 

237 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

more  serious  than  that,  it  created  an  unnatural  ob- 
stacle both  to  the  selection  of  types  of  planes  having 
the  best  balance  of  military  value  with  ease  of  manu- 
facture and  to  the  proper  coordination  of  the  pro- 
duction and  the  personnel  elements  of  the  Service. 

After  only  three  months  this  weakness  was  recog- 
nized in  the  final  major  step  in  reorganization,  when 
on  August  27  Mr.  Ryan  was  appointed  Second  As- 
sistant Secretary  of  War  and  Director  of  Air  Service, 
responsible  for  both  production  and  personnel.  This 
at  once  gave  the  Service  a  prestige  above  that  of  any 
other  branch  of  the  military  establishment,  and 
marked  a  long  advance  from  the  time  when  aviation 
was  but  a  section  of  a  branch  in  itself  very  modest. 
It  was  a  step  also  towards  meeting  the  strong  popular 
and  Congressional  demand  for  an  Air  Service  entirely 
separate  from  the  War  and  Navy  Departments,  for 
which  justification  was  found  in  the  experiences  of 
the  independent  British  and  French  Air  Ministries. 

Had  the  war  lasted  longer,  this  change  would  have 
been  very  important.  As  it  was,  however,  Mr.  Ryan 
left  almost  immediately  for  France,  arriving  on  Sep- 
tember 8  and  leaving  for  home  on  the  30th,  and  his 
war  term  was  too  short  for  big  results  to  work  them- 
selves out.  As  he  himself  said  in  his  letter  of  resig- 
nation, ten  days  after  the  armistice  was  signed :  * '  I 
have  not  taken  over  the  actual  direction  of  Military 
Aeronautics  and  my  connection  with  it  has  not  made 
any  real  change  in  its  operations." 

To  follow  through  the  detailed  lines  of  development 
of  the  programme,  the  actual  achievements  in  pro- 
duction may  first  be  discussed,  as  shortage  of  equip- 
ment had  been  throughout  the  war  the  limiting  factor. 

238 


EEAL  MEANING  OF  THE  PROGRAMME 

Mr.  Ryan,  after  a  careful  survey  of  the  situation 
when  he  first  took  office,  determined  to  continue  on 
the  existing  lines,  though  on  a  much  amplified  and 
better  coordinated  scale.  The  Liberty  Motor,  the 
climax  of  the  first  year's  industrial  effort,  on  which 
America's  aviation-engine  industry  had  been  concen- 
trated and  the  Allied  programmes  largely  based,  was 
endorsed  to  the  limit.  No  further  proof  is  needed 
than  that,  whereas  there  had  been  but  22,500  on 
order  in  May,  and  those  of  the  12-cylinder  type  only, 
on  November  11  there  was  on  order  44,100  of  that 
type  and  8,000  of  the  eight-cylinder  type,  or  more  than 
double. 

The  motor  had  early  made  good  in  actual  service. 
In  July  Vice-Admiral  Sims  cabled  that  a  test  of  a 
Liberty-Motored  seaplane  gave  "better  climbing  and 
load  carrying"  than  similar  planes  with  one  of  the 
best  English  motors.  British  officials  endorsed  it  un- 
reservedly, the  Air  Ministry  on  September  26  cabling : 
"Information  officially  expressed  four  months  ago  to 
effect  that  engine  would  prove  satisfactory  in  service 
fully  confirmed. ' '  On  August  28  Mr.  Ryan  said : 

Everyone  of  our  allies  is  calling  for  Liberty  engines, 
demanding  them,  finding  it  impossible  to  meet  their  own 
production  of  planes  with  engines  for  them.  They  are  all 
relying  on  our  production  of  Liberty  engines,  not  for  a 
few  engines  but  for  a  large  part  of  their  programme.  They 
all  now  have  Liberty  engines  and  have  tested  them  and 
tried  them  out.  Particularly  the  English  say  to  us :  "  We 
saw  it  first.  We  knew  it  was  a  good  engine  before  you 
admitted  it  was."  And  they  are  satisfied  with  it  and  de- 
manding numbers  that  are  out  of  the  question  for  us  to 
meet —  that  is,  they  will  take  more  engines  than  we  can 
make.  Remember  this,  that  there  has  never  been  on  either 

239 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

side  of  this  war  a  sufficient  number  of  engines.  That  is 
the  limiting  factor  in  any  air  programme  on  both  sides  of 
the  war. 

Perhaps  the  final  judgment  on  the  'Liberty  Motor 
may  be  left  to  Mr.  Hughes'  report : 

It  now  appears  to  be  conclusively  established  that  the     f 
Liberty  engine  is  a  great  success  for  observation  and  bomb-  ^ 
ing  planes  and  that  it  has  found  high  favor  with  the  Allies. 
It  is  too  heavy  for  the  lighter  pursuit  planes    ...    for 
which,  indeed,  the  12-cylinder  type  had  not  been  designed. 

Meanwhile,  as  the  factories  tooled  up  and  began  to 
swing  into  their  full  efficiency,  the  early  delays  in 
production  ceased.  Mr.  Hughes  says : 

There  is  slight  ground  for  criticism  by  reason  of  loss  of 
time  in  perfecting  the  Liberty  Motor.  The  difficulties  were 
inherent  in  the  task  and  the  task  itself  was  worth  while. 
The  weight  of  opinion  is  that  it  would  have  taken  about  as 
long  to  put  any  other  high-power  motor  into  successful 
quantity  production  in-  this  country,  according  to  our 
methods  of  manufacture,  as  it  has  taken  to  develop  the 
Liberty  Motor. 

The  production  curve  went  steadily  up.  Whereas 
620  Liberties  had  been  delivered  in  the  month  of  May, 
the  figures  rose  to  1,102  in  June,  1,589  in  July,  2,297 
in  August,  2,367  in  September,  and  3,878  in  October.  > 
By  November  11,  13,574  had  been  turned  out,  9,929  V 
of  the  Army  and  3,645  of  the  Navy  type,  with  a  daily 
production  rate  of  around  150.  Of  the  Army  type, 
2,474  had  been  shipped  overseas,  1,464  were  at  ports 
or  in  transit,  4,777  had  been  delivered  to  manu- 
facturers to  install  in  planes,  and  981  had  gone  to  the 
British,  six  to  the  French,  three  to  the  Italians,  174 

240 


REAL  MEANING  OF  THE  PROGRAMME 

to  the  flying  fields  here,  and  50  to  the  Navy.  Of  the 
Navy  type,  2,432  had  been  delivered  to  Naval  Avia- 
tion, 26  had  been  floated  or  were  awaiting  shipment, 
and  147  had  gone  to  manufacturers,  31  to  the  French, 
two  to  the  British,  two  to  the  Italian,  and  five  to 
American  flying  fields. 

Furthermore,  the  Hispano-Suiza  engine,  which  had 
been  started  to  production  early  in  the  original  pro- 
gramme but  not  vigorously  pushed,  was  greatly  stimu- 
lated. The  180-horse  power  type  was  authorized  to 
a  total  of  4,000,  of  which,  by  November  11,  469  had 
been  delivered  with  245  shipped  overseas,  and  a  con- 
stantly accelerating  rate  of  production  had  been 
reached.  .  The  300-horse  power  type  was  authorized 
to  the  number  of  10,000,  and  although  only  eight  were 
delivered  to  November  11,  the  hope  of  early  and  rapid 
production  was  good.  The  Bugatti  engine,  with  2,000 
on  order,  was  perfected  in  time  to  send  overseas  in 
the  week  before  the  armistice  the  first  four  motors  of 
the  eight  produced. 

At  the  termination  of  hostilities  there  were  68,100 
service  engines  and  20,892  training  engines  on  order  S* 
in  this  country,  a  total  of  88,992.  A  total  of  14,059  ^ 
service  and  15,789  training  engines  had  been  delivered, 
a  final  total  for  the  warj£23£4&r~ .J£hese  figures  bear 
study.  Only  HT  months  before  the  aviation-engine 
industry  had  been  practically  non-existent.  During 
that  time  the  Liberty  Motor  had  been  developed  as 
the  premier  quantity-production  heavy  engine  in  the 
Allied  programme;  the  Hispano-Suiza  in  four  types, 
the  Gnome  and  the  Le  Khone  rotary  engines,  and  the 
Bugatti  cannon  motor  had  been  adapted  from  foreign 
models;  and  the  training-engine  problem  had  ceased 

241 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

to  be.  In  fact,  the  complex  aviation-engine  problem 
stood  solved. 

The  problem  of  planes,  however,  which  was  re- 
garded abroad  as  far  simpler,  was  still  unsettled. 
The  cancellation  in  November,  1917,  of  the  original 
contract  for  3,000  single-seater  Spads  had  left  the 
Government  without  a  single-seater  pursuit  plane. 
As  time  wore  on,  the  early  overseas  statements  that 
the  single-seater  was  to  be  replaced  by  the  two-seater 
fighter  proved  more  and  more  incorrect,  as  was 
strikingly  shown  by  the  fact  that  the  final  overseas 
programme  of  August  24  called  for  60  single-seater 
squadrons  out  of  a  total  of  202.  During  April  and 
May  the  A.  E.  F.  expressed  increasing  solicitude  for 
a  supply  of  single-seaters,  and  as  a  result  a  contract 
was  given  to  the  Curtiss  Company  for  1,000  of  the 
S.E.-5  plane,  a  British  plane  which  could  be  produced 
most  easily  here ;  it  was  just  coming  through  when  the 
armistice  was  signed. 

Meanwhile,  the  planes  of  the  other  extreme,  the 
heavy  night  bombers,  Handley-Page  and  Caproni, 
were  under  development.  The  former,  driven 
through  under  the  stimulus  of  the  tremendous  Anglo- 
American  night-bombardment  agreement  (described 
in  Chapter  XVI)  and  by  the  presence  of  a  dozen 
British  engineers,  first  took  the  air  at  the  Standard 
factory  at  Elizabeth,  New  Jersey,  on  July  5. 
Christened  the  "Langley"  in  honor  of  America's 
pioneer  aviator,  with  Lord  "William  Semphill  of  the 
British  Air  Service  as  the  driver,  Major-General 
Kenly,  chief  of  the  American  Service  as  a  passenger, 
and  Assistant  Secretaries  of  War  Crowell  and  Ryan 
among  the  spectators,  the  9,000-pound  monster  with 

242 


REAL  MEANING  OF  THE  PROGRAMME 

its  twin  Liberty  Motors  and  its  100-feet  wing  spread, 
carrying  on  its  nose  the  Stars  and  Stripes  and  the 
Union  Jack,  performed  in  splendid  fashion  to  the 
exhilaration  of  a  crowd  of  5,000  people.  It  was 
credited  unofficially  with  a  ceiling  of  14,000  feet,  a 
speed  of  97  miles  an  hour,  and  a  radius  of  flight  of 
600  miles. 

Mr.  Ryan  took  this  occasion  of  success  to  make  some 
generous  remarks  about  the  original  aircraft  admin- 
istrators. As  quoted  in  the  New  York  Times,  he  said : 

There  has  been  great  dissatisfaction  expressed  by  the 
people  of  the  country  at  the  results  obtained  up  to  the 
present  in  the  production  of  aircraft.  Some  of  it  has  been 
warranted  —  most  of  it  has  been  caused  by  expectations 
beyond  the  possibility  of  performance.  Much  good  work 
has  been  done  by  my  predecessors  and  I  am  taking  this 
opportunity  to  assure  the  people  of  the  country  that,  in 
my  opinion,  there  has  been  no  such  delay  with  the  work 
or  anything  like  such  incapacity  of  those  in  charge  as  has 
been  indicated  in  some  of  the  criticisms  of  the  accomplish- 
ments, or  lack  of  them,  in  production. 

Production  of  Handley-Page  parts  began  soon  after 
the  test.  The  first  10  sets  were  shipped  overseas  on 
July  25  to  be  assembled  in  British  shops,  tested  in 
American-built  fields  and  airdromes,  and  manned  by 
American  aviators.  Up  to  November  11,  101  boxes 
of  parts  about  85  per  cent,  complete  had  been  shipped 
to  England,  where  their  rapid  assemblage  and  opera- 
tion was  assured. 

The  Caproni  plane  with  its  three  Liberty  Motors 
had  its  first  test  on  July  4  at  Mineola,  Long  Island, 
before  an  equally  notable  assembly.  Although  it 
gave  fairly  good  satisfaction,  there  was  a  continuance 

243 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

of  the  early  delay  between  the  Italian  engineers  who 
designed  it  and  the  American  officials,  so  that  at  the 
termination  of  hostilities  it  was  still  awaiting  its  final 
official  test  at  Dayton.  The  schedules  called  for  its 
production  to  begin  in  March,  1919. 

Progress  was  being  made  meanwhile  in  two-seater 
observation  and  other  bombing  planes.  One  of  the 
early  acts  of  the  new  Air  Service  administration  was 
definitely  to  abandon  the  ill-fated  Liberty  Bristol, 
which  in  attempts  to  adapt  a  light  body  about  the 
heavy  Liberty  Motor  had  cost  the  lives  of  four 
aviators,  tied  up  the  facilities  of  one  of  the  largest 
factories,  and  caused  a  money  loss  of  several  million 
dollars.  As  announced  on  July  27,  the  plane  was 
"  overpowered  and  not  of  military  value,  lacking 
manoauvrability  and  not  having  sufficient  speed  for 
war  purposes. "  However,  another  British  Bristol 
was  brought  across  which  performed  splendidly  with 
a  Hispano-Suiza  motor,  so  that  2,500  of  this  type 
were  authorized,  and  hopes  were  entertained  that  a 
good  two-seater  fighter  would  soon  be  available. 

Coincident  with  this  admitted  failure  was  the 
promising  development  work  of  Captain  Le  Pere,  who 
had  been  brought  over  from  France  to  design  a  special 
two-seater  plane  about  the  Liberty  Motor.  Of  three 
types  flown,  one  was  credited  by  the  Technical  Sec- 
tion with  the  high  speed  of  132  miles  an  hour  at  6,000 
feet  and  127  at  10,000  feet,  a  ceiling  of  20,000  feet, 
and  unusual  climbing  and  manoeuvring  ability.  Two 
of  the  first  planes  built  arrived  overseas  in  October 
for  examination  by  the  A.  E.  F.,  with  the  idea,  if  they 
were  approved,  of  going  into  heavy  production  of  the 
3,500  authorized. 

244 


' 


REAL  MEANING  OF  THE  PROGRAMME 

Another  most  promising  plane  was  the  two-seater 
monoplane  developed  by  Grover  C.  Loening,  one  of 
America's  few  aeronautical  engineers  at  the  outbreak 
of  the  war.  In  tests  just  after  the  armistice  was 
signed  it  was  credited  with  a  speed  of  145  miles  an 
hour  with  full  military  load,  including  four  guns, 
which  made  it  faster  than  any  European  single-seater 
combat  plane,  and  established  another  record  by 
climbing  25,000  feet  in  remarkable  time  with  two 
passengers.  Much  smaller  than  the  De  Havilaftd-4, 
it  weighed  but  2,400  pounds  loaded  for  the  air,  prac- 
tically the  same  as  a  single-seater  scout,  was  driven 
by  a  300-horse  power  Hispano-Suiza  motor,  carried 
fuel  for  three  and  a  half  hours,  and  gave  a  range  of 
vision  half  as  large  again  as  any  otHer  plane 
developed. 

At  the  same  time  the  Pomilio  brothers,  who  had 
been  brought  here  with  about  30  designers  and  work- 
men from  great  success  in  Italy,  were  progressing 
favorably  at  Indianapolis  with  both  a  single-seater 
with  an  eight-cylinder  Liberty  and  a  two-seater  day 
bomber  with  a  12-cylinder,  six  of  each  of  which  were 
on  order.  At  the  termination  of  hostilities,  also,  the 
Martin  bomber  had  been  approved  and  50  of  this 
type  had  been  ordered,  and  10  Loening  planes  were 
under  construction. 

Thus,  to  a  limited  extent,  the  statement  made  by 
William  C.  Potter,  Assistant  Chief  of  Production,  that 
there  was  not  an  aeronautical  engineer  in  the  United 
States  in  the  spring  of  1918  capable  of  building  a 
plane  fit  for  battle,  was  being  overcome.  With  the 
aid  of  foreign  experts,  including  Captain  Le  Pere, 
the  Pomilios,  Captain  d'Annunzio  and  his  Caproni 

245 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

experts,  and  a  dozen  Handley-Page  designers,  the  ex- 
perience gained  by  the  Allies  in  three  bitter  years  of 
struggle  in  this  complex  work  was  being  disseminated 
throughout  the  American  technical  fiejld. 

There  remains  for  discussion  the  De  Haviland-4, 
the  only  American-built  battle  plane  to  see  service  on 
the  front.  About  this  plane  beat  a  furore  of  criticism 
and  doubt.  After  the  original  public  outburst 
against  the  Air  Service  in  April  and  May,  a  danger- 
ous recurrence  broke  out  in  July  when  details  of  an 
A.  E.  F.  cable  requesting  changes  in  the  plane  leaked 
out  ift  exaggerated  form.  Finally  the  rumors  became 
so  alarming  that  Secretary  Baker  on  July  31  said : 

General  Pershing  has  requested  a  large  shipment  of  De 
Haviland  planes  of  the  present  type  on  the  priority 
schedule  for  August.  The  purpose  of  this  is  to  set  at  rest 
the  statement  which  was  made  from  some  quarter  that  no 
more  De  Haviland  planes  would  be  shipped,  because  he 
has  asked  for  a  very  large  shipment  of  De  Havilands  of 
the  present  type. 

Then  on  August  17  came  the  cable: 

First  complete  squadron  American  De  Haviland-4  planes 
with  Liberty  Motors  crossed  the  German  lines  on  inde- 
pendent reconnaissance  mission  August  7.  All  planes  re- 
turned safely. 

This,  the  first  flight  of  American-built  planes  over 
the  front,  aroused  great  enthusiasm  in  "Washington, 
and  the  message  was  shortly  made  public  by  Secre- 
tary Baker  in  order  to  quiet  the  false  reports. 

Two  months  later  Mr.  Ryan  returned  from  the 
front,  where  he  had  seen  the  American  Air  Service 
in  action  at  St.  Mihiel  and  in  the  Argonne.  In  a 
statement  of  October  16  he  said : 

246 


EEAL  MEANING  OF  THE  PROGRAMME 

The  United  States  De  Haviland  planes  were  in  general 
use  for  observation  and  day  bombing  in  both  the  St.  Mihiel 
and  the  Argonne  attacks  and  the  pilots  were  to  a  man  en- 
thusiastic as  to  their  performance,  and  while  individual 
pilots  and  commanders  had  suggestions  as  to  improvements 
and  betterments  that  might  be  made,  they  were  individual 
and  seldom  indicated  anything  more  than  a  personal  prefer- 
ence for  some  rearrangement  of  details.  The  commanders 
of  all  the  squadrons  using  De  Haviland  planes  as  well  as 
planes  of  British  and  French  manufacture  for  like  pur- 
poses, told  me  that  the  pilots  in  every  case  would  prefer  to 
take  a  De  Haviland  machine  with  a  Liberty  engine  over 
the  line  rather  than  any  machine  of  a  like  type.  This  is 
due  to  the  fact  that  the  machine  is  fast  and  for  one  of  its 
type  is  quite  maneuverable ;  that  it  climbs  well  and  the 
pilots  all  agreed  is  a  very  efficient  machine  for  the  uses  for 
which  it  is  intended. 

The  official  figures  on  the  Be  Haviland  are  interest- 
ing. It  was  credited  in  a  Technical  Section  report 
with  a  ceiling  of  19,500  feet,  a  ground  speed  of  124.7 
miles  an  hour,  a  speed  of  120  miles  an  hour  at  6,500 
feet,  117  miles  at  10,000  feet,  and  113  at  15,000 
feet.  Its  endurance,  which  was  much  criticized  at 
first,  was  given  as  two  hours  and  13  minutes  with  full 
throttle  at  6,500  feet,  and  three  hours  and  three 
minutes  at  half  throttle. 

Production  had  increased  at  a  most  gratifying  rate. 
Up  to  November  11,  of  the  8,500  ordered,  3,431 
planes,  combining  all  the  best  and  latest  details  in  the 
complicated  science  of  aviation,  had  been  turned  out 
by  American  factories,  with  a  final  week's  record  at 
the  termination  of  hostilities  of  260  machines.  The 
total  number  actually  shipped  for  the  front  stood  at 
2,000,  with  644  for  the  final  month  of  October,  496 
at  Hoboken  awaiting  shipment,  and  112  en  route  to 

247 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

the  Atlantic  seaboard  when  the  armistice  came  to  sus- 
pend hostilities. 

Thus  America  stood  in  regard  to  planes  at  the 
signing  of  the  armistice  —  a  successful  De  Haviland 
observation  and  day  bomber  in  quantity  production 
and  general  use  on  the  front ;  the  Le  Pere  two-seater 
fighter  awaiting  approval  in  France,  and  the  Bristol 
with  Hispano  motor  approved ;  the  Pomilio,  Loening, 
and  Martin  planes  developing  a  new  line;  the 
Handley-Page  night  bomber  in  fair-sized  production ; 
the  Caproni  night  bomber  flying  but  not  yet  ac- 
cepted; and  the  S.E.-5  single-seater  just  coming  out. 
"Whereas  19  months  before  the  United  States  had 
possessed  less  than  300  very  second-rate  planes,  it 
now  had  authorized  12,508  training  and  29,854  ser- 
vice planes,  with  deliveries  of  over  3,500  service 
planes  and  7,820  training  planes.  For  actual  battle 
service  there  were  being  turned  out  150  Liberty 
Motors  a  day  and  240  De  Haviland  planes  a  week. 

Beyond  the  primary  question  of  planes  and  en- 
gines, the  maze  of  complicated  equipment  required 
completely  baffles  description.  As  already  shown,  the 
Government  had  gone  into  scores  of  collateral  busi- 
nesses to  provide  all  the  paraphernalia  needed  in 
order  to  assure  the  final  plane  assembler  both  of 
sufficient  numbers  and  of  the  highest  quality  of  ma- 
terial. Practically  every  phase  of  this  work  was  in 
a  virgin  field,  and  practically  every  unit  in  it  was 
vitally  essential.  All,  therefore,  had  to  come  through 
into  production  in  unison,  despite  the  difficulties  of 
design,  manufacture,  and  changing  types. 

To  start  with  the  raw  materials  that  the  Govern- 
ment had  to  provide,  the  most  spectacular,  spruce 

248 


EEAL  MEANING  OF  THE  PROGRAMME 

from  the  Northwest,  had  required  logging  operations 
unparalleled  in  history.  The  force  of  soldiers  thrown 
into  these  primeval  forests  had  increased  to  over 
30,000  by  the  termination  of  hostilities,  with  logging 
railroads,  donkey  engines,  mills,  and  all  the  other 
noise  and  bustle  of  lumbering  breaking  in  on  the  vast 
silence  to  convert  the  forest  patriarchs  into  the  most 
romantic  and  beautiful  of  war's  weapons.  In  mid- 
August  the  United  States  Spruce  Production  Corpo- 
ration was  formed  by  the  Government,  on  the  lines  of 
the  Emergency  Fleet  Corporation,  in  order  to 
facilitate  the  business  management  of  this  great 
project  and  to  allow  the  Allies,  who  previously  had 
paid  the  same  price  for  spruce  as  the  United  States, 
to  bear  their  proportional  share  of  the  expenses  of 
production.  Up  to  November  11  the  enormous  total 
of  103,092,000  feet  of  spruce  had  been  cut,  of  which 
there  had  been  allotted  25,472,000  feet  to  the  Air 
Service,  36,877,000  to  England,  22,929,000  to  France, 
9,147,000  to  Italy,  and  8,667,000  to  the  Navy.  In 
addition,  a  great  amount  of  Douglas  fir  and  Port 
Orford  cedar  had  been  cut,  bringing  the  total  lumber 
produced  to  179,230,000  feet  board  measure,  sufficient 
to  meet  American  demands  and  provide  123,942,000 
feet  to  relieve  the  Allies'  serious  shortage. 

The  cotton  fabric  that  had  been  developed  as  a 
substitute  to  meet  the  world  exhaustion  of  linen  for 
airplane  wings  had  proved  so  successful  that  it  was 
used  for  both  training  and  service  planes,  although 
originally  the  best  hopes  had  been  that  it  would  be 
available  only  for  the  former.  Up  to  November  11, 
6,928,000  yards  had  been  produced.  At  the  same 
time,  dope,  the  varnish-like  substance  used  to  stretch 

249 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

and  make  the  wing  covering  moisture-proof,  had  come 
into  good  production  through  the  half-dozen  plants 
financed  by  the  Government;  484,000  gallons  had 
been  produced  by  November  11. 

It  would  be  almost  hopeless  to  try  to  enumerate  all 
the  accessories  necessary.  For  instance,  34,958  pro- 
pellers had  been  delivered;  71,000  machine-guns  of 
five  different  types,  with  nearly  half  shipped  overseas ; 
11,000  synchronizing  devices  to  allow  firing  through 
the  propeller ;  15,000  gun  mounts ;  86,000  gun  sights ; 
nearly  100,000  gun  yokes ;  114,000  bomb  sights ;  5,400 
bomb  releases;  and  95,000  flares.  Of  29  different 
kinds  of  instruments  and  other  accessories,  such  as 
altimeters,  speed  indicators,  clocks,  compasses,  fire 
extinguishers,  inclometers,  oxygen  apparatus,  safety 
belts,  and  the  like,  over  200,000  units  had  been  de- 
livered and  appreciable  shipments  made  overseas. 
Over  1,400  observation  and  enlarging  cameras  had 
been  made,  with  much  other  photographic  apparatus, 
and  nearly  a  score  of  thousands  of  radio  receiving  and 
transmitting  sets  and  other  equipment.  Of  hangars, 
1,424  steel  and  2,500  canvas  had  been  produced,  and 
of  balloons,  507,  with  much  f  erro-silicon,  caustic  soda, 
cable,  cylinders,  and  winches.  A  large  clothing 
organization  also  had  been  built  up  to  equip  airmen 
properly,  as  may  be  seen  from  a  production,  among 
other  articles,  of  52,000  goggles,  82,000  helmets, 
23,000  sweaters,  33,000  hoods,  7,400  chin  guards, 
30,000  winter  and  summer  flying  suits,  and  moccasins, 
gauntlets,  anti-sinking  coats,  face  masks,  knitted 
scarves,  flying  gloves,  and  mechanics'  and  construc- 
tion men's  outfits. 

At  the  close  of  the  war,  then,  production  of  the 
250 


KEAL  MEANING  OF  THE  PROGRAMME 

hundreds  of  kinds  of  specialized  equipment  needed 
for  the  Air  Service  was  under  way  in  all  its  branches, 
and  each  little  channel  was  beginning  to  carry  its 
precious  freight  into  the  main  stream  towards  a  per- 
fectly equipped  fighting  organization.  Dates  of  de- 
livery had  been  set  back  time  and  again  by  unexpected 
difficulties  and  some  elements  had  reached  production 
before  others.  Advanced-training  equipment  was 
still  inadequate,  and  battle-plane  and  -engine  pro- 
duction was  still  disproportioned  because  of  lack  of 
light  fighting  and  scouting  machines,  but  with  every 
day  that  passed  the  unevennesses  were  being  ironed 
out  and  a  well  balanced  programme  being  approached. 
The  United  States  stood  on  November  11  as  the 
Allies'  certain  hope  in  aviation,  her  Liberty  and 
Hispano  motors,  her  De  Haviland  and  Handley-Page 
planes,  her  spruce  and  other  raw  materials  and  ac- 
cessories tried  and  proved,  with  an  inexhaustible 
storehouse  behind  them  just  opening  to  unparalleled 
strength. 

The  business  problems  involved  in  all  this  new  de- 
velopment were  complex  in  the  extreme.  First  and 
most  pressing  after  the  lack  of  experienced  com- 
panies, was  the  lack  of  capital  in  or  available  for  the 
airplane  industry.  At  the  outbreak  of  war  the  total 
capitalization  of  all  plane  and  engine  companies  com- 
bined did  not  pass  $15,000,000,  more  than  two-thirds 
of  which  was  concentrated  in  two  concerns.  The 
total  estimated  for  all  specific  plane  companies  was  * 
$6,419,000,  of  which  the  Curtiss  Company  alone  / 
claimed  $5,400,000,  while  Thomas-Morse  claimed 
$246,000 ;  Standard,  $220,000 ;  Dayton-Wright,  $122,- 

251 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

000;  and  Fisher  Body  Corporation,  nothing.  Out 
of  a  total  of  $6,650,000  invested  in  airplane-engine 
work,  Wright-Martin  claimed  $5,240,000;  Packard 
and  the  General  Vehicle  Company,  $500,000  each; 
and  Hall-Scott,  $290,000.  Not  over  6,000  men  were 
engaged  in  airplane  work  and  2,000  in  airplane 
engines. 

Aviation  up  to  that  time  had  not  commended  itself 
to  American  business  men,  and  there  was  no  reason 
to  expect  that  it  would  in  the  near  future.  Con- 
siderable money  had  been  lost  in  projects  that  never 
passed  the  experimental  stage,  and  an  unenviable 
reputation  had  attached  to  the  industry.  Moreover, 
with  every  week  of  the  war  money  became  scarcer 
and  capital  more  cautious,  and  it  finally  became  evi- 
dent that  private  financing  had  come  to  an  end  until 
the  return  of  peace.  Consequently,  large  loans  were 
made  by  the  Government  to  the  companies  who  came 
forward  in  generous  spirit  with  their  plants  and 
skilled  labor  to  contribute  their  part  towards  winning 
the  war  in  the  air,  despite  the  dubious  future  of  the 
industry  as  a  business  venture  after  the  war. 

No  experience  was  at  hand  for  the  establishment 
of  a  just  price  for  aviation  supplies.  The  complete 
lack  of  large-scale  production  up  to  that  time,  the 
informal  methods  of  manufacture,  and  the  absence 
of  a  steady  market  all  contributed  to  a  general  un- 
certainty as  to  the  actual  cost  of  production  and  the 
consequent  price  to  be  charged  the  Government. 
Government  auditors  at  once  sent  into  the  factories 
were  convinced  that  even  the  companies  themselves 
had  no  scientific  knowledge  of  costs.  There  was  no 
time,  however,  to  haggle  over  terms.  What  was 

252 


EEAL  MEANING  OF  THE  PROGRAMME 

needed  was  the  immediate  concentration  of  all 
thought  and  energy  on  the  task  of  enlarging  the 
factories,  training  labor,  and  getting  into  production, 
with  the  general  understanding  that  a  price  would 
be  paid  that  would  be  fair  to  both  parties. 

The  cost-plus  arrangement  was  accordingly  adopted, 
with  results  which  dispelled  the  immediate  financial 
confusion  and  proved  with  experience  to  be  gen- 
erally satisfactory.  A  "bogie"  price  was  set  by 
agreement  to  cover  the  estimated  actual  cost  of  pro- 
duction. On  this  a  fixed  profit  was  allowed  of  10 
to  15  per  cent,  according  to  circumstances,  with  addi- 
tional incentive  to  the  manufacturer  to  reduce  rather 
than  pad  his  expenses,  first  by  not  allowing  him  a 
percentage  on  any  costs  above  the  "bogie,"  and  sec- 
ond by  allowing  him  to  add  to  his  profits  a  quarter 
of  any  savings  effected  under  "bogie."  This  pro- 
vided as  adequate  protection  to  both  sides  as  was 
possible  in  the  rush  and  confusion  of  a  new  industry. 
When  experience  showed  the  "bogie"  to  be  high,  as 
in  most  cases  it  did,  a  readjustment  was  made  to 
correct  it.  This  happened  especially  in  the  case  of 
the  Liberty  Motor,  which  with  increased  skill  in  pro- 
duction was  reduced  in  "bogie"  nearly  50  per  cent. 

With  the  Government  willing  and  able  to  advance 
the  otherwise  unavailable  capital  needed  for  the  ex- 
pansion of  the  industry  and  a  fair  price  arrangement 
reached  by  means  of  the  cost-plus  agreements, 
American  manufacturers  threw  themselves  with  all 
earnestness  into  the  task  of  creating  almost  overnight 
a  wholly  new  industry  in  a  field  complex  beyond  all 
anticipation.  Factories  were  enormously  enlarged, 
labor  forces  increased  time  and  again,  and  the  most 

253 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

elaborate  and  expensive  machinery  bought,  all  with 
a  single  eye  to  quick  production  for  the  war. 

This  effort  wrought  a  great  change  in  American 
industry.  A  new  business  was  established  which  at 
the  termination  of  hostilities  had  acquired  the  ability 
to  turn  out  within  a  year's  time  the  billion  dollars 
worth  of  equipment  for  which  appropriations  had 
been  granted.  Also  a  new  skill  and  technique  had 
been  developed  that  allowed  American  factories  to 
turn  out  in  quantity  and  with  a  high  standard  of 
quality  the  delicate  equipment  which  abroad  could 
be  made  only  by  hand.  As  Secretary  Baker  said  in 
his  annual  report:  "The  success  achieved  in  secur- 
ing quantity  production  is  a  gratifying  commentary 
on  the  manufacturing  ability  of  this  country." 

The  amounts  of  money  actually  spent  by  the  Gov- 
ernment have  been  very  generally  misunderstood, 
sometimes  because  of  confusion  with  the  sums  appro- 
priated, and  sometimes  because  of  broad  charges  of 
corruption  and  inefficiency.  These  may  best  be  met 
perhaps  by  reference  to  Mr.  Hughes'  report,  which, 
while  criticizing  some  of  the  original  prices  as  perhaps 
high,  and  pointing  to  a  certain  waste  in  experiments 
and  delay  in  selecting  types,  contains  no  evidence  of 
actual  misappropriation  of  funds.  That  such  vast  sums 
were  handled  with  such  haste  and  informality  without 
any  trace  of  corruption  is  cause  for  gratification. 

The  actual  sums  spent  and  the  main  headings  under 
which  they  fall  may  be  touched  on  briefly.  Mr. 
Hughes  found  that  up  to  June  30,  1918,  the  actual 
disbursements  for  airplanes  and  engines  and  spare 
parts  of  both  (including  payments  for  experimental 
and  development  work)  were:  under  the  $640,000,000 

254 


REAL  MEANING  OF  THE  PROGRAMME 

appropriation,  $142,908,398.95 ;  and  under  other  ap- 
propriations, $12,627,547.46 ;  making  a  total  of  $155,- 
535,946.41.  Of  this  amount  $25,605,074.31  was  ex- 
pended for  manufacture  overseas ;  $21,491,551.14  for 
advances  to  contractors ;  and  $1,697,830.19  for  experi- 
mental and  development  work.  These  items  amounted 
to  $48,794,455.64,  leaving  the  actual  disbursements  on 
account  of  production  in  the  United  States  $106,741,- 
490.77.  Expenditures  for  purposes  other  than  air- 
planes, engines,  and  their  spare  parts  brought  the 
total  disbursements  to  June  30,  1918,  to  $430,234,- 
316.99.  The  total  disbursements  under  the  $640,- 
000,000  appropriation  were  $363,818,014.87,  leaving 
in  the  Treasury  of  this  appropriation  an  unexpended 
balance  of  $276,181,985.13  at  the  end  of  the  fiscal  year. 

The  Army  Appropriation  Act  of  July  9,  1918,  con- 
tinued the  prior  appropriations  for  the  Air  Service, 
and  in  three  months  ending  September  30,  1918, 
further  disbursements  were  made  under  the  $640,- 
000,000  appropriation  of  $128,265,038.31,  and  under 
prior  1918  appropriations  of  $7,250,915.36,  a  total  of 
$135,515,953.67.  The  same  Act  made  a  new  appro- 
priation for  the  Air  Service  of  $884,304,758  for  the 
fiscal  year  ending  June  30,  1919,  and  under  this  ap- 
propriation $3,670,707.66  was  actually  disbursed  up 
to  September  30,  1918. 

Thus  to  within  six  weeks  of  the  signing  of  the 
armistice  the  total  disbursements  of  the  Air  Service, 
out  of  appropriations  for  the  two  fiscal  years  1918  and 
1919  aggregating  $1,576,156,624.47,  amounted  to 
$569,420,978.32.  Under  the  $640,000,000  appropria- 
tion $492,083,053.18  had  been  expended,  leaving  a 
balance  of  nearly  150  millions.  This  sum,  of  course, 

255 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 


was  fully  covered  by  obligations  contracted  for  but 
not  completed,  as  was  much  of  the  appropriation 
for  the  fiscal  year  1919,  but  from  the  signing  of  the 
armistice  these  allotments  were  gradually  reduced  by 
cancellation  of  orders.  By  February  7,  1917,  these 
cancellations  amounted  to  $468,847,993. 

The  relative  importance  of  the  main  classes  of  ex- 
penditure is  shown  in  the  following  statement  of  th< 
allotments  under  the  $640,000,000  appropriation :  \/ 

Airplanes  and  spare  parts $191,037,977.47 

Engines  and  spare  parts 190,736,194.05 

Transportation  (equipment) 42,966,110.47 

General  equipment 34,240,825 . 08 

Maintenance  (of  supply  depots,  etc.) 14,250,982.89 

Special  clothing 2,508,960.26 

Machine  guns,  ammunition  and  bombs 28,823,998.02 

Acquisition  of  plants 2,595,853 .38 

Miscellaneous  (supplies  and  expense) 6,172,754.46 

Purchase  and  lease  of  land 707,199 . 87 

Construction  of  flying  fields,  etc 57,205,544 . 10 

Construction  of  buildings  abroad 7,520,231 . 61 

Balloons 10,210,930.83 

Balloon  buildings 110,793.76 

Transportation    (equipment),    Balloon    Divi- 
sion   1,003,040.60 

Gas  for  balloons 3,411,954.49 

Miscellaneous    (equipment,  supplies  and  ex- 
pense), Balloon  Division 1,812,619.98 

Aeronautical  schools,  maintenance 1,074,054.89 

Expenses,  special  duty,  home  and  abroad 50,140.00 

Pay  of  Eeserve  Corps  and  traveling  expenses.  14,055,139 . 16 

Pay  of  civilian  employees 3,604,571 .40 

Vocational  training   238,085 .73 

Experimental  investigation 2,948,601 . 83 

Miscellaneous  expense  134,377 . 67 

Departments  and  depots  (expense) 151,607 .38 

Foreign  expenditure 26,600,000.00 

Aircraft  Board  (expense) 47,240 . 00 

Total $644,219,789.38 

Material  purchased  for  resale 148,534,836 . 17 

Total  allotments $792,754,625.55 

256 


CHAPTER  XIV 

THE  WORK   AT   THE  FIELDS 

Development  of  training  during  the  final  half-year  of  war  — 
Adequacy  of  facilities  to  meet  the  A.  E.  F.  Aviation  Pro- 
ject —  The  programme  modified  by  delays  in  production  — 
Difficulties  of  coordination  between  the  A.  E.  F.  and  the 
Air  Service  —  The  personnel  programme  and  the  personnel 
at  the  termination  of  hostilities  —  Products  of  the  training 
system  —  Ground  schools  —  Primary  training  —  Pursuit 
pilots  —  Aerial  observers  —  Bombing  pilots  —  Aerial-gun- 
nery schools  —  Photographic,  radio,  and  mechanical  per- 
ponnel  —  Casualties  in  training  —  Extent  of  the  conquest 
of  the  air  —  A  formation  flight  of  103  planes  —  A  flight 
from  the  Gulf  to  the  Great  Lakes  —  A  landing  in  the  midst 
of  the  Everglades  —  Examples  of  aviators'  troubles  —  A 
military  transcontinental  flight  in  formation  —  An  altitude 
record  of  29,000  feet  —  Parachute  descents  from  airplanes 
—  Fast  flights  —  New  uses  for  airplanes  —  Passenger 
carrying  —  The  aerial  mail  service  —  Development  of  the 
aerial  radio-telephone  —  Its  use  in  formation  flying  and 
influence  on  aerial  tactics. 

All  the  great  work  of  training,  including  flying, 
photographic,  radio,  and  mechanical  personnel,  was 
both  improved  in  quality  and  concentrated  in  location 
during  the  final  six  months  of  the  war.  The  complex 
educational  system  which  had  developed  so  rapidly 
during  the  first  year  was  amplified  and  harmonized  as 
time,  experience  and  equipment  gave  opportunity. 
As  with  production,  however,  the  essential  founda- 
tions laid  in  the  first  year  remained  unchanged. 

The  first  problem,  of  course,  was  to  ascertain 
whether  the  schools  had  sufficient  capacity  to  meet  the 
overseas  programme.  Hence,  when  General  Persh- 
ing  cabled  on  May  20,  1918,  that  the  original  pro- 
gramme for  260  service  squadrons  at  the  front  by 

257 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

June  30,  1919,  still  stood,  a  careful  canvass  of 
facilities  by  the  Control  Board  was  ordered.  On 
June  4  the  Board  reported  that  34,572  pilots  and 
observers  were  necessary  to  meet  the  programme  and 
provide  replacements  of  40  per  cent,  for  pursuit 
pilots,  20  per  cent,  for  observers  and  day  bombers, 
and  10  per  cent,  for  night  bombers.  Always  pro- 
vided that  sufficient  equipment  were  available,  it  was 
found  that  the  existing  training  system  was  fully 
adequate. 

Meanwhile  the  Bureau  of  Aircraft  Production  had 
been  estimating  its  capabilities  to  meet  the  pro- 
gramme, and  on  June  26  it  reported  that  instead  of 
260  squadrons  at  the  front  by  June  30,  1919,  it  could 
provide  equipment  for  but  182  squadrons  by  Sep- 
tember 30,  1919,  three  months  later.  This  forecast 
of  delay  in  production  dictated  a  recasting  of  the 
training  programme  to  prevent  the  formation  of  an 
unnecessarily  large  pool  of  fliers  to  the  consequent 
demoralization  of  those  who  would  have  no  chance  of 
securing  equipment  for  active  service.  Accordingly, 
as  there  were  as  many  fliers  in  training  as  were 
needed  to  meet  the  production  programme,  three  of 
the  eight  ground  schools  were  closed,  admissions  to 
the  others  were  limited  to  only  75  enlisted  men  a 
week,  and  the  training  programme  was  retarded  in 
several  other  ways. 

The  authorities  overseas,  however,  not  fully  aware 
of  this  situation,  began  to  call  in  large  numbers  both 
for  flying  personnel  to  fill  the  advanced  schools  in 
France  and  for  squadrons  to  develop  the  great  service 
of  supply  necessary.  They  were  acting  on  the  assum- 
tion  that  during  all  this  time  a  large  reservoir  of  both 

258 


THE  WORK  AT  THE  FIELDS 

kinds  of  personnel  had  been  built  up  here,  whereas 
the  General  Staff  had  allowed  only  a  very  negligible 
enlargement  because  of  production  delays.  On 
August  7,  1918,  for  instance,  the  American  Expedi- 
tionary Force  requested  40,100  Air  Service  men 
within  the  next  few  weeks,  whom  it  was  practically 
impossible  to  supply,  and  for  whom,  so  far  as  was 
known  here,  no  adequate  equipment  existed  abroad. 
An  immediate  reply  requested  the  A.  E.  F.  to  post- 
pone its  call  as  far  as  possible,  and  this  was  followed 
shortly  by  another  dispatch  detailing  the  production 
situation.  As  a  result  the  original  A.  E.  F.  pro- 
gramme, laid  down  on  July  11,  1917,  and  amplified 
on  September  18,  1917,  was  modified  for  the  first 
time.  Instead  of  260  squadrons,  the  A.  E.  F.  in  a 
cablegram  of  August  24  reduced  the  total  called  for 
by  June  30,  1919,  to  202  squadrons.  Even  at  that 
the  figure  was  above  that  set  by  the  Bureau  of  Air- 
craft Production  and  accepted  by  the  Division  of 
Military  Aeronautics  in  its  reduction  of  programme, 
the  difference  being  due  to  the  force  already  in  hand 
in  France  and  the  equipment  available  there. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  three  parties  to  the  Air 
Service  programme,  the  A.  E.  F.  overseas  and  Mili- 
tary Aeronautics  and  Aircraft  Production  here,  were 
finding  it  very  difficult  to  work  absolutely  in  unison. 
The  A.  E.  F.  laid  down  the  general  programme  to 
be  filled,  and  Military  Aeronautics  and  Aircraft 
Production  each  endeavored  to  carry  out  its  part  of 
it.  Military  Aeronautics,  however,  was  dependent 
upon  Aircraft  Production  for  equipment  to  train  its 
personnel,  and  as  a  result  it  found  itself  between  two 
fires,  the  A.  E.  F.  continually  demanding  more  and 

259 


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260 


THE  WORK  AT  THE  FIELDS 

more  trained  men,  and  Aircraft  Production  not  able 
to  provide  enough  of  the  complicated  training  equip- 
ment necessary. 

The  shipment  schedule  from  overseas  of  May  20, 
1918,  for  instance,  called  for  approximately  56,000 
men  between  that  date  and  November  11.  Subse- 
quent special  cables,  based  on  the  increasing  needs 
of  the  situation  overseas  and  sent  in  the  belief  that  a 
large  pool  of  men  had  been  built  up  here,  increased 
this  number  to  67,523  men.  These  figures,  however, 
were  beyond  what  the  Air  Service  was  able  to  supply, 
owing  to  the  fact  that  because  of  shortage  of  equip- 
ment and  the  great  need  for  men  in  other  services,  the 
higher  War  Department  officials  had  not  felt  able  to 
provide  the  new  personnel  in  the  large  numbers  and 
with  the  haste  necessary. 

On  October  3  a  final  chart  of  the  personnel  needed 
to  June  30,  1919,  was  submitted  to  the  General  Staff. 
This  called  for  a  grand  total  of  267,305  officers  and 
men,  including  162,200  overseas.  Against  this,  the 
total  strength  of  the  Service  at  the  termination  of 
hostilities  stood  at  151,742  officers  and  men,  of  whom 
78,399,  or  slightly  more  than  half,  had  been  embarked 
for  overseas. 

The  actual  training1  all  this  time  continued  under 

i  The  accompanying  chart  of  Air  Service  training  and 
channels  of  transfer  is  a  simplified  reproduction  of  a  very  de- 
tailed chart  prepared  in  the  office  of  the  Chief  of  Training, 
Division  of  Military  Aeronautics,  revised  to  October  23,  1918. 
The  original  listed  under  each  head  the  fields  or  schools  en- 
gaged in  the  particular  element  of  instruction  or  training,  their 
locations,  commanding  officers,  and  capacities.  A  complete  list 
of  flying  fields,  schools,  and  other  stations  of  the  Air  Service 
as  of  November  11,  1918,  is  given  in  Appendix  II,  and  it  is 
unnecessary  to  repeat  these  data  here. 

261 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

the  reduced  programme  with  increasing  efficiency  as 
equipment,  experience,  and  the  number  of  instructors 
increased.  The  development  of  military  aviation 
ultimately  required  the  establishment  of  a  total  of 
40  flying  schools,  five  schools  of  military  aeronautics, 
eight  balloon  schools,  three  radio  schools,  three  photo- 
graphic schools,  and  14  air  depots.  Up  to  the  termi- 
nation of  hostilities  a  total  of  22,542  men  had  been 
admitted  to  ground  schools  as  the  first  step  in  their 
progress  towards  becoming  aviators.  Of  these,  4,291 
had  been  discharged  and  16,857  graduated,  including 
1,791  sent  overseas  for  flying  training  in  the  summer 
of  1917  and  14,835  sent  on  to  American  flying  fields. 
Three  ground  schools,  at  Carnegie  Institute  of  Tech- 
nology, Cornell  University,  and  the  Ohio  State  Uni- 
versity, had  been  ordered  closed  on  August  4  as  a 
result  of  the  low  estimates  of  production  of  the  early 
summer,  but  Cornell  was  held  open  when  new  figures 
from  overseas  indicated  another  increase  in  pro- 
gramme, and  at  the  end  of  the  war  it  was  preparing 
for  the  admission  of  2,570  cadets  monthly. 

Primary  flying  training  developed  in  a  very  satis- 
factory way,  with  15  units  in  operation.  To  the 
termination  of  hostilities  8,688  men  were  graduated 
as  reserve  military  aviators  competent  to  execute  all 
the  ordinary  elements  of  flying,  including  starts, 
landings,  cross-country  flights,  and  a  few  stunts. 
Although  not  trained  in  the  acrobatics,  formation  fly- 
ing, aerial  gunnery,  and  other  specialized  work  neces- 
sary before  going  over  the  front,  these  men  had  all 
the  training  necessary  for  peace-time  flying  as  distinct 
from  military  flying.  With  men  trained  overseas, 
therefore,  the  total  of  men  able  to  take  a  plane  into 

262 


THE  WORK  AT  THE  FIELDS 

the  air,  fly  it,  and  land  it  was  well  over  10,000,  as 
against  barely  100  so  trained  19  months  before.  Of 
the  12,231  cadets  who  had  actually  begun  this  primary 
course,  377  had  been  discharged  from  further  in- 
struction, 204  had  been  killed,  and  2,764  were  still  in 
training.  A  total  of  652,009  hours  had  been  flown,  a 
truly  stupendous  figure  in  comparison  with  anything 
ever  done  before.  Primary  planes  were  sufficient  in 
number,  with  1,790  on  hand  on  November  11,  976  of 
which  were  in  commission.  Each  plane  averaged 
2.66  hours  daily  in  the  air,  and  each  cadet  1.07  hours. 

The  specialized  courses  which  followed  this  primary 
work  and  fitted  the  reserve  military  aviator  to  be  a 
pursuit  pilot,  observer,  or  bomber  over  the  enemy's 
lines  all  developed  appreciably  in  the  second  year  of 
the  war,  but  not  sufficiently  to  meet  the  large  A.  E.  F. 
demands.  This  was  due  almost  entirely  to  the  con- 
tinued shortage  of  the  highly  complicated  equipment 
necessary,  this  forcing  the  adoption  of  improvised 
material,  which  in  turn  lowered  both  the  speed  and  the 
quality  of  training.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  United 
States  was  endeavoring  to  provide,  both  for  the  front 
and  for  home  use,  a  mass  of  equipment  never  before 
produced  here  and  not  yet  produced  in  any  country 
in  the  world  on  a  similar  scale. 

Of  the  specialized  courses,  pursuit  training  ex- 
panded from  one  single-unit  field  to  four  units  dur- 
ing the  last  six  months  of  the  war.  These  fields  were 
especially  chosen  in  Florida  and  California  to  insure 
the  best  weather  possible.  In  spite  of  there  being 
only  384  single-seater  planes  to  supply  a  need  of  800, 
and  those  slow,  weak  in  construction,  and  difficult  to 
stunt,  479  cadets  were  graduated  from  this  course  to 

263 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

November  11.  On  July  15  the  A.  E.  F.  had  requested 
125  pursuit  aviators  weekly,  and  this  was  being  met 
at  the  termination  of  hostilities  by  sending  50  pur- 
suit cadets  and  the  balance  of  reserve  military  aviators 
capable  of  pursuit  work. 

Aerial  observers,  who  in  the  spring  of  1918  had 
been  very  limited  in  numbers,  were  also  being 
graduated  at  accelerated  speed.  Whereas  at  the  out- 
set personnel  for  this  work  had  been  provided  by  the 
Field  and  the  Coast  Artillery,  often  including  men 
who  could  have  been  spared  without  loss  to  the  Air 
Service  and  others  who  were  reluctant  to  leave  their 
own  services,  during  the  summer  the  confusion  thus 
created  was  dispelled  by  having  all  observers  com- 
missioned in  the  Air  Service,  which  thus  became  solely 
responsible  for  them.  This  change  was  supported 
by  experience  overseas,  which  showed  that  the  system 
of  having  pilots  responsible  to  the  Air  Service  and 
observers  responsible  to  the  line  organization  brought 
about  a  serious  lack  of  coordination.  As  a  result  of 
the  change  observers'  training  was  greatly  enlarged, 
so  that  by  the  termination  of  hostilities  1,192  pilots 
and  907  observers  had  been  graduated  for  this  work, 
and  615  pilots  and  509  observers  embarked  overseas. 

Bombing  training,  wholly  unknown  in  this  country 
up  to  January,  1918,  also  developed  appreciably, 
thanks  to  the  ingenious  improvisation  by  the  men  at 
the  fields  of  many  kinds  of  essential  equipment. 
Bombs,  bomb  sights,  release  mechanisms,  signals, 
wing  flares,  etc.,  never  before  made  in  this  country 
and  but  slowly  adopted  as  to  types,  were  critically 
lacking  at  first,  and  consequently  the  training  was 
slow,  incomplete,  and  restricted  in  capacity.  While 

264 


THE  WORK  AT  THE  FIELDS 

regular  dummy  bombs  and  release  mechanisms  were 
being  made,  improvised  plaster  of  Paris  bombs  turned 
out  at  the  fields  were  used  despite  their  variable 
trajectories,  and  the  roughest  kinds  of  bomb  release 
mechanisms  were  adopted.  By  the  termination  of 
hostilities  these  difficulties  had  been  largely  overcome ; 
414  bombing  pilots  and  329  bombing  observers  had 
been  graduated,  of  whom  the  first  had  been  used  as 
instructors  of  those  to  follow,  and  a  large  number 
had  been  sent  to  France. 

What  made  all  kinds  of  specialized  training  most 
difficult  was  the  lack  of  service  planes  such  as  the 
men  would  have  to  use  at  the  front.  Early  in  June, 
1918,  25  per  cent,  of  all  service  planes  produced  were 
requested  for  training  purposes,  but  the  needs  at  the 
front  were  so  great  that  they  could  not  be  diverted. 
On  August  7,  however,  the  Chief  of  Staff  granted  a 
request  to  divert  10  per  cent,  of  such  planes,  which 
should  enable  the  Air  Service  to  "send  to  France 
trained  units,  who  can  go  immediately  to  the  zone 
of  advance,  receive  some  'refresher*  flying  on  ma- 
chines they  already  know,  and  start  to  work  over  the 
line."  By  the  termination  of  hostilities  a  good  be- 
ginning had  been  made  along  this  line,  with  170  De 
Haviland  planes  in  use  for  training. 

The  aerial-gunnery  schools,  which  supplied  the 
final  step  in  the  training  of  fliers  in  this  country,  had 
developed  proportionally.  Whereas  in  the  spring  of 
1918  but  a  few  planes  were  equipped  with  machine 
guns  for  this  work,  the  provision  of  341  planes  by 
the  termination  of  hostilities  enabled  active  schools  to 
function  at  Ellington,  Selfridge,  Taliaferro,  and 
Rockwell  Fields,  with  a  total  of  2,295  graduates. 

265 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

Special  schools  for  flying  instructors  had  also  been 
instituted  at  Gerstner,  Kelly,  and  Brooks  Fields,  with 
732  officer  and  10  civilian  graduates. 

Non-flying  training  was  similarly  improved  as  time 
wore  on.  In  aerial  photography,  the  large  developers ' 
and  printers'  school  at  Rochester,  in  the  heart  of 
the  photographic  industry,  was  in  full  swing,  with 
1,567  graduates  to  November  11.  The  advanced 
course  at  Cornell  had  been  extended  from  six  to  nine 
weeks,  courses  on  mosaics,  stereos,  plotting,  and 
artillery  camouflage  added,  and  258  officers  and  men 
graduated.  A  final  school  had  been  opened  at 
Langley  Field,  at  which  men  trained  individually 
were  organized  into  units  ready  for  overseas  duty 
and  given  actual  field  training  in  conjunction  with 
the  school  of  observers  and  by  means  of  missions  into 
the  country  round  about  lasting  from  two  days  to  a 
week.  A  total  of  32  photographic  sections  had  been 
distributed  among  the  "huts"  at  the  various  fields, 
many  of  them  engaged  in  mapping  aerial  routes  over 
wide  stretches  of  territory. 

Radio  training,  which  had  been  entirely  in  charge 
of  the  Signal  Corps  at  the  time  of  the  separation  of 
the  two  services,  had  become  very  much  more  special- 
ized. On  June  30,  1918,  the  schools  at  Columbia 
University,  Carnegie  Institute  of  Technology,  and  the 
University  of  Texas  were  taken  over,  and  very  shortly 
a  new  course  of  three  weeks  was  added  at  Ellington 
Field  to  give  actual  field  instruction  from  dugouts  in 
conjunction  with  airplanes.  Moreover,  the  confusion 
which  had  existed  as  to  the  training  of  Field  and 
Coast  Artillery  radio  personnel  was  solved  by  having 
all  this  training  done  by  the  Air  Service  instead  of, 

266 


THE  WORK  AT  THE  FIELDS 

as  before,  by  these  line  organizations.  As  a  result 
of  the  increased  facilities  provided  for  this  work 
there  were  graduated  to  the  termination  of  hostilities 
240  radio  officers,  369  operators,  and  780  mechanics. 
In  addition,  a  special  course  had  been  instituted  by 
an  officer  brought  back  from  the  A.  E.  F.  to  train 
operators  in  reading  land  radio  signals  directing  the 
navigation  of  night-bombing  Handley-Page  squad- 
rons, in  order  to  prevent  a  serious  loss  of  planes  by 
aviators'  losing  their  way  home. 

Mechanics'  training  had  been  concentrated  in  two 
large  schools  at  St.  Paul  and  Kelly  Field.  The  final 
step  in  the  evolution  from  the  34  original  schools 
scattered  at  various  factories  all  over  the  country  was 
taken  in  late  June,  when  the  three  schools  at  Pratt 
Institute,  Carnegie  Institute,  and  David  Eanken 
School  were  given  up.  The  two  final  Government 
schools  were  very  much  enlarged,  but  lack  of  equip- 
ment and  personnel  prevented  their  reaching  their 
full  capacity  either  in  quality  of  training  or  in  num- 
bers. At  the  termination  of  hostilities  7,661  me- 
chanics had  been  graduated  from  the  various  courses, 
and  1,729  more  were  in  attendance. 

But  to  return  to  the  flying  fields !  An  amount  of 
flying  unprecedented  in  the  history  of  the  world  was 
going  6n  daily  in  the  great  network  of  31  fields 
scattered  over  the  United  States.  Whereas  a  total 
of  407,999  hours  had  been  flown  in  the  12  months 
ending  June  30,  1918,  a  total  of  403,073  hours  were 
flown  in  the  period  of  less  than  four  and  one-half 
months  between  that  date  and  the  signing  of  the 
armistice.  Figuring  this  at  80  miles  an  hour, 
American  aviators  in  this  country  made  over  32,- 

267 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

000,000  miles  of  air  travel  in  little  over  one-third  of 
a  year,  and  over  64,000,000  miles  during  the  war 
period. 

All  this  was  not  without  its  price.  Many  precious 
lives  were  lost  in  this  preparation  of  the  air  army, 
as  truly  sacrificed  for  their  country  as  though  they 
had  fallen  over  the  lines  in  France.  Up  to  Novem- 
ber 11  a  total  of  278  men  made  the  supreme  sacrifice 
at  flying  fields  on  this  side.  In  spite  of  all  pre- 
cautions, in  spite  of  the  most  urgent  regulations, 
fatalities  proved  unavoidable,  some  due  to  dangers 
inherent  in  the  abnormal  flying  required  for  war  work, 
some  due  to  purely  human  weaknesses  in  the  fliers. 
Averaging  this  number  against  the  total  of  811,072 
hours  flown  gives  one  fatality  for  every  2,960  hours 
or  236,800  miles,  a  very  much  more  favorable  record 
than  similar  figures  for  Americans  trained  in  France 
and  England  or  by  the  Canadian  authorities  in 
Texas. 

Among  these  sacrifices  special  mention  will  not  be 
out  of  place  of  the  tragic  death  at  Gerstner  Field 
of  Major  John  Purroy  Mitchel,  former  Mayor  of  New 
York  and  a  man  of  the  greatest  promise.  Major 
Mitchel,  despite  the  fact  that  his  age  of  37  years 
seemed  to  bar  him  from  aerial  fighting,  sought  the 
most  dangerous  branch  of  the  Service,  single-seater 
pursuit  work.  On  July  6,  1918,  when  at  about  600 
feet  altitude,  he  fell  headlong  from  his  plane,  which 
went  skimming  off  for  half  a  mile  without  a  pilot, 
finally  dashing  to  earth  completely  demolished.  It 
was  found  that  the  strap  to  fasten  the  aviator  in  the 
plane  had  not  been  put  in  place. 

To  prevent  accidents  so  far  as  was  possible  by 
268 


THE  WORK  AT  THE  FIELDS 

keeping  fliers  in  sound  physical  condition,  a  special 
corps  of  fight  surgeons  and  physical  directors  were 
early  appointed.  The  former  acted  as  specialists 
with  broad  powers  to  force  men  to  rest;  the  latter 
built  up  a  careful  system  of  training  through 
athletics,  swimming  pools,  tennis  courts,  and  physical 
exercises.  In  August,  1918,  all  fields  were  ordered 
to  install  ambulance  airplanes,  which  were  proved  at 
Gerstner  Field  not  only  to  be  more  gentle  in  their 
motion  than  an  automobile  ambulance,  but  also  to 
be  able  to  reach  places  inaccessible  to  motor  cars. 

The  price  paid  by  many  aviators,  however,  helped 
to  open  the  skies  to  their  companions.  With  every 
week  that  passed  the  scope  and  power  of  flight  was 
made  to  increase  enormously.  Whereas  at  the  out- 
break of  the  war  the  few  fliers  on  hand  had  timor- 
ously circled  about  their  fields,  the  aviators  at  the 
end  of  the  war  were  able  to  soar  off  freely  and  safely 
wherever  fancy  called  them.  Cross-country  flights 
in  all  that  great  section  of  the  Southwest  from  the 
Pacific  to  the  Mississippi,  especially  all  about  Texas, 
became  matter  of  common  occurrence.  Places  in 
the  Southwest  under  the  air  lanes  used  by  Army 
fliers  vied  with  each  other  in  hospitality  to  aviators. 
One  town,  calling  itself  "The  Dynamo  of  Central 
Texas, ' '  sent  out  the  following  card  to  aviators : 

Upon  presentation  of  this  card,  all  courtesies  will  be 
offered  you,  including  shower  and  pool  baths  at  the  Y.  M. 
C.  A.'s  $87,000  plant,  Country  Club's  $75,000  plant,  Elks 
Club  $47,000  plant.  Coffee  and  sandwiches  will  be  handed 
out  by  the  Red  Cross  Canteens;  hair  cut,  shave  and  shine 
given  free  at  any  barber  shop;  cold  drinks  at  the  soda 
water  fountain,  also  local  carfare. 

269 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

How  complete  the  mastery  of  the  air  had  become 
is  shown  in  the  following  report  of  a  monster  flight 
in  California : 

One  hundred  and  three  airplanes  from  March  Field, 
Riverside,  California,  made  a  flight  of  160  miles  in  battle 
formation  on  October  12  without  a  single  accident.  This 
large  squadron  bombed  Los  Angeles  with  Liberty  Loan 
literature. 

This  is  believed  to  be  a  record  never  before  equaled  in 
any  of  the  flying  fields  in  the  United  States.  It  was  not  a 
special  performance  with  a  number  of  picked  planes  and 
pilots  but  was  a  wholesale  turn-out  of  the  school.  The 
total  mileage  of  this  trip  was  over  16,000,  which,  without 
a  fatality  or  the  loss  of  a  ship,  made  the  performance  a 
very  remarkable  one. 

The  gigantic  formation  taxied  off,  circled  the  course, 
assembled  in  10  separate  and  distinct  units  and  finally 
headed  in  one  solid  formation  for  Los  Angeles,  60  miles 
distant.  The  103  planes  got  into  the  air  in  six  minutes, 
maintaining  an  approximate  altitude  of  from  3,000  to 
6,000  feet. 

The  Arcadia  Balloon  School  was  advised  by  wireless  of 
the  approaching  squadron  and  two  ships  were  sent  out  to 
escort  the  formation  over  the  city.  A  realistic  battle-front 
feature  of  the  flight  was  accomplished  when  the  air  fleet 
passed  over  the  balloon  school,  seven  huge  observation  bal- 
loons having  been  in  the  air  at  the  time. 

While  thousands  of  persons  craned  their  necks  to  get  a 
glimpse  of  this  American  air  armada,  the  planes  suddenly 
swept  down  from  the  mountain  peaks,  giving  Los  Angeles 
a  realistic  imitation  of  a  real  air  raid.  Bombs  were 
dropped,  and  from  them  fell  leaflets  saying :  "  What  if  we 
were  Germans?  Buy  Liberty  Bonds." 

Accompanying  the  air  fleet  was  a  hospital  plane  and  a 
flight  surgeon.  All  the  planes  were  of  the  Curtiss  JN-4D 
training  type.  Approximately  3,000  gallons  of  gasoline 
were  consumed.  The  ships  returned  in  formations  of  10, 
several  by  more  distant  routes  after  visiting  numerous 

270 


THE  WORK  AT  THE  FIELDS 

Southern  California  towns  and  cities  in  the  interest  of  the 
Liberty  Loan. 

Previous  to  this  the  largest  number  of  planes  visiting  an 
American  city  was  68,  when  members  of  the  First  Pro- 
visional Wing  of  the  American  Air  Service  flew  over  New 
York  City.  In  the  March  Field  squadron,  half  of  the  pilots 
participating  were  cadets,  pilots  in  training,  while  the  re- 
maining pilots,  other  than  unit  leaders,  were  for  the  most 
part  flying  officers  who  have  been  commissioned  at  this  field 
since  July. 

With  but  one  exception,  all  of  the  planes  to  leave  March 
Field  returned  on  scheduled  time,  this  feat  in  itself  being  a 
record.  One  was  required  to  make  a  forced  landing  in  the 
outskirts  of  Los  Angeles  when  the  motor  "  froze  "  in  the  air. 

A  good  instance  of  the  complete  independence  of 
the  modern  airman  was  afforded  by  a  4,000-mile 
zigzag  flight  made  by  Lieutenant  John  E.  Davis  from 
the  Gulf  of  Mexico  to  the  Great  Lakes  and  back  dur- 
ing October.  Without  changing  plane  or  motor, 
without  knowing  the  route  or  the  landing  places, 
without  mechanic  or  landing  lights  for  night  work, 
he  covered  the  distance  from  Ellington  Field  to 
Mount  Clemens,  Michigan,  and  back  in  64  flying 
hours  over  a  period  of  nine  days.  His  experience 
with  a  heavy  storm  over  the  Mississippi  River,  alone 
among  the  elements,  is  described  in  his  log  as  follows : 

I  climbed  to  5,000  feet  and  flew  over  the  storm  for  two 
hours.  At  the  end  of  this  time  I  figured  I  was  nearing 
Little  Rock  and  descended  into  the  storia.  clouds  to  check 
my  course.  I  no  sooner  entered  the  clouds  at  4,500  feet 
than  my  compass  started  acting  peculiarly.  My  ship  was 
buffeted  around  and  I  completely  lost  control.  I  cut  my 
gun  and  watched  my  altimeter  and  noted  that  I  was  falling 
at  a  high  rate  of  speed.  My  controls  were  absolutely  use- 
less, so  I  left  them  alone,  awaiting  in  readiness  to  right 

271 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

myself  upon  emerging  from  the  clouds.  I  finally  came 
through  the  clouds  in  a  steep  nose  dive  and  side-slip  at  an 
altitude  of  300  feet.  I  righted  myself  and  looked  for  a 
landing  place,  because  I  feared  that  the  ^rain  would  stop 
my  motor.  Was  unable  to  find  any  place  to  land,  the 
country  being  covered  with  forest.  I  flew  along  at  300  feet 
for  some  time  and  found  that  I  had  covered  only  half  of 
the  distance  I  should  have  by  this  time.  I  climbed  care- 
fully through  the  clouds  to  5,000  feet  and  passed  the  storm 
in  about  one  and  one-half  hours. 

To  a  much  more  surprising  predicament  was 
brought  Lieutenant  Smith,  who  set  out  to  map  a 
shorter  flight  from  Carlstrom  Field  (Arcadia, 
Florida)  over  the  Everglades  to  Fort  Myers.  He 
had  reached  an  altitude  of  7,000  feet  above  the  great 
swamp  when  he  observed  a  storm  approaching  from 
the  south  and  changed  his  course  to  get  around  it. 
Finding  this  impossible,  he  veered  to  the  west  and 
attempted  to  climb  above  it.  At  8,000  feet,  however, 
he  encountered  a  terrific  wind  from  the  north  which 
made  the  ship  almost  unmanageable,  tossing  it  first 
on  one  wing  and  then  on  the  other  in  a  vertical 
position,  and  twice  putting  it  almost  completely  on 
its  back.  Nevertheless,  he  kept  on  to  the  south  with 
the  sight  of  land  obliterated  by  the  storm  under  him 
until  he  was  finally  forced  down  by  the  lack  of  gaso- 
line. His  report  reads: 

There  were  no  dry  spots  to  land  on,  and  the  ship  turned 
over  on  its  back.  Sergeant  O'Connor,  my  passenger,  cut 
his  lips  and  bruised  his  body  and  both  right  and  left  shins. 
I  suffered  only  a  bruised  body.  Realizing  that  nothing 
could  be  done  with  the  ship  and  that  it  was  impossible  to 
right  it  and  take-off  at  this  place,  we  started  walking  in  a 
northeasterly  direction. 

The  territory  in  which  this  landing  was  made  is  known 
272 


THE  WORK  AT  THE  FIELDS 

as  the  Everglades.  Its  sameness  is  almost  appalling;  just 
one  small  cypress  hummock  after  another;  water  and  muck 
everywhere;  innumerable  mosquitoes,  alligators,  water  moc- 
casins and  black  snakes.  Here  and  there  a  hummock  would 
be  found  with  a  rock  base  and  on  some  of  these  rock  bases 
Seminole  Indians  eke  out  an  existence.  After  landing,  we 
walked  to  one  of  these  hummocks,  and  as  it  was  getting 
dark,  collected  a  small  amount  of  dry  wood  and  built  a 
fire,  endeavoring  to  keep  the  mosquitoes  off  and  dry  our 
clothing,  which  could  not  be  removed  on  account  of  the 
mosquitoes  which  attacked  us  in  hordes.  But  we  could  find 
no  Indians.  Meanwhile,  we  had  drunk  no  water  for  fear 
it  might  be  infected  with  malaria  germs  or  some  other 
swamp  fever,  nor  had  any  food  been  found.  After  passing 
a  miserable  night,  we  started  a  little  before  daybreak  to 
drill  through  the  knee-deep  muck  and  continued  in  a  north- 
easterly direction  all  day.  Finding  no  suitable  hummock, 
we  were  compelled  to  spend  the  night  again  in  the  swamp, 
this  time  on  ground  covered  with  an  inch  or  more  of 
water.  By  this  time  we  were  so  nearly  exhausted  that  we 
took  a  chance  on  the  water,  but  due  to  lack  of  food  we  were 
rapidly  approaching  starvation. 

The  next  morning  we  resumed  our  way  through  the  muck 
again,  starting  before  daylight,  and  at  ten  thirty  a.  m. 
sighted  a  flag  flying  over  a  hummock  not  far  off.  We  found 
this  camp  inhabited  by  Seminole  Indians.  By  sign  lan- 
guage we  succeeded  in  conveying  to  the  Indians  our  need 
of  food  and  after  our  meal  managed  to  make  them  under- 
stand that  we  wished  to  reach  Miami.  They  provided  a 
"  glade  boat,"  which  is  made  of  one  large  cypress  tree  trunk 
hollowed  out  and  propelled  by  a  pole  some  fifteen  feet  long 
with  a  V-shaped  foot  on  one  end  of  it.  After  being  poled 
through  a  perfect  maze  of  waterways,  we  reached  the  dredge 
at  the  end  of  the  Tampa-Miami  Trail,  where  we  were  given 
food  and  a  good  bed  and  could  wash  the  muck  and  dirt 
from  our  clothing  and  bodies.  The  next  day  a  motor  boat 
took  us  down  the  canal  and  further  along  we  hired  a  Ford 
which  took  us  to  the  flying  field  in  Miami,  arriving  there  at 
noon  Sunday. 

273 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

From  Miami  an  attempt  was  made  to  salvage  the  ship  by 
means  of  a  caterpillar  tractor  which  was  carried  to  the  edge 
of  the  Everglades  on  a  canal  boat,  but  the  equinoxial  storms 
setting  in  put  the  whole  swamplands  under  water  and  this 
attempt  had  to  be  abandoned  in  favor  of  an  expedition  in 
"  glade  boats  "  furnished  by  the  Seminoles.  In  this  manner 
a  number  of  men  with  food  and  gas  for  the  engine,  together 
with  spare  parts,  were  taken  into  the  swamp,  and  after 
four  days'  travel  reached  a  point  a  few  miles  from  the 
ship  where  a  base  camp  was  established.  Eventually  a 
more  secure  rock  base  was  located  within  three  miles  of  the 
airplane  and  after  chopping  a  track  through  the  swamp 
the  salvage  party,  by  means  of  planks  and  cables,  moved 
the  airplane  to  the  rock  base.  The  motor,  however,  could 
not  be  turned  over,  due  to  its  submersion  in  the  water  for 
three  weeks.  Indian  "  glade  boats  "  were  again  dispatched 
to  Miami  for  engine  parts,  together  with  a  "  trouble- 
shooter"  from  the  nearest  flying  field.  Upon  the  arrival 
of  the  mechanic  and  his  tools  the  motor  was  finally  started 
and  with  the  engine  roaring  and  the  propeller  droning  a 
new  tune  to  the  startled  Seminoles,  the  ship  took  the  air 
once  more.  In  a  comparatively  few  minutes  it  was  landed 
at  the  Marine  Field,  Miami,  for  gas,  overhauling  and 
repairs. 

A  rather  different  experience  befell  Lieutenant 
Albert  0.  Spencer,  whose  plane,  when  flying  with 
eight  others,  suffered  a  break  in  the  gas  line  when 
nearly  10,000  feet  up  and  when  the  earth  had  not 
been  visible  for  45  minutes.  The  report  says : 

Forced  to  spiral  down  through  several  layers  of  clouds 
and  rain  to  a  level  of  about  1,000  feet  before  the  ground 
became  visible,  he  found  himself  over  a  town  and  was 
obliged  to  make  a  forced  landing  in  a  vacant  lot.  This 
drew  a  crowd  of  curious  inhabitants  and  to  avoid  hitting 
the  more  venturesome  who  ran  across  his  path,  he  made  a 
sharp  turn,  colliding  with  a  telegraph  pole,  damaging  a 
wing.  With  the  aid  of  two  broom  sticks  and  some  muslin, 

274 


THE  WOKK  AT  THE  FIELDS 

temporary  repairs  were  made  and  the  gas  lines  having  been 
repaired,  resumption  of  the  trip  was  possible. 

The  lot  was  hardly  large  enough  for  a  good  take-off,  but, 
by  squeezing  between  telegraph  poles,  the  pilot  was  able 
to  get  a  run  through  a  corn  field  and  take  the  air  with 
barely  enough  clearance  to  jump  a  big  warehouse  up-wind 
from  him. 

Assurances  from  the  townspeople  had  led  Lt.  Spencer  to 
believe  Birmingham  was  only  a  few  miles  distant,  but  it  had 
already  grown  dark  before  the  lights  of  the  city  came  into 
view.  Again  difficulty  in  finding  a  landing  place  was  ex- 
perienced, but  having  picked  out  a  black  spot  which  ap- 
peared to  be  cleared  land,  Spencer  leveled  out  for  a  three- 
point  landing.  A  few  feet  off  the  surface  of  his  black  spot, 
he  suddenly  discovered  that  particular  surface  to  be  water 
and  he  was  in  the  middle  of  a  good  sized  pond.  He 
"  zoomed  "  just  in  time  to  keep  his  tail  planes  out  of  the 
wet,  climbed  about  300  feet  and  began  a  circle  of  the  city 
searching  for  the  other  ships.  He  met  with  no  success  in 
this  effort  and  again  picked  out  another  spot  for  a  landing. 
This  appeared  to  be  a  vacant  lot.  Again  he  settled  to  the 
street  level  and  flattened  out,  when  to  his  surprise  instead 
of  feeling  ground  beneath  him,  he  kept  on  settling  and 
finally  brought  up  in  an  excavation  20  feet  below  the  level 
of  the  lot  and  stopped  on  the  brink  of  a  ditch  which  was 
invisible  until  disclosed  by  the  headlights  of  an  automobile 
in  the  street  above  him. 

A  military  transcontinental  fight  in  formation  was 
made  in  December,  1918,  by  a  squadron  of  four 
planes,  each  carrying  two  men.  They  left  San  Diego, 
California,  on  December  4  and  arrived  at  Jackson- 
ville, Florida,  on  the  22d,  having  flown  approximately 
2,400  miles  in  short  flights  limited  by  the  size  of 
their  gasoline  tanks,  which  carried  no  more  than  an 
hour  and  a  half's  supply.  The  total  flying  time  was 
55  hours.  As  they  proceeded  they  gathered  data  of 
landing  fields  and  mapped  a  complete  southern  trans- 

275 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

continental  air  route.  This  work  was  a  part  of  a  big 
aerial  reconnaissance  being  made  by  fliers  going  out  in 
all  directions  from  over  25  fields  in  various  parts  of 
the  country,  all  contributory  to  the  mapping  of  a  net- 
work of  air  routes  between  important  centers  covering 
the  entire  country. 

As  American  aviators  were  going  far  and  wide,  so 
they  were  also  going  high.  New  reaches  and  stretches 
of  land  tempted  their  imagination  not  more  than  the 
fastnesses  of  the  upper  skies.  If  some  men  went  far 
afield,  others  were  tempted  on  and  on  upwards.  This 
had  its  very  practical  value,  for  the  effect  of  thin 
air  and  the  efficiency  of  oxygen  tanks  had  to  be  well 
proved.  A  test  of  the  latter  was  made  in  Chicago 
on  September  8,  when  a  De  Haviland-4  plane,  piloted 
by  Lieutenant  M.  B.  Kelleher,  climbed  to  23,000  feet, 
where  a  temperature  of  17  degrees  below  zero, 
Fahrenheit,  was  encountered.  The  oxygen  apparatus 
functioned  well,  allowing  easy  breathing.  An  idea 
of  the  power  of  an  airplane  is  given  by  the  fact  that 
the  ascent  of  23,000  feet  was  made  in  25  minutes, 
nearly  1,000  feet  a  minute. 

It  remained,  however,  for  Captain  R.  W.  Schroeder, 
to  reach  the  highest  altitude.  His  record  of  nearly 
29,000  feet  over  Dayton  on  September  18,  1918, 
almost  five  miles  above  the  ground  and  higher  than 
the  world's  highest  mountain,  has  been  officially  con- 
firmed. His  report  of  his  sensations  and  the  effects 
of  a  temperature  32  degrees  below  zero,  Centigrade 
(about  23  degrees  below,  Fahrenheit),  says: 

The  cold  thin  air  is  one's  greatest  adversary.  First  of 
all,  one  must  make  a  study  of  the  performance  of  his  motor 
at  these  high  altitudes.  I  took  off  at  1 :45  p.  m.,  Wednes- 

276 


THE  WORK  AT  THE  FIELDS 

day,  September  18th,  1918,  and  made  a  steady  circular 
climb,  passing  through  clouds  at  8,000  feet,  12,000  feet  and 
16,000  feet.  At  20,000  feet,  while  still  climbing  in  large 
circles,  my  goggles  became  frosted,  making  it  very  difficult 
for  me  to  watch  my  instruments.  When  I  reached  25,000 
feet  I  noticed  the  sun  growing  very  dim,  I  could  hardly 
hear  my  motor  run,  and  I  felt  very  hungry.  The  trend  of 
my  thought  was  that  it  must  be  getting  late,  that  evening 
must  be  coming  on,  but  I  was  still  climbing,  so  thought  I 
might*  as  well  stick  to  it  a  little  longer,  for  I  knew  I  could 
reach  my  ceiling  pretty  soon,  then  I  should  go  down  and 
even  though  it  were  dark,  I  could  land  all  right  for  I  had 
made  night  landings  many  times  before,  and  so  I  went  to 
talking  to  myself  and  this  I  felt  was  a  good  sign  to  begin 
taking  oxygen  and  I  did.  I  was  then  over  25,000  feet  and 
as  soon  as  I  started  to  inhale  the  oxygen,  the  sun  grew 
brighter  again,  my  motor  began  to  exhaust  so  loud  that 
it  seemed  something  must  be  wrong  with  it,  I  was  no  longer 
hungry  and  the  day  seemed  to  be  a  most  beautiful  one.  I 
felt  like  singing  with  sheer  joy  as  I  gazed  about  through 
the  small  portion  of  my  goggles  which  had  no  frost,  due 
to  a  drop  of  oil  which  had  splashed  on  them  from  the  motor. 

It  was  wonderful  to  see  the  very  clear  blue  sky  with  the 
clouds  thousands  of  feet  below.  The  frost  on  my  goggles 
bothered  me  very  much.  At  times  I  had  to  remove  my  glove 
in  order  to  put  the  warm  palm  of  my  hand  on  the  glass  to 
thaw  the  frost.  I  did  this  about  every  ten  minutes  so  that 
I  could  take  the  proper  readings  of  the  instruments,  which 
I  marked  down  on  my  data  pad.  I  believe  that  if  my 
goggles  had  been  better  ventilated,  they  would  not  have 
frosted.  When  I  was  about  27,000  feet,  I  had  to  remove 
my  gogles,  as  I  was  unable  to  keep  a  steady  climb.  My 
hands,  by  this  time,  were  numb  and  worried  me  consider- 
ably. The  cold  raw  air  made  my  eyes  water  and  I  was 
compelled  to  fly  with  my  head  well  down  inside  the  cockpit. 

I  kept  at  it  until  my  oxygen  gave  out  and  at  that  point 
I  noticed  my  aneroid  indicated  very  nearly  29,000  feet. 
The  thermometer  showed  32  degrees  below  zero,  centigrade, 
and  the  r.p.m.  had  dropped  from  1,600  to  1,560.  This  is 

277 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

considered  very  good.  But  the  lack  of  oxygen  was  affect- 
ing me.  I  was  beginning  to  get  cross,  and  I  could  not 
understand  why  I  was  only  29,000  feet  after  climbing  for 
BO  long.  I  remember  that  the  horizon  seemed  to  be  very 
much  out  of  place,  but  I  felt  that  I  was  flying  correctly 
»nd  that  I  was  right  and  the  horizon  was  wrong. 

About  this  time  the  motor  quit.  I  was  out  of  gasoline, 
BO  I  descended  in  a  large  spiral.  When  I  descended  to 
about  20,000  feet,  I  began  to  feel  much  better  and  realized 
that  the  lack  of  oxygen  had  affected  me.  I  passed  down 
through  the  clouds  at  16,000  feet  and  as  I  remember,  it  was 
snowing  from  these  clouds  upon  the  next  layer,  some  4,000 
feet  below.  I  am  not  positive  of  this  as  I  may  have  been 
affected  by  the  lack  of  oxygen.  I  noticed  as  I  descended 
that  the  air  seemed  very  thick  and  stuffy,  but  very  nice,  and 
warm.  I  did  not  see  the  ground  from  the  time  I  went  up 
through  the  clouds  above  Dayton,  Ohio,  until  I  came 
through  them  again  at  4,000  feet  above  Canton,  Ohio,  over 
200  miles  from  where  I  started. 

Special  stunts,  although  allowed  only  in  unusual 
circumstances,  became  more  bold  as  skill  and  know- 
ledge increased.  One  of  the  most  unusual  was  that 
of  Lieutenant  William  T.  Campbell,  who  made  102 
consecutive  loops  from  a  height  of  10,000  feet  at  Love 
Field.  Several  men  jumped  from  planes  in  flight  to 
test  the  practical  use  of  parachutes.  Chauffeur  R. 
W.  Bottriell  on  October  15,  1918,  with  the  engine 
stalled  by  his  pilot  and  the  plane  banked  so  as  to 
allow  him  to  clear  the  tail,  jumped  over  the  side  at 
4,800  feet  altitude  with  an  American  flag  flying  from 
the  parachute,  and  judging  the  distance  nicely  in  the 
strong  north  wind,  landed  squarely  in  the  main  flying 
field. 

Fast  flights  also  became  common.  On  July  31, 
1918,  a  flight  from  New  York  to  Washington  in  two 

278 


THE  WORK  AT  THE  FIELDS 

hours  and  15  minutes  through  rain  and  mist  was 
made  by  Major  C.  K.  Rhinehart  and  Captain  Fred 
Harvey.  In  early  October  a  De  Haviland  plane  flew 
the  430  miles  from  Dayton,  Ohio,  to  Washington  in 
two  hours  and  50  minutes  at  a  speed  of  143  miles 
an  hour,  against  16  hours  and  10  minutes  for  the 
fastest  train.  On  November  29  General  Kenly  flew 
from  Washington  to  New  York  in  a  De  Haviland  plane 
in  one  hour  and  55  minutes,  and  on  December  6  a 
Glenn  Martin  bomber  flew  the  191  miles  airline  from 
Pittsburgh  to  Washington  in  75  minutes. 

The  uses  of  planes  continually  increased.  For  the 
first  time  in  the  country's  history,  soldiers  under 
orders  for  duty  were  transported  by  airplane  on 
September  7,  when  18  enlisted  men  were  taken  from 
Rantoul  to  Champaign,  Illinois;  shortly  after  a  rul- 
ing was  made  that  expenses  should  be  allowed  for 
airplane  travel  at  the  rate  of  four  cents  a  mile,  as  is 
allowed  for  transportation  by  prairie  schooners, 
Alaska  dog  sleds,  and  Philippine  buffalo  carts.  After 
the  explosion  of  the  Gillespie  shell-loading  plant  at 
Morgan,  New  Jersey,  a  plane  hovering  only  1,000  feet 
above  8,000,000  pounds  of  T.  N.  T.  was  able  to  detect 
lanes  of  fire  leading  from  the  demolished  loading 
sheds  to  the  T.  N.  T.  plant,  direct  the  firemen  through 
the  openings  between  the  walls  of  fire  and  wreckage, 
and  help  greatly  to  check  the  flames  and  probably 
avert  the  added  horror  of  a  T.  N.  T.  explosion.  A 
new  record  for  passenger  carrying  was  established 
by  the  Navy  in  December,  when  its  giant  seaplane 
C-l,  with  three  Liberty  Motors,  took  up  50  men. 

A  very  noteworthy  event  was  the  opening  on  May 
15,  1918,  of  the  first  regular  aerial  mail  service  in  the 

279 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

United  States.  The  Army  furnished  six  planes  and 
pilots,  shortly  doubled,  for  a  daily  round  trip  between 
New  York,  Philadelphia  and  Washington,  carrying 
about  350  pounds  each  way,  with  a  ffight  record  of 
50  minutes  for  the  90  miles  from  Philadelphia  to 
New  York  and  one  hour  and  50  minutes  for  the  135 
miles  from  Philadelphia  to  Washington.  Very 
shortly  100  per  cent,  efficiency  of  delivery  at  less  than 
one-half  train  time  was  established,  and  the  postage 
rate  was  reduced  from  24  cents  a  letter  to  16  cents 
and  then  to  six,  omitting  the  special  delivery. 

On  August  12  this  work  was  formally  taken  over  by 
the  Post  Office  Department,  which  meanwhile  had 
secured  civilian  fliers.  Additional  planes  were  se- 
cured as  fast  as  possible  under  the  restrictions  im- 
posed by  military  necessity,  and  arrangements  were 
made  to  take  over  a  large  number  of  battle  planes 
and  bombers  at  the  end  of  the  war.  Plans  for  a  very 
large  extension  of  the  service  were  announced,2  in- 
cluding a  route  between  New  York  and  Chicago  with 
a  time  of  nine  hours  as  against  21  by  train,  and  every 
confidence  was  expressed  that  on  these  long  flights, 
where  overhead  charges  for  terminals  would  be  very 
small,  the  aerial  mail  would  be  not  only  over  twice 
as  fast,  but  very  nearly  as  cheap  as  rail  mail  with  its 
expenses  for  trackage,  terminals,  and  upkeep. 

2  The  Postmaster-General 's  annual  report,  issued  in  Decem- 
ber, suggests  a  much  more  elaborate  programme  comprising 
four  trunk  lines:  (1)  New  York  to  San  Francisco,  with  feeders 
from  Chicago  to  St.  Louis  and  Kansas  City,  Chicago  to  St.  Paul 
and  Minneapolis,  and  Cleveland  to  Pittsburgh;  (2)  Boston  to 
Key  West,  with  feeders  from  Philadelphia  to  Pittsburgh,  Wash- 
ington to  Cincinnati,  and  Atlanta  to  New  Orleans;  (3)  Key 
West,  via  Havana,  to  Panama;  (4)  Key  West,  via  West  Indies, 
to  South  America. 

280 


BOMB   DROPPING    AT   THE    TRAI»NG    FIELDS 


NIGHT     FLYING    AT     THE     TRAINING     FIELDS 


THE  WOKK  AT  THE  FIELDS 

Most  amazing  of  all  recent  innovations  in  aerial 
work,  however,  was  the  development  of  the  control  by 
actual  human  voice  of  a  large  squadron  of  planes. 
This  was  made  possible  by  the  perfection  of  the  radio 
telephone  to  a  point  where  the  commander  of  a 
squadron  can  direct  his  fellow  aviators  through  all 
evolutions.  By  this  means  a  fleet  of  planes  flying 
perhaps  on  several  different  levels  can  be  turned  to 
the  right  or  left,  upward  or  down,  just  as  freely  as 
the  commander  of  a  company  of  infantry  can  put  his 
men  through  drill. 

Very  early,  indeed  in  1910  at  the  International 
Aviation  Tournament  at  Belmont  Park,  the  im- 
portance of  controlled  formation  flying  was  recog- 
nized by  Army  officers  who  saw  a  squadron  of  11 
monoplanes,  one  of  the  first  in  history,  come  swoop- 
ing towards  them  in  a  group  from  over  a  grove  of 
trees.  The  following  September  the  development  of 
radio-telegraphy  was  begun  at  San  Diego,  with  the 
ultimate  hope  of  developing  also  radio-telephony. 
By  1916  wireless  telegraphy  had  come  to  a  point 
where  airplanes  in  flight  could  communicate  with  each 
other  over  a  few  miles  and  with  the  ground  over  a 
distance  of  140  miles. 

In  February,  1917,  two  months  before  this  country 
entered  the  war,  the  first  successful  experiments  with 
aerial  radio-telephony  were  made  by  Colonel  C.  C. 
Culver ;  communication  was  then  established  with  the 
ground  over  a  distance  of  a  few  miles.  The  pressure 
of  war,  with  its  great  aerial  programme,  gave  added 
impetus  to  this  work.  Beginning  with  a  conference 
on  May  22,  1917,  between  Army  radio  officers  and 
large  commercial  interests,  developments  became  much 

281 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

more  rapid,  until  in  May,  1918,  extended  tests  were 
begun  at  Gerstner  Field  which  continued  through 
June  and  July.  During  these  tests  an  official  in- 
spection was  made  by  the  Director  of  Military  Aero- 
nautics. A  command  of  39  machines  formed  into  two 
squadrons  of  18  planes  each,  with  the  thirty-ninth 
plane  carrying  the  commander,  had  been  carefully 
drilled  and  made  ready.  When  General  Kenly  ar- 
rived, the  command  was  formed  in  the  air  into  a  single 
formation,  proceeded  across  a  distant  part  of  the  field 
in  column,  executed  "column  left,"  and  then  in  sec- 
tions passed  before  the  reviewing  stand.  A  fast 
close-order  drill  then  followed  which  showed  absolute 
control  of  the  planes  by  voice. 

Ability  to  hear  the  human  voice  above  the  noise  of 
the  motor  depends  upon  the  fact  that  noises  produced 
by  the  motor  have  a  vibration  frequency  of  less  than 
200  per  second,  while  the  vibrations  of  the  human 
voice  range  from  a  little  over  200  to  as  high  as  3,000. 
The  transmitter  is  so  constructed  as  to  exclude  all 
sounds  below  a  frequency  of  200  and  the  receiver  so 
built  into  the  aviator's  helmet  as  further  to  exclude 
external  noise.  Pilots  who  do  not  send  but  only  re- 
ceive commands  are  equipped  only  with  a  receiver  but 
are  able  to  answer  their  commander's  questions  by 
dipping  their  planes  forward  for  the  affirmative  and 
sideways  for  the  negative. 

In  all  formations  machines  are  echeloned  in  alti- 
tude from  front  to  rear,  the  leading  machines  being 
the  lowest.  In  all  line  formations  machines  are 
echeloned  in  depth.  Individual  flank  movements  are 
made,  not  on  a  given  radius,  but  with  the  machine 
banked  45  degrees.  The  preparatory  command  is 

282 


THE  WORK  AT  THE  FIELDS 

given  twice,  followed  by  the  command  of  execution, 
"Go."  Many  times  towards  the  end  of  the  war  offi- 
cers sitting  in  the  radio  room  in  the  Division  of  Mili- 
tary Aeronautics  building  in  Washington  listened  in 
as  a  squadron  commander  several  thousand  feet  above 
the  Capitol  ordered  his  companion  aviators  to  wheel 
this  way  or  that  or  perform  other  evolutions. 

This,  of  course,  provided  the  final  word  in  aerial 
tactics,  and  forecast  squadrons  of  many  types  of 
planes  flying  in  different  strata  and  for  different  pur- 
poses, but  manoeuvring  like  a  high-seas  fleet  of  battle- 
ships, cruisers  and  destroyers.  There  might  thus  be, 
for  example,  a  first  flight  flying  at  about  12,000  feet, 
a  second  flight  2,000  feet  above  and  800  feet  behind 
to  fly  down  to  the  protection  of  the  first,  and  a  third 
flight  another  2,000  feet  above  and  slightly  behind 
the  second  to  guard  both  top  and  flank.  This  would 
enable  immediate  concentration,  either  from  above  or 
below,  at  any  threatened  point,  with  ability  to 
manoeuvre  in  absolute  unison  in  response  to  voice 
commands. 


283 


CHAPTER  XV 

THE  BALLOON  SERVICE 

The  balloon  service  a  necessary  consort  of  aviation  —  History 
of  military  ballooning  —  Its  neglect  in  the  United  States  — 
Its  development  through  the  European  War  —  Service, 
duties,  and  dangers  of  balloon  observers  —  American  bal- 
loon service  at  the  outbreak  of  war  —  The  war  pro- 
gramme —  Training  of  personnel  —  Schools  at  Fort  Omaha, 
Camp  John  Wise,  and  Arcadia  —  French  ballooning  system 
adopted  —  Courses  for  observers  and  manoeuvring  officers 
—  Arrangements  for  telephonic  communication  —  Officer 
personnel  at  the  termination  of  hostilities  —  Balloon  de- 
sign—  Difficulties  and  results  of  production  —  Production 
of  helium  gas  in  balloon  quantities  —  Total  personnel  and 
overseas  personnel  at  the  signing  of  the  armistice  — 
Transformation  school  in  France  —  The  balloon  service  in 
action. 

A  vitally  important  element  of  the  Air  Service, 
quite  distinct  from  the  work  so  far  described,  yet 
collaborating  with  it  most  effectively  in  the  collection 
of  military  information,  is  the  balloon  service.  Less 
spectacular  perhaps  than  the  heavier-than-air  branch, 
a  balloon  service  is  an  indispensable  adjunct  of  any 
army  in  the  field,  and  it  carries  out  a  duty  which 
could  be  accomplished  by  no  other  means,  especially 
under  the  new  conditions  of  trench  warfare.  Like 
its  companion  service,  ballooning  had  an  enormous 
development  through  the  Great  War. 

Ballooning  antedates  aviation  proper  by  several 
centuries;  it  represents,  indeed,  man's  first  attempt 
to  learn  from  the  skies  the  plans  of  his  enemies.  In 
the  Napoleonic  wars  France  used  balloonists  against 
Austria,  but  so  revolutionary  was  the  procedure,  and 
so  out  of  keeping  with  the  ideas  of  warfare  then  pre- 
284 


THE  BALLOON  SERVICE 

vailing,  that  Austria  treated  all  captured  balloon 
observers  as  spies  fit  only  for  the  ignominious  death 
reserved  as  a  penalty  for  illegitimate  warfare.  During 
the  Civil  War  in  the  United  States  Northern  ob- 
servers looked  out  across  the  Potomac  from  near 
Washington  at  the  Confederates  on  the  other  side, 
and  secured  very  valuable  information,  though  under 
the  most  precarious  of  conditions.  France  further 
developed  the  art  in  the  war  of  1870  against  Germany, 
but  it  remained  for  the  latter  nation  to  bring  it  up  to 
its  highest  development  in  her  monster  Zeppelins. 
Except  in  Germany,  however,  the  science  of  balloon- 
ing fell  upon  slack  times,  as  did  aviation  itself  in 
Germany.  While  that  nation  proceeded  with  the  de- 
velopment of  her  ungainly  airships,  the  other  nations 
were  inclined  to  see  in  them  something  of  the  heavi- 
ness and  stolidity  usually  associated  with  the  German 
character,  and  as  a  result  devoted  themselves  to  the 
more  romantic  and  the  more  scientifically  challenging 
subject  of  heavier-than-air  work. 

In  the  United  States  especially  was  this  true. 
With  the  American  military  establishment  cut  almost 
to  the  bone,  ballooning  was  reduced  bit  by  bit  until 
before  the  war  it  had  practically  ceased  to  exist. 
For  the  first  decade  of  the  present  century  the  War 
Department's  reports  contain  recurrent  statements 
that  no  work  was  done  because  of  lack  of  funds. 
With  the  almost  negligible  sums  voted  by  Congress 
for  aviation  as  a  whole,  the  less  stimulating  and 
less  promising  branch  of  the  Air  Service  was  entirely 
neglected. 

The  war  in  Europe  quickly  reinstated  ballooning  in 
the  important  position  to  which  its  potentialities  as  a 

285 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

means  of  securing  vital  information  as  to  enemy 
movements  entitled  it.  This  was  especially  so  the 
moment  the  war  became  a  war  of  position,  for  it  was 
found  that  balloon  observers  could  ferret  out  informa- 
tion through  their  painstaking  examination  which 
was  denied  to  their  very  much  fleeter  and  conse- 
quently more  transitory  fellow  observers  in  heavier- 
than-air  machines.  Hence,  there  developed  rapidly 
a  system  of  ever-watchful  sentries,  swinging  below 
their  ungainly  gas  bags  two  to  five  miles  from  the 
enemy's  lines  and  at  altitudes  up  to  a  mile,  covering 
every  sector  of  the  front  from  the  North  Sea  to  the 
Adriatic.  A  constant  vigil  was  maintained  over 
every  move  of  the  enemy  and  over  every  shell  fired  by 
either  side,  so  that  friends  below  might  be  saved  from 
surprise  and  enemies  beyond  might  receive  the 
maximum  of  damage. 

The  balloonist,  with  a  range  of  vision  of  about  eight 
miles  in  every  direction,  was  able  to  make  a  far  more 
detailed,  minute-by-minute  analysis  of  the  enemy's 
movements  than  the  airplane  observer,  though  of 
course  in  a  very  much  more  restricted  field.  Every 
movement  within  the  enemy's  lines,  no  matter  how 
slight,  was  registered  until  a  detailed  schedule  of 
the  usual  enemy  routine  was  built  up  and  the  average 
amount  of  movement  known.  Any  departure  from 
this  schedule  at  once  became  suspect.  A  train  run- 
ning late  or  with  more  cars  than  usual,  men  in  the 
trenches  being  relieved  too  frequently,  new  roads  or 
emplacements  being  built  with  too  much  earnestness, 
might  easily  give  the  hint  that  the  enemy  was  planning 
some  new  move. 

A  keen  balloonist,  of  course,  would  note  any  such 
286 


THE  BALLOON  SERVICE 

minute  details,  which  very  possibly  would  escape  the 
airplane  observer,  especially  as  the  latter  might  be 
engaged  in  work  far  behind  the  enemy's  lines.  He 
would  perhaps  telephone  down  to  the  ground,  for  all 
the  balloons  were  connected  by  telephone,  that  "an 

extra  train  of  six  cars  passed at  10 :40. ' '     Half 

a  mile  further  down  the  line  another  observer  might 
report  * '  a  large  convoy  moving  up  to  the  front,  range 
so  and  so,"  while  still  further  down  another  sus- 
picious circumstance  might  be  noted,  until  the  General 
Staff  below,  adding  together  all  these  scraps  of  in- 
formation, could  foresee  the  beginning  of  a  major 
movement  across  the  lines  and  make  plans  to  break 
it  up.  The  airplane  observer  meanwhile  would  be 
taking  photographs  of  the  suspected  points  and 
penetrating  far  back  into  the  enemy's  service  of  sup- 
ply to  determine  whether  the  movement  were  purely 
local  or  general. 

For  hours  at  a  time  the  balloonist  would  ride  in  his 
basket  with  the  enemy  lines  spread  out  before  him 
and  with  the  intelligence  officers  below  in  direct 
telephonic  communication.  The  moment  artillery 
action  began  on  either  side  a  new  phase  of  his  work 
opened.  If  it  were  enemy  batteries  going  into  action, 
he  would  have  to  line  out  as  nearly  as  possible  their 
exact  location,  possibly  in  triangulation  with  other 
sources  of  information,  and  tell  by  their  fire  of  what 
calibre  and  how  many  in  number  were  the  guns.  He 
was  expected  to  know  his  front  so  well  that  no  new 
battery  could  come  into  action  without  his  spotting 
it  immediately  and  furnishing  the  information  that 
would  lead  to  its  demolition.  So  also  in  case  of  his 
own  batteries  going  into  action,  he  had  immediately 

287 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

to  spot   the   efficacy   of   their   fire   and   correct   its 
accuracy. 

This  work,  of  course,  had  its  dangers.  Nothing 
afforded  more  attractive  prey  for  the  aviator  than 
an  enemy  balloon,  for  there  was  excitement  in  pene- 
trating its  anti-aircraft  defenses  and  satisfaction  in 
seeing  its  clumsy  and  inquisitive  form  burst  into  a 
cloud  of  smoke.  At  any  moment  "hostile  airplane 
overhead "  was  apt  to  come  over  the  telephone  wire, 
and  the  balloonist  be  forced  to  drop  everything,  climb 
over  the  side,  and  jump  out,  a  mile  above  the  ground, 
with  only  a  slender  parachute  to  save  him  from  death. 
If  there  were  no  hostile  aviator,  there  might  be  a 
rain  of  shrapnel  with  the  object  of  setting  the  balloon 
on  fire,  or  of  percussion  shells  aiming  to  blow  up  the 
windlass  below  and  set  the  big  bag  adrift  with  a  wind 
blowing  across  the  enemy  lines. 

Other  difficulties  also  had  to  be  met.  Ascents  in 
thunderstorms  were  dangerous  because  of  the  light- 
ning ;  rainstorms  added  to  the  weight  of  the  balloon 
and  consequently  decreased  its  ascending  power; 
heavy  winds  put  a  strain  on  the  cable  and  considerable 
wear  and  tear  on  the  windlass ;  occasional  clouds  were 
dangerous  as  hiding  places  for  lurking  enemy  air- 
men, while  general  clouds  rendered  observation  al- 
most impossible.  The  finding  of  a  "bed"  for  the 
big  envelope  also  presented  difficulties,  especially  as 
enemy  airmen  were  fond  of  seeking  out  balloons  as 
they  lay  on  the  ground.  As  a  rule  beds  were  sought 
in  the  lee  of  a  hill  which  would  obstruct  artillery  fire 
or  in  the  deceptive  shadows  of  a  near-by  wood,  with 
all  the  added  precautions  that  the  camofleurs'  art 
could  give. 

288 


THE  BALLOON  SERVICE 

With  developments  such  as  these  worked  out  in  the 
experience  of  the  European  War  during  the  years  of 
America's  neutrality,  the  United  States  found  itself 
upon  our  entrance  into  the  war  wholly  deficient  in 
balloon  science.  What  little  equipment  the  Govern- 
ment had  possessed  had  been  at  Fort  Omaha, 
Nebraska,  but  this  had  been  abandoned  some  years 
before,  the  field  grown  over,  and  the  rather  delicate 
material  allowed  to  deteriorate.  In  the  November 
previous  to  our  entry  into  the  war,  this  school  had 
been  ordered  reopened  with  accommodations  for  15 
officers  and  400  men  and  an  equipment  of  one  balloon 
shed,  a  gas  plant,  two  obsolete  captive  balloons,  and 
some  telegraph  material,  a  capital  only  less  promising 
than  that  on  hand  for  the  heavier-than-air  work. 

In  ballooning,  as  in  aviation,  the  war  brought  a 
tremendous  increase  in  programme.  As  in  aviation 
also  the  work  fell  under  the  two  heads  of  personnel 
and  equipment,  with  a  further  division  between  what 
was  done  here  and  what  was  done  overseas.  A  con- 
siderable training  system  and  a  large  industrial 
establishment  were  built  up,  with  American-built 
balloons  and  American  observers  actually  in  con- 
siderable numbers  at  the  front  before  the  hostilities 
ended. 

To  begin  with  training  in  this  country,  the  Fort 
Omaha  School  was  very  greatly  enlarged  in  size  in 
September,  1917,  to  accommodate  61  officers  and  1,200 
men;  on  December  28  Camp  John  Wise  was  opened 
as  a  southern  winter  camp  at  San  Antonio,  Texas, 
with  a  capacity  of  150  officers  and  2,200  men,  largely 
for  concentration  purposes;  and  later  a  third  school 
was  opened  at  Arcadia,  California,  where  weather  con- 

289 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

ditions  were  thought  to  be  peculiarly  favorable  for 
balloon  ascensions.  Great  uncertainty  existed  at 
first  as  to  the  courses  to  be  taught  at  these  schools,  as 
there  was  an  almost  complete  lack  of  information  as 
to  the  practice  in  foreign  armies.  At  first  attention 
was  equally  divided  between  captive  and  free  bal- 
looning, but  with  the  arrival  of  British  Royal  Flying 
Corps  officers  in  June,  1917,  the  course  was  made  to 
conform  with  the  British  practice,  with  particular 
attention  paid  to  artillery  observation.  When  in 
October,  however,  the  Artillery  practically  decided  to 
adopt  French  methods,  the  French  system  of  balloon- 
ing was  added,  and  the  two  courses,  French  and 
British,  continued  concurrently  until  April,  1918, 
when  the  French  system  was  made  the  exclusive 
course. 

As  finally  operating  the  officers'  course  began  with 
10  weeks  of  ground  instruction  at  Fort  Omaha,  fol- 
lowed by  two  advanced  courses  of  six  weeks  each,  one 
for  observers  at  Arcadia  and  the  other  for  manoeuv- 
ring officers  at  San  Antonio,  the  latter  being  the 
ground  officers  who  handled  all  the  work  in  connection 
with  sending  up  balloons,  manoeuvring  them  as  to 
winds  and  enemy  attack,  and  handling  their  equip- 
ment and  crews.  In  general  the  subjects  taught  in- 
cluded map  reading,  artillery  observation,  telephones 
and  communicating  lines,  rigging  and  repairs,  the 
winch,  hydrogen,  the  theory  of  ballooning,  and,  above 
all,  meteorology  with  all  its  details  of  atmospheric 
pressure,  movements  of  air,  precipitation  areas, 
storms,  and  instruments. 

Arcadia  developed  into  perhaps  the  most  interest- 
ing school,  with  some  quite  unusual  features.  A  total 

290 


THE  BALLOON  SERVICE 

of  106  miles  of  wire  were  in  use  there  to  teach  military 
communication,  strung  exactly  as  it  would  be  at  the 
front,  with  communication  posts  and  stations  for  all 
kinds  of  messages,  and  covering  a  large  part  of  the 
surrounding  country.  All  the  balloons  when  aloft 
were  so  wired  that  they  could  be  linked  together  with 
any  trench,  doubled  up  for  work  together,  or  cut  off 
so  that  each  talked  only  with  its  own  chart  room, 
winch,  or  operating  crew  on  the  ground  below.  What 
was  thought  to  be  the  highest  wireless  aerial  in  the 
world  was  operated  there  by  means  of  a  cable  from 
a  balloon ;  it  intercepted  messages  from  the  Brooklyn 
Navy  Yard. 

Up  to  the  termination  of  hostilities  a  total  of  598 
officers  were  graduated  from  these  schools,  including 
379  from  Fort  Omaha,  128  from  Camp  John  Wise,  and 
91  from  Arcadia.  Another  370  were  in  attendance, 
while  various  detachments  had  been  sent  at  different 
times  to  Fort  Sill,  Fortress  Monroe,  and  other 
artillery  firing  centers  for  the  training  of  artillery 
officers  in  cooperating  with  balloons. 

The  problem  of  equipment  presented  difficulties,  as 
there  was  neither  a  satisfactory  type  available  here 
nor  factories  trained  in  this  specialized  manufacture. 
During  the  Mexican  trouble  in  1916  there  had  been 
but  one  balloon  in  the  service  of  the  army  on  the 
border,  that  a  gift  to  a  National  Guard  battery  and 
of  amateur  design. 

Up  to  the  beginning  of  the  European  War  there 
had  been  the  greatest  difficulty  in  securing  a  balloon 
that  did  not  sway  and  bob  about  in  the  air  to  an  extent 
inconsistent  with  exact  observation.  Captain  Caquot 
of  the  French  Army,  however,  developed  a  new  type 

291 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

with  a  gas  bag  larger  in  diameter  at  the  nose  than 
at  the  tail,  which  made  it  head  into  the  wind,  and 
with  a  rudder  at  the  tail  which  kept  it  from  rocking 
and  pitching.  The  maximum  diameter  of  the  balloon 
was  approximately  28  feet,  its  capacity  1,000  cubic 
metres,  or  35,000  cubic  feet,  and  its  power  of  ascen- 
sion conferred  by  hydrogen  gas. 

The  reproduction  of  this  type  here,  however,  pre- 
sented unexpected  difficulties.  The  manufacture  of 
balloon  fabric  had  been  only  partially  developed  in 
this  country,  and  considerable  time  was  required  to 
get  it  in  full  swing.  Factories  with  sufficient  free 
and  open  floor  space  and  a  complete  absence  of  dirt 
and  dust  were  not  readily  available.  The  essential 
speed  was  so  difficult  to  obtain  with  the  untrained 
labor  force  that  a  number  of  experienced  men  and 
women  were  brought  over  from  France  to  act  as 
instructors.  Nevertheless,  by  November  11,  1,167 
balloons  were  on  order  and  507  had  been  delivered, 
of  which  119  had  been  sent  to  the  training  schools  and 
333  actually  embarked  for  overseas,  more  than  suffi- 
cient to  meet  American  needs  there.  In  addition, 
2,482  tons  of  ferro-silicon  and  947  tons  of  caustic  soda, 
89,125  hydrogen  cylinders,  48  winches,  and  1,172,000 
feet  of  cable  had  been  turned  out,  of  which  a  con- 
siderable portion  had  been  embarked. 

America  made  one  contribution  to  military  balloon- 
ing of  the  greatest  importance,  though  not  in  time  to 
affect  the  course  of  events  in  Europe.  It  was  thus 
described  by  General  Squier  before  the  American  In- 
stitute of  Electrical  Engineers  on  January  10,  1919: 

One  of  the  greatest  scientific  achievements  of  the  present 
war  from  a  technical  standpoint  is  the  production  of  helium 

292 


THE    CAQUOT    BALLOON    ASCENDING;    THE    TRIPLE -LOOPED    TAIL    IS    IN- 
FLATED BY   THE   WIND,   AND   NOT  ONLY   KEEPS  THE    HEAD  TOWARD  THE 
WIND,    BUT    BY    MEANS    OF    A    DIAPHRAGM    ARRANGEMENT    INSIDE    THE 
BALLOON  KEEPS  THE   MAIN   GAS  BAG  RIGID  EVEN  WHEN 
MUCH  OF  THE   HYDROGEN    HAS  LEAKED  OUT 


THE  BALLOON  SERVICE 

in  balloon  quantities.  This  gas  is  non-inflammable  and  has 
about  92  per  cent,  of  the  buoyant  effect  of  hydrogen.  Its 
name  is  due  to  its  having  been  discovered  in  the  sun's 
atmosphere  through  a  characteristic  line  in  the  solar 
spectrum,  before  its  presence  on  the  earth  or  any  of  its 
properties  were  known.  It  first  was  obtained  in  minute 
quantities  by  Ramsay  in  England  some  twenty  years  ago 
by  heating  certain  radioactive  minerals,  in  which  it  occurs 
because  it  is  a  disintegration  product  of  radium.  Its 
pre-war  scarcity  may  be  appreciated  from  the  fact  that  up 
to  two  years  ago,  not  more  than  100  cubic  feet  ever  had 
been  obtained,  and  the  usual  selling  price  was  about  $1,700 
a  cubic  foot. 

Notwithstanding  so  discouraging  an  outlook  someone  in 
the  British  Admiralty  had  imagination  enough  to  propose 
the  large-scale  separation  of  helium  from  certain  natural 
gases  in  Canada,  that  contain  about  one-third  of  one  per 
cent,  of  it,  and  experiments  were  undertaken  at  the  Univer- 
sity of  Toronto.  Soon  after  the  entry  of  the  United  States 
into  the  war,  the  Bureau  of  Mines,  learning  of  the  problem 
from  a  British  confidential  memorandum,  persuaded  the 
Signal  Corps  and  the  Bureau  of  Steam  Engineering  of  the 
Navy  to  approve  and  finance  jointly  an  experimental  pro- 
gramme on  a  large  scale.  Thanks  partly  to  the  unusually 
rich  sources  of  supply  in  this  country,  and  partly  to  the 
skill  of  the  two  commercial  companies  whose  services  were 
enlisted,  and  to  the  enthusiasm  of  the  Bureau  of  Mines  staff 
and  of  Mr.  Carter,  of  the  Navy,  who  for  a  time  represented 
the  Army  as  well  in  the  project,  such  success  was  achieved 
that,  at  the  cessation  of  hostilities,  there  was  compressed 
and  on  the  dock  ready  for  floating  147,000  cubic  feet  of 
nearly  pure  helium,  and  plants  were  under  construction  to 
give  at  least  50,000  cubic  feet  a  day  at  an  estimated  cost  of 
not  more  than  ten  cents  a  cubic  foot. 

The  production  of  a  balloon  gas  that  assures  safety  from 
fire  opens  up  a  new  era  for  the  dirigible  balloon.  In 
November,  1917,  a  Zeppelin  made  the  trip  from  Bulgaria 
to  German  East  Africa  with  twenty-five  tons  of  medicines 
and  munitions  only  to  find  that  the  German  forces  already 

293 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

had  been  dispersed,  and  returned  safely  to  its  base  without 
landing.  With  a  non-inflammable  gas,  not  only  comforta- 
ble and  expeditious,  but  also  safe  trans-continental  and 
trans- Atlantic  travel  in  dirigibles  will,  it  is  believed,  soon  be 
commonplace. 

The  overseas  demands  for  balloon  personnel  and 
equipment  increased  steadily  as  time  wore  on  in  much 
the  same  way  as  demands  in  the  heavier-than-air 
field.  The  A.  E.  F.  programme  of  September  18, 
1917,  called  for  a  total  of  69  balloon  companies  over- 
seas, with  eight  shipped  each  month  beginning  in 
January,  1918.  The  general  authorization  for  the 
Division  of  Military  Aeronautics  approved  on  May 
29, 1918,  allowed  for  a  balloon  force  of  14,467  officers 
and  men.  As  the  overseas  requirements,  however, 
called  for  13,800  of  these  men,  authority  was  asked  on 
July  17  for  30  more  companies  to  allow  the  training 
and  artillery-cooperation  work  in  this  country  to  con- 
tinue. This  was  granted  on  August  12,  and  adding 
240  officers  and  6,000  men  to  the  strength  authorized. 

On  June  30,  1918,  the  actual  strength  stood  at 
9,621  officers  and  men,  with  1,382  sent  overseas. 
From  then  on  overseas  demands  increased  steadily, 
44  companies  being  called  for  in  August  and  30  in 
September,  with  a  total  to  November  11  of  107,  as 
against  the  original  schedule  of  69.  Up  to  the  sign- 
ing of  the  armistice  25  companies  had  actually  been 
sent  overseas,  with  a  total  personnel  of  223  flying 
officers  and  10  non-flying  officers,  131  Artillery  offi- 
cers attached,  and  6,475  men.  Similarly  the  total 
strength  here  and  abroad  had  jumped  to  685  flying 
officers,  66  non-flying  officers,  156  Artillery  officers 
attached,  and  16,549  men.  Despite  this  great  in- 

294 


THE  BALLOON  SERVICE 

crease,  however,  the  men  had  not  been  received  in 
time  to  meet  the  requests  from  overseas. 

As  in  the  heavier-than-air  service,  a  special  training 
system  was  developed  abroad  to  " transform"  men 
from  this  country  by  means  of  training  under  actual 
war  conditions.  To  this  end  a  balloon  school  was 
established  in  France  both  for  observers  and  for  en- 
listed men.  By  the  termination  of  hostilities  157 
officers  had  been  graduated  and  48  were  still  in  attend- 
ance, while  of  enlisted  men  there  had  been  graduated 
174  machine  gunners,  68  winch  operators,  63  chart- 
room  clerks,  58  telephone  experts,  and  55  radio 
operators. 

Although  this  force  came  to  the  front  but  gradu- 
ally, the  balloon  service  may  be  said  to  have  proved 
itself  at  Chateau-Thierry,  as  did  its  companion 
heavier-than-air  service.  Only  three  hours  after  the 
American  infantry  had  entered  the  city  in  the  be- 
ginning of  its  offensive,  a  balloon  company  of  170 
men  and  its  equipment  entered ;  next  morning  it  had 
a  balloon  up  five  miles  beyond,  observing  for  Ameri- 
can artillery,  with  a  complete  line  of  communication 
established.  Another  balloon  company,  a  few  hours 
behind  the  first,  got  into  action  closely  after  and 
brought  down  an  enemy  airplane  with  a  captured 
machine  gun,  for  which  a  citation  in  French  Army 
orders  was  given  it.  Another  company,  so  heavily 
shelled  that  it  had  to  haul  down  its  gas  bag,  trans- 
ferred its  whole  equipment  to  the  other  side  of  a 
forest  14  acres  in  area  and  continued  its  work  un- 
interrupted. Several  other  companies  were  men- 
tioned in  orders,  one  because,  "  despite  the  fact  that 
shells  were  falling  on  all  sides  of  the  balloon,  two  so 

295 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

close  as  to  tear  holes  in  the  fabric,  no  man  left  the 
ropes  nor  faltered/' 

Many  balloon  observers  found  safety  when  their 
balloons  were  set  on  fire  by  enemy  planes  only  by 
climbing  out  and  jumping  off  into  space  with  their 
parachutes.  Lieutenant  James  A.  McDevitt,  for  in- 
stance, was  cited  as  follows : 

Four  jumps :  September  17,  1918,  at  Memey,  Lieut.  Mc- 
Devitt jumped  when  attacked  by  enemy  plane.  October  5, 
1918,  Lieut.  McDevitt  jumped  during  the  advance  north- 
west of  Verdun.  There  were  eight  holes  in  the  balloon  and 
four  in  the  basket  from  the  enemy's  bullets.  October  6, 
1918,  Lieut.  McDevitt,  while  observing  in  a  balloon  was 
attacked  by  two  enemy  planes  and  forced  to  jump.  Eight- 
een minutes  later  he  ascended  and  continued  his  work. 
October  6,  1918,  Lieut.  McDevitt  was  attacked  the  second 
time  and  an  hour  and  eight  minutes  later.  He  jumped. 
The  balloon  was  burned. 

So  also  Lieutenant  George  D.  Armstrong  was 
credited  with  three  jumps,  the  second  on  October  6 
when  he  was  attacked  by  two  Fokker  planes,  followed 
immediately  by  a  reascension  and  another  jump  13 
minutes  later. 

The  first  fatality  in  this  work  was  that  of  Lieu- 
tenant C.  J.  Ross  in  October.  Lieutenant  Ross  was  on 
a  special  mission  during  a  day  of  overcast  skies, 
when  suddenly,  during  an  intense  bombardment 
which  he  was  directing,  a  German  air  squadron  ap- 
peared out  of  a  cloud  bank,  dived  for  the  balloon  and 
set  it  on  fire.  Ross's  companion  had  some  trouble  in 
getting  out  of  the  basket,  and  Ross  delayed  to  see 
him  clear  before  he  jumped  himself.  The  delay 
proved  fatal,  as  his  parachute  in  its  slow  flight  was 

296 


BALLOON  CREW  AT  THE   GAS   CYLINDERS   CONNECTED   WITH   THE  FEEDING 

TUBE 


PILOT  AND  ARTILLERY  OBSERVER   IN   BALLOON   BASKET   WITH   TELEPHONE 

EQUIPMENT  AND  PARACHUTES  IN  STOPS;  EACH  PARACHUTE  IS  ATTACHED 

TO    THE    MAN    WHO    MAY    HAVE    TO    USE    IT 


THE  BALLOON  SERVICE 

overtaken  and  ignited  by  burning  wreckage  from  the 
balloon. 

All  during  this  time  both  equipment  and  men  be- 
came available  in  ever  increasing  numbers,  so  that  by 
the  time  hostilities  ended  America  was  well  repre- 
sented in  ballooning  at  the  front,  where  Colonel 
Charles  de  F.  Chandler  was  head  of  the  Balloon  Ser- 
vice, A.  E.  F.  Up  to  November  6,  251  balloons  had 
been  received  from  the  United  States,  of  which  10 
had  been  given  to  the  French  and  15  to  the  British; 
23  had  been  lost  by  burning  or  condemnation,  16 
were  at  the  training  fields,  and  81  in  the  zone  of 
advance,  and  106  were  stored.  During  the  week  of 
October  30,  17  balloon  companies  were  actually  at  the 
front  and  flew  a  total  of  54  hours.  Of  the  405  officers 
with  the  service  in  France,  201  were  in  the  zone  of 
advance.  Ballooning,  though  less  spectacular  than 
the  heavier-than  air  work,  had  fully  proved  its  in- 
estimable value  in  observation  and  direction  of 
artillery  fire. 


297 


CHAPTER  XVI     ... 

THE  STRUCTURE  OVERSEAS 

Course  of  the  overseas  development  of  the  Air  Service  —  Co- 
ordination of  American  and  Allied  resources  —  The  de- 
velopment in  France  —  Training  of  fliers  —  The  flying 
field  at  Issoudun  —  Summary  of  Air  Service  establish- 
ments —  The  Eomorantin  assembly,  repair  and  salvage 
plant  —  Establishments  at  Orly,  Tours,  and  Colombey-les- 
Belles  —  Organization  of  the  first  squadrons  —  Equipment 
of  the  combatant  squadrons  and  training  fields  witli  French 
and  American  planes  —  The  development  in  England  — 
Training  of  fliers  —  Their  service  with  the  Eoyal  Flying 
Corps  —  Training  of  mechanics  —  The  Anglo-American 
night-bombing  agreement  —  Total  personnel  trained  in 
England  —  The  development  in  Italy  —  The  situation  at 
the  termination  of  hostilities  —  The  service  of  the  American 
air  force. 

We  now  turn  finally  overseas,  where  American 
airmen  wrote  a  chapter  in  the  aerial  history  of  the 
Great  War  which  cannot  be  surpassed.  The  romance, 
the  glory,  and  the  skill  associated  with  these  picked 
young  Americans  will  send  a  thrill  of  pride  through 
their  compatriots  when  time  permits  the  full  story  to 
be  told.  Now  only  a  hasty  glimpse  behind  the  curtain 
is  possible. 

America's  aviation  activities  abroad,  as  in  this 
country,  had  to  be  built  from  the  very  foundations. 
Long,  weary  months  of  development,  of  constructing 
fields,  depots,  and  airdromes,  of  learning  the  very 
primer  of  flying,  had  to  be  gone  through  before  even 
a  handful  of  pilots  appeared  over  the  front.  Vexa- 
tions, delays,  and  cross  purposes  had  their  place  there 
as  in  America,  intensified  further  by  distance  from 

298 


THE  STRUCTURE  OVERSEAS 

home  and  presence  among  foreigners.  All  were  for- 
gotten, however,  as  the  first  enemy  aviators  began  to 
go  down  before  the  young  American  flying  force. 

The  entry  of  the  United  States  into  the  war  found 
the  Allied  nations  with  a  magnificient  aviation 
mechanism  but  largely  stripped  of  personnel;  the 
United  States,  on  the  other  hand,  had  a  super- 
abundance of  personnel  without  an  operating  mechan- 
ism. Three  years  of  desperate  strife  had  drained 
off  the  best  flying  material  abroad,  while  years  of 
isolation  from  the  war's  developments  and  a  general 
public  apathy  had  prevented  the  building  of  any 
structure  here.  Consequently,  American  aviators 
could  take  their  places  over  the  lines  within  any  rea- 
sonable time  only  if  they  were  admitted  at  once  to 
Allied  schools.  Out  of  this  situation  of  contrasts 
grew  an  inter- Allied  cooperation  of  splendid  efficiency. 
America  provided  of  her  strength  in  untrained  per- 
sonnel and  in  raw  materials,  while  the  Allies  gave 
of  their  skill,  experience,  and  plant.  With  admirable 
unity  of  purpose  the  joint  forces  were  forged  together 
to  a  common  end,  and  to  this  dovetailing  of  resources 
may  be  largely  ascribed  the  part  that  America  played 
in  the  aerial  warfare. 

Little  did  anyone  foresee  at  the  outset  what 
America's  overseas  aerial  programme  would  be.  As 
a  matter  of  fact,  there  was  created  outside  of  the 
United  States  an  organization  which  at  the  termina- 
tion of  hostilities  was  slightly  larger  in  total  per- 
sonnel than  that  existing  here.  Its  functions  and 
work  may  be  divided  both  by  classes  and  by  countries. 
First  was  the  training  of  fliers,  which  was  carried  out 
in  Canada,  England,  France,  and  Italy.  Second  was 

299 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

the  provision  of  enlisted  personnel  both  in  England 
and  in  France,  for  the  purpose  of  relieving  the  de- 
pleted labor  markets  of  the  Allies  and  of  training 
mechanics  for  eventual  use  with  American  forces. 
Third  was  the  building  of  fields,  airdromes,  and 
plants  and  the  assembly  and  upkeep  of  planes,  en- 
gines, and  other  equipment.  The  three  brought  to 
the  front  all  the  parts  essential  to  a  splendidly 
balanced  Air  Service. 

To  begin  with  the  development  in  France,  the  first 
modest  start  came  with  the  sending  abroad  on  May 
27,  1917,  seven  weeks  after  the  outbreak  of  war,  of  a 
small  detachment  of  cadets  who  had  had  some  slight 
flying  training.  This  was  in  response  to  France's 
offer  to  train  60  men  in  her  schools,  and  its  quick 
acceptance  by  the  United  States  led  not  only  to  a 
very  great  enlargement  of  France's  offer  but  also  to 
similar  offers  from  England  and  Italy.  As  a  result, 
other  cadets  followed  rapidly  —  491  by  September  1, 
1917,  and  2,260  by  February  1,  1918,  the  pick  of 
America's  young  manhood,  until  finally  2,531  cadets 
had  been  sent  to  France  while  American  schools  were 
being  filled  with  their  classmates. 

At  the  outset  the  majority  of  these  men  went  to 
wholly  French  schools,  but  as  American  engineers  and 
construction  companies  built  up  American  schools 
overseas,  they  were  shifted  over  until  at  the  end  of 
the  war  nearly  all  were  in  American  institutions. 
For  a  time  very  many  were  idle  because  of  the  up- 
setting of  the  whole  Allied  aerial  programme  by  the 
unexpected  demands  created  by  the  Russian  and 
Italian  defeats  and  by  the  slow  shipment  of  raw 
materials  from  the  United  States,  but  as  the  crisis 

300 


THE  STRUCTURE  OVERSEAS 

passed  and  a  more  normal  course  was  resumed,  de- 
liveries of  planes  also  picked  up  and  with  them  the 
American  training  programme. 

The  number  of  men  trained  in  France  is  surprising. 
Up  to  November  11  the  schools  of  France  had  gradu- 
ated a  total  of  8,114  pilots  and  observers,  including 
1,573  preliminary,  2,359  advanced,  1,160  pursuit,  723 
observation,  329  day-bombing,  and  25  night-bombing 
pilots,  and  88  pursuit,  1,425  artillery,  390  day-bomb- 
ing, and  142  night-bombing  observers.  A  total  of 
1,853  graduates  had  been  sent  to  the  zone  of  ad- 
vance by  November  6,  and  2,012  others  y/ere  in  train- 
ing at  the  termination  of  hostilities.  Up  to  Novem- 
ber 6  there  had  been  148  fatalities  in  training  and  a 
total  of  137,804  hours  flown,  or  931  hours  to  a 
fatality,  as  against  606  hours  among  American  pilots 
in  England  and  2,960  hours  in  the  United  States.  By 
November  the  schools  in  France  had  attained  a 
capacity  of  about  2,000  pilots  a  month,  and  were 
frantically  cabling  to  the  United  States  to  send  over 
men  who  had  gone  through  preliminary  training  for 
the  final,  or  "refresher,"  work  there.  As  the 
hostilities  ceased,  the  system  of  giving  all  the  pre- 
liminary work  in  the  United  States  and  the  final  work 
in  France  was  becoming  well  established,  and  the  early 
lack  of  cohesion  between  the  two  systems  was  being 
adjusted  into  a  well  regulated  balance. 

America's  aerial  building  operations  in  France  be- 
gan almost  equally  early  and  equally  modestly. 
Even  before  the  advance  guard  of  the  A.  E.  F.  sailed 
for  France,  arrangements  to  build  an  aviation  school 
there  had  been  made  by  the  aviation  authorities  and 
approved  by  Secretary  Baker  on  May  19,  1917.  All 

301 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

materials,  including  nine  miles  of  railroad,  were 
assembled  in  five  weeks'  time,  and  on  July  16  three 
ships  sailed  from  Hoboken  laden  with  equipment  to 
build  barracks,  mess  halls,  hangars,  machine  shops, 
water  towers,  and  plumbing.  Two  days  later  the 
first  detachment  of  aviation  enlisted  men,  200  in 
number,  followed.  Personnel  and  materials  were 
brought  together  at  Issoudun,  France,  and  by  Sep- 
tember flying  was  in  progress  there. 

This  field  at  Issoudun  became  the  largest  in  France, 
and  also  in  the  world.  It  was  described  as  ' '  a  flying 
field  of  36  square  miles,  the  area  of  an  American 
township,  with  nine  separate  flying  fields  on  which 
American  aviators  advance  to  the  stage  of  flight  com- 
batants, and  airplanes,  Liberties,  Nieuports,  Capronis, 
and  all  others,  with  officers,  instructors  and  newly 
equipped  aviators,  swelling  our  squadrons  each 
month.'*  Its  capacity  was  to  be  1,000  planes,  with 
350  staff  officers,  1,800  students,  and  6,100  men,  of 
whom  1,165  officers  and  cadets  and  4,861  men  were 
actually  on  hand  on  November  1.  There  were  au- 
thorized 203  buildings  for  housing,  37  shops  for  store- 
houses, 84  hangars,  and  15  miles  of  railroads  and 
turnouts.  At  the  termination  of  hostilities  the  Issou- 
dun field,  then  commanded  by  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Hiram  Bingham,  had  14  flying  fields  and  was  the  in- 
struction center  for  the  Air  Service  of  the  Third 
Army. 

Meanwhile,  other  American  aviation  centers  began 
to  spring  up  all  over  France.  Some  were  built  by 
American  engineers  and  workmen,  others  taken  over 
from  the  French,  until  by  the  signing  of  the  armistice 
the  whole  country  was  dotted  with  them.  Besides 

302 


THE  STRUCTURE  OVERSEAS 

offices  in  London  and  at  the  A.  E.  F.  headquarters  at 
Chaumont,  the  central  offices  were  in  Paris,  service  of 
supply  headquarters  at  Tours,  and  advance  head- 
quarters at  Colombey-les-Belles ;  the  Paris  office  was 
by  far  the  largest,  with  over  400  officers,  under  com- 
mand of  Lieutenant-Colonel  H.  Dunwoody.  Besides 
the  flying  school  at  Issoudun  there  were  seven  other 
schools:  Tours  and  Chatillon-sur-Seine,  for  ob- 
servers ;  Meucon,  Souge,  and  Coetquidan,  for  artillery 
firing  point ;  Clermon-Ferrand,  for  bombardment ;  and 
St.  Jean-de-Monte,  for  aerial  gunnery.  In  addition, 
there  were  six  ports  of  debarkation,  20  airdromes,  five 
organization  training  centers,  three  air  depots,  three 
supply  depots,  and  one  aerial-gunnery  school,  one 
warehouse,  concentration  camp,  acceptance  park, 
testing  field,  and  assembly,  salvage  and  repair  depot. 
Of  these  establishments  that  at  Romorantin,  under 
command  of  Lieutenant-Colonel  E.  V.  Sumner,  was 
most  important,  * '  a  mammoth  Air  Service  production 
center  with  huge  shops  and  warehouses,"  as  a  corre- 
spondent described  it,  housing  305  officers  and  6,775 
men  on  October  29,  1918,  and  laid  out  to  care  for 
25,000,  with  warehouses,  motor-transport  park,  plants 
for  fabricating  day  and  night  bombers  and  for  repair 
and  salvage,  and  three  flying  fields.  Its  construction 
had  been  approved  by  the  Commander-in-Chief  on 
December  27,  1917,  and  it  was  74  per  cent,  completed 
on  September  30,  1918.  Assembly  of  American-built 
planes,  repair  of  a  score  of  different  foreign  motors 
and  of  all  planes  badly  damaged,  and  salvage  of  all 
parts  of  planes  and  motors  that  could  be  reused  were 
carried  on  here.  As  a  correspondent  wrote  of  the 
Romorantin  establishment : 

303 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

All  the  cars  made  in  America  come  here  in  parts,  to  be 
assembled,  tested,  armed,  and  all  the  other  makes  of  cars 
are  mobilized  here  preparatory  to  going  into  use  on  the 
flying  fields  and  the  front.  There  is,  besides,  the  huge  work 
of  receiving  the  wrecked  cars  as  they  come  here  riddled 
with  bullets,  their  wings  torn  off,  which  tell  of  a  fierce  con- 
test. Such  as  can  be  made  serviceable  again  are  sent  back 
to  the  field,  while  the  wreckage  of  those  beyond  repair 
strews  an  immense  field  and  is  a  ghastly  reminder  of  the 
heroic  sacrifice  their  pilots  have  made. 

The  process  of  assembling  the  cars  as  they  come  from 
America  was  followed  through  its  various  stages  in  the  six 
huge  "  bays  "  of  the  workshop,  each  bay  having  a  capacity 
of  18  machines  or  over  100  machines  going  forward  at  the 
same  time.  Nine  huge  boxes  bring  the  different  parts. 
First,  the  fuselage  or  body  is  set  up,  the  motors  installed, 
the  landing  wheels  attached,  the  wings  and  tail  adjusted, 
the  gun  racks  and  armament  prepared,  and  soon  a  complete 
car  ready  for  flight  grows  out  of  the  scattered  parts. 

How  many  are  turned  out  daily  cannot  be  stated,  but 
it  can  be  said  that  the  capacity  of  this  big  airplane  center 
working  in  eight-hour  shifts  is  50  complete  airplanes  a  day. 
And  in  these  days,  when  the  mobilizing  of  machines  follows 
close  on  the  mobilizing  of  men,  the  actual  production  is  not 
far  from  the  full  capacity. 

Orly  also  was  an  important  center,  where  all  planes 
received  from  the  French,  which  for  a  long  time  were 
the  only  ones  available,  were  tested  and  accepted  by 
the  United  States.  This  project,  made  necessary  by 
the  congestion  in  French  factories  and  authorized  on 
March  19,  1918,  contemplated  a  plant  to  handle  500 
planes,  with  a  force  of  300  officers  and  1,800  men. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  280  officers  and  2,232  men  were 
at  work  on  October  29,  with  construction  work  85 
per  cent,  completed  on  September  30.  The  Orly  Ac- 
ceptance Park  was  commanded  by  Colonel  T.  A.  Bald- 

304 


THE  STRUCTURE  OVERSEAS 

win.  At  St.  Maixent  was  the  Air  Service  Re- 
placement Barracks,  commanded  by  Colonel  Aubrey 
Lippincott,  where  the  complete  organization  and 
equipment  of  the  squadrons  was  carried  out,  except 
the  planes,  which  were  flown  to  the  advance  stations 
by  the  pilots  from  Orly. 

Tours,  in  addition  to  being  S.  0.  S.  headquarters, 
was  also  a  large  training  center  with  its  school  taken 
over  from  the  French  on  November  1,  1917,  when  it 
had  a  force  roughly  of  20  officers,  100  students  and 
450  men.  The  United  States  at  once  arranged  to 
triple  its  size,  and  the  Air  Service  had  the  construc- 
tion work  95  per  cent,  completed  on  September  30, 
1918,  and  a  force  of  844  officers  and  cadets  and  2,660 
men  installed  on  October  29.  The  Chief  of  Training, 
with  headquarters  at  Tours,  was  Colonel  W.  S.  Kilner. 

Also  at  Tours  was  the  headquarters  of  the  Air  Ser- 
vice overseas.  At  the  termination  of  hostilities  the 
overseas  force  was  commanded  by  Major-General 
Mason  M.  Patrick,  Chief  of  Air  Service,  A.  E.  F.  His 
Assistant  Chiefs  were  Brigadier-General  "William 
Mitchell,  Army  Group,  or  zone  of  advance,  and 
Brigadier-General  Benjamin  Foulois,  Service  of  Sup- 
ply. The  commanders  of  the  army  groups  were 
Colonel  Frank  P.  Lahm,  First  Army,  and  Colonel 
Thomas  DeW.  Milling,  Second  Army ;  when  the  Third 
Army  Air  Service  was  organized,  General  Mitchell 
took  command. 

Colombey-les-Belles  was  headquarters  of  the  First 
Air  Depot  in  the  zone  of  advance.  Approved  as  early 
as  September  29,  1917,  and  a  complete  project  sub- 
mitted a  month  later,  it  was  94  per  cent,  completed  on 
September  30, 1918,  and  had  a  force  of  396  officers  and 

305 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

3,050  men  on  October  29.  This,  of  course,  was 
the  operating  base  of  the  Air  Service  squadrons  at 
the  front,  whence  orders  to  the  actual  fighting  force 
were  issued. 

In  due  time  all  this  preparatory  effort  in  the  rear 
began  to  show  on  the  front.  First  as  detachments  or 
individuals  brigaded  with  the  French  and  later  as 
complete  American  units,  the  personnel  began  to 
move  out  to  the  zone  of  advance,  a  stream  small  at 
first  but  steadily  mounting  to  great  power.  The  first 
squadron,  the  12th  Observation,  was  reported  com- 
pleted on  March  6,  the  94th  Pursuit  on  the  7th,  the 
90th  Observation  on  the  22d,  and  the  103d  Pursuit  on 
the  29th.  April  saw  completed  the  93d  Pursuit  and 
the  89th  and  99th  Observation  on  the  llth,  and  the 
1st  Pursuit  on  the  17th.  May  saw  completed  the  88th 
and  91st  Observation,  and  the  147th  and  27th  Pur- 
suit; June,  the  139th  Pursuit;  July,  the  13th,  49th, 
93d,  and  213th  Pursuit,  and  the  24th  and  104th  Ob- 
servation ;  a  total  of  23  squadrons  in  five  months. 

The  provision  of  equipment  was  a  very  serious  prob- 
lem. For  over  a  year  the  large  American  training 
schools  in  France  and  the  men  at  the  front  were  en- 
tirely dependent  upon  foreign  planes.  From  the 
French  alone,  for  instance,  18  different  planes  total- 
ing 14,378  machines  had  been  ordered,  and  15  different 
motors  to  a  total  of  48,846,  with  deliveries  of  actual 
combat  planes  to  November  6  totaling  2,676.  On  Oc- 
tober 30  there  were  with  combat  units  305  pursuit, 
336  observation,  and  87  bombing  planes,  while  10  days 
before  there  had  been  at  fields  891  training  planes  in 
commission,  695  out  of  commission,  and  654  in  re- 
serve, a  total  of  2,968  planes  of  all  types.  The  total 

306 


THE  STRUCTURE  OVERSEAS 

number  of  planes  received  by  the  A.  E.  F.  from  all 
sources  up  to  November  16  was  6,472. 

Of  the  43  squadrons  on  the  front  on  October  31 
(there  were  two  more  by  November  11,  one  night- 
bombing  and  one  night  observation),  20  were  mono- 
place  pursuit,  including  17  equipped  with  Spads  and 
three  with  Sopwith-Carnel ;  17  were  observation,  in- 
cluding 11  equipped  with  Salmson,  five  with  American 
De  Haviland-4,  and  one  with  Breguet-A2;  six  were 
day  bombers,  including  five  equipped  with  American 
De  Haviland-4,  and  one  with  Breguet-B2.  Eleven 
more  squadrons  were  equipped  and  waiting  to  go  to 
the  front  and  another  10  were  being  mobilized. 

This  shows  that  despite  all  the  delays  in  American 
production,  10  of  the  43  American  squadrons  on  the 
front  on  November  1  were  equipped  with  American 
De  Haviland  planes.  "With  the  first  of  this  type  re- 
ceived in  France  in  May,  157  had  arrived  by  July  1, 
377  by  August  1,  661  by  September  1,  853  by  October 
1,  1,185  by  November  1,  and  1,379  by  the  termination 
of  hostilities.  Of  these  there  were  actually  in  the 
zone  of  advance  six  by  July  1,  64  by  August  1,  180  by 
September  1,  494  by  October  1,  and  582  by  November 
1.  In  consideration  of  the  fact  that  the  total  French 
strength  was  set  at  2,820  and  the  total  British  strength 
at  1,664,  these  figures  are  very  considerable,  and  indi- 
cate plainly  that  if  the  war  had  continued,  American 
equipment  would  have  taken  a  very  important  place 
within  a  few  weeks. 

In  addition,  of  course,  a  mass  of  other  supplies  was 
received,  including  instruments  and  accessories,  ma- 
chine guns  and  ammunition,  and  bombs.  la  the  single 
week  of  November  6,  14,949,541  pounds  of  this  service 

307 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

material  was  received  at  the  ports  of  debarkation. 
All  this  had  its  place  in  building  up  the  service  of 
supply  necessary  both  to  equip  new  planes  and  to 
repair  those  that  had  been  over  the  lines.  In  the 
single  matter  of  motors,  for  instance,  a  total  of  2,188 
Liberties  had  been  received  at  Romorantin  for  testing, 
in  addition  to  the  first  of  the  Hispano-Suiza  engines. 

All  this  time  a  smaller  but  not  dissimilar  organiza- 
tion was  being  built  up  in  England.  As  with  France, 
cadets  were  sent  over  early  in  response  to  a  cable  of 
August  28,  1917,  that  "  200  cadets  can  be  taken  for 
training  in  England."  In  all,  nearly  400  were  put 
into  British  schools  on  the  same  status  as  the  British 
themselves,  with  total  graduations  of  316  men,  includ- 
ing 157  pursuit  pilots,  129  day  bombers,  23  night 
bombers,  and  seven  observers.  A  rough  basis  of  com- 
parison as  to  the  relative  danger  of  the  British  and 
American  training  systems  is  given  in  the  fact  that 
to  October  9,  1918,  34  Americans  were  killed  in  acci- 
dents with  only  20,624  hours  flown,  or  a  death  to  every 
606  hours.  This,  admitting  the  far  more  advanced 
training  given  in  England  and  the  encouragement  to 
test  skill  by  running  risks  in  flying  close  to  buildings 
and  making  dangerous  landings,  shows  the  American 
rate  of  one  accident  to  every  2,960  hours  flown  to  be 
relatively  favorable.  In  this  training  18  different 
planes  were  used,  as  against  not  a  third  that  number 
here. 

Of  the  316  graduates  sent  to  France,  102  were  de- 
livered to  the  A.  E.  F.,  the  cost  of  training,  it  is  inter- 
esting to  note  being  figured  at  £1,000.  The  other  214 
men  were  attached  to  British  squadrons,  where  they 
were  shown  in  the  Royal  Flying  Corps  reports  to  have 

308 


THE  STRUCTURE  OVERSEAS 

done  magnificent  work,  though  at  a  very  heavy  toll. 
A  total  of  95,  or  44  per  cent.,  had  been  put  out  of 
action  by  the  termination  of  hostilities,  including  23 
dead,  25  missing,  18  wounded,  23  prisoners,  one  in- 
terned, four  discontinued,  and  one  transferred.  This 
total  figured  against  the  number  of  days  of  service 
gave  the  average  period  of  usefulness  of  a  pilot  as 
but  68  days. 

England  also  served  as  a  great  supply  and  me- 
chanics' training  center.  On  December  5,  1917,  an 
agreement  was  made  to  maintain  a  force  of  15,000 
American  mechanics  there,  bringing  in  new  men  from 
the  United  States  all  the  time  and  sending  on  to 
Prance  those  who  had  become  proficient.  England 
derived  great  benefit  from  this  arrangement  through 
an  increase  in  her  seriously  depleted  labor  supply 
and  a  stimulation  of  its  morale,  while  America  se- 
cured the  advantage  of  having  these  men  trained  in 
the  best  British  factories  and  airdromes  and  with 
actual  service  planes  before  going  to  the  front.  The 
programme  was  delayed  somewhat ;  951  men  were  de- 
livered by  January  1,  as  against  4,000  agreed ;  1,375 
by  February  1,  against  9,000  agreed;  and  3,931  by 
March  1,  against  15,000  agreed.  By  April  1,  however, 
the  number  jumped  to  10,819,  with  13,470  by  June  1, 
16,224  by  September  1,  and  16,092  on  November  13. 
In  addition,  6,200  carpenters,  bricklayers,  and  general 
laborers  were  to  be  provided  for  building  airdromes 
and  fields,  of  whom  a  total  of  3,643  were  on  hand. 
An  armorers'  school  was  in  operation  at  Uxbridge, 
and  a  Technical  Training  School  at  Wendover,  the 
latter  graduating  498  welders,  vulcanizers,  sailmakers, 
instrument  repairmen,  and  the  like.  Air  Service  head- 

309 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

quarters  in  England  was  commanded  by  Colonel  C.  R. 
Bay. 

Finally  came  the  Handley-Page  agreement  of  Jan- 
uary 28,  a  monster  cooperative  Anglo-American  night- 
bombing  venture  to  turn  out  30  of  these  fearful 
squadrons.  The  United  States  was  to  furnish  the 
Handley-Page  parts,  except  linen,  which  was  to  be 
deducted  from  the  part  of  the  supply  allocated  to  her, 
increase  the  shipment  of  dope  for  the  wings  by  20,000 
gallons  monthly,  provide  3,000  laborers  to  build  the 
five  airdromes  necessary,  man  the  three  aircraft  ac- 
ceptance parks  which  were  to  be  built  by  the  Royal 
Flying  Corps,  provide  three  training  depots,  and  pay 
£670,000  for  construction  and  £50,000  weekly  for  as- 
sembly. The  British,  in  addition  to  supplying  the 
linen  and  the  three  parks,  were  to  convert  Lancashire 
cotton  mills  and  weaving  sheds  into  assembly  shops 
and  provide  much  of  the  labor  and  all  the  technical 
knowledge. 

This  project  was  held  up  four  months  by  delay  in 
production  of  parts  in  the  United  States.  On  July 
25,  1918,  however,  the  first  sets  sailed,  and  by  the 
cessation  of  hostilities  10  shipments  had  been  received 
overseas,  of  which  five,  sufficient  for  70  planes,  were 
at  the  Oldham  assembly  plant.  On  August  8  nine 
Handley-Page  companies  of  2,500  men  sailed,  followed 
on  the  17th  and  the  31st  by  the  First  and  Second 
Acceptance  Parks  of  57  officers  and  600  men  each, 
and  in  September  by  a  training  depot  and  a  service 
squadron.  The  first  detachment  of  enlisted  men  com- 
pleted their  training  at  the  Oldham  factory  on  Oc- 
tober 18,  ready  for  service,  and  60  flying  officers  and 
three  squadrons  were  under  training  at  Ford  Junction. 

310 


THE  STRUCTURE  OVERSEAS 

On  November  13  there  were  19,535  Air  Service  per- 
sonnel in  England  and  another  11,740  who  had  been 
sent  on  from  England  to  France.  The  schedule  called 
for  57,488  more  to  pass  through  that  country  to  June 
30,  1919.  All  these  men  were  to  stay  for  a  short 
time,  relieving  the  British  labor  shortage  on  the  one 
hand,  and  securing  further  training  on  the  other.  The 
total  American  expeditures  in  England  were  estimated 
to  be  about  $36,000,000,  including  about  $12,500,000 
for  the  Handley-Page  programme,  $20,000,000  for 
planes,  hangars,  and  equipment,  and  $2,500,000  for 
training.  The  arrangement  was  of  decided  mutual 
advantage,  and  it  was  one  of  the  most  effective  ways 
in  which  American  and  Allied  resources  were  made 
to  dovetail  to  the  common  end. 

To  Italy  also  were  sent  cadets  for  training,  all  of 
them  as  Caproni  bombers.  On  July  10,  1917,  Italy 
offered  to  receive  500  Americans  in  its  schools,  and 
on  August  27  the  United  States  accepted,  subject  to 
the  condition  that  no  expense  except  maintenance 
should  attach  to  the  training  and  that  the  men  might 
be  used  anywhere  desired  on  the  west  front.  On 
September  28,  47  cadets  reported  at  Foggia  from 
Paris,  "  went  into  quarters, "  as  their  log  says,  "  and 
started  flying  the  same  day."  By  October  30,  1918, 
126  night  bombers  had  graduated,  with  33  more  still 
in  training  and  three  killed  in  accidents,  and  1,468 
hours  had  been  flown.  On  November  6,  49  fully 
trained  American  night  bombers  were  with  Italian 
squadrons  in  the  zone  of  advance.  The  Rome  head- 
quarters of  the  Air  Service  was  under  command  of 
Major  Robert  Glendenning. 

In  France,  in  England,  in  Italy,  then,  American 
311 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

airmen  were  concentrating  in  large  numbers.  Over- 
seas figures  show  that  on  November  6,  five  days  before 
the  armistice  was  signed,  77,726  men  of  the  Air 
Service  had  actually  arrived  overseas.  Of  these, 
20,003  were  with  the  A.  E.  F.  in  the  zone  of  advance 
and  32,561  in  the  service  of  supply;  4,314  were  with 
the  French  in  the  zone  of  advance ;  515  were  with  the 
British  Expeditionary  Force ;  20,162  were  in  England ; 
and  49  were  in  the  Italian  zone  of  advance  and  122 
in  the  Italian  service  of  supply.  At  the  termination 
of  hostilities  the  Air  Service  in  France  included  in 
the  zone  of  advance  2,161  officers  and  22,351  soldiers, 
a  total  of  24,512  at  the  actual  front.  There  were  also 
4,643  officers  and  28,353  soldiers  in  the  service  of 
supply.  With  the  French  armies  there  were  detailed 
eight  American  flying  officers,  and  with  the  British 
Expeditionary  Force  there  were  49  officers  and  525 
soldiers.  The  total  personnel  in  France  consisted  of 
6,861  officers  and  51,229  soldiers,  a  total  air  strength 
of  58,090.  Air  Service  mechanics  regiments  with  the 
French  Army  included  109  officers  and  4,744  soldiers. 
Nineteen  months  before,  it  may  be  recalled,  the  total 
strength  of  the  Air  Service  was  1,185  officers  and 
men. 

Slowly  at  first,  but  finally  very  rapidly,  the  young 
American  airmen  began  to  appear  over  the  trenches 
in  every  sector  from  the  North  Sea  to  the  Adriatic. 
Brigaded  with  French,  British  or  Italian  squadrons 
or  organized  into  American  squadrons,  they  came  just 
at  the  critical  time  of  the  war.  With  the  British  they 
saw  the  beginning  of  the  German  rout  in  Flanders; 
with  the  French  and  their  own  troops,  Chateau- 
Thierry,  St.  Mihiel,  and  the  final  advance  to  victory ; 

312 


THE  STRUCTURE  OVERSEAS 

with  the  Italians,  the  abortive  Austrian  offensive  and 
subsequent  rout.  Their  part,  although  not  decisive 
in  the  extreme  degree  of  which  early  American  optim- 
ism had  given  hope,  was  nevertheless  important  in 
effecting  the  amazingly  sudden  crumbling  of  the 
enemy  and  gave  definite  assurance  of  leading  to  early 
and  decisive  Allied  aerial  supremacy. 


313 


CHAPTER  XVII 


THE  AIR  SERVICE  IN  ACTION 

Exploits  of  the  Air  Service  at  the  front  —  First  German  planes 
brought  down  by  American  aviators  —  First  reconnoissance 
over  the  German  lines  —  Death  of  Major  Eaoul  Luf bery  — 
First  American-trained  ace  —  First  bombing  raid  —  A 
reputation  established,  but  at  a  cost  —  The  Air  Service 
first  a  major  striking  force  at  Chateau-Thierry  —  Death  of 
Lieutenant  Quentin  Eoosevelt  —  Official  recognition  of  the 
Service  in  the  second  battle  of  the  Marne  —  The  Air  Ser- 
vice at  St.  Mihiel  —  Command  of  the  air  with  the  Ameri- 
cans—  General  Pershing's  tribute  —  Further  unofficial 
testimony  —  The  offensive  on  the  Meuse  —  Flights  in 
force  —  Harassment  of  the  German  retreat  —  American 
aviators  with  the  British  in  Flanders  —  Their  service  as 
reported  by  the  Eoyal  Flying  Corps  —  American  aviators 
with  the  Italians  —  The  Austrian  rout  on  the  Piave  —  A 
daylight  raid  on  the  naval  base  at  Pola  —  Summary  of 
achievements  of  the  Air  Service  in  action  —  Enemy  planes 
and  balloons  brought  down  in  France  —  Losses  of  Ameri- 
can planes  and  balloons  —  List  of  American  aces  —  Air 
Service  casualties  —  General  Pershing's  last  words  of 
praise. 

On  April  14,  1918,  a  year  and  a  week  after  our 
declaration  of  war,  the  first  two  German  planes  fell 
prey  to  aviators  in  the  American  Air  Service,  Lieu- 
tenant Alan  F.  Winslow,  later  shot  down  and  held 
prisoner  in  Germany,  and  Lieutenant  Douglas  Camp- 
bell, later  America's  first  ace.  The  former's  account, 
written  privately,  follows : 

On  Sunday  morning  April  14th,  I  was  "  on  alert "  from 
6:00  a.  m.  'till  10:00  a.  m.  with  Lieut.  Douglas  Campbell. 
We  were  sitting  in  the  little  alert  tent,  playing  cards,  wait- 
ing for  a  call.  Our  machines  were  outside,  ready  at  a 
moment's  notice.  At  8:45  I  was  called  to  the  'phone,  told 
by  the  information  officer,  who  is  in  direct  touch  with  all 

314 


THE  AIR  SERVICE  IN  ACTION 

batteries  and  observation  posts,  that  two  German  aero- 
planes were  about  two  thousand  metres  above  the  city, 
which  is  only  a  mile  or  so  from  here.  We  were  told 
they  were  going  east.  We  were  rushed  down  to  our 
machines  in  side  cars,  and  in  another  minute  were  off  in 
the  air. 

"  Doug  "  started  ahead  of  me,  as  I  was  to  meet  him  above 
a  certain  point  at  five  hundred  meters,  and  then  take  the 
lead.  I  gave  him  about  forty-five  seconds'  start,  and  then 
left  myself,  climbing  steeply  in  a  left-hand  spiral  in  order 
to  save  time.  I  had  not  made  a  complete  half  turn,  and 
was  at  about  two  hundred  and  fifty  metres,  when  straight 
above  and  ahead  of  me  in  the  mist  of  the  early  morning, 
and  not  more  than  a  hundred  yards  away,  I  saw  a  plane 
coming  toward  me  with  huge  black  crosses  on  its  wings  and 
tail.  I  was  so  furious  to  see  a  Hun  directly  over  our 
Aviation  field  that  I  swore  out  loud  and  violently  opened 
fire.  At  the  same  time,  to  avoid  my  bullets,  he  slipped  into 
a  left-hand  reversement,  and  came  down,  firing  on  me.  I 
climbed,  however,  in  a  right-hand  spiral,  and  slipped  off, 
coming  down  directly  behind  him  and  "  on  his  tail."  Again 
I  violently  opened  fire.  I  had  him  at  a  rare  advantage 
which  was  due  to  the  greater  speed  and  maneuverability  of 
our  wonderful  machines.  I  fired  twenty  to  thirty  rounds 
at  him  and  could  see  my  tracers  entering  his  machine. 
Then,  in  another  moment,  his  plane  went  straight  down  in 
an  uncontrolled  nose-dive,  his  engine  out  of  commission. 
I  followed  in  a  straight  dive,  firing  all  the  way.  At  about 
six  feet  above  the  ground  he  tried  to  regain  control  of  his 
machine,  but  could  not,  and  he  crashed  to  earth.  I  darted 
down  near  him,  made  a  sharp  turn  by  the  wreck,  to  make 
sure  he  was  out  of  commission,  then  made  a  victorious  swoop 
down  over  him,  and  climbed  up  again  to  see  if  "  Doug " 
needed  any  help  with  the  other  Hun  —  for  I  had  caught  a 
glimpse  of  their  combat  out  of  the  corner  of  my  eye. 

Mind  you,  the  fight  took  place  only  three  hundred  metres 
up,  in  full  view  of  all  on  the  ground  and  in  the  near-by 
town,  and  directly  above  our  Aviation  field.  Furthermore, 
mine  dropped  about  one  hundred  yards  to  the  right,  and 

315 


THE  AMEEICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

"  Doug's  "  one  hundred  yards  to  the  left  of  our  field.  These 
are  remarkable  facts,  for  one  of  our  Majors,  who,  with  the 
French  army  since  1915,  has  shot  down  seventeen  machines, 
never  had  one  land  in  France  —  and  here  we  go,  right  off 
the  bat  and  stage  a  fight  over  our  aerodrome  and  bring 
down  two  Huns  right  on  it.  It  was  an  opportunity  of  a 
lifetime  —  a  great  chance. 

When  we  landed,  only  our  respective  mechanics  were  left 
in  the  drome  to  help  us  out  of  our  flying  clothes.  The 
whole  camp  was  pouring  out,  flying  by  on  foot,  bicycles, 
side  cars,  automobiles;  soldiers,  women,  children,  majors, 
colonels,  French  and  American  —  all  poured  out  of  the  city. 
In  ten  minutes  several  thousand  people  must  have  gathered. 
"  Doug  "  and  I  congratulated  each  other,  and  my  mechanic, 
no  longer  military,  jumping  up  and  down,  waving  his  hat, 
pounded  me  on  the  back  instead  of  saluting  and  yelled: 
"  Damn  it !  That's  the  stuff,  old  kid !  "  Then  Campbell 
and  I  rushed  to  our  respective  Hun  wrecks. 

On  the  way  there  —  it  was  only  half  a  mile,  I  ran  into  a 
huge  crowd  of  soldiers  —  blue  and  khaki  —  pressing  about 
one  man.  I  pushed  my  way  through  the  crowd,  and  heard 
somebody  triumphantly  say  to  the  surrounded  man  in 
French :  "  There  he  is ;  now  you  will  believe  he  is  an 
American."  I  looked  at  the  man  —  a  scrawny,  poorly  clad, 
little  devil,  dressed  in  a  rotten  German  uniform.  It  was 
the  Hun  pilot  of  the  machine  I  had  shot  down.  Needless 
to  say,  I  felt  rather  haughty  to  come  face  to  face  with  my 
victim,  now  a  prisoner,  but  did  not  know  what  to  say.  It 
seems  he  would  not  believe  that  an  American  officer  had 
brought  him  down.  He  looked  me  all  over,  and  then  asked 
me  in  good  French  if  I  was  an  American.  When  I 
answered,  "  Yes  "  he  had  no  more  to  say.  .  .  . 

"Doug"  had  set  his  Hun  machine  on  fire  at  three  hun- 
dred metres,  and  it  had  fallen  in  flames,  rolling  over  three 
times,  and  then  completely  burning  up.  There  remained 
but  a  charred  wreckage,  like  the  sacrifice  of  some  huge 
animal.  The  Hun  pilot  had  been  thrown  out  and  was  badly 
off.  His  face,  hands,  feet,  nostrils  and  lungs  were  all  burnt, 
while  his  leg  was  broken.  He  is  now  in  hospital  and  my 

316 


THE  AIR  SERVICE  IN  ACTION 

Boche  is  probably  commencing  his  job  of  ditch  digging  for 
the  rest  of  the  war. 

They  got  much  valuable  information  from  my  man  —  the 
other  couldn't  speak.  He  was  a  Pole,  said  he  was  not  an 
officer  because  he  was  a  Pole,  although  he  had  been  an 
"  aspirant "  and  a  pilot  at  the  front  for  two  years.  He  said 
to  me,  with  a  sort  of  sigh  of  relief,  throwing  up  his  hands 
at  the  same  time,  "  Alors,  la  guerre  est  fini  pour  moi!  " 

That  afternoon  my  wrecked  Hun  plane  and  the  charred 
result  of  "  Doug's  "  good  work  were  exhibited  in  the  public 
square  of  the  town,  surrounded  by  an  armed  guard,  and 
overlooked  by  a  French  military  band.  It  also  was  a  great 
day  for  the  townspeople,  and  has  had  a  good  moral  effect, 
you  can  imagine  it,  when  you  realize  it  took  place  above 
their  roof  tops,  at  only  three  hundred  meters,  and  that  they 
were  able  to  see  the  whole  fight.  .  .  . 

An  amusing  incident  was  this,  the  fight  was  so  near  to 
the  earth  that  bullets  were  flying  dangerously  all  about  the 
ground.  No  one  was  hurt,  save  a  French  worker  in  the 
field,  who  received  a  hole  through  his  ear  from  one  of  my 
bullets,  and  is  very  proud  of  it. 

On  April  14  American  pursuit  units  began  oper- 
ating on  the  Toul  sector.  On  the  next  day  Major 
Ralph  Royce  made  the  first  American  reconnaissance 
over  the  enemy's  lines,  for  which  he  was  later  deco- 
rated with  the  French  Croix  de  Guerre. 

On  May  15  a  delightful  tableau  was  staged  at  the 
front.  While  a  large  and  formal  assemblage  was 
waiting  for  a  French  general  to  come  to  confer  decora- 
tions, the  communique  says, 

Captain  Peterson  made  an  ascent  and  encountered  two 
German  planes  and  shot  down  both  within  one  minute, 
firing  60  shots  at  first  and  15  at  second.  First  plane  burst 
to  flames  before  hitting  ground  and  wings  of  second  were 
seen  to  crumble  up  when  nearing  earth.  No  definite  in- 
formation of  third  hostile  plane  reported  brought  down. 

317 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

Later  it  was  added : 

The  planes  were  sighted  by  Captain  Peterson  flying  at 
4,000  metres  in  single  file  towards  our  line.  Captain  Peter- 
son swung  in  behind  them  at  5,200  metres  and  attacked  the 
rear  plane  firing  50  rounds.  The  hostile  plane  dove  ver- 
tically 500  metres  and  broke  into  flames  and  fell.  Captain 
Peterson  was  meanwhile  attacked  by  the  second  plane  from 
the  front.  He  again  attacked  from  above,  firing  75  rounds. 
The  hostile  plane  threw  out  a  cloud  of  smoke  and  attempted 
a  sharp  turn  but  slipped.  The  wings  folded  up  and  one 
fell  off  as  the  plane  fell.  After  the  hostile  planes  were 
brought  down,  the  ceremony  proceeded. 

On  May  19  an  irreparable  loss  to  American  aviation 
was  reported.  Major  Raoul  Lufbery,  American  "ace 
of  aces,"  credited  with  18  enemy  planes  in  the  mag- 
nificent fighting  he  had  done  as  a  member  of  the 
Lafayette  Escadrille,  was  officially  reported  to  have 
been  "seen  to  fall  from  his  machine,  which  itself  fell 
a  short  distance  from  him.  He  was  possibly  wounded 
or  dead  before  he  fell.  Earlier  reports  stated  that  he 
was  at  the  time  engaged  in  a  long  running  fight  and 
was  flying*  upside  down  at  a  height  of  2,000  i'eet. ' ' 
A  more  detailed  account  was  given  in  the  press : 

At  about  10  o'clock  Sunday  morning  a  German  triplane 
suddenly  descended  from  the  clouds,  apparently  because  of 
engine  trouble,  until  it  was  some  1,500  metres  over  the  city 
of  Toul.  Lufbery  in  his  Nieuport  combat  plane  gave  chase, 
followed  by  two  American  machines.  The  enemy  made  for 
his  own  lines,  and  when  eight  miles  away,  Lufbery  was 
seen  to  attack  from  under  the  tail,  but  then  he  drew  off  as 
if  his  machine  gun  had  jammed.  Two  minutes  later  he 
attacked  again  from  the  same  position  and  almost  imme- 
diately his  machine  burst  into  flames.  Those  on  the  ground 
suddenly  saw  his  form  jump  from  the  machine.  Lufbery's 
body  fell  some  400  yards  from  his  machine. 

318 


THE  AIR  SERVICE  IN  ACTION 

Major  Lufbery  was  known  throughout  the  American 
army  and  in  the  French  air  service  as  "  Luff,"  and  was  one 
of  the  most  daring  fliers  on  the  front.  Lufbery  had  just 
returned  from  leave  several  days  before  his  time  was  up, 
believing  that  he  was  needed  in  combatting  the  German 
effort  at  aerial  supremacy.  He  has  been  awarded  the  Croix 
de  Guerre,  the  British  Military  Cross,  the  French  Medaille 
Militaire  and  the  Legion  of  Honor. 

It  was  Lufbery 's  ambition  to  die  fighting.  He  was 
popular  not  only  because  of  his  exploits  in  the  air,  but  for 
his  colorful,  picturesque  personality  and  career.  Lufbery 
was  an  American  by  paternal  citizenship,  a  Frenchman  by 
birth  and  devotion,  being  born  in  Clermont,  France,  thirty- 
four  years  ago. 

Shortly  after,  as  if  in  some  degree  to  compensate, 
came  the  first  American-trained  ace.  On  May  31, 
Lieutenant  Douglas  Campbell,  who  had  been  grad- 
uated from  the  University  of  California  ground  school 
and  received  his  final  training  in  France,  brought 
down  his  fifth  plane  near  Pont-a-Mousson.  Campbell 
sighted  his  enemy  at  4,500  metres,  got  on  his  tail  when 
he  tried  to  escape  to  his  own  lines,  and  signalled  him 
to  surrender,  as  the  German's  ammunition  had  run 
out.  The  German  declined  and,  as  Campbell  said, 
"I  did  not  like  the  idea  of  shooting  him  down  when 
he  was  not  fighting  but  I  could  not  let  him  get  away. ' ' 

A  little^later,  on  Jup.0  12,  the  first  raift  bv  an 
American  bombing  squadron  was  carried  out  against 
Dommary-Baroncourt,  northwest  of  Metz.  General 
Pershing  reported  that  it  was  executed  by  five  planes, 
which  dropped  80  bombs,  one  striking  a  warehouse  at 
the  station.  A  correspondent  describes  the  flight  as 
follows : 

As  they  made  their  start  for  Germany,  the  bombing 
planes  received  quite  an  ovation.  A  number  of  French  and 

319 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

British  aviators  and  officers  and  a  large  number  of  Ameri- 
can fliers  cheered  them  from  the  flying  field  as  they  came 
racing  down  the  grass,  tilted  upward  and  then  turned  north 
toward  the  enemy's  lines. 

The  German  anti-aircraft  batteries  gave  them  a  hot  re- 
ception as  they  crossed  the  front,  but  this  shelling  was 
extremely  tame  compared  to  what  they  underwent  as  they 
approached  Dommary-Baroncourt.  Two  of  the  American 
planes  leading  the  squadron  became  the  particular  targets 
of  the  anti-aircraft  guns.  They  twisted  and  dived  under  a 
heavy  shrapnel  fire  until  they  arrived  over  their  objective  — 
a  railway  junction  and  the  surrounding  buildings  three 
miles  below. 

The  commanding  officer  of  the  unit  was  in  the  leading 
plane  as  observer  and  it  sped  over  the  objective  first,  the 
commander  releasing  his  bombs.  At  the  same  time  he 
signaled  to  the  other  machines  which  followed  in  a  nearby 
straight  line.  Bursting  bombs  laid  a  perfect  circle  of  smoke 
about  the  railway  junction.  The  smoke  obscured  the  build- 
ings as  the  bombers  turned  southward  toward  the  American 
lines. 

German  attacking  planes  met  the  Americans  two  miles 
from  Dommary  and  attempted  to  pick  off  those  planes 
which  were  trailing,  but  the  lively  fire  of  the  other  machines 
forced  the  enemy  to  give  up  the  attempt  just  as  the  line 
was  reached.  Arriving  at  the  starting  point,  the  aviators 
were  showered  with  congratulations  on  the  results  of  the 
first  raid  by  their  envious  comrades. 

By  June  the  young  American  flying  force  had  made 
a  reputation  for  itself.  From  April  14  to  June  1 
pursuit  pilots  over  the  Toul  sector  were  credited  by 
the  French  with  17  enemy  airplanes  brought  down 
and  another  15  unconfirmed.  A  price,  however,  had 
been  paid.  On  July  2,  for  example,  General  Pershing 
reported:  " American  aviation  squadrons  cooperated 
with  our  troops  in  the  action  northwest  of  Chateau- 
Thierry.  Three  of  our  aviators  did  not  return/* 

320 


THE  AIR  SERVICE  IN  ACTION 

Bombing  work  especially  was  costly.  On  July  11 
General  Pershing  reported:  "As  a  result  of  a  bomb- 
ing expedition  last  evening,  five  of  our  machines  are 
missing.  "  These  were  of  a  squadron  of  21  which  in 
a  raid  on  Conflans  were  overtaken  by  a  heavy  wind 
which  exhausted  the  gasoline  capacity  of  five  of  the 
planes.  The  Germans,  in  their  official  announcement, 
made  the  most  possible  of  this  loss. 

Fitting  it  was  that  Chateau-Tierry  gfrpfllfl, 


the  coming~ot'  the  American  Air  j^ervi/**  fa+-i  jfifl  ir»WTl 
as  a  major  striking  force  at  the  same  time  and  place 
that  the  American  Army  as  a  whole  proved  itself  the 
equal  of  any  in  the  world.  Previously  there  had  been 
innumerable  individual  exploits  by  our  aviators  and 
much  vital  work  accomplished,  but  if  one  must  choose 
a  date  when  the  American  Air  Service  as  a  Service 
received  its  baptism  of  battle,  it  may  well  be  in  that 
climax  of  crises  when,  again  at  the  Marne,  the  mighty 
German  machine  had  spent  its  last  effort  and  the 
Allies  were  gathering  themselves  for  the  blow  that 
was  to  eventuate  in  the  complete  military  defeat  of^ 
their  foe. 

Daily  during  those  critical  hours  the  press  carried 
detailed  reports  of  American  aerial  exploits  while  the 
official  reports  maintained  a  vexing  silence.  On  July 
2  a  squadron  of  nine  American  planes  was  described 
in  a  thrilling  half-hour  fight  over  Chateau-Thierry 
with  13  German  planes,  of  which  six  were  thought 
brought  down.  The  next  day  four  more  Germans 
were  reported  brought  down,  while  the  German  official 
communique  claimed  four  American  victims  of  a 
squadron  of  nine.  The  first  of  these  early  battles  was 
unofficially  described  as  follows  : 

321 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

WITH  THE  AMERICAN  ARMY  ON  THE  MARNE,  July  3. — 
American  aviators  met  the  Kaiser's  best  fighting  airmen  in 
a  sensational  encounter  near  Chateau-Thierry  late  yester- 
day. Six  German  planes  were  brought  down.  We  had  no 
losses.  This  is  the  largest  air  fight  in  which  members  of 
the  American  air  squadron  have  taken  part. 

Their  opponents  were  a  unit  of  the  famous  Riehthofen's 
own  squadron,  the  leader  of  which  was  killed  some  weeks 
ago,  but  which  has  retained  his  name.  The  squadron  was 
first  formed  by  the  renowned  Boelke.  It  has  been  many 
times  honored  by  the  Kaiser,  and  is  the  only  German  squad- 
ron in  which  each  flyer  has  individual  insignia  on  his  avion. 
It  is  known  by  the  red  nose  and  red  tail  of  its  avions.  The 
reputation  of  this  squadron  is  that  it  is  the  hardest  fighting 
of  all  the  German  fliers. 

It  was  just  before  7  o'clock  when  the  American  air  field 
got  word  that  a  fleet  of  Boche  aviators  was  coming  after 
two  of  our  observation  machines  over  the  German  lines  near 
Epaux.  In  a  few  moments  nine  of  our  planes,  led  by  Lieu- 
tenant Kenneth  L.  Parker,  were  in  the  air,  bound  north. 
As  they  neared  our  line  they  saw  13  Germans  flying  in  a 
new  double-deck  formation,  nine  about  5,000  metres  and 
four  about  2,000  metres  up.  This  formation  is  adopted  by 
the  Germans  so  that  when  either  group  is  attacked  the  other, 
perhaps  unseen,  may  come  upon  the  opponents  with  over- 
whelming force. 

When  our  aviators  saw  this  formation  five  of  our  nine 
machines  immediately  mounted  and  four  descended,  so  that 
we  had  the  same  formation.  The  German  top  deck  was 
over  ours,  but  our  bottom  deck  was  over  the  Germans. 
About  7:20  our  lower  group  engaged  the  German  lower 
group,  when  two  Germans  were  brought  down  and  the  other 
two  made  away. 

Three  minutes  later  the  two  upper  groups  were  in  combat 
about  four  kilometres  north  of  Chateau-Thierry  in  an  aerial 
battle  which  lasted  an  unusually  long  time  —  35  minutes  — 
at  the  end  of  which  four  more  Germans  had  been  brought 
down. 

In  the  fight  Lieutenant  Cleveland  W.  McDermott  got  cut 

322 


THE  AIR  SERVICE  IN  ACTION 

off  by  the  remaining  Boche,  after  bringing  down  one.  He 
was  forced  to  flee  30  kilometres  back  of  the  Hun  lines,  until 
he  escaped  by  evolutions  and  flew  back  toward  the  Ameri- 
can lines,  coming  down  out  of  gasoline  just  back  of  our 
positions. 

Credit  for  bringing  down  the  German  airplanes  goes  to 
Lieutenants  Ralph  A.  O'Neill,  of  Nogales,  Ariz.;  John  H. 
Stevens,  of  Albion,  N.  Y. ;  Kenneth  L.  Parker,  of  Dowagiac, 
Mich.;  Tyler  C.  Bronson,  of  New  York  City;  Maxwell  0. 
Perry,  of  Indianapolis,  Ind.;  Cleveland  W.  McDermott,  of 
Syracuse,  New  York. 

The  American  airmen  now  have  a  sector  of  thirteen 
kilometres  on  this  front,  their  work  extending  on  both 
sides  of  the  present  American  sector. 

So  each  day  the  activity  increased.  American  fliers 
were  both  brave  and  venturesome  beyond  praise.  Not 
only  were  they  in  constant  battle,  but  they  went  off  on 
long-distance  reconnaissances,  as  when  on  July  10 
they  penetrated  German-occupied  territory  for  a  dis- 
tance of  50  miles  north  of  Chateau-Thierry,  andjQn 
long-distance  bombing  raids,  as  when  a  squadron  of 
21  planes  set  out  for  Coblenz,  six  of  which  the  Ger- 
mans claimed  to  have  shot  down.  Weaknesses,  of 
course,  were  discovered,  especially  in  bad  coordination 
between  the  Air  Service  and  the  Artillery,  but  by  and 
large  the  work  done  in  these  critical  hours  by  an 
organization  almost  new  to  battle  was  most  gratifying. 

One  spectacular  loss  was  suffered,  that  of  Lieutenant 
Quentin  Roosevelt,  son  of  the  former  President  of  the 
United  States,  whose  death  at  the  point  of  extreme 
danger,  occurring  moreover  on  Bastile  Day  and  only 
a  few  days  after  he  was  reported  to  have  brought  down 
his  first  German,  touched  the  world's  imagination  as 
almost  no  other  individual  occurrence  could  have  done. 

323 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

Let  his  enemy  describe  it  through  the  Wolff  Bureau 
announcement : 

On  Sunday,  July  14,  an  American  squadron  of  twelve 
battleplanes  was  trying  to  break  through 'the  German  de- 
fense over  the  Marne.  In  the  violent  combat  which  ensued 
with  seven  German  machines  one  American  aviator  stub- 
bornly made  repeated  attacks.  This  culminated  in  a  duel 
between  him  and  a  German  non-commissioned  officer,  who, 
after  a  short  fight,  succeeded  in  getting  good  aim  at  his 
brave  but  inexperienced  opponent,  whose  machine  fell  after 
a  few  shots  near  the  village  of  Chambry,  ten  kilometres 
north  of  the  Marne. 

His  pocket  case  showed  him  to  be  Lieutenant  Quentin 
Roosevelt,  of  the  aviation  section  of  the  United  States 
Army.  The  personal  belongings  of  the  fallen  airman  are 
being  carefully  kept,  with  a  view  to  sending  them  later  to 
his  relatives.  The  earthly  remains  of  the  brave  young  air- 
man were  buried  with  military  honors  by  German  airmen 
near  Chambry  at  the  spot  where  he  fell. 

To  Lieutenant  Roosevelt  the  Stars  and  Stripes,  the 
official  paper  of  the  A.  E.  F.,  gave  the  honor  of  being 
the  first  American  lost  in  the  battle  of  the  Champagne. 
The  paper 's  summary  of  the  general  situation  says : 

The  new  German  offensive  gave  the  American  aviation 
forces  their  first  opportunity  to  participate  in  major  opera- 
tions. Allied  airplanes  in  force  had  crossed  the  German 
lines  at  daylight  Sunday  morning  to  clear  the  air,  harass 
the  enemy's  movements,  and  learn  as  much  as  possible 
about  the  German  concentrations  and  artillery  positions. 

There  was  no  pretense  of  secrecy.  The  Allies  knew  the 
Germans  were  on  the  eve  of  attacking,  and  the  Germans 
knew  that  the  Allies  knew. 

In  these  air  forces  the  Americans  were  well  and  gallantly 
represented.  Their  observation  airplanes  had  done  a  share 
of  the  preceding  day's  photographing,  locating  troops  and 
guns.  As  a  testimony  of  their  success  it  may  be  said  that 

324 


THE  AIR  SERVICE  IN  ACTION 

during  Sunday  they  located  twenty-five  enemy  batteries, 
most  of  which  were  neutralized  by  our  artillery  before  they 
were  fairly  in  action. 

Our  chaser  squadrons  were  instructed  to  cease  air  fight- 
ing and  fly  low  to  harass  the  enemy's  troops  and  ammuni- 
tion movements  with  machine  gun  fire.  It  was  in  this  pre- 
liminary fighting  that  Quentin  Roosevelt,  who,  three  days 
previously,  had  brought  down  his  first  German,  was  lost. 

His  loss  was  quickly  avenged.  The  American  aviators 
believe  they  destroyed  fourteen  machines  on  Sunday,  Mon- 
day and  Tuesday.  Some  of  these  are  officially  confirmed. 
Others  were  too  far  within  the  German  lines.  For  instance, 
an  American  squadron  patrolling  over  the  German  lines 
met  a  patrol  of  equal  number  and  brought  down  four  of 
the  enemy. 

It  was  on  Monday  and  Tuesday,  when  the  Germans  were 
forced  to  abandon  moving  troops  and  munitions  by  night, 
that  the  Allied  aviators  did  their  most  spectacular  work.  A 
great  flock  of  more  than  200  went  out  Monday,  the  Ameri- 
cans flying  the  lowest,  the  French  next,  and  the  British  the 
highest.  When  they  reached  an  important  highway  the 
American  commander  dived.  Every  American  followed, 
then  the  French,  and  then  the  British. 

Every  machine  emptied  its  guns  into  the  miles  of  wagons 
and  the  fields  to  which  the  Germans  scuttled. 

"  An  ant  hill  would  look  like  a  Sunday  school  compared 
to  that  bunch,"  said  one  of  the  aviators.  "  There  is  no 
telling  how  many  we  hit,  but  it  will  be  a  long  time  before 
those  trucks  will  haul  soldiers  again." 

Time  and  time  again  the  Americans  returned  for  am- 
munition. Some  of  them  made  five  flights  in  a  single  day. 

The  early  work  of  the  Service  was  much  appreciated 
by  the  general  officers.  On  August  1  the  Chief  of 
Staff  of  the  First  Army  Corps  wrote  his  Chief  of 
Air  Service : 

1.  The  Corps  Commander  is  extremely  gratified  and 
pleased  with  the  effective,  splendid  work  of  the  observation 
squadrons  of  this  Corps. 

325 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

2.  In  spite  of  control  of  the  air  by  the  enemy,  the  pilots 
and  observers  have  been  tireless  and  successful  in  carrying 
out  their  missions  of  observation  and  for  the  purpose  of 
taking  photographs  which  have  played  a  great  part  in  the 
successful  advance  of  the  Corps. 

3.  The  Corps  Commander  desires  that  you  convey  his 
personal  thanks  to  those  under  your  command,  and   he 
further  desires  that  the  names  of  those  whom  you  deem 
worthy  of   special   recognition   be   reported   promptly   to 
these  Headquarters  for  transmission  to  the  Commander-in- 
Chief. 

Likewise  Major-General  C.  R.  Edwards  of  the  26th 
Division  sent  a  special  letter  on  July  31  to  the  com- 
mander of  the  12th  Aero  Squadron : 

1.  In  the  memorable  attack  and  campaign  of  the  second 
battle  of  the  Marne,  in  which  my  division,  the  26th,  par- 
ticipated from  the  18th  to  the  25th  of  July,  inclusive,  I 
relied  much  upon  the  effective  and  gallant  service  of  your 
squadron. 

2.  As  far  as  material  would  warrant  and  allow,  your 
personnel  rendered  gallant  and  efficient  service.     The  in- 
terest and  spirit  was  splendid. 

3.  On  the  behalf  of  the  division,  let  me  express  my 
thanks  and  congratulations.    You  have  a  fine  body  of  young 
men.    Tell  them  that  we  like  them  and  believe  in  them. 

The  start  made  at  Chateau-Thierry  developed 
rapidly.  Aviators  in  increasing  numbers  went  out  to 
the  front.  America's  aerial  strength  constantly 
mounted  to  justify  the  undercurrent  of  fear  that 
was  beginning  to  be  expressed  in  Germany  and  espe- 
cially in  the  Rhineland.  In  the  first  two  weeks  of 
August,  for  instance,  964  flights  were  reported,  with 
94  combats,  20  enemy  airplanes  brought  down,  and 
5,300  kilograms  of  bombs  dropped.  One  pursuit 
squadron  in  July  alone  was  credited  with  28  enemy 

326 


THE  AIR  SERVICE  IN  ACTION 

airplanes  confirmed  and  another  28  claimed  but  not 
officially  confirmed. 

The  next  great  aerial  offensive  formed  part  of  that 
first  independent  attack  of  the  American  Army  in 
France  when  the  whole  St.  Mihiel  salient,  which  had 
stood  for  four  years,  was  crushed  out  in  a  few  hours. 
Its  unprecedented  aerial  phase  General  Pershing  later 
described  as  follows  : 

The  French  Independent  Air  Force  was  placed  under  my 
command,  which  together  with  the  British  bombing  squad- 
rons and  our  air  forces  gave  us  the  largest  assembly  of 
aviators  that  had  ever  been  engaged  in  one  operation  on 
the  western  front.  w— 

In  the  four  days  from  September  12  to  16,  American 
aviators  made  over  3,300  sorties,  were  in  the  air  over 
4,000  hours,  fired  30,000  rounds  of  machine-gun  am-  p^ 
munition  at  convoys,  troops,  and  artillery,  made  1,000 
raids  on  railroad  junctions,  ammunition  depots,  and 
other  centers,  dro^ped_75_tpns_of^high 


shot  down  nine  enemy  planes  in  flames  and  54  more 
out  of  control. 

On  September  28  the  A.  E.  F.  was  able  to  issue  the 
proud  statement  :  "American  aviators  have  kept  com- 
mand of  the  air.  '  '  What  those  few  words  meant  after 
the  months  of  delay,  disappointment,  and  criticism 
cannot  be  estimated  by  any  one  outside  the  Service. 
At  last,  in  spite  of  errors,  ignorance,  and  failures, 
the  American  Air  Service  had  come  through  —  -not 
yet  indeed  as  an  overwhelming  force  destined  to  make 
an  early  end  of  the  war,  but  as  the  vanguard  of  tried 
courage  and  skill  just  preceding  a  main  body  that 
should  in  time  prove  crushing. 

The  communique  went  on: 
327 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

They  have  brought  down  (in  the  last  two  days)  12  bal- 
loons and  more  than  60  enemy  planes,  while  less  than  a 
third  of  that  number  of  our  planes  are  missing.  In  con- 
junction with  French  and  British  aviators,  they  have,  not- 
withstanding unfavorable  weather,  rendered  valuable  ser- 
vice and  successfully  executed  many  missions. 

On  October  1  General  Pershing  reported:  " Since 
September  26  our  aviators  have  shot  down  more  than 
100  hostile  planes  and  21  balloons/' 

The  work  at  St.  Mihiel  was  highly  praised  by  Gen- 
eral Pershing.  On  September  16  he  sent  the  following 
letter  to  the  Chief  of  Air  Service  of  the  First  Army : 

Please  accept  my  sincere  congratulations  on  the  success- 
ful and  very  important  part  taken  by  the  Air  forces  under 
your  command  in  the  first  offensive  of  the  First  American 
Army.  The  organization  and  control  of  the  tremendous 
concentration  of  Air  forces,  including  American,  French, 
British  and  Italian  units,  which  has  enabled  the  Air  Ser- 
vice of  the  First  Army  to  carry  out  so  successfully  its 
dangerous  and  important  mission,  is  as  fine  a  tribute  to  you 
personally  as  is  the  courage  and  nerve  shown  by  your 
officers  a  signal  proof  of  the  high  morale  which  permeates 
the  service  under  your  command. 

Please  convey  to  your  command  my  heartfelt  appreciation 
of  their  work.  I  am  proud  of  you  all. 

The  unofficial  reports  from  Prance  chronicled  these 
achievements  more  fully.  On  September  20  the  Asso- 
ciated Press,  which  on  February  27  had  carried  the 
sensational  report  that  "control  of  the  air  over  the 
American  sector  belongs  to  the  enemy,"  and  that 
4 '  German  planes  come  and  go  over  the  American  lines 
almost  at  will,"  stated  that  American  aviators  were 
now  "undisputed  masters  of  the  air"  in  the  Verdun 
region.  The  New  York  Times  correspondent  quoted 

328 


THE  AIR  SERVICE  IN  ACTION 

the  French  as  saying  that  the  two  American  offensives 
at  St.  Mitiiel  and  west  of  Verdun  "were  the  best  pre- 
pared and  provided  for  in  aviation  of  any  battles  yet  * 
fought  in  the  war."    Renter's  on  September  30  said:       JF 
"The  outstanding  achievement  of  the  American  Army 
in. the  offensive  is  undoubtedly  due  to  its  aviators, 
who  have  done  all  that  was  expected  of  them  and 
much  more." 

Again,  on  October  19,  General  Pershing  reported : 

Yesterday  our  pursuit  squadrons  on  the  front  of  the 
First  Army  were  engaged  in  25  combats  in  which  17  enemy 
machines  were  brought  down.  Our  bombing  units  dropped 
4^2  tons  of  bombs  on  Buszancy,  Bayonville  and  Remonville. 

On  the  23rd  the  official  statement  read : 

Our  pursuit  squadrons  shot  down  15  enemy  airplanes  and 
1  observation  balloon.  Three  of  our  observation  balloons 
were  destroyed  and  6  of  our  machines  are  missing.  Our 
bombing  units  dropped  5  tons  of  bombs  on  enemy  concen- 
tration points. 

On  October  27,  13  enemy  planes  were  destroyed 
with  the  loss  of  five  American  planes,  and  3%  tons 
of  explosives  dropped.  Three  more  enemy  planes  and 
one  balloon  were  destroyed  on  the  28th  without  loss ; 
18  planes  on  the  29th,  with  the  loss  of  five  American 
planes;  and  21  planes  and  two  balloons  on  the  30th, 
with  the  loss  of  two  American  planes.  On  October 
31  six  tons  of  bombs  were  reported  dropped  on  Barri- 
court,  Bayonville  and  Longuyon,  and  on  the  next  day 
three  tons  on  the  roads  and  dumps  near  Tailly,  Barri- 
court  and  Villers-devant-Dun ;  also  seven  enemy  planes 
were  brought  down  without  loss  and  enemy  troops  and 
convoys  machine  gunned. 

329 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

.  For  the  next  to  the  last  week  before  the  signing  of 
the  armistice,  the  most  spectacular  effort  yet  made  by 
the  American  Air  Service  was  chronicled  in  the  follow- 
ing tantalizingly  brief  words  of  the  Coordination  Sec- 
tion report  for  the  week  of  October  30,  received  in 
Washington  shortly  after : 

In  spite  of  the  rainest  week  of  the  year,  operations  of 
American  squadrons  at  the  front  during  the  past  week  have 
been  the  most  satisfactory  so  far,  according  to  direct  report 
by  telephone  from  the  zone  of  advance.  All  missions  were 
successfully  carried  out.  A  perfect  battle  formation  of  190 
planes  attacked  on  the  largest  scale  ever  attempted  by  our 
air  forces,  with  highly  satisfactory  results. 

Another  monster  flight  of  45  day  bombers  and  100 
pursuit  plalieirivas^  4,  juot-a* 

week  before  the  signing  of  the  armistice,  as  follows : 

In  the  course  of  the  day,  improving  weather  conditions 
permitted  our  planes  to  carry  out  very  successfully  their 
missions  of  reconnaissance  and  infantry  liaison.  A  raid 
with  a  force  consisting  of  45  day-bombardment  and  100 
pursuit  planes  was  made  against  Montmedy  and  obtained 
excellent  results  on  the  crowded  enemy  traffic  at  that  place. 
Over  five^Tions  of  bombs  were  dropped.  Determined 
attacks  by  enemy  pursuit  planes  gave  us  added  oppor- 
tunities to  destroy  his  airplanes.  During  the  day's  fighting 
30  enemy  planes  were  destroyed  or  driven  down  out  of 
control  and  three  balloons  were  burned.  Seven  of  our 
planes  are  missing. 

The  rapid  retreat  of  the  Germans  before  their  final 
collapse  brought  no  let  up  in  this  activity.  On  Novem- 
ber 5  two  tons  of  bombs  were  dropped  by  a  flight  of 
30  planes  on  Meuse  and  Rochcourt;  enemy  infantry 
was  machine  gunned,  and  20  enemy  planes  and  two 
balloon¥^Broughl;  down,  with  the  loss  of  seven  Ameri- 
can planes.  On  the  6th  seven  more  enemy  planes  and 

330 


THE  AIR  SERVICE  IN  ACTION 

two  American  planes  were  destroyed,  and  a  ton  of 
explosives  dropped  on  roads  by  which  the  enemy  was 
attempting  to  escape.  On  the  8th  three  enemy  planes 
and  four  balloons  were  shot  down,  with  one  American 
plane  missing,  in  a  continued  pursuit  and  harassment 
of  the  fleeing  Germans. 

During  all  this  time  other  American  fliers  brigaded 
with  British  squadrons  in  Flanders  were  making  an 
equally  enviable  record.  These  men  were  early  grad- 
uates of  the  American  ground  schools  sent  over  to 
British  schools  while  American  flying  fields  were  mak- 
ing ready  to  take  the  large  number  of  cadets  waiting 
training,  and  they  had  been  given  every  facility  that 
British  experience  and  equipment  offered.  Beginning 
in  July  the  Royal  Flying  Corps  communiques  contain 
mention  after  mention  of  enemy  planes  brought  down 
or  gallant  work  performed  by  American  fliers.  This 
little  handful  of  Americans,  only  about  200  fliers  in 
all,  driven  on  by  the  incentive  of  their  presence  with 
a  foreign  force,  took  every  chance  of  danger  offered, 
as  was  shown  in  their  final  casualties  of  44  per  cent, 
dead,  wounded,  missing,  or  otherwise  out  of  action. 

In  the  period  from  July  1  to  August  25  the  British 
reported  these  Americans  to  have  brought  down  50 
enemy  planes  and  seven  balloons ;  from  August  25  to 
September  8,  14  planes  and  three  balloons ;  from  Sep- 
tember 9  to  September  22,  11  planes  and  one  balloon ; 
and  from  September  22  to  within  three  weeks  of  the 
end  of  the  war,  25  more  enemy  planes,  making  a  total 
of  well  over  100  for  these  men  alone.  Over  30  dif- 
ferent men  were  mentioned  by  name  in  the  first  com- 
pilation, over  a  dozen  were  decorated  with  the  Dis- 
tinguished Flying  Cross,  and  one,  Lieutenant  A.  F. 

331 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

Bonnalie,  was  given  the  British  Distinguished  Service 
Order  for  "a  marvelous  performance "  described  as 
follows : 

Lieutenant  A.  F.  Bonnalie,  an  American  attached  to  the 
Royal  Air  Force,  has  been  awarded  the  British  Dis- 
tinguished Service  Order.  On  August  thirteen,  this  officer 
led  two  other  machines  on  a  long  photographic  reconnais- 
sance. In  spite  of  the  presence  of  numerous  enemy  air- 
craft they  were  able  to  take  all  the  photographs  required, 
but  were  attacked  by  six  Fokker  biplanes. 

During  the  combat  Lieutenant  Bonnalie  saw  that  one  of 
his  accompanying  machines  was  in  difficulty  and  that  an 
enemy  airplane  was  nearly  on  its  tail.  He  at  once  broke 
off  combat  with  the  enemy  with  whom  he  was  engaged  and 
dived  to  the  assistance  of  the  machine  in  trouble.  He  drove 
off  the  enemy  plane,  regardless  of  the  bullets  which  were 
ripping  up  his  own  machine. 

Eventually,  however,  his  tail  planes  and  his  elevator  wires 
were  shot  away  and  his  machine  began  to  fall  in  side  dash 
slips.  Lieutenant  Bonnalie  managed  to  keep  his  machine 
facing  toward  the  British  line  by  means  of  the  rudder  con- 
trol, while  his  observer  and  the  third  machine  drove  off  the 
enemy  aircraft  which  was  still  attacking. 

In  its  damaged  condition  Lieutenant  Bonnalie's  machine 
was  tail  heavy  and  he  therefore  had  his  observer  leave  his 
cock-pit  and  lie  out  along  the  cowl  in  front  of  the  pilot. 
In  this  manner  he  recrossed  the  British  trenches  at  a  low 
altitude  and  righted  his  machine  sufficiently  to  avoid  a  fatal 
crash. 

Had  it  not  been  for  the  gallantry  of  Lieutenant  Bonnalie, 
the  injured  machine  to  whose  assistance  he  went  would  have 
fallen  into  enemy  territory,  as  pilot  had  been  wounded  and 
its  observer  killed.  Lieutenant  Bonnalie's  own  machine  was 
riddled  with  bullets,  and  it  was  a  marvelous  performance  to 
bring  it  safely  to  the  ground. 

Two  American  squadrons,  the  17th  and  148th,  also 
were  attached  to  the  British.  An  idea  of  the  work 

332 


THE  AIR  SERVICE  IN  ACTION 

they  did  may  be  had  from  the  following  citation  in  a 
R.  F.  C.  communique: 

A  raid  was  carried  out  by American  Squadron  on 

• aerodrome,  in  conjunction  with  squadrons  of  the  5th 

Group.     After  the  first  two  squadrons  had  dropped  their 

bombs    from    a   low    height,    machines    of American 

Squadron  dived  to  within  200  feet  of  the  ground  and  re- 
leased their  bombs,  then  proceeded  to  shoot  at  hangars  and 
huts  on  the  aerodrome,  and  a  chateau  on  the  northeast 
corner  of  the  aerodrome  was  also  attacked  with  machine-gun 
fire.  The  following  damage  was  observed  to  be  caused  by 
this  combined  operation.  A  dump  of  petrol  and  oil  was 
set  on  fire,  which  appeared  to  set  fire  to  an  ammunition 
dump ;  six  Fokker  biplanes  were  set  on  fire  on  the  ground, 
and  two  destroyed  by  direct  hits  from  bombs;  one  large 
Gotha  hangar  was  set  on  fire  and  another  one  half  de- 
molished; a  living  hut  was  set  on  fire  and  several  hangars 
were  seen  to  be  smouldering  as  the  result  of  phosphorous 
bombs  having  fallen  on  them.  In  spite  of  most  of  the  ma- 
chines taking  part  being  hit  at  one  time  or  another,  all 
returned  safely,  favorable  ground  targets  being  attacked  on 

the  way  home ; Squadrons  bombed  the  aerodrome  after 

the  low-flying  attack  was  over,  and  demolished  the  chateau 
previously  referred  to. 

The  work  these  squadrons  did  was  appreciated  by 
their  Allies.  In  September  the  commander  of  a 
British  squadron  which  the  Americans  had  been  es- 
corting in  its  bombing  raids  wrote :  * '  I  do  not  consider 
that  any  squadron  in  France  is  supplied  with  a  better 
escort  than  is  my  squadron."  That  was  very  strong 
praise  indeed  and  well  compensated  the  lone,  arduous, 
and  extremely  dangerous  work  involved. 

Meanwhile,  the  handful  of  men  who  had  been  sent 
in  October,  1917,  to  Foggia,  Italy,  for  training  as 
Caproni  bombing  pilots  were  also  taking  their  places 
on  the  front.  They  arrived  in  June,  1918,  just  at  the 

333 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 


moment  when  a  nejy^Jbistiiaii~aQ^ 
ing  ItaliSffirSlety,  and  undoubtedly  had  considerable 
value  in  stimulating  a  shaken  morale,  as  well  as 
having  the  opportunity  to  participate  in  the  first  day- 
light raid  on  the  Austrian  naval  base  at  Pola  on  July 
J.7.  Their  experiences  are  related  by  Lieutenant 
Willis  S.  Fitch  as  follows7~ 

After  about  eight  months  I  was  finally  able  to  shake  off 
the  cobwebs  of  Foggia,  and  get  to  the  front  here  a  little 
lover  a  month  ago.  I  came  up  with  a  few  others  to  fly  in 
Italy  squadrons  until  we  got  our  own  planes.  We  were 
given  a  great  send-off  in  Rome,  as  we  were  the  first  Ameri- 
cans of  any  branch  of  the  service  to  go  into  action  on  the 
Italian  front.  We  arrived  at  our  station  on  the  19th  of 
June,  just  as  the  Austrian  offensive  was  in  full  force,  and, 
much  to  our  joy,  were  put  into  action  at  once  without 
further  training.  In  fact,  we  went  over  the  lines  on  a  bom- 
bardment the  following  day.  We  were  busy  all  through  the 
offensive,  which  soon  turned  into  a  defensive  or  rout  for  the 
Austrians.  An  objective  assigned  to  us  one  night  for  bomb- 
ing the  Allowing  morning  would  have  to  be  changed  be- 
cause cfcmng  the  night  the  Italian  infantry  had  advanced 
and  already  taken  that  position.  Each  day  our  trips  were 
longer,  as  the  Italian  line  moved  forward.  The  Austrian 
Air  Force  suffered  tremendous  losses,  over  100  planes  being 
destroyed  in  the  first  few  days. 

The  efficiency  of  their  anti-aircraft  guns  was  not  dam- 
aged, however,  and  seldom  did  we  come  back  from  over  the 
lines  without  bullet  or  shrapnel  holes  in  our  planes.  One 
of  our  boys  was  brought  down  on  his  first  trip  over  the 
lines,  or  at  least  he  came  down  within  their  lines.  It  was 
very  cloudy  that  day  and  rainy.  We  were  flying  at  about 
1,000  metres  and  under,  which  is  extraordinarily  low  for 
day  work  in  these  large  machines.  Another  boy  was  hit 
squarely  by  a  shell  which  carried  away  one  of  his  engine 
controls  and  one  of  his  elevator  controls.  He  just  did  make 
the  home  "piste,"  scraped  a  hangar  and  smashed  up  in 

334 


THE  AIR  SERVICE  IN  ACTION 

landing.  On  the  same  day  another  man  had  a  Boche  on 
his  tail  which  he  brought  down  after  a  lively  scrap,  but  his 
plane  had  163  bullet  holes  in  it. 

I  have  been  very  lucky  myself.  The  day  before  yester- 
day, for  example,  I  made  a  trip  over  the  lines  with  another 
Caproni,  to  drop  some  propaganda.  We  had  four  or  five 
chasse  planes  for  an  escort  to  take  care  of  the  enemy  while 
we  were  doing  our  work.  We  crossed  the  Piave  at  about 
300  metres,  and  the  minute  wd  were  over,  we  were  greeted 
warmly  by  a  burst  of  shrapnel  just  over  our  heads.  That 
was  the  signal  for  the  fun  to  begin.  From  then  on  we 
weren't  left  alone  for  a  minute.  Bang!  and  a  big  black 
puff  would  appear  just  off  our  left  wing.  I  would  kick  in 
all  my  right  rudder  and  wind  the  wheel  over,  and  off  we 
would  go  at  right  angles  to  our  previous  course.  Bang! 
and  another  black  puff  would  appear  in  front  of  us.  This 
time  they  had  our  altitude.  Down  we  shot  with  full  motors 
for  a  couple  of  hundred  metres  and  then  up  on  a  turn. 
Right  in  the  middle  of  it  an  explosion  came,  seemingly  right 
under  our  feet,  and  the  machine  jumped  from  the  force  of 
it.  I  felt  a  blow  in  the  arm  and  glanced  around  to  see 
where  the  shot  had  hit.  There  was  no  hole  that  I  could 
see  and  the  motors  still  pounded  along  beautifully,  so  we 
kept  on  for  10  or  15  miles  more  until  we  were  over  the 
objective.  Then,  with  the  "  manifistini,"  as  they  call 
propaganda,  gone,  we  turned  back  and  I  picqued  her  nose 
down  to  run  the  gauntlet  with  all  possible  speed.  Some- 
times climbing,  sometimes  diving,  and  always  wallowing 
around  in  a  zig-zag  course  like  a  ship  in  a  heavy  sea,  we 
reached  the  Piave.  Never  before  did  the  house  tops  of 
Venice  look  so  good.  Once  in  our  lines,  I  turned  the  wheel 
over  to  the  other  pilot  and  examined  my  arm.  The  sleeve 
of  my  flying  combination  was  completely  torn  away,  as 
was  also  my  uniform  coat  underneath.  But  my  arm  was 
only  scratched  a  little  and  I  could  scarcely  feel  the  wound. 
I  picked  a  piece  of  shrapnel  out  of  the  sleeve  that  was  about 
two  inches  long  —  big  enough  to  do  quite  a  bit  of  damage 
if  it  had  hit  squarely.  When  we  had  landed,  an  examina- 
tion of  the  plane  showed  five  shell  holes  in  it.  I  found  an- 

335 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

other  small  piece  of  shrapnel  in  my  foot  that  had  spent  its 
force  and  hadn't  penetrated  my  leather  boot.  The  Archies 
are  very  accurate  on  the  Piave  but  they  were  unusually  so 
that  morning. 

But,  yesterday  we  staged  a  "  regular  party."  A  daylight 
raid  on  Pola,  the  big  Austrian  naval  base  in  the  Adriatic, 
had  been  talked  about  for  several  months  but  had  been 
always  considered  too  fraught  with  danger.  They  had 
bombed  it  many  times  with  success  at  night,  but  they 
wanted  such  accuracy  as  only  daylight  can  give.  So  after 
a  week's  preparation,  it  was  staged  yesterday.  They  didn't 
want  to  take  any  Americans  at  first  because  of  our  inex- 
perience, but  after  a  great  deal  of  urging,  I  finally  got 
aboard  with  one  or  two  others.  We  started  at  daybreak  and 
it  was  broad  daylight  when  we  reached  the  coast.  It  was  a 
wonderful  sight  to  see  the  big  sturdy  Capronis  with  their 
loads  of  bombs  and  passengers,  and  above  them  the  little 
chasse  planes  darting  in  and  out  in  search  of  the  enemy. 
Over  sixty  planes  took  part,  Capronis,  lighter  bombing 
planes,  chasse  planes,  and  hydro-airplanes.  Down  on  the 
water  there  were  two  fleets  of  destroyers  attacking  in  co- 
operation with  us.  It  was  a  110-kilometre  flight  straight 
across  the  Adriatic  and  even  at  that  height  we  were  out  of 
eight  of  land  for  quite  a  while.  We  all  had  on  life  belts 
for  use  in  case  of  a  forced  landing  at  sea.  But  all  went 
well.  We  went  over  the  objective  one  by  one  and  dropped 
our  bombs  without  being  molested.  We  were  fired  at  by 
land  batteries  and  by  a  dozen  large  battleships  in  the  harbor 
but  their  range  was  poor.  When  I  turned  away,  I  could 
see  bursts  of  fire  on  the  center  of  the  city,  on  the  arsenal 
and  one  on  a  torpedo  boat  in  the  harbor.  The  photographs 
taken  showed  very  favorable  results.  It  was  a  long  trip 
home  and  we  were  all  pretty  tired,  but  happy  over  the  re- 
sults and  to  know  that  all  of  our  machines  returned.  And 
so  the  first  daylight  raid  on  Pola  has  come  and  gone. 

Final  figures  giving  with  exactitude  what  the  Ameri- 
can Air  Service  accomplished  in  its  different  sectors 
will  not  be  available  until  all  the  overseas  records  have 

336 


THE  AIR  SERVICE  IN  ACTION 

been  brought  together,  checked,  and  summarized. 
Over  1,000  fliers,  however,  were  actually  in  action  with 
the  A.  E.  F.  alone,  including,  as  of  October  30,  291 
pursuit,  309  observer,  and  62  k0JS^^,PJ}.9isJUiajid 2S& 
reconnaissance  and  70  bombing  observers,  with  a 
record  for  that  week  of  63  enemy  planes  brought  down, 
and  seven  Americans  killed,  12  missing,  and  13 
wounded.  To  November  11  official  figures  reported  by 
General  Harbord  under  date  of  December  15  give  the 
number  of  enemy  planes  brought  down  by  American 
fliers  as  491  confirmed  and  354  unconfirmed,  a  total 
of  845;  the  number  of  enemy  balloons  reported  de- 
stroyed was  82,  of  which  57  were  confirmed.  During 
the  activities  of  the  Air  Service  in  France  it  lost  271 
planes  and  45  balloons.  With  a  total  AHied  strength 
of  but  5,500  planes  and  a  total  enemy  strength  of 
3,300  planes,  it  is  evident  that  the  toll  taken  by  the 
Americans  formed  a  large  part  in  the  replacement 
programme  upon  which  the  Germans  had  to  figure. 
Despite  the  delays  and  disappointments,  it  is  evident 
also  that  the  American  Air  Service  took  a  far  bigger 
part  in  the  hostilities  than  was  commonly  supposed. 

Most  of  the  German  planes  the  destruction  of  which 
was  confirmed,  a  total  of  462,  fell  to  the  63  American 
aviators  who  by  bringing  down  at  least  five  enemy 
planes  won  the  coveted  designation  of  "ace."  The 
official  list  of  American  aces  of  January,  1919,  with  the 
number  of  victories  credited  to  each,  is  as  follows: 

Captain  Edward  V.  Rickenbacher,  Columbus,  Ohio 26 

First  Lieutenant  Frank  Luke,  Jr.,  Phoenix,  Arizona 

(killed  in  action  September  30,  1918) 18 

Major  Victor  Raoul  Lufbery,  Wallingford,  Connecticut 

(killed  in  action  May  19,  1918) 17 

337 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

Captain  Reed  G.  Landis,  Chicago,  Illinois 12 

First  Lieutenant  David  E.  Putnam,  Brookline,  Massachu- 
setts (killed  in  action  September  14,  1918) 12 

First  Lieutenant  Fielde  Kindley,  Gravette,  Arkansas ....  10 
First  Lieutenant  Jacques  Michael  Swaab,  Philadelphia, 

Pennsylvania 10 

First   Lieutenant   George   A.   Vaughn,   Brooklyn,   New 

York 10 

Captain  Elliott  W.  Springs,  Lancaster,  Pennsylvania ....  9 
First  Lieutenant  Thomas  G.  Cassady,  Spencer,  Indiana . .   9 
First  Lieutenant  William  P.  Erwin,  Chicago,  Illinois ....   9 
First  Lieutenant  Chester  E.  Wright,  Cambridge,  Massa- 
chusetts     9 

Major  James  A.  Meissner,  Brooklyn,  New  York 8 

Captain    Hamilton    Coolidge,    Boston,    Massachusetts 

(killed  in  action  October  27, 1918) 8 

Captain  G.  Def reest  Larner,  Washington,  D.  C 8 

First  Lieutenant  Paul  F.  Baer,  Fort  Wayne,  Indiana 8 

First  Lieutenant  Henry  Clay,  Jr.,  Fort  Worth,  Texas ...  8 
First  Lieutenant  Frank  0.  D.  Hunter,  Savannah,  Georgia.  8 
First  Lieutenant  Wilbert  Wallace  White,  New  York,  New 

York  (died  December  13, 1918) 8 

Second  Lieutenant  Clinton  Jones,  San  Francisco,  Cali- 
fornia     8 

Captain  Reid  M.  Chambers,  Memphis,  Tennessee 7 

First  Lieutenant  Harvey  W.  Cook,  Toledo  Ohio 7 

First  Lieutenant  Lloyd  A.  Hamilton,  Burlington,  Vermont 

(killed  in  action  August  26, 1918) 7 

First  Lieutenant  Lansing  C.  Holden,  New  York,  New 

York 7 

First   Lieutenant    Wendel    A.    Robertson,    Fort    Smith, 

Arkansas 7 

First  Lieutenant  Leslie  J.  Rummel,  Newark,  New  Jersey .  7 
First  Lieutenant  Karl  J.  Schoen,  Indianapolis,  Indiana 

(killed  in  action  October  30,  1918) 7 

Major  Harold  E.  Hartney,  Saskatoon,  Canada 6 

Captain  Douglas  Campbell,  Mount  Hamilton,  California .   6 

Captain  Edgar  Gardner  Tobin,  San  Antonio,  Texas 6 

Captain  Jerry  Cox  Vasconeelles,  Denver,  Colorado 6 

338 


THE  AIR  SERVICE  IN  ACTION 

First  Lieutenant  James  D.  Beane,  Concord,  Massachusetts.  6 
First  Lieutenant  Clayton  L.  Bissel,  Kane,  Pennsylvania. .   6 
First  Lieutenant  Arthur  R.  Brooks,  Framingham,  Massa- 
chusetts      6 

First  Lieutenant  Jesse  0.  Creech,  Washington,  D.  C 6 

First  Lieutenant  Edward  P.  Curtis,  Rochester,  New  York.  6 
First  Lieutenant  Murray  K.  Gutherie,  Mobile,  Alabama . .  6 
First  Lieutenant  Donald  Hudson,  Kansas  City,  Missouri.  6 
First  Lieutenant  Robert  0.  Lindsay,  Madison,  North 

Carolina 6 

First  Lieutenant  Ralph  A.  O'Neill,  Nogales,  Arizona  (re- 
ported killed  in  accident) 6 

First  Lieutenant  Sumner  Sewall,  Bath,  Maine 6 

First  Lieutenant  Martinus  Stenseth,  Twin  Valley,  Minne- 
sota . . . 6 

First  Lieutenant  William  H.  Stovall,  Stovall,  Mississippi.  6 
Second  Lieutenant  Howard  Burdick,  Brooklyn,  New  York.  6 

Second  Lieutenant  Frank  K.  Hays,  Chicago,  Illinois 6 

Lieutenant-Colonel  William  Thaw,  Pittsburgh,  Pennsyl- 
vania    5 

Major  Charles  J.  Biddle,  Philadelphia,  Pennsylvania 5 

Major  David  McK.  Peterson,  Honesdale,  Pennsylvania ...   5 

Captain  H.  R.  Buckley,  Agawan,  Massachusetts 5 

First  Lieutenant  Byrne  E.  Baucom,  Milford,  Texas 5 

First  Lieutenant  Arthur  E.  Easterbrook,  Fort  Flagler, 

Washington    5 

First  Lieutenant  George  W.  Furlow,  Rochester,  Minne- 
sota    5 

First  Lieutenant  Harold  H.  George,  Niagara  Falls,  New 

York 5 

First  Lieutenant  Edward  M.  Haight,  Astoria,  New  York.  5 
First  Lieutenant  James  A.  Healey,  Jersey  City,  New 

Jersey 5 

First  Lieutenant  Howard  C.  Knotts,  Carlinville,  Illinois. .  5 
First  Lieutenant  James  Knowles,  Cambridge,  Massachu- 
setts    5 

First  Lieutenant  Innes  Potter 5 

First  Lieutenant  John  J.  Seerley,  Chicago,  Illinois 5 

First  Lieutenant  Francis  M.  Symonds,  New  York  City. .  5 

339 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

First  Lieutenant  Joseph  Fritz  Wehner,  Everett,  Massa- 
chusetts (killed  in  action  September  20, 1918) 5 

Second  Lieutenant  Harold  Me  Arthur 5 

Second  Lieutenant  J.  Sidney  Owens,  Baltimore,  Mary- 
land   ; '. 5 

These  successes  of  course,  were  not  without  their 
cost.  A  high  price  indeed  was  paid,  made  all  the 
higher,  it  is  generally  agreed,  by  the  impetuosity  of 
the  American  fliers.  Seven  of  the  63  aces  were  killed 
in  action  before  the  armistice  was  signed.  Up  to 
November  14  the  Air  Service  casualties  totaled  1,233, 
including  164  killed  in  action  or  died  of  wounds,  319 
killed  in  accidents,  335  died  of  other  causes,  200  miss- 
ing "in  action,  102  prisoners,  and  113  wounded.  Of 
these  total  casualties,  those  of  the  commissioned  per- 
sonnel in  France,  as  reported  by  Geijeral  Harbord, 
numbered  442,  including  109  killed,  103  wounded,  200 
missing,  27  prisoners,  and  three  interned.  The  total 
number  of  aviators  killed  in  action  on  alT"Irontfl  jfl* 
separately  reported  as  15U.  This  record  portrays  a 
burning  baptism  of  'BreTorlEe  new  American  service 
in  its  first  months  on  the  front. 

To  praise  those  young  men  who  went  forth  into  this 
hazardous  service,  to  try  to  picture  in  words  the 
heroism  and  sacrifice  of  their  deeds,  would  be  super- 
fluous. All  the  world  knows  the  romance  and  the  risks 
of  aerial  warfare.  Let  the  final  word,  then,  be  said 
by  General  Pershing,  their  Commander-in-Chief,  who 
immediately  after  the  armistice,  in  his  general  report 
to  Secretary  Baker,  wrote : 

Our  aviators  have  no  equals  in  daring  or  fighting  ability 
and  have  left  a  record  of  courageous  deeds  that  will  ever 
remain  a  brilliant  page  in  the  annals  of  our  Army. 

340 


APPENDICES 
I.  THE  AVIATION  ACT  OF  JULY  24,  1917 

An  Act  To  authorize  the  President  to  increase  temporarily  the 
Signal  Corps  of  the  Army  and  to  purchase,  manufacture, 
maintain,  repair,  and  operate  airships,  and  to  make  appro- 
priations therefor,  and  for  other  purposes. 

Be  it  enacted,  etc.,  That  for  and  during  the  existing 
emergency,  the  President  be,  and  is  hereby,  authorized 
to  increase  the  present  authorized  commissioned  and  en- 
listed strength  of  the  Signal  Corps  of  the  Army,  including 
the  Aviation  Section  thereof. 

SEC.  2.  That  to  provide  the  additional  commissioned  per- 
sonnel required  by  this  Act  the  President  is  authorized  to 
promote,  appoint,  detail,  or  attach  as  temporary  officers  in 
the  Signal  Corps,  including  the  Aviation  Section  thereof, 
officers  of  the  Regular  Army,  National  Army,  or  National 
Guard,  or  the  Officers'  Reserve  Corps,  or  to  appoint  tem- 
porarily enlisted  men  of  the  Regular  Army,  enlisted  men 
of  the  Enlisted  Reserve  Corps,  or  persons  from  civil  life: 
Provided,  That  no  person  shall  be  so  promoted,  appointed, 
detailed,  or  attached  until  he  shall  have  been  found  physi- 
cally, mentally,  and  morally  qualified  under  regulations 
prescribed  by  the  Secretary  of  War:  Provided  further, 
That  officers  with  rank  not  above  colonel  shall  be  appointed 
and  commissioned  by  the  President  alone,  irrespective  of 
the  rank  or  grade  held  by  them  on  the  date  of  the  passage 
of  this  Act,  and  that  officers  above  the  grade  of  colonel 
shall  be  appointed  by  the  President,  by  and  with  the  advice 
and  consent  of  the  Senate,  irrespective  of  the  rank  or  grade 
held  by  them  on  the  date  of  the  passage  of  this  Act. 

SEC.  3.  That  to  provide  the  additional  enlisted  men  re- 
quired by  this  Act,  the  President  is  authorized  to  raise  and 
maintain,  by  voluntary  enlistment  or  by  draft,  such  num- 
ber of  enlisted  men  as  he  may  deem  necessary  and  to  em- 
body them  into  organizations  hereinafter  provided  for  in 

341 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

section  four :  Provided,  That  the  draft  herein  provided  for 
shall  not  apply  to  any  person  under  the  age  of  twenty-one 
years  or  to  any  person  above  the  age  of  thirty-one  years: 
Provided  further,  That  the  grades  of  chauffeur,  first  class, 
and  chauffeur  are  hereby  created  in  the  Signal  Corps.  The 
pay  and  allowances  of  a  chauffeur,  first  class,  shall  be  the 
same  as  a  sergeant,  first  class,  in  the  Signal  Corps.  Pay 
and  allowances  of  a  chauffeur  shall  be  the  same  as  a  ser- 
geant in  the  Signal  Corps.  All  chauffeurs  while  serving  as 
such  shall  rank  with  corporals  of  the  Signal  Corps  and 
shall  be  subject  to  promotion  and  reduction  to  any  other 
grade  now  authorized  in  the  Signal  Corps. 

SEC.  4.  That  the  President  is  hereby  authorized  to  appro- 
priately officer  and  organize  the  personnel  of  the  Signal 
Corps  into  such  number  of  divisions,  brigades,  regiments, 
wings,  squadrons,  battalions,  companies,  and  flights  as  may 
be  necessary,  and  to  increase  or  decrease  the  number  of 
organizations  prescribed  for  the  divisions,  brigades,  regi- 
ments, wings,  squadrons,  battalions,  companies,  and  flights, 
and  to  prescribe  such  new  and  different  organizations  and 
personnel  for  divisions,  brigades,  regiments,  wings,  squad- 
rons, battalions,  companies,  and  flights  as  the  efficiency  of 
the  service  may  require. 

The  President  is  further  authorized  to  organize  such 
headquarters  and  headquarters  detachments  for  divisions, 
brigades,  regiments,  wings,  squadrons,  battalions,  com- 
panies, and  flights  as  may  be  necessary,  and  to  prescribe 
new  and  different  organizations  for  such  headquarters  and 
headquarters  detachments  whenever  the  efficiency  of  the 
service  may  require. 

SEC.  5.  That  the  President,  by  and  with  the  advice  and 
consent  of  the  Senate,  is  authorized  to  appoint  for  the 
period  of  the  existing  emergency  such  general  officers  of 
appropriate  grades  as  may  be  necessary  for  staff  duty  and 
for  duty  with  such  brigades  and  divisions  of  the  troops  of 
the  Signal  Corps,  including  the  Aviation  Section  thereof, 
as  may  be  organized  by  the  President. 

Vacancies  in  all  grades  of  the  Regular  Army,  National 
Army,  or  National  Guard  resulting  from  the  temporary 

342 


APPENDICES 

appointment  of  officers  thereof  to  higher  grades  shall  be 
filled  or  vacated  as  provided  for  in  sections  eight  and  nine 
of  the  Act  authorizing  the  President  to  increase  temporarily 
the  military  establishment  of  the  United  States  and  ap- 
proved May  eighteen,  nineteen  hundred  and  seventeen. 

SEC.  6.  That  officers  detailed  in  or  attached  to  the  Avia- 
tion Section  of  the  Signal  Corps  may,  when  qualified 
therefor,  be  rated  as  junior  military  aviators,  military 
aviators,  junior  military  aeronauts,  and  military  aeronauts, 
but  no  person  shall  be  so  rated  until  there  shall  have  been 
issued  to  him  a  certificate  to  the  effect  that  he  is  qualified 
for  the  rating,  and  no  certificate  shall  be  issued  to  any  per- 
son until  an  examining  board,  which  shall  be  composed  of 
two  officers  of  experience  of  the  Aviation  Section  of  the 
Signal  Corps  and  one  medical  officer,  shall  have  examined 
him  under  general  regulations  to  be  prescribed  by  the  Secre- 
tary of  War  and  published  to  the  Army  by  the  War  De- 
partment, and  shall  have  reported  him  to  be  qualified  for 
the  rating.  No  person  shall  receive  the  rating  of  military 
aviator  or  military  aeronaut  until  he  shall  have  served 
creditably  for  three  years  as  an  aviation  officer  with  the 
rating  of  a  junior  military  aviator  or  the  rating  of  a  junior 
military  aeronaut,  except  that  in  time  of  war  any  officer  or 
enlisted  man  who  specially  distinguishes  himself  in  active 
service  may,  upon  recommendation  of  the  Chief  Signal 
Officer  of  the  Army,  be  rated  as  a  junior  military  aviator, 
military  aviator,  junior  military  aeronaut,  or  military  aero- 
naut without  regard  to  examination  or  to  length  of  service : 
Provided,  That  junior  military  aeronauts  and  military  aero- 
nauts shall  be  entitled  to  the  same  increase  in  rank  and  pay 
as  are  now  authorized  by  law  for  junior  military  aviators 
and  military  aviators,  respectively :  Provided  further,  That 
any  officer  attached  to  the  Aviation  Section  of  the  Signal 
Corps  for  any  military  duty  requiring  him  to  make  regular 
and  frequent  flights  shall  receive  an  increase  of  twenty-five 
per  centum  of  the  pay  of  his  grade  and  length  of  service 
under  his  commission. 

SEC.  7.  That  the  Secretary  of  War  is  authorized  from 
time  to  time  to  cause  such  number  of  the  enlisted  men  of 

343 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

the  Aviation  Section  of  the  Signal  Corps  above  the  grade 
of  corporal  as  he  may  deem  necessary  to  be  rated  as  avia- 
tion mechanicians  or  as  balloon  mechanicians  in  the  manner 
now  prescribed  by  law:  Provided,  That  balloon  mecha- 
nicians shall  receive  the  same  increase  of  pay  as  now  pre- 
scribed by  law  for  aviation  mechanicians. 

SEC.  8.  That  all  officers  and  enlisted  men  of  the  tem- 
porary forces  of  the  Signal  Corps,  including  the  Aviation 
Section  thereof  provided  for  herein,  shall  be  in  all  respects 
on  the  same  footing  as  to  pay,  allowances,  and  pensions  as 
permanent  officers  and  enlisted  men  of  corresponding  grades 
and  length  of  service  in  the  Regular  Army. 

Provided,  That  nothing  in  this  Act  shall  operate  to  de- 
crease the  present  authorized  strength  of  the  Regular  Army 
or  National  Army  heretofore  authorized  by  law. 

SEC.  9.  That  during  the  existing  emergency  authority  is 
hereby  given  to  the  President,  through  the  War  Depart- 
ment, for  the  purchase,  manufacture,  maintenance,  repair, 
and  operation  of  airships  and  other  aerial  machines,  includ- 
ing instruments  and  appliances  of  every  sort  and  descrip- 
tion necessary  for  the  operation,  construction,  or  equip- 
ment of  all  types  of  aircraft,  including  guns,  armament, 
ammunition,  and  all  necessary  spare  parts,  and  equipment 
connected  therewith;  and  all  necessary  buildings  for  equip- 
ment and  personnel  in  the  Aviation  Section  and  for  the 
purchase,  maintenance,  repair,  and  operation,  through  the 
Chief  Signal  Officer  of  the  Army,  of  all  motor-propelled 
passenger  and  equipment  carrying  vehicles  which  may  be 
necessary  for  the  Aviation  Section  of  the  Signal  Corps. 

And  during  the  existing  emergency  authority  is  hereby 
further  given  for  the  establishment,  equipment,  maintenance, 
and  operation  of  aviation  stations,  including  (a)  the  ac- 
quisition of  land,  or  any  interest  in  land,  with  any  build- 
ings and  improvements  thereon,  by  purchase,  lease,  dona- 
tion, condemnation,  or  otherwise :  Provided,  That  by  order 
of  the  President  any  unappropriated  or  reserved  public 
lands  may  be  reserved  from  entry,  designated,  and  used  for 
such  aviation  stations;  (b)  the  improvement  of  such  land 
by  clearing,  grading,  draining,  seeding,  and  otherwise  mak- 

344 


APPENDICES 

ing  the  same  suitable  for  the  purpose  intended;  (c)  the 
construction,  maintenance,  and  repair  of  permanent  or 
temporary  barracks,  quarters,  hospitals,  mess  houses,  ad- 
ministration, instructional  and  recreational  buildings,  han- 
gars, magazines,  storehouses,  sheds,  shops,  garages,  boat- 
houses,  docks,  radio  stations,  laboratories,  observation  sta- 
tions, and  all  other  buildings  and  structures  necessary  or 
advisable;  (d)  procuring  and  introducing  water,  electric 
light  and  power,  telephones,  telegraph,  and  sewerage  to 
aviation  stations  and  buildings  and  structures  thereon  by 
the  extension  of  existing  systems  or  the  creation  of  new 
systems  and  their  maintenance,  operation  and  repair,  in- 
stallation of  plumbing,  electric  fixtures  and  telephones,  fire 
apparatus  and  fire  alarm  systems  and  the  maintenance, 
operation  and  repair  of  all  such  systems,  fixtures  and  ap- 
paratus; (e)  construction  and  repair  of  roads,  walks,  sea 
walls,  breakwaters,  bridges,  and  wharves,  dredging,  filling 
and  otherwise  improving  land  and  water  sites;  (f)  pur- 
chase of  stoves  and  other  cooking  and  heating  apparatus, 
kitchen  and  tableware,  and  furniture  and  equipment  for 
kitchens,  mess  halls,  offices,  quarters,  barracks,  hospitals, 
and  other  buildings,  screens,  lockers,  refrigerators,  and  all 
other  necessary  equipment;  (g)  purchase  of  gasoline,  oil, 
fuel,  and  all  supplies  of  every  kind  and  character  neces- 
sary or  advisable  for  maintenance  and  operation  of  aviation 
stations,  including  electric  light  and  power,  telephones, 
water  supply  and  sewerage  service;  (h)  purchase  and  manu- 
facture and  installation  of  all  kinds  of  machinery,  tools, 
material,  supplies,  and  equipment  for  construction,  main- 
tenance, and  repair  of  aircraft,  buildings,  and  improve- 
ments at  aviation  stations,  or  property  or  appliances  used 
in  connection  with  aviation. 

And  also  for  the  purchase  or  manufacture  and  issue  of 
special  clothing,  wearing  apparel,  and  similar  equipment 
for  aviation  purposes. 

And  also  for  the  actual  and  necessary  expenses  of  officers, 
enlisted  men,  and  civilian  employees  of  the  Army  and  au- 
thorized agents  sent  on  special  duty  at  home  and  abroad  for 
aviation  purposes,  including  observation  and  investigation 

345 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 

of  foreign  military  operations  and  organization,  manufac- 
ture of  aircraft,  and  engines,  also  special  courses  in  foreign 
aviation  schools  and  manufacturing  establishments,  to  be 
paid  upon  certificates  of  the  Secretary  of  .War  certifying 
that  the  expenditures  were  necessary  for  military  purposes. 

And  also  for  vocational  training,  including  employment 
of  necessary  civilian  instructors  in  important  trades  related 
to  aviation,  purchase  of  tools,  equipment,  materials,  and 
machines  required  for  such  training,  purchase  of  textbooks, 
books  of  reference,  scientific  and  professional  papers, 
periodicals  and  magazines,  and  instruments  and  material  for 
theoretical  and  practical  instruction  at  aviation  schools  and 
stations,  and  all  other  means  to  carry  out  the  provisions  of 
section  twenty-seven  of  the  Act  approved  June  third,  nine- 
teen hundred  and  sixteen,  authorizing,  in  addition  to  the 
military  training  of  soldiers  while  in  active  service,  means 
for  securing  educational  and  vocational  training  of  a  char- 
acter to  increase  their  military  efficiency  and  enable  them  to 
return  to  civil  life  better  equipped  for  industrial,  com- 
mercial, and  general  business  occupations. 

And  also  to  pay  and  otherwise  provide  for  such  officers 
of  the  Officers*  Reserve  Corps  of  the  Aviation  Section  of 
the  Signal  Corps  and  such  enlisted  men  of  the  Enlisted  Re- 
serve Corps  of  the  Aviation  Section  of  the  Signal  Corps  as 
may  be  called  into  active  service  and  such  enlisted  men  as 
may  be  enlisted  in  the  Aviation  Section  of  the  Signal  Corps 
under  the  provisions  of  section  two  of  the  Act  to  increase 
temporarily  the  military  establishment  of  the  United  States, 
approved  May  eighteenth,  nineteen  hundred  and  seventeen, 
or  any  subsequent  Act  temporarily  increasing  the  com- 
missioned or  enlisted  personnel  of  the  Aviation  Section  of 
the  Signal  Corps  and  such  civilian  employees  as  may  be 
necessary,  for  the  payment  of  their  traveling  and  other 
necessary  expenses  when  not  traveling  with  troops:  Pro- 
vided, That  hereafter  all  reserve  officers  and  enlisted  men 
of  the  Aviation  Section  of  the  Signal  Corps  shall  be  paid  by 
Quartermaster  Corps  disbursing  officers  from  funds  trans- 
ferred to  their  credit  from  Signal  Corps  appropriations. 

And  also  for  the  payment  of  all  expenses  in  connection 
with  the  development  of  suitable  types  of  aviation  engines, 

346 


APPENDICES 

airplanes,  and  other  aircraft  appurtenances,  including  the 
cost  of  sample  engines,  airplanes,  and  appurtenances,  cost 
of  any  patents  and  other  rights  therein,  and  costs  of  in- 
vestigation, experimentation,  and  research  in  respect  thereto. 

And  also  for  the  payment  of  all  expenses  in  connection 
with  the  creation,  expansion,  acquisition,  and  development 
of  plants,  factories,  and  establishments  for  the  manufacture 
of  airplanes,  aircraft,  engines,  and  appurtenances,  includ- 
ing provision  for  the  purchase  or  lease  of  land  with  the 
buildings  thereon,  construction  of  permanent  or  temporary 
buildings  for  all  purposes,  purchase  of  machinery,  tools, 
and  employment  of  operatives,  together  with  all  adminis- 
trative expenses  necessary,  the  purchase  and  supply  of  raw 
and  semifinished  materials  and  of  fuel  and  all  other  things 
necessary  for  creating  and  extending  the  production  of  air- 
planes, aircraft,  engines,  and  all  appurtenances. 

And  also  for  creating,  maintaining,  and  operating  at 
technical  schools  and  colleges  courses  of  instruction  for 
aviation  students,  including  cost  of  instruction,  equipment, 
and  supplies  necessary  for  instruction  and  subsistence  of 
students  while  receiving  such  instruction. 

Provided,  That,  subject  to  the  approval  of  the  Secretary 
of  War,  motor-propelled  vehicles,  airplanes,  engines,  parts 
thereof,  and  appurtenances  may  be  exchanged  in  part  pay- 
ment for  new  equipment  of  the  same  or  similar  character 
to  be  used  for  the  same  purpose  as  those  proposed  to  be 
exchanged. 

Provided  further,  That  during  the  present  emergency, 
officers  and  enlisted  men  in  foreign  armies  attached  to  the 
Aviation  Section  of  the  Signal  Corps  as  instructors  or  in- 
spectors when  traveling  in  the  United  States  on  official  busi- 
ness pertaining  to  the  Aviation  Section  of  the  Signal  Corps 
shall  be  authorized,  from  funds  appropriated  by  this  Act, 
the  same  mileage  and  transportation  allowances  as  are  au- 
thorized for  officers  or  enlisted  men  of  the  Regular  Army. 

SEC.  10.  That  for  the  purpose  of  carrying  this  Act  into 
effect  the  sum  of  $640,000,000  is  hereby  appropriated  out 
of  any  funds  in  the  Treasury  not  otherwise  appropriated, 
to  be  available  until  June  thirtieth,  nineteen  hundred  and 
eighteen. 

347 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 


II.  Am  SERVICE  STATIONS  ON  NOVEMBER  11,  1918 
PLYING  FIELDS 

The  special  functions  of  the  different  fields  are  indicated  as 
follows:  A,  advanced  flying;  JB,  bombing  school;  F,  primary 
flying;  G,  aerial  gunnery;  J,  instructors  school;  O,  observers' 
school;  P,  pursuit  flying;  PG,  photographic.  Figures  in 
parentheses  after  names  of  fields  refer  to  number  of  auxiliary 
fields. 


Maximum 

Location                    Cadet 

Capacity 

Baker's  Field:  PG 

Rochester,  N.  Y. 

Barron  Field  (1)  :  F 

Everman,  Tex.                     »    300 

Boiling  Field:  A 

Anacostia,  D.  C. 

Brooks  Field  (2)  :  I 

San  Antonio,  Tex.                   300 

Call  Field  (1)  :  O 

Wichita  Falls,  Tex.               300 

Carlstrom  Field:  P 

Arcadia,  Fla.                           400 

Carruthers  Field  (1)  :  F 

Benbrook,  Tex.                        300 

Chanute  Field  (1)  :  F 

Rantoul,  111.                             300 

Dorr  Field:  G 

Arcadia,  Fla.                           120 

Eberts  Field  (1)  :  F 

Lonoke,  Ark.                            300 

Ellington  Field  (6)  :  B  and  G 

Houston,  Tex.                          600 

Emerson  Field:  A 

Columbia,  S.  C. 

First  Reserve  Wing  : 

Mineola,  L.  I.,  N.  Y. 

Brindley  Field:  A 

Commack,  L.  I.,  N.  Y. 

Henry  J.  Damm  Field:  A 

Babylon,  L.  I.,  N.  Y. 

Hazelhurst  Field  :  A 

Mineola,  L.  I.,  N.  Y. 

Luf  berry  Field:  A 

Wautaught,  L.  I.,  N.  Y. 

Mitchell  Field:  A 

Mineola,  L.  I.,  N.  Y. 

Eoosevelt  Field:  A 

Mineola,  L.  I.,  N.  Y. 

France  Field:  A 

Cocoa  Walk,  Panama 

Canal  Zone 

Gerstner  Field  :  B 

Lake  Charles,  La.                   600 

Kelly  Field  (2)  :  F 

San  Antonio,  Tex.                  600 

Love  Field  (2)  :  F 

Dallas,  Tex.                             300 

March  Field:  F 

Riverside,  Cal.                          300 

Mather  Field:  F 

Sacramento,   Cal.                     300 

Park  Field  (2)  :  F 

Millington,  Tenn.                     300 

Payne  Field  (2)  :  A 

West  Point,  Miss.                  300 

Post  Field:  O 

Fort  Sill,  Okla.                       315 

Rich  Field  (5)  :  F 

Waco,  Tex.                               300 

Rockwell  Field  (H)  :  P  and  G 

San  Diego,  Cal.                      400 

Auxiliary  field  at  Otoymaso,  Cal. 


APPENDICES 

FLYING  FIELDS  —  Continued 

Maximum 
Location  Cadet 

Capacity 

Second  Reserve  Wing :  Park  Place,  Houston,  Tex. 

Self  ridge  Field:  G  Mt.  Clemens,  Mich.  350 

Scott  Field  (1) :  F  and  /  Belleville,  111.  300 

Souther  Field  (1) :  F  Americus,  Ga.  300 

Taliaferro  Field:  G  Hicks,  Tex.  180 

Taylor  Field  (3)  :  F  Montgomery,  Ala.  300 

Camp  Dick 

(Cadet  Gunnery  Camp)  Dallas,  Tex.  4,500 

Wilbur  Wright  Field 

(Armorers'  School)  Fairneld,  Ohio  600 

Langley  Field 

(Observers'  School)  Hampton,  Va.  210 

SCHOOLS  OF  MILITARY  AERONAUTICS 

University  of  California  Berkeley,  Cal.  1,200 

Cornell  University  Ithaca,  N.  Y.  1,000 

Princeton  University  Princeton,  N.  J.  1,200 

University  of  Illinois  Urbana,   111.  1,200 

University  of  Texas  Austin,  Tex.  1,400 

BALLOON  SCHOOLS 

Army  Balloon  School  (2)  Fort  Omaha,  Neb. 

Army  Balloon  School  Lee  Hall,  Va. 

Army  Balloon  School  Arcadia,  Cal. 

Camp  John  Wise  San  Antonio,  Tex. 

Balloon  Detachment  Fort  Monroe,  Va. 

Balloon  Detachment  Fort  Sill,  Okla. 

Balloon  Detachment  Langley  Field,  Va. 

Balloon  Detachment  Camp  McClellan,  Anniston,  Ala. 

Balloon  Detachment  Camp  Knox,  Stithton,  Ky. 

Balloon  Detachment  Camp  Jackson,  Columbia,  S.  C. 

RADIO  SCHOOLS 

Air  Service  School  for  Radio  Columbia   University, 

Officers  New  York,  N.  Y.  300 

Air  Service  School  for  Radio  Penn  Field,  Austin, 

Operators  Tex.  1,000 

Air  Service  School  for  Radio  Carnegie  Institute  of  Tech- 
Mechanics  nology,  Pittsburgh,  Pa.  1,200 

349 


THE  AMERICAN  AIR  SERVICE 


FIRING  CENTERS  2 

Camp  Jackson  Columbia,  S.  C. 

Camp  Doniphen  Fort  Sill,  Okla. 

Camp  McClellaii  Anniston,  Ala. 

Camp  Knox  Stithton,  Ky.  - ' 

PHOTOGRAPHIC  SCHOOLS 

Maximum 
Student 
Capacity 
U.  S.  School  of  Aerial  Pho-    Eochester,  N.  Y.  750 

tography 
Photographic     School,     Cor-    Ithaca,  N.  Y.  250 

nell  University 

Preliminary  Photographic          Fort  Ethan  Allan,  Bur- 
School  lington,  Vt.  2,500 


MECHANICS  SCHOOLS 

Air  Service  Mechanics  School  Kelly  Field,  South,  San 

Antonio,  Tex.  3,700 

Air  Service  Mechanics  School  Overland  Building,  St. 

Paul,  Minn.  3,700 


AVIATION  GENERAL  SUPPLY  DEPOTS 

Americus,  Ga.  Little  Rock,  Ark. 

Fairfield,  Ohio  Washington,  D.  C. 

Houston,  Tex.  Washington,  D.  C. 

Middletown,  Pa.  Buffalo,  N.  Y. 

Richmond,  Va.  Detroit,  Mich. 

San  Antonio,  Tex.  San  Francisco,  Cal. 

Los  Angeles,  Cal.  Sacramento,  Cal. 

BALLOON  GENERAL  SUPPLY  DEPOT 
Richmond,  Va. 

AIR  SERVICE  DEPOTS 
Garden  City,  L.  I.,  N.  Y.  Morrison,  Va. 

2  Air  Service  radio  officers  instructing  Artillery  personnel 
at  these  locations. 

350 


APPENDICES 


AVIATION  BEPAIR  DEPOTS 

Indianapolis,  Ind.  Dallas,  Tex. 

Montgomery,  Ala. 


EECRUIT  CONCENTRATION  CAMPS 
Port  Wayne,  Mich.  Kelly  Field,  San  Antonio,  Tex. 

TECHNICAL  SECTION 
Air  Building,  Dayton,  Ohio. 

TESTING  FIELD 
Wilbur  Wright  Field,  Fairfield,  Ohio. 

ACCEPTANCE  PARKS 

Acceptance  Park,  Dayton-Wright  Airplane  Co.,  Dayton,  Ohio. 
Acceptance  Park,  Fisher  Body  Co.,  Detroit,  Mich. 

MISCELLANEOUS  STATIONS 

Camp  Alfred  Vail  Little  Silver,  N.  J. 

Chandler  Field  Essington,  Pa. 

271st  Aero  Squadron  Aberdeen,  Md. 

6th  Aero  Squadron  Honolulu,  H.  I. 

7th  Aero  Squadron  Panama  Canal  Zone 

PORTS  OF  EMBARKATION 

New  York,  N.  Y.  Philadelphia,  Pa. 

Newport  News,  Va.  Baltimore,  Md. 

DEPARTMENT  AIR  SERVICE  OFFICES 

Central  Department:    Chicago,  111. 
Eastern  Department:   New  York,  N.  Y. 
Northeastern  Department:   Boston,  Mass. 
Southern  Department:    Fort  Sam  Houston,  Tex. 
Southeastern  Department:    Charleston,  S.  C. 
Western  Department:    San  Francisco,  Cal. 
Philippines  Department:    Manila. 
Hawaiian  Department:   Honolulu. 
Panama  Canal  Department 

351 


INDEX 


A7A  Engine  for  J  type  plane, 
187. 

Accidents,  numbers  and  causes 
of,  122,  268,  308. 

Aces,  list  of  American,  337. 

Acetate  of  lime,  lack  of,  96, 
162;  new  sources  of,  162. 

Acetic  anhydride,  shortage  of, 
163. 

Adjutants,  schools  for,  125. 

A.  E.  F.  Aviation  Project,  ac- 
ceptance of,  232;  demands 
for  balloon  personnel  and 
equipment,  292,  294;  de- 
mands for  "  overseas  "  avi- 
ation force,  259;  number  of 
American  aviators  with,  at 
signing  of  armistice,  312; 
regarding  success  of  Ameri- 
can air  service,  328. 

Aerial  building  operations,  in 
France,  by  America,  in  first 
months  of  the  war,  301. 

Aerial  fleets,  importance  of,  in 
warfare,  10. 

Aerial  gunnery,  adoption  of 
Royal  Flying  Corps  systems 
in  teaching  of,  121;  devel- 
opment of,  119;  increased 
facilities  for  training  in, 
summary  of,  226;  school, 
American  in  France,  303; 
schools,  development  of,  by 
close  of  the  war,  265; 
schools,  training  of  pilots 
at,  119,  121. 

Aerial  knowledge,  permanent 
value  of,  41. 

Aerial  mail  route,  operation 
of  first,  by  U.  S.  Army,  34. 

Aerial  mail  service,  opening 
of,  279,  280 ;  taking  over  of, 


by  Post  Office  Department, 
280. 

Aerial  navigation,  training  in, 
127. 

Aerial  observers,  115;  curri- 
culum of  training  for,  116; 
number  of,  at  close  of  war, 
264;  original  plan  for  se- 
curing, 115. 

Aerial  offensive  warfare,   13. 

Aerial  participation,  by  Amer- 
ica, final  figures  of,  336, 
337. 

Aerial  photographic  "huts," 
134. 

Aerial  photography,  causes  of 
delay  in  progress  of,  134; 
developments  of,  128 ;  early, 
in  United  States,  130; 
equipment  for,  167;  on 
battle  sectors,  128;  training 
in,  128,  131;  training  fa- 
cilities in,  by  close  of  war, 
226. 

Aerial  radio  equipment,  167; 
training,  135 ;  training, 
foundations  completed  for, 
139;  war  development  of, 
135. 

Aerial  review,  first,  by  U.  S. 
Army,  Aug.  22,  1916,  34, 
35. 

Aerial  signalling,  early,   135. 

Aerial  unit,  creation  of  first, 
25. 

Aerial  wireless,  development 
of,  at  Arcadia  Ballooning 
School,  291. 

Aero  Club  of  America,  insist- 
ence of,  upon  proper  mili- 
tary provision  for  aviation, 
78. 


353 


INDEX 


Aero  squadron,  first,  25. 

Aerodrome,  Langley's,  3-6. 

Aeronautic  experimentation, 
in  universities  and  colleges, 
29. 

Aeronautical  Society,  protest 
of,  regarding  Air  Service 
breakdown,  216;  report  of, 
condemning  Air  Service, 
217. 

Air  Forces  of  the  Allied  and 
Central  powers,  July  30, 
1918,  analysis  of,  235. 

Air  programme,  constant  in- 
crease in,  234;  official,  ac- 
ceptance of,  232. 

Air  raids,  first  American 
bombing  squadron  in, 
achievement  of,  319. 

Air  Service,  accomplishment 
of,  in  development  of  prob- 
lems, summary  of,  223;  in 
facilities  for  training  of 
ground  force,  226;  in  in- 
creased training  facilities 
in  radio-telegraphy,  aerial 
photography,  aerial  gun- 
nery, 226;  in  overseas  avia- 
tion force,  227;  in  produc- 
tion of  raw  materials  and 
accessories,  224;  in  produc- 
tion of  training  and  battle 
planes  and  engines,  224; 
increase  in  flying  personnel 
and  training  facilities,  225. 

Air  Service,  administrative 
personnel  of,  inadequacy  of, 
222 ;  American,  European 
acceptance  of,  as  an  inter- 
national striking  force,  234 ; 
appropriation  for,  1917,  35 ; 
Appropriation  Act  of  July 
9,  1918,  for,  255;  arraign- 
ment of,  by  Gutzon  Borglum, 
215;  bricklayers  and  con- 
struction men  needed  in, 
141;  candidates  for,  rejec- 
tion of,  large  numbers  of, 
101;  changes  and  growth  in 


354 


personnel  and  training  side 
of,  95 ;  concentration  of  work 
with  Divisional  Boards  in, 
103;  conflicting  reports  of 
Senate  Committee  as  to 
failure  of,  217;  Congress  on 
1916  Military  Programme 
for,  33 ;  correlation  of,  with 
other  military  departments 
in  first  war  estimates,  43; 
criticism  of,  for  falling  be- 
hind schedule,  211;  criti- 
cism of,  for  indiscriminate 
railroad  priorities  and  over 
concentration,  211;  criti- 
cism of,  in  Senate,  215;  de- 
mand of  cirimmal  investi- 
gation of,  by  Gutzon  Borg- 
lum, 217;  depots,  locations 
of,  350;  development  of 
continuation  of,  along  old 
lines,  by  new  administra- 
tion, 237;  development  and 
organization  of,  95 ;  difficul- 
ties in  manufacture  of 
planes  for,  97;  difficulties 
in  securing  right  type  of 
men  for,  99 ;  difficulties  and 
handicaps  in  construction 
programme  of,  221,  222; 
disagreement  of,  with  War 
Department  in  1916,  32; 
disbursements,  total  figures 
of,  255,  256;  Divisional 
Boards  for,  100;  examining 
boards  for,  cooperation  of 
medical  men  with,  100;  es- 
tablishment of,  100;  grad- 
^ually  eliminated  in,  103. 
Air  Service,  expenditures  for, 
254,  255;  first  steps  in 
breaking  away  from  general 
military  establishment  by, 
70;  first  volunteers  for,  98; 
high  cost  of,  39,  40;  im- 
provement in,  due  to  United 
States  factory  inspection, 
39;  in  France,  American 
squadrons  in,  equipment  of, 


INDEX 


306;  lack  of  civilian  avia- 
tors for,  in  1916,  32;  lack 
of  equipment  of,  97 ;  lack 
of  mechanics  in,  40;  lack 
of  planes  for,  1916,  32;  leg- 
islation for,  1916,  33;  me- 
chanics for,  need  of,  139; 
mechanics  for,  recruiting 
of,  140;  mechanics  trans- 
ferred to,  from  National 
Army,  141;  medical  exam- 
ination of  candidates  for, 
102;  medical  requirements 
of  fliers  for,  101,  102; 
newspaper  criticism  regard- 
ing, 214;  number  of  men  in, 
at  close  of  war,  312;  or- 
ganization of  American 
squadrons  of,  in  France, 
306;  personnel  of,  by  Na- 
tional Defense  Act  of  June 
3,  1916,  33;  personnel  of, 
restrictions  regarding,  1916, 
32;  problems  of  personnel 
in  manning  of,  96;  rapid 
increase  in  numerical 
strength  of,  141;  recruiting 
of  men  from  Officers'  Train- 
ing Camps  for,  99;  relation 
of  raw  materials  and  indus- 
trial problems  to,  148;  re- 
organization of,  through 
National  Defense  Act  of 
June  3,  1916,  33;  selection 
of  men  for  non-flying  com- 
missions in,  102;  separa- 
tion of,  from  Signal  Corps, 
217;  specialized  mechanical 
training  for,  143;  stations, 
construction  of,  overseas, 
108 ;  stations,  development 
of  different  types  of,  108; 
training  and  channels  of 
transfer,  chart  of,  260; 
tests  for  candidates  for, 
102;  type  of  men  needed 
for,  99,  101;  upbuilding  of, 
92;  war  record  of,  in  Eu- 
rope, 312. 


355 


Air  strength,  American,  May 
11,  1917,  61;  strength,  July 
30,  1918,  236. 

Air  supremacy,  apparent  Ger- 
man control  of,  May,  1917, 
60. 

Aircraft  Manufacturers'  As- 
sociation, criticism  of,  53 ; 
formation  of,  52;  ratifica- 
tion of,  by  Attorney-Gen- 
eral Gregory,  53. 

Aircraft  Production,  Bureau 
of;  see  Bureau  of  Aircraft 
Production. 

Aircraft  Production  Board, 
appointment  of,  48;  ap- 
pointment of  W.  S.  Gifford 
as  official  investigator  of, 
208;  approval  of  plan  for 
dispatching  American  tech- 
nical mission  by  May,  1917, 
64;  award  of  contracts  for 
De  Haviland  battle  planes, 
193;  decision  of,  to  pur- 
chase JN-4D  Curtiss  train- 
ing plane,  187;  establish- 
ment of,  48;  participation 
of,  in  initial  joint  war  air 
programme,  June,  1917,  50 ; 
personnel  of,  49;  proposal 
of,  for  building  Caproni 
planes,  205;  purposes  of, 
48;  statement  of  plan  for 
standardization  by,  80 ; 
status  and  powers  of,  de- 
nned by  Act  of  Congress, 
93 ;  stimulation  of  indus- 
trial development  by  crea- 
tion of,  57;  transference  of 
personnel  of,  to  Signal 
Corps,  93. 

Airplane  engines,  Gnome, 
171;  Hispano-Suisa,  172; 
LeBhone,  171;  Liberty-Mo- 
tor, 174;  Lorraine-Dietrich, 
172-173;  problem  of,  168; 
Eolls-Eoyce,  172,  173 ;  types 
and  qualifications  of,  re- 
quired, 168,  169. 


INDEX 


Airplane  industry,  appeal  of, 
40;  critical  condition  of,  in 
1917,  39,  45;  in  1915,  31; 
mobilization  of,  suggestion 
for,  47;  sta  dardization  of 
parts  in,  suggestion  for,  47. 

Airplane  manufacture,  cot- 
ton fabric  used  for,  159 ;  fir 
used  for,  155;  Govern- 
ment's lack  of  insight  re- 
garding, 26;  Hay's  report 
on,  1915,  27;  kiln  drying  of 
lumber  for,  156;  linen  for, 
shortage  of,  158;  spruce 
for,  149. 

Airplane  manufacturers,  par- 
ticipation of,  in  initial  joint 
war  air  programmes,  50, 
51;  unfitness  of,  for  Gov- 
ernment production,  46. 

Airplane  patents,  complica- 
tions regarding,  52 ;  sugges- 
tions for  Government  pur- 
chase of,  52. 

Airplane  production,  difficul- 
ties in,  97 ;  need  of  official 
stimulation  of,  47;  possi- 
bilities of,  questionnaire  of 
Advisory  Committee  on,  47. 

Airplanes,  adoption  of  trac- 
tor for,  24;  ambulance, 
269;  apparatus  necessary 
for  pilot  of,  166;  battle, 
belligerents '  secrecy  con- 
cerning, 189;  battle,  diffi- 
culties in  manufacturing  of 
first,  189;  fighting  plane, 
first  specifications  of,  25; 
plans  for  all  -  American 
types  of,  208;  bombing, 
manufacture  of,  192;  build- 
ing of,  spruce  in,  value  of, 
149;  capital  investment  in, 
at  outbreak  of  war,  252; 
castor  oil  for  motor  in, 
shortage  of,  163;  De  Havi- 
land-4,  American-built,  his- 
tory of,  overseas  service  of, 
246;  dope  for,  creation  of 


new  sources  of,  163;  dope 
for,  shortage  of,  161,  162. 

Airplanes,  engines  for,  Bu- 
gatti,  174;  Clerget,  172, 
173;  for  advanced  training- 
planes,  170;  for  battle- 
planes, 172;  for  scouting- 
planes,  171;  for  training 
planes,  169. 

Airplanes,  equipment  for 
instruments  and  accessories 
for,  166;  Government  mo- 
nopoly in,  167;  standardi- 
zation of,  167. 

Airplanes,  Handley  -  Page, 
first  flight  of  American 
model,  242;  in  punitive  ex- 
pedition into  Mexico,  33; 
JN-4H,  use  of,  in  bombing 
practice,  118;  LePere  two- 
seater,  244;  lumber  for 
transportation  of,  156 ;  min- 
eral-oil lubricant  needed 
for,  164;  navigating  instru- 
ments for,  166;  night- 
bombing,  development  in, 
203;  of  Pomilio  brothers, 
245 ;  offensive  armament 
for,  167;  official  authoriza- 
tion for  equipment  of,  344; 
official  authorization  for 
maintenance  of,  344 ;  official 
authorization  for  provision 
of,  344;  overseas  orders  for, 
for  American  Army,  208; 
possibilities  of,  belief  of 
scientists  in,  27;  pusher 
type  of,  abandonment  of, 
24;  ruining  of,  through  de- 
fective lubricants,  165 ; 
scout,  Thomas-Morse,  188; 
shortage  of,  96,  97,  98; 
single-seaters,  contract  for 
S.E.-5  plane,  given  Curtiss 
Co.,  242 ;  single-seaters,  elim- 
ination of,  242;  summary 
of  situation  in,  at  close  of 
hostilities,  248 ;  Thomas- 
Morse  type,  in  training  of 


356 


INDEX 


pursuit  pilots,  118;  train- 
ing, need  of,  186,  265 ;  two- 
seater  monoplane  of  Grover 
C.  Loening,  245. 

Alcohol,  a  source  of  acetate 
of  lime,  162. 

Allen,  General,  recommenda- 
tions of,  regarding  aero- 
nautics, 10;  report  of,  for 
1911,  12. 

Allied  air  forces,  July  30, 
1918,  analysis  of,  235. 

Allied  air  programme,  inter- 
Allies'  cooperation  in,  299; 
inter-Allied  cooperation  for 
training  in,  300,  301. 

Allied  air  service,  condition 
of,  at  America's  entrance 
into  war,  298;  personnel 
for,  American,  299;  splen- 
did overseas  mechanism  for, 
at  America's  entrance  into 
war,  299. 

Allied  air  supremacy,  need  of, 
as  agency  to  shorten  war, 
77,  79. 

Allies'  aviation  demands  on 
America,  basis  and  method 
of,  230. 

Altitude   flights,  record,   276. 

Altitude  record,  establishment 
of,  1914,  by  Captain  H. 
LeE.  Muller,  single-seater 
plane,  30;  establishment  of, 
1915,  by  Lieutenant  J.  E. 
Carberry,  two-seater  plane, 
30. 

Altitude  test  for  students, 
113. 

Ambulance  airplanes,  use  of 
at  Gerstner  Field,  269. 

American  aviators  in  fighting 
zone,  307,  312. 

American  flying  squadrons, 
initial  attempt  at  forma- 
tion in  France,  59;  comple- 
tion of  organization  of, 
306. 

American  public,  response  of, 


to   the  appeal  of  aviation, 
23. 

American  Squadron,  12th, 
praise  from  Major  General 
C.  E.  Edwards  for,  326; 
17th,  work  of,  in  conjunc- 
tion with  the  British,  332; 
148th,  work  of,  in  conjunc- 
tion with  the  British,  332. 

American  technical  mission, 
approval  of  plan  for  dis- 
patch of  abroad,  64;  speed- 
ing up  of  aviation  pro- 
gramme as  result  of  over- 
seas arrival  of,  65. 

American  Wood  Eeduction 
Company,  sawmill  waste  of, 
used  for  production  of  ace- 
tate of  lime,  163. 

Ames,  Dr.  Joseph  S.,  support 
of  aviation  appropriation 
by,  81. 

Appropriations  by  Congress 
for  aviation,  11,  14,  17,  26, 
34,  35;  first  war  estimate 
of,  Feb.,  1917,  43,  44;  for 
first  five-year  period  of, 
compared  with  other  na- 
tions, 16;  for  1918,  esti- 
mate on,  38;  for  1918,  pas- 
sage of,  41 ;  of  $700,000,000 
called  for  by  Ribot-Foulois 
war  aviation  programme, 
67;  of  $700,000,000  in  avi- 
ation bill,  consideration  of, 
by  House  Committee  on  Mili- 
tary Affairs,  70;  of  $700,- 
000,000  in  aviation  bill  cut 
to  $640,000,000,  72;  $640,- 
000,000,  347;  of  $640,000,- 
000,  debate  in  House,  con- 
cerning, 83;  of  $640,000,- 
000,  publicity  campaign 
for,  74;  of  $640,000,000, 
Senatorial  discussion  re- 
garding, 88;  of  $640,000,- 
000,  support  by  President 
Wilson  for,  80;  of  $640,- 
000,000,  supported  by  pub- 


357 


INDEX 


lie  opinion,  82;  of  $640,- 
000,000,  passage  of,  by 
House,  88;  of  $640,000,000, 
passage  of,  by  Senate,  July 
21,  1917,  90. 

Appropriations  Act  for  Air 
Service,  of  July  9, 1918,  255. 

Arcadia,  California,  develop' 
of  aerial  wireless  at,  290, 
291;  opening  of  a  balloon- 
ing training  school  at,  289. 

Armament,  offensive,  for  aero- 
planes, 167. 

Armament  officers,  schools  for, 
126. 

Armorers'  school, at  Uxbridge, 
England,  309. 

Armstrong,  Lieutenant  George 
D.,  citation  of,  in  balloon 
service,  296. 

Army  Appropriation  Act, 
1912,  provision  for  aviation, 
11  j  1916,  estimated  provi- 
sion for  aviation,  26;  of 
July  9,  1918,  provision  for 
aviation,  255. 

Army  aviators,  first  training 
of,  by  Wright  brothers,  10. 

Army-corps  pilots,  114;  curri- 
culum of  training  for,  116. 

Army  and  Navy  Technical 
Board,  formation  of,  for 
plane  type  determination, 
50;  participation  of,  in  in- 
itial joint  war  air  pro- 
gramme, June,  1917,  50. 

Arnold,  Lieutenant  H.  H.,  suc- 
cess of,  in  flying,  12. 

Arnold,  Lieutenant,  success  of, 
in  1912,  13. 

Artillery  firing  schools  in 
France,  303. 

Associated  Press,  charges  of, 
against  Air  Service  capac- 
ity, 213;  story  from,  of 
German  air  supremacy  over 
American  lines,  212,  213. 

Austria,  military  aeronautics 
in,  provision  for,  1915,  27. 


358 


Austrian  Air  Service,  strength 
of,  July  30,  1918,  235,  236. 

Austrian  offensive,  American 
air  participation  in,  334. 

Aviation,  military  importance 
of,  23 ;  popularity  of  appeal 
of,  to  the  American  public, 
231. 

Aviation  accessories,  British 
help  in  supplying,  3 09;  avia- 
tion acceptance  parks,  loca- 
tion of,  351 ;  quantity,  use 
of,  in  Prance,  307,  308. 

Aviation  Act,  July  24,  1917, 
purpose  of,  341;  signing  of, 
by  President  Wilson,  90; 
summary  of  history  of,  90. 

Aviation  allowances,  official 
provision  for,  344. 

Aviation  centers  in  France, 
302,  303. 

Aviation  Corps,  reorganization 
of,  under  Colonel  Squier,  37. 

Aviation  developments  in 
European  War,  secrecy  of 
belligerents  regarding,  22. 

Aviation  equipment,  U.  S.,  in- 
spection of,  39. 

Aviation  facilities  in  France 
at  America's  entrance  into 
war,  68;  possessed  by 
United  States  at  close  of 
hostilities,  251. 

Aviation  field  facilities,  at  out- 
break of  war,  53. 

Aviation  fields,  selection  of 
Middle  West  sites  for,  56. 

Aviation  force  overseas,  size 
and  strength  of,  at  end  of 
1918,  227. 

Aviation  general  supply  de- 
pots, less  of,  350. 

Aviation  mechanics'  training, 
British  help  in,  309. 

Aviation  pay,  official  provision 
for,  346. 

Aviation  programme,  com- 
pared with  French  accom- 
plishment after  three  years 


INDEX 


of  warfare,  233;  dispropor- 
tionateness  of,  232;  pro- 
mulgation and  acceptance 
of,  as  the  A.  E.  F.  aviation 
project  and  the  official  avia- 
tion programme,  232;  sum- 
mary of  speedy  amplifica- 
tion of,  231. 

Aviation  section,  proposal  for 
creation  of  as  separate  sec- 
tion within  Signal  Corps, 
20. 

Aviation  section  of  Signal 
Corps,  transference  of  mem- 
bers of  Aircraft  Production 
Board  to,  93. 

Aviation  service,  back  of  men 
in,  30 ;  aviation  special  duty, 
official  provisions  for  de- 
fraying of  costs  of,  345. 

Aviation  stations,  miscellane- 
ous locations  of,  357 ;  official 
authorization  for  establish- 
ment and  operation  of,  344. 

Aviation  supply  centers  in 
France,  303. 

Aviation  technical  section,  lo- 
cation of,  351. 

Aviation  training  centers  in 
France,  303. 

Aviation  training  schools, 
selection  of,  55. 

Aviators,  delay  in  graduation 
of,  97;  need  of,  96;  reserve 
military,  total  number  of, 
1918,  113;  status  of,  offi- 
cial provision  for,  344; 
transfer  of,  overseas,  97; 
see  also  Fliers. 

Aviators '  troubles,  examples 
of,  271,  272,  273,  274. 

Baker,  Secretary,  endorsement 
of  $700,000,000  aviation  ap- 
propriation bill  by,  69 ;  issu- 
ance of  cabled  success  of 
American  De  Haviland-4 
planes  by,  246 ;  public  state- 
ments of  War  Department 's 


belief  in  value  of  Air  Service 
by,  79;  report  of,  on  Emer- 
gency Appropriation  for 
Air  Service,  34. 

Balance  test,  102. 

Baldwin,  Colonel  T.  A.,  com- 
mander of  Orly  Acceptance 
Park,  304. 

Balloon  equipment,  demands 
of  the  A.  E.  F.  for,  292; 
difficulties  of  the  problem 
of,  291;  status  of,  at  close 
of  hostilities,  297. 

Balloon  fabric,  problems  con- 
nected with  manufacture  of, 
292. 

Balloon  general  supply  depot, 
location  of,  350. 

Balloon  programme,  increase 
in,  289. 

Balloon  schools,  establishment 
of,  in  France,  295 ;  increase 
in  number  and  size  of,  289; 
number  of,  at  close  of  hos- 
tilities, 262,  349. 

Balloon  service  in  action,  at 
Chateau-Thierry,  295;  per- 
sonnel of  294 ;  personnel  of, 
at  close  of  war,  291,  297; 
personnel  of,  demands  of 
the  A.  E.  F.  for,  292;  vital 
importance  of,  to  Air  Ser- 
vice, 284. 

Balloon  training,  adoption  of 
British  system  of,  290;  ar- 
rangements for  training  of 
ground  officers  in,  290; 
courses  in,  290;  use  of 
French  methods  in,  290. 

Ballooning,  dangers  of,  288; 
development  of  in  German 
Zeppelins,  285 ;  development 
of  in  war  of  1-870,  285; 
during  Civil  War,  285 ;  dur- 
ing Napoleonic  wars,  284; 
lack  of  knowledge  of,  in 
United  States,  at  beginning 
of  the  war,  289;  military 
history  of,  284,  285;  neg- 


359 


INDEX 


lect  of,  in  the  United  States, 
285. 

Balloons,  value  of,  as  an 
"army  eye,"  285,  286; 
value  of,  in  observation 
work,  286;  value  of,  in  re- 
porting and  directing  artil- 
lery action,  287,  288;  value 
of  helium  for  inflation  in, 
293. 

Barricourt,  American  air  at- 
tacks against,  329. 

Battle  formalities  of  190 
planes,  work  of,  330. 

Battle  planes,  American  over- 
seas orders  for,  in  France 
and  Italy,  208;  arrival  of 
first  models  of,  190;  bel- 
ligerents' secrecy  concern- 
ing, 189;  constant  changes 
in  equipment  specifications 
for,  190,  191;  difficul- 
ties in  manufacture  of 
first,  189;  engines  for,  172; 
intricacy  of  manufacturing 
problems  of,  190;  lack  of 
manufacturing  facilities  for, 
190;  manufacture  of,  recog- 
nition of  need  of  European 
aid  in,  51,  52;  types  of, 
adopted  by  the  United 
States,  191. 

Bayonville,  American  air  at- 
tacks against,  329. 

Belgian  Air  Service,  strength 
of,  236. 

Belmont  Park  exhibition 
meets,  1910, 18. 

Bennett,  Gordon,  contests,  18. 

Biddle,  Major  Charles  J.,  avi- 
ation success  of,  339. 

Bingham,  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Hiram,  appointment  of,  as 
organizer  of  aviation  in- 
struction, 55;  commander  at 
Issoudun,  302. 

Biplane,  fighting,  demand  for 
special  type  of,  25. 

Boiling,  Colonel  E.  C.,  appoint- 


ment of,  as  head  of  Ameri- 
can technical  mission  for 
overseas  inspection  trip,  64; 
death  of,  65,  219;  insistence 
of,  that  Americans  be 
trained  in  French  aviation 
schools,  63. 

Boiling  technical  commission, 
adoption  and  shelving  of 
Spad  scout-battle  plane  by, 
191;  difficulties  of,  affect- 
ing America 's  production  of 
battle  planes,  190. 

Bombing  pilots,  114;  training 
of,  117. 

Bombing  planes,  adoption  of 
Be  Haviland  two-seater, 
192;  manufacture  of,  192; 
night,  development  of,  203. 

Bombing  school  in  France,  lo- 
cation of,  303. 

Bombing  training,  facilities 
for,  at  close  of  war,  264. 

Bonnalil,  Lieutenant  A.  P., 
exploit  of,  332. 

Borglum,  Gutzon,  arraignment 
of  Air  Service  by,  215; 
charges  against,  by  Military 
Intelligence  Bureau,  218; 
demand  of,  for  criminal  in- 
vestigation of  Air  Service, 
217. 

Breguet-A2  planes,  American 
use  of,  in  France,  307. 

Breguet  B-2  planes,  American 
use  of,  in  France,  307. 

Bridgeport,  Conn.,  terrain 
plotting  by  aeroplanes  in 
army  manoeuvres  at,  12. 

Bristol  battle  plane,  adoption 
of  by  United  States,  191; 
arrival  of  first  model  of, 
190;  award  of  first  order 
for  manufacture  of,  202; 
delay  in  construction  of 
American  model  of,  201; 
delay  in  shipment  of  British 
models  of,  199;  difficulties 
at  Curtis  plant  with  manu- 


360 


INDEX 


facture  of,  201;  drafting 
difficulties  in  American 
adoption  of,  200;  first 
flights  of  American-made, 
201,  202;  necessity  for 
changes  in,  for  use  with 
Liberty  motor,  199;  trial  of 
Hispano-Suiza  engine  in, 
202;  trial  of  8-cylinder 
Liberty  motor  in,  202. 

Bristol,  Liberty,  abandonment 
of,  by  new  Air  Service  ad- 
ministration, 244 ;  with  His- 
pano-Suiza engine,  order 
for,  244. 

British  Air  Service,  strength 
of,  235,  236. 

British  ballooning  system, 
adoption  of,  290. 

British  Distinguished  Service 
Order,  decorating  of  Ameri- 
can airmen  with,  332. 

British  endorsement  of  Liber- 
ty Motor,  239. 

British  reports,  American 
air  achievement,  told  by, 
331. 

British  Squadron  Commander, 
praises  of  American  air 
work  by,  333. 

British  training  plane  for  fly- 
ing service,  adoption  of,  55. 

British  War  Mission,  arrival 
of,  58;  effect  of,  on  avia- 
tion programme,  59. 

British-French  Mission,  avia- 
tors '  testimony  urging 
$640,000,000  appropriation 
bill  for,  78. 

Bronson,  Lieutenant  Tyler  C., 
achievement  of,  323. 

Buckley,  Captain  H.  E.,  avia- 
tion successes  of,  339. 
Bugatti  engine,  174;  comple- 
tion of,  for  overseas  service, 
241 ;  development  of,  241. 
Bureau    of   Aircraft    Produc- 
tion, creation  of,  219;  diffi- 
culties   of    in    cooperating 


with  the  A.  E.  F.  and  the 
Division  of  Military  Aero- 
nautics on  training  pro- 
gramme, 259;  difficulty  in 
operation  of,  as  separate 
bureau,  237. 

Bureau  of  Mines,  contribution 
of,  to  quantity  production  of 
helium,  293. 

Bureau  of  Standards,  experi- 
mentation of,  in  use  of  cotton 
fabrics  for  aeroplane  wings, 
160. 

Cadets,  delay  in  graduation 
of,  97;  transfer  abroad  of 
advanced,  97. 

California,  University  of,  avi- 
ation training  school,  55. 

Camp  Dick,  course  in  aerial 
navigation  in,  127;  school 
for  compass  officers  at,  127. 

Camp  John  Wise,  opening  of, 
as  ballooning  training 
school,  289. 

Campbell,  Captain  Douglas, 
exploits  of,  314,  319,  338. 

Campbell,  Lieutenant  William 
T.,  stunt  flights  of,  278. 

Campbell,  Major  C.  D.  M., 
contributions  of,  to  know- 
ledge of  aerial  photography, 
131. 

Canadian  air  programme,  plan 
for  adpotion  of,  55. 

Canadian  aviation  training, 
completion  of  plans  for  reci- 
procity in,  63. 

Canadian  training  fields,  54. 

Candidates  for  air  service,  first, 
98;  from  officers'  training 
camps,  99;  medical  require- 
ments for,  101,  102;  rejec- 
tion of  large  numbers  of, 
101;  tests  for,  102;  types  of 
men  needed  in,  99,  101. 

Capitalization  for  aviation 
purposes,  difficulties  with, 
251,  252. 


361 


INDEX 


Caproni  battle  plane,  adoption 
of,  by  United  States,  191; 
American  -  built,  successful 
trial  test  of,  243 ;  approval 
of,  by  Aircraft  Production 
Board,  205;  cancellation  of 
Italian  order  for,  207;  final 
decision  for  American  quan- 
tity production  of,  207;  first 
flight  of,  in  United  States, 
205 ;  suggestions  for  Ameri- 
can manufacture  and  Euro- 
pean assembly  of,  206;  un- 
certainty regarding,  203. 

Caproni  bombers,  training  of 
American  aviators  as,  311. 

Caproni,  Signer,  letter  from, 
regarding  American  manu- 
facture of  Caproni  planes, 
206. 

Caquot,  Captain,  contributions 
of,  to  ballooning  science, 
291. 

Carbery,  Lieutenant  J.  E., 
establishment  of  altitude 
record  by,  January  5,  1915, 
in  two-seater  plane,  30. 

Carnegie  Institute  of  Tech- 
nology, aerial  radio  school 
at,  137,  266;  ground  school 
at,  262;  mechanical  instruc- 
tion at,  146. 

Cascade  Range  spruce  in  aero- 
plane building,  149. 

Cassady,  First  Lieutenant 
Thomas  G.,  aviation  suc- 
cesses of,  338. 

Castor  oil,  embargo  on  expor- 
tation of,  164 ;  industry,  re- 
vival of,  in  the  United 
States,  164;  increase  in 
planting  of  seeds  of,  164; 
purchase  of  Indian  crop  of, 
at  Hull,  England,  164; 
shortage  of,  163 ;  use  of,  for 
aeroplane  motors,  163. 

Casualties,  American,  in  work 
in  Toul  sector,  320;  Ameri- 
can, number  of,  340 ;  Ameri- 


362 


can,  in  training,  numbers 
and  causes  of,  122,  268;  in 
American  and  British  sys- 
tems of  training,  308;  total 
number  of,  340. 

Cedar,  Port  Or'ford,  use  of,  in 
aircraft  industry,  249. 

Cellulose  acetate,  shortage  of, 
163. 

Chamberlain,  Senator,  presen- 
tation of  $640,000,000  avia- 
tion appropriation  bill  to 
Senate  by,  88. 

Chambry,  burial  of  Quentin 
Roosevelt  near,  324. 

Champagne  offensive,  Ameri- 
can airmen 's  achievement 
in,  325. 

Chandler,  Colonel  Charles  de 
F.,  head  of  the  Balloon  Ser- 
vice, A.  E.  F.,  297. 

Chanute  Feld,  Rantoul,  111., 
57. 

Chapman,  Victor,  one  of  origi- 
nal seven  members  of  La- 
fayette Escadrille,  59. 

Chatillon-sur-Seine,  France, 
observers'  school  at,  303. 

Chaumont,  France,  aviation 
offices  at,  303. 

Chateau-Thierry,  American 
Air  Service  achievement  at, 
312,  321;  balloon  service  in 
action  at,  295. 

Chauffeur,  official  status  by, 
through  Aviation  Act  of 
July  24,  1917,  342. 

Chicago  exhibition  meets, 
1910,  18. 

Churchhill,  Captain  Lawrence 
S.,  commander  of  first  over- 
seas aviation  unit,  62. 

Civil  War,  use  of  balloons  in, 
285. 

Clarkson,  Grosvenor  B.,  secre- 
tary of  Council  of  National 
Defense,  argument  for 
$640,000,000  aviation  ap- 
propriation by,  76. 


INDEX 


Glaring,  Illinois,  third  Gordon 
Bennett  contest  at,  18. 

Clerget  130-horse  power  rotary 
motor,  172,  173. 

Clermon  -  Ferrand,  France, 
bombing  school  at,  303. 

Coblenz,  American  air  attempt 
against,  323. 

Coetquidan,  France,  artillery 
firing  school  at,  303. 

Coffin,  Howard  E.,  appoint- 
ment of,  chairman  of  Air- 
craft Production  Board,  49 ; 
industrial  reassurances  con- 
cerning the  Eibot-Foulois 
War  Aviation  programme 
by,  69;  issuance  of  a  series 
of  statements  preparing 
Americans  for  vast  aviation 
war  participation,  78;  pub- 
lic praise  of  quick  action  of 
House  Committee  on  Mili- 
tary Affairs  by,  82;  recog- 
nition by,  of  industrial  diffi- 
culties involved  in  Eibot 
plan,  75;  resignation  of, 
from  Aircraft  Production 
Board,  219;  statement  of, 
on  passage  of  $640,000,000 
aviation  appropriation,  90; 
statement  of,  to  editors  re- 
garding need  of  $640,000- 
000  aviation  appropriation 
76,  77;  suggestion  of,  for 
complete  investigation  of 
Air  Service,  213;  work  of, 
for  $640,000,000  aviation 
appropriation,  75. 

College  Park  Station,  aban- 
donment of,  15;  location  of 
first  flying  school  at,  12. 

Colombey-les-Belles,  France, 
advance  aviation  headquar- 
ters at,  303;  as  American 
operating  base  in  sqadron 
work,  305. 

Columbia  University,  officers' 
aerial  radio  training  school 
at,  136,  266;  school  for  mili- 


tary cinematography,  at, 
131. 

Columbus  -  Colonia  Dublan 
aerial  mail  route,  34. 

Commissioned  personnel,  offi- 
cial authorization  for  ap- 
pointment of,  341;  official 
requirements  for,  341. 

Committee  on  Public  Informa- 
tion, issuance  of  statements 
of  Foreign  Mission  Aviators 
by,  to  prepare  for  large  avi- 
ation appropriation  by,  81. 

Compass  officers,  schools  for, 
127. 

Conflans,  raid  against,  321. 

Congress,  authorization  by,  of 
creation  of  Aviation  Section 
in  Signal  Corps,  21;  first 
appropriation  of,  for  avia- 
tion, 11;  on  1916,  Military 
Programme  for  aviation  ser- 
vice, 33 ;  opposition  to 
Eibot-Foulois  war  aviation 
programme  by,  69;  passage 
of  $640,000,000  appropria- 
tion bill,  88,  90;  presenta- 
tion of  $700,000,000  avia- 
tion appropriation  bill  to, 
July  6,  1917,  70,  82. 

Conscription,  adoption  of,  up- 
on arrival  of  British-French 
war  mission,  58. 

Coolidge,  Captain  Hamilton, 
aviation  record  of,  338. 

Corn,  blighted,  a  source  of 
acetate  of  lime,  163. 

Cornell  University,  aerial 
photography  training  at, 
132,  266;  aeronautic  experi- 
mentation in,  29;  aviation 
training  school  at,  55; 
ground  school  at,  262. 

Cost-plus  arrangement,  adop- 
tion of,  253;  success  of, 
254. 

Cotton  fabric  as  substitute 
for  linen  in  aeroplane  manu- 
facture, 159;  development 


363 


INDEX 


of,  160,  249;  final  success 
of,  161 ;  government  orders 
for,  161;  specifications  for, 
160. 

Cotton-seed  hulls,  a  source  of 
acetate  of  lime,  163. 

Cowdin,  Elliott  C.,  one  of  the 
original  seven  members  of 
Lafayette  Escadrille,  59. 

Cross-country  flight  in  1911, 
12;  initial  ten-mile  by 
Wright  brothers  at  Fort 
Myer,  9;  training  in,  111, 
113. 

Cross-country  record  of  Lieu- 
tenant Dodd,  1914,  24. 

Culver,  Col.  C.  C.,  success  of, 
in  aerial  radio-telephony,  281. 

Curtis,  Senator,  on  $640,000,- 
000  aviation  appropriation 
bill,  89. 

Curtiss,  Glenn  H.,  winner  of 
first  Gordon  Bennett  con- 
test, Eheims,  France,  18. 

Curtiss  Co.,  aviation  invest- 
ment at  outbreak  of  war,  251; 
capacity  of,  for  maunfac- 
ture  of  training  planes,  at 
beginning  of  war,  186,  187; 
deliveries  of  training  planes 
JN-4D  during  1917  by,  187; 
manufacture  of  training 
planes  for  British  by,  186, 
187;  order  to  for  S.E.-5 
plane,  242;  selection  of,  for 
manufacture  of  Bristol 
planes,  200. 

Curtiss  0X5  90-horse  power 
engines,  169;  production  of, 
169. 

Curtiss  160-200  horse-power 
military  planes,  purchase  of, 
by  U.  S.  Government,  34. 

' '  Cut-up  ' '  mill  of  Government, 
154. 

Daniels,  Secretary,  proposal 
of,  for  civilian  head  of  air- 
craft production,  47. 


d'Annunzio,  Captain  U.  V., 
coming  of,  to  the  United 
States,  206. 

David  Ranken  School,  mechani- 
cal instruction  at,  145,  146. 

Davis,  Lieutenant  John  E., 
4000-mile  flight  of,  271. 

Day,  Colonel  C.  E.,  commander 
of  American  aviation  forces 
in  England,  310. 

Dayton,  Ohio,  Wilbur  Wright 
Flying  Field,  57. 

Dayton-Wright  Co.,  aviation 
investment  of,  at  outbreak 
of  war,  251;  selection  of, 
for  building  of  first  De 
Haviland  battle  planes,  193. 

Deeds,  Colonel  E.  A.,  appoint- 
men  of,  as  Hughes  co-inves- 
tigator,  219;  appointment 
of,  to  Aircraft  Production 
Board,  49;  criticism  of,  211, 
212;  criticism  of,  by  Gutzon 
Borglum,  215;  placed  in 
charge  of  Equipment  Divi- 
sion of  Signal  Corps,  94; 
support  of  $640,000,000  avi- 
ation appropriation  bill  by, 
77  ;  recommendations  of 
Charles  E.  Hughes  report 
on,  220;  vindication  of,  by- 
Senate  Committee  on  Mili- 
tary Affairs,  212;  by  War 
Department  special  board 
of  review,  220,  221. 

De  Haviland  battle  plane, 
adoption  of,  by  United 
States,  191;  arrival  of  first 
model  of,  190;  complica- 
tions in  plans  for  manufac- 
ture of,  193;  use  of  fir  in 
manufacture  of,  155;  De 
Haviland-4  planes,  British 
suggestions  for  changes  in, 
196;  changes  in  equipment 
of,  by  orders  of  General 
Foulois,  195;  defects  in, 
199;  plan  for  use  of,  in  ad- 
vanced training,  67. 


,- 

//• 
i 


364 


INDEX 


De  Haviland-4  planes,  Ameri- 
can built,  delays  in  produc- 
tion of,  during  early  months 
of  1918,  194;  first  flight  of 
equipped  model  of,  196; 
flight  of  first  in  France, 
198;  history  of  overseas  ser- 
vice of,  246;  performance 
of,  247 ;  endorsement  of,  by 
General  Pershing,  199;  use 
of,  in  France,  307;  order 
for  2,000,  196;  order  for 
overseas  shipment  of  four, 
195 ;  production  possibili- 
ties of,  at  close  of  hostilities, 
247;  success  in  production 
of,  198. 

De  Haviland  training  planes, 
impossibility  to  procure, 
during  1917,  187. 

De  Haviland  two-seater  bomb- 
er, adaption  of,  to  Liberty 
Motor,  193;  adoption  of, 
192 ;  first  American-built 
model  of,  first  flight  of,  192, 
193. 

Dent,  Chairman,  House  Com- 
mittee on  Military  Affairs, 
on  $700,000,000  appropria- 
tion bill,  70 ;  presentation 
of  bill  for  $640,000,000  avi- 
ation appropriation  by,  83. 

Department  of  Justice,  inves- 
tigation of  Air  Service  by, 
218. 

Detroit,  Michigan,  aviation 
field  at,  56. 

Disque,  Colonel  Brice  P.,  re- 
commendation of,  to  send 
Government  troops  into 
spruce  forests,  151. 

Division  of  Military  Aeronau- 
tics, creation  of,  219. 

Divisional  Boards  for  examin- 
ation of  aviation  candidates, 
100,  103. 

Dodd,  Lieutenant,  cross-coun- 
try record  of,  1914,  24. 

Dommary-Baroncourt,        first 


American  bombing  squadron 
attack  against,  319. 

Dope  constituents,  creation  of 
new  sources  of,  163;  pro- 
duction of,  249;  shortage 
of,  161,  162. 

Draft,  official  application  of, 
to  air  service,  341. 

Dual  work  in  flying,  training 
in,  110. 

Dun  woody,  Lieutenant-Colonel 
H.,  commanding  aviation 
officer  at  Paris  headquar- 
ters, 303. 

Dunwoody  Industrial  Institu- 
tion, mechanical  instruction 
at,  145. 

Eastman  Kodak  Company, 
special  school  of,  for  photo- 
graphers, 132;  courses  of 
study  at,  133. 

Edgar,  Colonel  C.  G.,  construc- 
tion work  in  flying  fields  in 
charge  of,  105. 

Editorial  aid,  solicited  for 
$640,000,000  aviation  ap- 
propriation, 75,  76. 

Editorial  demand  for  huge  air 
fleet,  and  speed  by  Con- 
gress, 78. 

Edwards,  Major-General  C.  E., 
praise  of  12th  Aero  Squad- 
ron by,  326. 

Ellington  Field,  bombing 
school  at,  117;  gunnery 
school  at,  120;  training  in 
aerial  radio-telegraphic 

work  at,  136. 

Emergency  Spruce  Council, 
formation  of,  151. 

Emoluments,  proposal  for  in- 
crease in,  20. 

Endurance  record,  establish- 
ment of,  March  12,  1915,  30. 

Engineer  officers,  school  for, 
126. 

Engines,  airplane,  168;  A7A; 
Hall  Scott  for  J  plane,  187 ; 


365 


INDEX 


Bugatti,  174 ;  capital  invest- 
ment in  at  outbreak  of  war, 
252;  Clerget,  172,  173;  for 
advanced  training,  170;  for 
scouting  planes,  171;  for 
training-planes,  169;  Gnome, 
176 ;  Hispano-Suiza,  172 ; 
Hispano-Suiza,  adopted  for 
use  in  the  new  British  Bris- 
tol, 244;  improvement  in, 
25 ;  Le  Rhone,  171 ;  Liberty 
Motor,  174;  Lorraine-Diet- 
rich, 172, 173 ;  need  of  quan- 
tity production  of  high 
power,  174;  official  provi- 
sion for  defraying  costs  of, 
347 ;  OX5,  limitation  in,  for 
JN-4D  planes,  187;  Rolls- 
Royce,  172,  173 ;  standardiz- 
ation of,  175;  summary  of 
solution  of  problem,  241, 
242;  total  order  of,  at  ter- 
mination of  hostilities,  241 ; 
types  and  qualifications  of, 
required,  168,  169. 

England,  American  Air  Ser- 
vice personnel  in,  311 ;  avia- 
tion supply  centers  for 
United  States  in,  309 ;  train- 
ing of  American  aviators  in, 
308. 

Enlisted  men,  official  authoriz- 
ation for  raising  and  main- 
tenance of,  341. 

Enlisted  Reserve  Corps,  crea- 
tion of,  33. 

Erwin,  First-Lieutenant  Wil- 
liam P.,  aviation  successes 
of,  338. 

Equipment  Division  of  Signal 
Corps,  Colonel  Deeds  in 
charge  of,  94. 

Equipment,  instruments  and 
accessories  for  aeroplanes, 
166;  deliveries  of,  in 
France,  307,  308;  Govern- 
ment monopoly  in,  167; 
problems  of,  in  work  in 
France,  306;  summary  of 


development  of,  250;  stand- 
ardization of,  167. 

European  War,  secrecy  of  bel- 
ligerents regarding  aviation 
developments  in,  22 ;  effect 
of,  on  progress  in  United 
States,  26. 

Examining  Boards  for  Air 
Service,  cooperation  of 
medical  men  with,  100; 
establishment  of,  100 ;  gra  - 
ual  elimination  of,  and  con- 
centration at  camps,  103. 

Expenditures  of  the  Air  Ser- 
vice, as  reported  by  Mr. 
Hughes,  254. 

Factories,  specialized  mechani- 
cal training  in,  142. 

Factory  production,  inspection 
of,  by  U.  S.  Government,  39. 

Fairfield,  Ohio,  armament  offi- 
cers' school  at,  126. 

Fast  flights,  records  estab- 
lished in,  278,  279. 

Fess,  Representative,  support 
of  $640,000,000  aviation  ap- 
propriation bill  by,  86. 

Fighting  plane,  first  specifica- 
tions for,  25. 

Fir,  Douglas,  use  of,  in  air- 
craft industry,  249;  ship- 
ments, 157 ;  used  for  aero- 
plane manufacture,  155. 

Firing  centers,  list  of,  350. 

First  Army  Corps,  praise  of 
Air  Service  from  Chief  of, 
325. 

Fisher  Body  Corporation,  lack 
of  aviation  investments  of, 
at  outbreak  of  war,  252; 
selection  of,  for  De  Havi- 
land  battle  plane  produc- 
tion, 193. 

Fitch,  Lieutenant  Willis  S., 
account  of  Pola  attack  by, 
334. 

Fitzgerald,  Representative, 
opposition  to  $640,000,000 


366 


INDEX 


aviation  appropriation  by, 
85. 

Flanders  offensive,  American 
airmen  in,  312. 

Fletcher,  Peter,  appointed 
Government  and  trade  rep- 
resentative for  purchase  of 
linen,  158. 

Fliers,  difficulties  in  securing 
right  types  of  men  as,  99; 
first  volunteers  as,  98 ;  medi- 
cal requirements  for,  101, 
102;  number  and  distribu- 
tion of  world,  in  1913,  18; 
preliminary  training  of,  at 
"  ground  schools, "  104;  re- 
cruiting of,  from  Officers' 
Training  Corps,  99;  statis- 
tics of,  225;  tests  for,  102; 
types  of  men  needed  as,  99, 
101. 

Flights,  fast,  record,  278,  279 ; 
in  battle  formation  of  103 
planes,  in  California,  270; 
military  transcontinental,  in 
formation,  275 ;  passenger 
transportation,  279;  record 
altitude,  276;  student,  alti- 
tude test  in,  113;  student, 
cross-country  work  in,  113; 
student,  inspection  of 
planes  and  mechanism  com- 
pulsory proceeding,  112 ; 
student,  instruction  for 
mano3uvres  during,  112; 
student,  landing  instruc- 
tions for,  112;  stunt  record, 
278 

Flying,  "Bules  of  the  Air" 
in,  111. 

Flying  fields,  construction 
work  on,  standard  form  of 
contract  for,  107;  course  of 
instruction  at,  109;  estab- 
lishment of,  summary  of, 
105;  increase  in  number  of, 
107;  leasing  terms  of,  106; 
list  of,  348;  selection  of 
sites  for,  106;  staudardiza- 


367 


tion  of  layouts  of,  106 ;  util- 
ization of,  as  schools  for 
mechanical  instruction,  143. 

Flying  school,  original,  at  Col- 
lege Park,  12. 

Flying  work  in  training  at 
aviation  fields,  110;  dual 
flying  in,  110;  cross-country 
flying  in,  111;  solo  flying 
in,  110. 

Fokker  planes,  destruction  of, 
by  Americans,  333;  initial 
synchronizing  firing  device 
of,  120. 

Foreign  aviation  officers  in 
U.  S.,  official  provision  for 
transportation  of,  347. 

Formation  flying,  importance 
of  aerial  radio -telephony  in, 
282,  283. 

Fort  Myer,  demonstration 
flight  by  Wright  brothers 
at,  9;  initial  ten-mile  cross- 
country flight  of  Wright 
brothers  at,  9. 

Fort  Omaha  School,  increase 
in  size  of,  for  balloon  train- 
ing, 289;  officers'  course  in 
ballooning  at,  290. 

Fort  Sill,  officers'  aerial  radio 
training  school  at,  137. 

Foulois,  Brigadier-General 
Benjamin  D.,  Assistant 
Chief  of  Air  Service,  305; 
change  in  equipment  sched- 
ule for  De  Haviland-4 's,  by 
orders  of,  195;  commander 
of  first  aero  squadron,  expe- 
dition into  Mexico,  33;  ini- 
tial success  of,  in  flying,  12 ; 
work  of,  for  $700,000,000 
aviation  appropriation  bill, 
70;  work  of,  in  amplifica- 
tion of  Eibot  aviation  pro- 
gramme, 66. 

France,  American  Air  Service 
personnel  in,  311 ;  American 
Air  Service,  schools  in,  303 ; 
aviation  centers  in,  302, 


INDEX 


303;  first  steps  in  training 
American  fliers  by,  300; 
military  aeronautics  provi- 
sion of,  for  1915,  27. 

Franco-Prussion  War,  use  of 
balloons  in,  285. 

French  Air  Service,  strength 
of,  July  30,  1918,  235,  236. 

French  Army,  initial  flights  in, 
for  reconnaisance,  11. 

French  ballooning  methods, 
adoption  of,  290. 

French  War  Mission,  arrival 
of,  58;  effect  of,  on  avia- 
tion programme,  59. 

Gard,  Congressman,  support 
of  $640,000,000  Aviation 
Appropriation  Bill  by,  87. 

Garrison,  Secretary,  action  of, 
regarding  appropriation 
proposal  for  1915,  16;  on 
1916  appropriation  estimate 
for  flying,  26;  protest  of, 
against  proposed  cut  in  1915 
aviation  appropriation,  17. 

General  Vehicle  Co.,  aviation 
engine  investment  of,  at 
outbreak  of  war,  252;  pro- 
duction of  Gnome  engines 
by,  171. 

Georgetown  University  School 
of  Technology,  ' '  ground 
school'  'at,  103. 

German  aviation  plans  for 
1918,  as  given  out  from 
Paris,  June,  1917,  79.  . 

German  planes,  destruction  of, 
by  Americans,  337;  first  to 
be  shot  down  by  Americans, 
314. 

Germany,  Air  Service  of, 
strength  of,  July  30,  1918, 
235,  236;  breaking  of  diplo- 
matic relations  with,  42; 
military  aeronautics  in,  pro- 
vision for,  1915,  27. 

Georgia  School  of  Technology, 


Supply  Officers'  School  at, 
125. 

Gerstner  Field,  training  school 
for  pursuit  pilots,  119. 

Giffor4,  W.  S.,  appointment 
of,  as  official  Aircraft  Pro- 
duction Board  investigator, 
213. 

Gillespie  explosion,  at  Mor- 
gan, N.  J.,  work  of  aero- 
plane at,  279. 

Gillett,  Congressman,  criticism 
of  War  Department  by,  re- 
garding action  concerning 
$640,000,000  aviation  ap- 
propriation, 86. 

Glacial  acetic  acid,  shortage 
of,  163. 

Glendenning,  Major  Robert, 
commander  of  American 
aviation  force,  in  Italy,  311. 

Gliders,  experiments  with, 
Cornell  University,  1915, 
29;  Wright  brothers,  7; 
Gnome  engines,  171;  Gnome, 
development  of,  241;  en- 
gines, production  of,  171. 

Government,  investigation  of 
Langley  's  aerodrome  by, 
5;  lack  of  insight  of,  on 
airplane  manufacture,  1915, 
27;  loans  to  aviation  in- 
dustry, 252;  offer  of  Wright 
brothers  to  sell  patent 
rights  to,  8. 

Grand  Rapids  Airplane  Co., 
award  to,  of  Handley-Page 
planes  manufacture,  205. 

Grange,  Captain  de  la,  French 
War  Mission  aviation  rep- 
resentative, 59;  issuance  by, 
of  statements  regarding 
value  of  aviation,  in  sup- 
port of  large  appropriation 
bill,  81;  support  of  Pre- 
mier Ribot's  aviation  re- 
quest by,  72. 

Great  Britain,  military  aero- 
nautics, provision  for,  1915, 


368 


INDEX 


27 ;  negotiations  of  Govern- 
ment with,  for  supply  of 
linen,  158. 

Gregory,  Attorney  -  General, 
ratification  of  formation  of 
Aircraft  Manufacturers ' 
Association,  53. 

Ground  force,  makeup  of, 
125;  need  of,  124;  training 
of,  124;  training  of,  sum- 
mary of  facilities  for,  226. 

Ground  schools,  262;  assign- 
ments of  applicants  to, 
103;  course  and  curriculum 
at,  104;  elimination  of  un- 
fit at,  104;  establishment 
of,  56;  student  history  of, 
105. 

Gunnery,  aerial,  development 
of,  by  close  of  war,  265; 
school  in  France,  American, 
303;  see  also  Aerial  Gun- 
nery. 

Hall,  Bert,  one  of  original 
seven  members  of  Lafayette 
Escadrille,  59. 

Hall  -  Scott  A7A  100-horse 
power  engines,  169;  produc- 
tion of,  169. 

Hall-Scott  Co.,  estimated  avi- 
ation engine  investment  at 
outbreak  of  war,  252. 

Handley-Page  agreement,  for 
the  solution  of  the  assem- 
bly problem,  310;  battle 
plane,  adoption  of,  by 
United  States,  191;  Ameri- 
can-built model  of,  first 
flight  of,  242;  award  to 
Grand  Eapids  Airplane  Co., 
manufacture  of  wooden 
parts  of,  205;  award  to 
Standard  Aero  Corporation, 
manufacture  of  metal  parts 
of,  205;  British-American 
agreement  on  manufactur- 
ing plans  for,  204;  original 
plans  for  building  of,  in 


America,  204 ;  successful 
shipment  of  parts  to  Eng- 
land, 243;  uncertainty  of 
technical  mission  regarding, 
203;  project,  cost  of,  311; 
project,  the  working  out  of, 
310. 

Harbord,  General,  report  of 
American  air  casualties,  by, 
340. 

Hardwick,  Senator,  question 
as  to  applicability  of  draft 
in  $640,000,000  aviation  ap- 
propriation bill  by,  89. 

Hartney,  Major  Harold  E., 
aviation  successes  of,  338. 

Hawley,  AUen  E.,  letters  of, 
to  President  Wilson,  charg- 
ing collapse  of  air  pro- 
gramme, 216;  insisting  up- 
on proper  appropriation 
for  aviation  by,  78. 

Hay,  Chairman,  report  of,  on 
airplane  manufacture,  1915, 
27. 

Headquarters,  official  author- 
ization of,  provision  for, 
342. 

Heavier  -  than  -  air  machine, 
first  flight  of,  7. 

Helium,  history  of,  293 ;  quan- 
tity production  of,  in 
United  States,  293;  value 
of,  for  balloon  inflation, 
293. 

Hill,  Dudley,  member  of  La- 
fayette Escadrille,  59. 

Hispano-Suiza  engines,  Amer- 
ican use  of,  in  France,  308 ; 
development  of,  in  four 
types,  241 ;  in  battle-planes, 
172;  in  JN-4D  advanced 
training  planes,  188;  in 
JN-4D  plane,  188;  in  Loen- 
ing  two-seater,  245 ;  produc- 
tion of,  170;  stimulation  of 
production  of,  241 ;  trial  of, 
in  the  Bristol  plane,  202; 
types  of,  170. 

369 


INDEX 


House  Committee  on  Military 
Affairs  cut  of  $700,000,000 
aviation  appropriation  to 
$640,000,000,  72;  presenta- 
tion of  $700,000,000  avia- 
tion appropriation  bill  to, 
70;  unanimous  report  of 
appropriation  for  $640,000,- 
000  reported  by,  72. 

Hughes,  Charles  Evans,  ap- 
pointment of,  as  head  of 
Air  Service  investigation, 
218;  endorsement  of  Liber- 
ty Motor  by,  240 ;  report  of, 
on  Air  Service  investiga- 
tion, 220 ;  report  of,  on  Air 
Service  expenditures,  254, 
255. 

Hulbert,  Eepresentative,  de- 
mand of,  for  separate  de- 
partment of  aeronautics, 
87;  support  of  $640,000,000 
aviation  appropriation  bill 
by,  87. 

* '  Huts, ' '  photographic,  in 
flying  fields,  134. 

Hydroplane,  America 's  con- 
tribution to  aeronautics, 
18;  early  development  of, 
12. 

Ideal  radiator,  demonstration 
of  value  of,  196. 

Inspection  by  U.  S.  Govern- 
ment of  factory  production, 
39. 

Inspection  of  planes  and 
mechanism  preparatory  to 
flights,  112. 

Instructors,  schools  for  train- 
ing of,  119. 

Issoudun,  France,  American 
building  operations  at,  302 ; 
extent  of  aviation  camp  at, 
302;  flying  fields  at,  302; 
site  of  first  American  Train- 
ing School  in  France,  62. 

Italian  Air  Service,  strength 
of,  July  30, 1918,  236. 


Italian  front,  work  of  Ameri- 
can airmen  on,  313. 

Italian  military  aeronautics, 
provision  for  1915  in,  27. 

Italian  Training  Schools  for 
Americans,  64,  311. 

I.  W.  W.  troubles  in  spruce 
industry,  151. 

J-l  training  planes,  deliveries 
of  during  1917,  187;  manu- 
facture of,  187. 

Jennings  color  test,  102. 

JN-4D  planes,  advanced  train- 
ing, with  Hispano-Suiza  en- 
gine, deliveries  of,  188;  de- 
cision in  favor  of,  by  Air- 
craft Production  Board, 
187;  deliveries  of,  during 
1917,  187;  for  training, 
Hispano-Suiza  engine  for, 
188;  installation  of  Curtiss 
OX5  90-horsepower  engines 
in,  169;  manufacture  of, 
187;  use  of,  in  bombing 
practice,  118. 

Jones,  Lieutenant  B.  Q.,  es- 
tablishment of  altitude  rec- 
ord by,  in  two-seater  plane, 
30. 

Jones,  Senator,  fear  of,  for 
too  great  increase  in  offi- 
cers through  $640,000,000 
aviation  appropriation,  89. 

Kahn,  Representative,  vindi- 
cation of  secrecy  re  plan 
for  expenditure  in  $640,- 
000,000  aviation  apropria- 
tion  by,  87. 

Kelleher,  Lieutenant  M.  B., 
altitude  flight  of,  276. 

Kelly,  G.  E.  M.,  death  of,  12. 

Kelly  Field,  mechanical  in- 
struction at,  126,  144,  267; 
school  for  adjutants  and 
supply  officers  at,  125. 

Kelly,  Major-General  William 
L.,  appointment  of,  as 


370 


INDEX 


head  of  new  Division  of 
Military  Aeronautics,  217; 
passenger  in  first  flight  of 
"Langley,"  242. 

Kiln  drying  of  lumber  for 
aeroplanes,  156. 

Kilner,  Colonel  W.  S.,  Chief 
of  Training,  at  Tours,  305. 

Kindley,  First  Lieutenant 
Fielde,  aviation  successes 
of,  338. 

Kitty  Hawk,  Wright  broth- 
ers' experiments  at,  7. 

Kodak  Park,  school  for  aerial 
photography  at,  132. 

Kulm,  Brigadier-General  Jo- 
seph E.,  fear  of  Ribot- 
Foulois  war  aviation  pro- 
gramme by,  69. 

Lafayette  Escadrille,  231 ; 
fame  of,  as  aid  to  $640,- 
000,000  aviation  appropria- 
tion, 74;  mobilization  of, 
59 ;  realization  of  its  appeal 
to  Americans  by  British- 
French  Mission,  59. 

La  Guardia,  Representative, 
statement  of,  for  aviation 
appropriation  of  $640,000,- 
000,  87. 

Lahm,  Colonel  Frank  P.,  305. 

Landing  instruction,  112. 

Landis,  Captain  Reed  G.,  avi- 
ation successes  of,  338. 

"Langley,"  name  of  first 
American  -  built  Handley- 
Page  plane,  242. 

Langley,  Professor  Samuel 
Pierpont,  3. 

Langley  Field,  aerial  photo- 
graphy school  at,  131;  ob- 
servers' school  at,  117. 

Langley  's  ' '  aerodrome, ' '  3 , 
4;  failure  of,  5,  6;  United 
States  Government  investi- 
gation of,  5 ;  vindication  of, 
5,  6. 

" Langley 's  folly/'  3. 


Le  Pere  two-seater  plane,  244. 

La  Rhone  engines,  171;  devel- 
opment of,  241. 

"Liberty  Aero  Oil,"  165. 

Liberty  Bristol,  original 
model  of,  abandoned  by  new 
administration,  244. 

Liberty  Ignition  School  for 
mechanical  instruction,  145. 

Liberty  Motor,  174;  adopted 
for  use  in  Le  Pere  two- 
seater  plane,  244 ;  American 
use  of,  in  France,  308; 
changes  in  original  design 
of,  179,  181 ;  characteristics 
of,  176,  177;  completion  of, 
by  Packard  and  Lincoln 
Companies,  185 ;  concen- 
trated effort  in  improve- 
ment of,  182;  demand  for, 
181;  delays  in  production 
of,  causes  of,  186;  deliv- 
eries of,  241;  development 
of,  176;  development  into 
premier  quantity  produc- 
tion heavy  engine,  241;  de- 
velopment of  different  types 
of,  184;  differentiation  of, 
into  Army  and  Navy  types, 
240;  effect  of  coal  shortage 
and  transportation  difficul- 
ties in,  183;  effect  of  labor 
shortage  on  production  of, 
178;  endorsement  of,  by 
British,  239 ;  endorsement 
of,  by  Charles  E.  Hughes, 
240;  endorsement  of  by 
John  D.  Ryan,  239;  en- 
dorsed by  Vice  •  Admiral 
Sims,  239;  first  steps  to- 
ward development  of,  57; 
increase  in  orders  for,  239; 
increase  in  production  of, 
240;  lack  of  tools  for,  183; 
over-estimation  of  produc- 
tion of,  180 ;  placing  of  con- 
tracts for,  177;  production 
of,  179;  rigidity  of  specifi- 
cations of,  182;  substitu- 
371 


INDEX 


tion  of  8-cylinder  for  12- 
cylinder,  in  Bristol  plane, 
202;  success  of,  185,  224; 
technical  advantages  of, 
184;  testing  of  completed, 
180;  use  of,  in  American 
De  Haviland  bombing  plane, 
193 ;  use  of,  in  Bristol  fight- 
ing plane,  200;  use  of,  in 
Caproni  plane,  243;  use  of, 
in  planes  of  Pomilio  broth- 
ers, 245. 

Lime,  acetate  of,  new  sources 
of,  162;  acetate  of,  short- 
age of,  96,  162. 

Lincoln  Co.,  completion  of 
Liberty  Motors  by,  185. 

Linen,  negotiations  of  Gov- 
ernment with  Great  Britain 
for  supplies  of,  158;  for 
aeroplane  manufacture, 

shortage  of,  158;  shortage 
of,  causes  of,  159,  substi- 
tutes for,  159. 

Linen  supply,  sources  of,  158. 

Lippincott,  Colonel  Aubrey, 
commander  of  Air  Service 
Replacement  Barracks,  at 
St.  Maixent,  France,  305. 

Livingston  radiator,  demon- 
stration of  value  of,  196. 

Loening,  Grover  C.,  originator 
of  two-seater  monoplane, 
245. 

London,  aviation  offices  at, 
303. 

Long  distance  attacks,  by 
American  air  men,  success 
of,  330. 

Longuyon,  American  air  at- 
tacks against,  329. 

Loop  flying,  record  of  Lieu- 
tenant William  T.  Camp- 
bell, 278. 

Lorraine-Dietrich,  270-horse- 
power  engine,  172,  173. 

Los  Angeles  exhibition  meets, 
1910,  18. 

Loyal  Legion  of  Loggers  and 


Lumbermen,       organization 

of,  152. 
Lubricating  oil,  Liberty  Aero, 

165. 
Lubricant,    mineral-oil,    need 

of  satisfactory,  164. 
Lufbery,  Major  Victor  Eaoul, 

aviation  successes  of,  337; 

death  of,  318;    member  of 

Lafayette  Escadrille,  59. 
Luke,  First  Lieutenant  Frank, 

Jr.,  aviation  record  of,  338. 
Lumber,  aeroplane,  transport- 
ation of,  156;   kiln  drying 

of,  156. 

MacKay  trophy,  for  cross- 
country flight,  13. 

McConnell,  James  W.,  one  of 
original  seven  members  of 
Lafayette  Escadrille,  59. 

McDermott,  Lieutenant  Cleve- 
land W.,  exploit  of,  at 
Marne,  323. 

McDevitt,  Lieutenant  James 
A.,  citation  of,  for  bravery 
in  balloon  service,  296. 

McKellar,  Senator,  opposition 
of,  to  1916  airplane  appro- 
priation, 27. 

McKeown,  Congressman,  sug- 
gestion for  cut  in  $640,000,- 
000  aviation  appropriation 
by,  88. 

Machine  guns,  initial  use  of, 
on  aeroplanes,  13. 

Mail  route,  aerial,  operation 
of  first,  by  U.  S.  Army,  34. 

Mail  service,  aerial,  opening 
of,  279,  280;  taking  over 
of,  by  Post  Office  Depart- 
ment, 280. 

Mann,  Republican  minority 
leader,  speech  of,  in  favor 
of  $640,000,000  aviation  ap- 
propriation bill,  84. 

Manufacture ;  see  Airplane 
Manufacture. 

Marshall,    H.    Snowden,    ap- 


372 


INDEX 


pointment  of,  as  head  of 
Air  Service  investigating 
committee,  213. 

Maryland  Agricultural  Col- 
lege, officers '  radio  training 
school  at,  136. 

Massachusetts  Institute  of 
Technology,  aviation  train- 
ing at,  29,  55;  engineer  of- 
ficers' school  at,  126. 

May,  Captain  O.  J.,  lubricat- 
ing oil  survey  of,  165. 

Mechanical  instruction  at  vo- 
cational schools,  145;  in 
Canada,  143 ;  in  factories, 
142;  summary  of,  146;  util- 
ization of  flying  fields  for, 
143. 

Mechanics,  American,  work 
of,  in  England,  309;  for 
Air  Service,  recruiting  of, 
140;  ground  army  of,  ne- 
cessity for,  139 ;  in  National 
Army,  transferred  to  Air 
Service,  141;  official  provi- 
sion for  promotion  of,  343 ; 
schools  for,  list  of,  350; 
training  of,  142;  training 
of,  facilities  for,  by  close 
of  war,  267;  training  of,  in 
England,  309. 

Meissner,  Major  James  A. 
aviation  successes  of,  338. 

Meuse,  American  air  attack 
on,  330. 

Mexican  border,  crisis  on, 
33. 

Meucon,  France,  artillery  fir- 
ing schools  in,  303. 

Miami,  aviation  field,  55 ;  civi- 
lian school,  61. 

Michel,  Lieutenant  Eene,  con- 
tributions of,  to  knowledge 
of  aerial  photography,  131. 

Michigan,  University  of,  aero- 
nautic instruction  in,  29. 

Military  aeronautics,  1915,  27. 

Military  Aeronautics,  Division 
of,  creation  of,  217,  219; 


373 


difficulties  of,  in  cooperat- 
ing with  the  A.  E.  F.  and 
Aircraft  Production  Bureau 
on  training  programme, 
259;  difficulties  in  opera- 
tion of,  as  separate  bureau, 
237. 

' '  Military  planes, ' »  initial 
use  of,  13 ;  issuance  of  first 
specifications  for,  25 ;  type- 
determination  in,  consider- 
ation of,  50. 

Military  preparedness,  1916, 
agitation  for,  31. 

Military  Staff,  opposition  of, 
to  Eibot-Foulois  war  avia- 
tion programme,  69. 

Military  transcontinental 
flight  in  formation,  275. 

Miller,  Captain  J.  E.,  com- 
mander of  first  overseas 
cadet  attachment,  63. 

Miller,  Congressman,  demand 
for  endorsement  of  plan  in 
$640,000,000  aviation  ap- 
propriation bill,  86. 

Milling,  Colonel  Thomas  DeW., 
305. 

Milling,  Lieutenant,  early  rec- 
ord flight  of,  between  San 
Antonio  and  Texas  City, 
14;  success  of,  in  1912,  13. 

Mineola  flying  field,  at  out- 
break of  war,  53;  govern- 
ment school,  officers  and 
pupils  at,  61;  successful 
flight  of  first  American- 
built  Caproni  at,  243. 

Mineral-oil  lubricant  for  en- 
gines, need  of  satisfactory, 
164;  "Liberty  Aero,"  165; 
survey  of,  165. 

"Miniature  range"  use  of. 
104. 

Mitchel,  Major  John  Purroy, 
death  of,  268. 

Mitchell,  Brigadier  -  General 
William,  Assistant  Chief  of 
Air  Service,  305. 


INDEX 


Mitchell,  Captain,  1913,  re- 
port of,  on  lack  of  future  in 
flying,  20. 

Molasses,  a  source  of  acetate 
of  lime,  162. 

Monoplanes,  two-seater  of 
Grover  C.  Loening,  245. 

Montgomery,  Colonel  E.  L., 
appointment  of  as  Hughes 
investigator,  219;  appoint- 
ment to  Aircraft  Produc- 
tion Board,  49. 

Montmedy,  American  air  at- 
tack on,  330. 

Morgan,  W.  A.,  damaging 
statements  regarding  Air 
Service  from,  216. 

Motion  picture  photography, 
131. 

Motors ;   see  Engines. 

Muller,  Captain  H.  LeR,  alti- 
tude record  of,  1914,  single- 
seater  plane,  30. 

Napoleonic  wars,  use  of  bal- 
loons in,  284. 

National  Advisory  Committee 
on  Aeronautics,  establish- 
ment of,  personnel  of,  28; 
experimentation  of,  in  use 
of  cotton  fabrics  for  aero- 
plane wings,  160;  general 
inquiry  of,  regarding  prog- 
ress in  aeronautics,  28;  in- 
dustrial conference  of,  45; 
on  formation  of  Aircraft 
Production  Board,  48;  plan 
for  adoption  of  Canadian 
programme,  54 ;  question- 
naire of,  on  airplane  pro- 
ductivity possibilities,  April, 
1917,  47 ;  suggestion  of,  for 
war  aviation  programme, 
48. 

National  Defense  Act  of  June 
3,  1916,  on  personnel  of  Air 
Service,  33;  reorganization 
of  Air  Service  through,  33. 

Navigating  instruments,  166. 


Navy  Bureau  of  Steam  Engi- 
neering, work  of,  for  quan- 
tity production  of  helium, 
293. 

Newport  New,s,  civilian  school, 
61. 

Night-bombing  planes,  devel- 
opment of,  203. 

Observers,  aerial,  115;  curri- 
culum of  training  for,  116; 
number  of,  at  close  of  war, 
264;  original  plans  for  se- 
curing, 115;  school  for  at 
Post  Field,  establishment 
of,  115,  117;  schools  for,  in 
France,  303. 

Officers,  aviation,  official  au- 
thorization for  provision 
for,  342;  official  provision 
for  rating  of,  343. 

Officers'  Eeserve  Corps,  crea- 
tion of,  33. 

Officers'  Training  Camps,  ori- 
ginal, at  San  Antonio, 
Texas,  12;  recruiting  of 
men  from,  for  Air  Service, 
99. 

Ohio  State  University,  avia- 
tion training  school,  55 ;  ad- 
jutants '  school  at,  125; 
ground  school  at,  262. 

Oldham,  England,  assembly 
plant,  work  done  at,  310. 

O'Neill,  Lieutenant  A., 
achievement  of,  323. 

Orly,  importance  of,  in  avia- 
tion work,  304. 

Overman  Act,  invocation  of, 
for  reorganization  of  Air 
Service,  219. 

Overseas  aviation  programme, 
230. 

Overseas  aviation  unit,  sailing 
of  first,  62. 

Overseas  cadet  detachment, 
sailing  of  first  for  training 
in  French  aviation  schools, 
63. 


374 


INDEX 


Overseas  training '  school,  es- 
tablishment of  first,  in 
France,  62. 

Owen,  Senator,  demand  of, 
for  safeguarding  expendi- 
ture of  $640,000,000  avia- 
tion appropriation,  89. 

OX5  engines  for  JN-4D 
training  planes,  limitation 
in.  187. 

Pacific  Aircraft  Spruce  Pro- 
duction Board,  formation 
of,  151. 

Packard  Co.,  aviation  engine 
investment  of,  at  outbreak 
of  war,  252;  completion  of 
Liberty  Motors,  185. 

Parachute,  tests  of,  work  in, 
278;  value  of,  to  the  bal- 
loonist, 28§. 

Paris,  aviation  offices  at,  303. 

Parker,  Lieutenant  Kenneth 
L.,  exploits  of,  322,  323. 

Passenger  transportation 
flights,  279. 

Patrick,  Major-General  Mason 
M.,  Chief  of  Air  Service, 
A.  E.  F.,  305. 

Pensions,  aviation,  official 
provision  for,  344. 

Perry,  Lieutenant  Maxwell 
O.,  achievement  of,  323. 

Pershing,  General,  approval 
of,  plan  for  advanced  fly- 
ing school  in  France,  62; 
decision  of,  to  leave  pro- 
duction of  single  -  seater 
fighting  planes  to  Europe, 
192;  description  of,  of  air 
work  against  St.  Mihiel 
salient,  327;  punitive  ex- 
pedition of,  into  Mexico, 
value  of  aircraft  in,  33 ;  re- 
port of,  on  American  air 
casualties,  at  Chateau  Thier- 
ry, 320 ;  report  of,  on  Amer- 
ican successes,  Oct.  19, 1918, 
328,  329;  request  of,  for 


priority  shipment  of  De 
Haviland-4s,  199. 

Peterson,  Captain,  exploit  of, 
317. 

Photographers,  aerial,  schools 
for,  131,  350. 

Photographic  equipment,  aeri- 
al, 167. 

Photographic  "huts,"  in  fly- 
ing fields,  134. 

Photographic  intelligence  offi- 
cers '  school  at  Cornell  Uni- 
versity, 134. 

Photographic  schools,  number 
of,  at  close  of  hostilities, 
262. 

Photographic  Section  of  Sig- 
nal Corps,  organization  of, 
130. 

Photography,  aerial,  causes  of 
delay  in  progress  of,  134; 
development  of,  128;  devel- 
opment of,  by  close  of  war, 
266 ;  early,  in  United  States, 
130;  on  battle  sectors,  128; 
training  in,  128. 

Pilots,  advanced  radio  train- 
ing for,  139;  advanced 
schools  for,  114;  apparatus 
necessary  for,  166;  army- 
corps,  114;  army-corps,  cur- 
riculum of  training  for, 
116;  bombing,  114;  bomb- 
ing, training  of,  117 ;  differ- 
ent types  of,  required,  117; 
different  types  of  service  re- 
quired of,  114;  final  train- 
ing of,  at  aerial  gunnery 
schools,  119;  plan  for  hav- 
ing 4,500  in  France  by 
spring,  1918,  67;  pursuit, 
114;  pursuit,  curriculum  for 
training  of,  118;  radio  re- 
quirements of,  138. 

Pola,  American  participation 
with  Italians  in  daylight 
aerial  raid  against  Aus- 
trian base  at,  334. 

Pomilio  brothers,  work  of,  on 

375' 


INDEX 


new  single  and  two-seater 
day  bomber  planes,  245. 

Ports  of  embarkation,  loca- 
tion of,  351. 

Post  Field,  observers*  school 
at,  115,  117. 

Pratt  Institute,  mechanical 
instruction  at,  145. 

President,  authorization  to, 
for  emergency  action  as 
head  of  Aviation  Section  of 
the  Signal  Corps  of  the 
Army,  341. 

Price-fixing  for  aviation  sup- 
plies, difficulties  connected 
with,  252. 

Primary  flying  training,  de- 
velopment of,  at  close  of 
war,  262. 

Prince,  Norman,  one  of  ori- 
ginal seven  members  of  La- 
fayette Escadrille,  59. 

Princeton  University,  estab- 
lishment of  "ground 
school"  at;  see  Ground 
School. 

Public  Information,  Commit- 
tee of,  aerial  photographs 
for,  130. 

Public  opinion,  support  of 
$640,000,000  aviation  ap- 
propriation by,  82. 

Pusher  type  of  plane,  aban- 
donment of,  24. 

Pursuit  pilots,  114;  curricu- 
lum for  training  of,  118. 

Pursuit  training,  development 
of,  at  close  of  war,  263. 

Putnam,  First  Lieutenant, 
David  E.,  aviation  record 
of,  338. 

Quinn,  Eepresentative,  sup- 
port of  $640,000,000  appro- 
priation bill  by,  87. 

Eadiator,  difficulties  with  con- 
struction of,  for  battle 
planes,  196. 


Radio  equipment,  aerial,  167. 

Eadio  requirements  of  pilots, 
138. 

Eadio  Section  of  Signal  Corps, 
establishment  of,  138. 

Eadio  work,  personnel  for,  by 
close  of  war,  267. 

Eadio  -  telegraphy,  necessity 
for,  135;  war  development 
of,  135. 

Eadio  -  telegraphy,  training, 
128,  135;  advanced,  139; 
development  of  facilities 
for,  by  close  of  war,  266; 
foundations  completed  for, 
139;  increased  facilities 
for,  summary  of,  226; 
schools  for,  number  of,  at 
close  of  hostilities,  262, 
349;  standardization  of, 
138. 

Eadio -telephony,  history  of 
beginning  of,  281;  influ- 
ence of,  in  formation  flying 
and  aerial  tactics,  281 ;  per- 
fecting of,  281;  work  in, 
by  Col.  C.  C.  Culver,  281. 

Eantoul,  111.,  Chanute  Field 
at,  57. 

Eeber,  Colonel  Samuel,  on  dif- 
ficulties of  airplane  situa- 
tion, 26;  on  lagging  of 
America's  interest,  18;  on 
outdistancing  of  the  United 
States  in  military  aeronau- 
tics, 32,  33. 

Eeconnaissance,  first  Ameri- 
can, by  Major  Ealph  Eoyce, 
317;  practical  demonstra- 
tion of  aircraft  value  in, 
Pershing  Expedition  into 
Mexico,  33;  value  of  air- 
plane in,  26. 

Eecruit-Concentration  Camps, 
locations  of,  351. 

Eeed,  Senator,  insistence  of, 
on  speed  in  action  on  $640,- 
000,000  aviation  appropria- 
tion, 89. 


376 


INDEX 


Eees,  Lieutenant-Colonel,  Bri- 
tish War  Mission,  59. 

Bees,  Colonel,  issuance  of 
statement  of,  on  aviation, 
to  interest  public  in  large 
appropriation,  81;  support 
of  Premier  Bibot 's  aviation 
request  by,  72. 

Bepair  depots,  aviation,  loca- 
tions of,  356. 

Reserve  military  aviators,  to- 
tal number  of,  113. 

Beuter  >s  dispatch,  reporting 
American  air  success  by 
Sept.  30,  1918,  329. 

Bheims,  France,  first  Gordon 
Bennett  contest,  at,  18. 

Bibot,  Premier,  cabling  by,  of 
suggested  American  war 
aviation  programme,  66, 
231. 

Bibot  war  aviation  programme, 
as  amplified  in  the  United 
States,  67. 

Bickenbacker,  Captain  Ed- 
ward V.,  aviation  successes 
of,  337. 

"Biving"  process  for  split- 
ting logs  used  in  spruce  pifo- 
duction,  155. 

Boehourt,  American  air  at- 
tack on,  330. 

Bockwell,  Kiffin,  one  of  origi- 
nal seven  members  of  La- 
fayette Escadrille,  59. 

Bolls  -  Boyee,  275-horsepower 
engine,  172,  173. 

Borne,  headquarters  of  Amer- 
ican aviation  force  in  Italy, 
311. 

Bomorantin,  France,  Ameri- 
can Air  Service  production 
center  at,  303 ;  aviation  ma- 
terial salvage  work  done  at, 
303. 

Boosevelt,  Lieutenant  Quen- 
tin,  death  of,  323. 

Boss,  Lieutenant  C.  J.,  death 
of,  in  balloon  service,  296. 


Boyal  Flying  Corps,  adoption 
of  aerial  gunnery  system 
of,  121;  American  aviators 
in,  308,  309. 

Boyce,  Major  Balph,  first 
American  reconnaissance  by, 
317. 

"Bules  of  the  Air,"  111. 

Bumsey,  Lawrence,  member  of 
Lafayette  Escadrille,  59. 

Bussia,  military  aeronautics, 
provision  for,  1915,  27. 

Byan,  John  D.,  appointment 
of,  as  head  of  Army  Air- 
craft Production,  217;  ap- 
pointment of,  as  Second 
Assistant  Secretary  of  War 
and  Director  of  Air  Service, 
238;  report  of,  on  endorse- 
ment of  Liberty  Motor, 
239;  statement  of,  regard- 
ing success  of  American  De 
Haviland-4's  in  actual  serv- 
ice, 246;  tribute  of,  to  ori- 
ginal administration,  243. 

Salmson  planes,  American  use 
of,  in  France,  307. 

San  Antonio,  Texas,  original 
Officers'  Training  Camp  at, 
12. 

San  Diego  aviation  school,  24, 
61;  flying  field,  at  outbreak 
of  war,  53 ;  transference  of 
College  Park  Station  equip- 
ment to,  15. 

Sawmill  waste  a  source  of 
acetate  of  lime,  162. 

Schools,  aviation,  American, 
in  France,  300,  301,  303; 
number  of,  at  close  of  hos- 
tilities, 262;  for  adjutants 
and  supply  officers,  125;  for 
aerial  navigation,  127;  for 
aerial  photography,  128, 
131 ;  for  aerial  photography, 
development  of,  by  close  of 
war,  262,  266;  for  aerial 
radio  training,  136;  for 
377 


INDEX 


aerial  radio -telegraphy,  128, 
266;  for  aerial  radio-tele- 
graphy, number  of,  at  close 
of  hostilities,  262;  for 
armament  officers,  126;  for 
armorers,  in  England,  309; 
for  balloon  training,  289; 
for  balloon  training,  estab- 
lishment of,  in  France,  295 ; 
for  balloon  training,  num- 
ber of,  at  close  of  hos- 
tilities, 262;  for  bombing 
pilots,  117;  for  compass  of- 
ficers, 127 ;  for  engineer  of- 
ficers, 126;  for  ground 
force,  262;  for  ground 
force,  assignment  of  suc- 
cessful applicants  to,  103 ; 
for  ground  force,  course 
and  curriculum  at,  104;  for 
ground  force,  elimination  of 
unfit  at,  104;  for  ground 
force,  student  history  of, 
105;  for  gunnery,  develop- 
ment of,  by  close  of  war, 
265 ;  for  mechanical  train- 
ing, 143,  267;  for  mechani- 
cal instruction  in  flying 
fields,  143;  for  mechanical 
training,  summary  of,  146; 
of  military  aeronautics,  list 
of,  349;  for  military  cine- 
matography, 131;  for  ob- 
servers, at  Post  Field,  es- 
tablishment of,  115,  117; 
for  pilots,  advanced,  114; 
for  pilots,  pursuit,  118. 

Schroeder,  Captain,  B.  W., 
record  altitude  flight  of, 
276. 

Scouting  planes,  engines  for, 
171;  Thomas-Morse,  deliv- 
eries of  during  1917,  188; 
Thomas-Morse,  selection  of, 
188. 

Scriven,  General  George  P.,  on 
aircraft  industry,  30;  on 
importance  of  airplane  in 
reconnaissance,  26 ;  mili- 


tary importance  of  aero- 
plane, 23 ;  on  United  States 
action  on  1915  aviation  ap- 
propriation, 17 ;  recom- 
mendations'  of,  to  National 
Advisory  Committee  for 
Aeronautics,  28;  report  of 
for  1915,  argument  for  pre- 
paredness, 30;  report  of, 
on  America's  lack  of  pre- 
paredness in  flying,  19; 
review  by,  of  aeroplane  ar- 
mada Villacoublay,  France, 
14. 

S.E.-5  planes,  contract  for 
given  to  Curtiss  Co.,  242. 

Selfridge,  Lieutenant,  death 
of,  during  exhibition  flight 
with  Orville  Wright,  9. 

Semphill,  Lord  William,  B. 
B.  A.,  242. 

Senate,  criticism  of  Air  Serv- 
ice by,  215;  majority  re- 
port of,  on  "substantial 
failure"  of  Air  Service, 
216;  minority  report  of,  in 
justification  of  Air  Service 
accomplishment,  217. 

Senatorial  Committee,  contin- 
uance of  Air  Service  inves- 
tigation by,  218. 

Sherley,  Bepresentative,  sup- 
port of  $640,000,000  avia- 
tion appropriation  bill  by, 
86. 

Signal  Corps,  approval  of,  by 
Bibot-Foulois  war  aviation 
programme  by,  68;  Avia- 
tion Section  of,  authorized 
by  Congress,  21;  Aviation 
Section  of,  transference  of 
members  of  Aircraft  Pro- 
duction Board  to,  93; 
Equipment  Division  of,  Col- 
onel Deeds  in  charge  of, 
94;  official  provision  for  or- 
ganization of,  342;  Photo- 
graphic Section  of,  organi- 
zation of,  130;  progress  of, 
378 


INDEX 


in  1914,  24;  Radio  Section 
of,  establishment  of,  138; 
separation  of  Air  Service 
from,  217;  tests  by,  of  cot- 
ton fabric  for  aeroplane 
wings,  160;  training  in 
radio-telegraphic  work  en- 
trusted to,  136;  transfer- 
ence of  personnel  of  Air- 
craft Production  Board  to, 
93;  work  of,  for  quantity 
production  of  helium,  293. 

Signal  Enlisted  Eeserve  Corps, 
personnel  of,  103 ;  status  of, 
103. 

Signalling,  aerial,  early,  135. 

Sims,  Vice-Admiral,  endorse- 
ment of  Liberty  Motor  by, 
239. 

Single-seater  planes,  elimina- 
tion of,  242;  establishment 
of  altitude  record  with, 
1914,  by  Captain  H.  LeB. 
Muller,  30. 

Single-seater  S.E.-5  planes, 
contract  for,  awarded  the 
Curtiss  Co.,  242. 

Solo  flying,  training  in,  110. 

Sopwith-Camel  planes,  Ameri- 
can use  of,  in  France,  307. 

Sopwith  S.E.-5  plane,  plan  for 
use  in  advanced  training, 
67. 

Songe,  Trance,  artillery  firing 
school  at,  303. 

Southern  schools  for  winter 
training,  adoption  of,  98. 

Spad  planes,  American  use  of, 
in  France,  307;  elimination 
of,  242;  scout-battle  plane, 
adoption  and  shelving  of,  by 
Boiling  Technical  Commis- 
sion, 191;  scout-battle,  ex- 
perience of  Curtiss  Co.  with, 
191,  192;  S.E.-5  plane, 
plan  for  use  in  advanced 
training,  67. 

Speed  -  scout,  single  -  seater 
type,  initial  use  of,  13. 


Spirals  and  glides,  instruc- 
tions for,  112. 

Springs,  Captain  Elliott  W., 
aviation  success  of,  338. 

Spruce,  agreement  with  oper- 
ators to  reserve  first  right  to, 
for  Government 's  needs,  150 ; 
development  and  history  of, 
248,  249;  difficulties  in  ob- 
taining, 149,  150;  forests, 
industrial  unrest  in,  settling 
of,  151;  kiln  drying  of, 
156;  logging  difficulties  in 
obtaining,  149,  150;  ship- 
ments of,  157;  substitutes 
for  in  aeroplane  manufac- 
ture, 155 ;  transportation  of, 
156;  value  of,  in  aeroplane 
building,  149;  varied  in- 
terests in  obtaining  of,  150. 

Spruce  Council,  Emergency, 
formation  of,  151. 

Spruce  industry,  eight-hour 
day  for,  153;  I.  W.  W. 
troubles  in,  151;  sending  of 
Government  troops  to  aid 
of,  152,  153;  wage  condi- 
tions in,  settling  of,  153 ; 
production,  demand  for  in- 
creased, 154 ;  Government 
"  cut-up"  mill  in,  154; 
Government  regulation  of, 
151;  "riving"  process  for 
splitting  logs  in,  155 ; 
standardization  of  specifica- 
tions for  cutting  in,  154; 
summary  of,  157,  158. 

Spruce  Production  Board, 
Pacific  Aircraft,  formation 
of,  151. 

Spruce  Production  Division, 
organization  of,  152. 

Squier,  General  George  O.,  ap- 
pointment of  as  Chief  Sig- 
nal Officer,  38;  appoint- 
ment of,  to  Aircraft  Pro- 
duction Board,  49;  assign- 
ment, of,  to  Signal  Corps 
duty,  219;  contribution  of, 


379 


INDEX 


to  telegraphy,  37;  coopera- 
tion of,  toward  French  plan 
for  advanced  flying  school 
in  France,  61 ;  early  exhibi- 
tion flight  of,  with  Orville 
Wright,  9;  issuance  of 
statements  by,  on  value  of 
Yankee  aggressiveness  in 
Air  Service  in  fighting  Ger- 
many, 79;  observations  of, 
on  European  War  methods, 
38;  on  lack  of  men  and 
equipment,  discussion  of 
1918  appropriation,  38;  on 
production  of  helium  in 
United  States,  292-294 ;  rec- 
ommendation of  $700,000,- 
000  aviation  appropriation 
by,  70;  reorganization  of 
Aviation  Corps  under,  37; 
statement  of,  on  passage  of 
$640,000,000  aviation  ap- 
propriation, 90;  statement 
of,  on  Premier  Eibot's 
cablegram  by,  76;  work  of, 
for  $640,000,000  aviation 
appropriation,  bill,  70 ;  work 
of,  on  United  States  War 
Department  aeroplane  spe- 
cifications, 8. 

St.  Jean  -  de  -  Monte,  France, 
American  aerial  gunnery 
school  at,  303. 

St.  Maixent,  Air  Service  Ee- 
placement  Barracks  at,  305. 

St.  Mihiel  Salient,  Air  Service 
achievement  in  attacking, 
312,  327. 

St.  Paul,  school  for  mechanics 
at,  267. 

Standard  Aero  Corporation 
award  to,  of  Handley-Page 
planes  manufacture,  205 ; 
estimated  aviation  invest- 
ment at  outbreak  of  war, 
251;  order  for  J  training 
planes  from,  187;  work  of, 
on  Caproni  planes,  207. 

Standard  S  J-l  planes,  instal- 


lation   of    Hall-Scott    A7A 

100-horsepower   engines    in, 

169. 
Standardization    of    airplane 

production,  suggestion   for, 

46,  80. 
"Stars  and  Stripes, "  report 

of     death     of     Lieutenant 

Eoosevelt  in,  324. 
Stevens,  Lieutenant  John  H., 

achievement  of,  323. 
"Strike  on   the   job,"   effect 

of,  on  spruce  industry,  152. 
Submarine      warfare,      unre- 
stricted, resumption  of,  by 

Germany,  42. 
Sumner,  Lieutenant-Colonel  E. 

V.,    commander    at    Eomo- 

rantin,  303. 

Supervisory     District     Head- 
quarters, divisions  of,  351. 
Supply    officers,    schools    for, 

125. 
Synchronizing    firing     device, 

120,  122;  trouble  with,  198. 
S  w  a  a  b ,      First     Lieutenant 

Jacques    Michael,    aviation 

successes  of,  338. 

Tailly,  American  air  attacks 
against,  329. 

Taylor,  David  W.,  appoint- 
ment to  Aircraft  Produc- 
tion Board,  49. 

Telegraphy,  contributions  to, 
by  Col.  Squier,  38. 

Telegraphy,  radio,  history  of 
beginning  of,  281;  see  also 
Radio-telegraphy. 

Telephone,  radio,  history  of 
beginning  of,  281. 

Tennessee  Valley  Iron  and 
Eailroad  Company,  new 
wood  distillery  of,  162. 

Terrain  plotting  by  early  avi- 
ators at  Bridgeport,  Conn., 
1912  Army  manoeuvres,  12. 

Testing  field,  aviation,  loca- 
tion of,  351. 


380 


INDEX 


Texas  Agricultural  and  Me- 
chanical College,  aerial  ra- 
dio school  at,  137. 

Texas,  University  of,  aerial 
radio  school  at,  137;  avia- 
tion training  school,  55; 
radio  training  at,  266. 

Thaw,  Lieutenant  -  Colonel 
William,  aviation  successes 
of,  339;  one  of  original 
seven  members  of  Lafayette 
Escadrille,  59. 

Thomas,  Eepresentative,  sup- 
port of  $640,000,000  avia- 
tion appropriation  bill  by, 
86. 

Thomas-Morse  Co.,  estimated 
aviation  investment  at  out- 
break of  war,  251. 

Thomas-Morse  plane,  use  of 
for  training  of  pursuit  pi- 
lots, 118;  scout  planes,  de- 
liveries of,  during  1917, 
188;  scout  planes,  selection 
of,  188. 

Tilt,  Albert,  appointed  in 
charge  of  investigation  of 
cotton  fabric  for  aeroplane 
wings,  159. 

Times,  New  York,  campaign 
for  $640,000,000  aviation 
appropriation  by,  81;  re- 
port of  American  air 
achievement  by,  328;  sum- 
mary of  editorials  re  value 
of  large  aviation  pro- 
gramme in,  81. 

Tobin,  Captain  Edgar,  avia- 
tion successes  of,  339. 

Toul  sector,  American  air 
work  in,  320. 

Toronto,  aviation  field  at,  visit 
to,  by  Americans,  55;  spe- 
cialized mechanical  train- 
ing at,  143;  study  of  Brit- 
ish flying  training  methods 
at,  55. 

Tours,  France,  aviation  activ- 
ity at,  305;  aviation  supply 


headquarters  at,  303;  ob- 
servers' school  at,  303. 

Tractor,  adoption  of,  24. 

Training,  adoption  of  south- 
ern schools  for  winter,  98; 
at  flying  fields,  course  of, 
109;  at  "ground  schools, " 
104;  delays  in  graduation 
in,  97;  aviation,  official  pro- 
vision for  defraying  costs 
of,  347;  casualties  in,  268, 
308;  chart  of,  260;  de- 
velopment of,  in  first  half 
year  of  war,  257 ;  in 
aerial  gunnery,  development 
of,  at  close  of  war,  265;  in 
aerial  navigation,  127;  in 
aerial  navigation,  course  in, 
110;  in  aerial  navigation, 
primary,  development  of,  at 
close  of  war,  262 ;  in  aerial 
photography,  128,  131,  266; 
in  balloon  observation,  289; 
in  England,  of  American 
aviators,  308;  in  England, 
cost  of,  308,  309;  in  France, 
303;  in  Italy,  311;  in  mili- 
tary aeronautics,  schools  of, 
number  of,  at  close  of  hos- 
tilities, 262;  in  radio-tele- 
graphy, 128,  135,  266;  in 
special  mechanical  work, 
142;  lack  of  equipment  for, 
97;  of  aerial  observers,  cur- 
riculum for,  116;  of  adju- 
tants, 125 ;  of  armament 
officers,  126;  of  army-corps 
pilots,  curriculum  for,  116; 
of  bombing  pilots,  117;  of 
bombing  pilots,  facilities 
for,  at  close  of  war,  264; 
of  compass  officers,  127;  of 
engineer  officers,  126;  of 
fliers  in  France,  300,  301; 
of  fliers,  interallied  co- 
operation in,  299,  300,  301; 
of  ground  force,  124; 
of  instructors,  schools 
for,  119;  of  mechanics, 
381 


INDEX 


facilities  for,  by  close  of 
war,  267;  of  mechanics, 
summary  of,  146;  of  pur- 
suit pilots,  118;  of  pursuit 
pilots,  development  of,  at 
close  of  war,  263;  of  sup- 
ply officers,  125;  precau- 
tions for  cadets '  safety  dur- 
ing, 109. 

Training  facilities  of  Allies, 
61. 

Training-plane  engines,  169; 
for  advanced  training,  170. 

Training  planes,  advanced, 
JN-4D  with  Hispano-Suiza 
engine,  deliveries  of,  188; 
American  orders  for,  in 
France,  208;  De  Haviland, 
impossibility  to  procure  dur- 
ing 1917,  188;  J-I,  deliver- 
ies of,  during  1917,  187; 
manufacture  of,  187 ;  J  type, 
manufacture  of,  187;  JN- 
4D,  decision  in  favor  of,  by 
Aircraft  Production  Board, 
187;  JN-4D,  deliveries  of, 
during  1917,  187;  JN-4D, 
equipment  of,  with  Hispano- 
Suiza  engine,  188;  JN-4D, 
manufacture  of,  187;  lack 
of,  186,  265. 

Training  programme,  difficul- 
ties of  cooperating  with 
A.  E.  F.  demands  regarding, 
259 ;  equipment  facilities 
for,  258;  facilities  to  meet 
A.  E.  F.  demands  of,  257, 
258;  modifications  in,  be- 
cause of  delay  in  produc- 
tion, 258;  personnel  of,  at 
the  termination  of  hostili- 
ties, 261. 

Tribune,  New  York,  withhold- 
ing of  criticism  of  Colonel 
Deeds  by,  212. 

Tulasne,  Major,  French  War 
Mission,  aviation  represen- 
tative of,  59;  suggestion 


of,  for  advanced  flying 
school  in  France,  61;  sug- 
gestion of,  for  training 
Americans  in  French  avia- 
tion schools,  62;  support 
of  Premier -Ribots'  aviation 
request  by,  72. 

Two-seater  plane,  developed 
by  Grover  C.  Loening,  245; 
establishment  of  altitude 
records,  1915,  30;  Le  Pere, 
244. 

Type-determination,  appoint- 
ment of  Army  and  Navy 
Technical  Board,  for  war 
usage  on,  50. 

Union  Switch  and  Signal  Com- 
pany, production  of  Le 
Rhone  engines  by,  171. 

Universities  and  colleges,  aero- 
nautic experimentation  in, 
1915,  29. 

Uxbridge,  England,  armorers' 
school  at,  309. 

Vancouver  Barracks,  kiln  dry- 
ing of  lumber  at,  156. 

Vane,  fixed  vertical,  in  first 
gliders  of  Wright  brothers, 

Vardaman,  Senator,  question 
of,  as  to  applicability  of 
draft  in  $640,000,000  avia- 
tion appropriation  bill,  89. 

Vaughn,  First  Lieutenant 
George  A.,  aviation  suc- 
cesses of,  338. 

Verdun,  Associated  Press  re- 
port of  American  air  suc- 
cesses around,  September 
20,  1918,  328. 

Villacoublay,  France,  review 
at,  of  aeroplane  armada  at, 
by  General  George  P. 
Scriven,  14. 

Villers-devant-Dun,  American 
air  attacks  on,  329. 

Vincent,  Colonel,  statement  of, 


332 


INDEX 


explaining  delay  in  De  Ha- 
viland-4's,  195. 

Vinegar,  a  source  of  acetate 
of  lime,  162. 

Vocational  schools,  mechanical 
instruction  at,  145 ;  aviation 
instruction  at,  official  pro- 
visions for,  346. 

Walcott,  Dr.  Charles  D.,  on  in- 
dustrial conditions  in  aero- 
plane production,  March, 
1917,  45. 

Waldon,  Colonel  S.  D.,  ap- 
pointment of,  as  Hughes  in- 
vestigator, 219;  appoint- 
ment of,  to  Aircraft  Pro- 
duction Board,  49;  appoint- 
ment of,  to  Committee  on 
Production,  47. 

War  Department,  appointment 
of  Air  Service  investigating 
committee  by,  213 ;  award 
of  first  aeroplane  contracts 
to  Wright  brothers  by,  8; 
disagreement  of,  with  air- 
plane service,  1916,  32;  ef- 
forts of,  to  secure  recogni- 
tion of  importance  of  me- 
chanical flight,  10;  issuance 
of  first  aeroplane  specifica- 
tions by,  8;  statement  re- 
garding overseas  shipment 
of  De  Haviland-4  planes, 
195,  212. 

War  estimate  for  Air  Service, 
Feb.,  1917,  43,  44. 

War  programme,  initial  Amer- 
ican, for  air  craft  produc- 
tion, 50. 

War  record  of  American  air- 
men in  fighting  zone,  312, 
337. 

War  tactics,  alteration  of  by 
use  of  aircraft,  23. 

West -Virginia  Pulp  and  Paper 
Company,  use  of  pulp  liquor 
from,  for  production  of 
acetate  of  lime,  162. 


Wendover,  England,  Technical 
Training  School  at,  309. 

Wilbur  Wright  Flying  Field, 
Dayton,  Ohio,  57. 

Williams,  Senator,  objection 
of,  to  speed  in  passage  of 
$640,000,000  aviation  ap- 
propriation, 89. 

Wilson,  President,  appoint- 
ment of  Charles  Evans 
Hughes,  as  official  investi- 
gator by,  218;  reorganiza- 
tion of  aircraft  administra- 
tion by,  217;  support  of 
$640,000,000  aviation  ap- 
priation  by,  80. 

Wood,  Eepresentative,  support 
of  $640,000,000  aviation  ap- 
propriation bill,  by,  86. 

Wood  pulp  liquor,  a  source  of 
acetate  of  lime,  162. 

World,  New  York,  charges  re- 
garding airplane  production 
delays  in,  216;  publication 
of  Gutzon  Borglum  Air  Ser- 
vice attack  by,  215. 

Wright  brothers,  award  of 
aeroplane  contracts  to,  by 
War  Department,  8;  early 
demonstration  flight  of,  at 
Fort  Myers,  9 ;  early  experi- 
ments of,  61;  early  gas 
motor-driven  plane  of,  7; 
experiments  of,  with  gliders, 
7;  first  flights  of,  7,  8;  first 
ten-mile  cross-country  flight 
of,  at  Fort  Myer,  9;  first 
training  of  Army  aviators 
by,  10;  offer  of  patent 
rights  to  Government,  8. 

Wright,  First  Lieutenant 
Chester  E.,  aviation  suc- 
cesses of,  338. 

Wright,  Orville,  accident  in 
flight  of,  9 ;  exhibition  flight 
with  Major  Squier,  9 ;  state- 
ment of,  on  possibilities  of 
carrying  war  into  Germany, 
by  air,  80. 
383 


INDEX 


Wright,  Wilbur,  success  of,  in 
France,  9. 

Wright-Martin  Co.,  estimated 
aviation  engine  investment 
at  outbreak  of  war,  252. 


Yale  aviation  training  school, 
55. 

Zeppelins,      development      of, 
285. 


384 


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